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This thesis examines one key research question: how has the ideational infrastructure of global 
financial markets impacted on the regulatory reforms within the transnational and Third World 
financial regulatory orders? It explores the ideological and performative role of ideas and their 
related technologies and practices in the reproduction of financial capitalism and regulatory 
neoliberalism in the globalized financial markets and related transnational and national 
regulatory institutions, specifically in Third World countries. The regulation of the liberalized 
ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デWゲ ｷﾐ KWﾐ┞;げゲ IヴWSｷデ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデ aﾗヴﾏゲ デｴW H;ゲｷゲ ﾗa ; デｴヴWW-part case study on 
reproduction of regulatory neoliberalism in Third World countries. The study is premised on 
the observation that デｴW TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉSげゲ ｴｷゲデﾗヴｷI;ﾉ IﾗﾐデWゲデ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW デヴ;ﾐゲﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ 
regulatory order has registered both progress and challenges, but regulatory neoliberalism and 
the globalization of financial capitalism grows more resilient, despite periodic setbacks.  
While noting the significance of structural power, stakeholder interests, and material 
embedding, in the reproduction of regulatory neoliberalism, this thesis identifies and focuses 
on specific ideas and related technologies and practices as making an under-stated 
contribution. It therefore explores the ideological and performative power of neoclassical 
economic theories, doctrines of legal formalism, technological ideas, artefacts, and their 
related practices, which form the ideational infrastructure of contemporary financial markets. 
The thesis examines their role in constructing meaning, relationships and institutions, 
allocating identities, interests and capacities, defining problems and their solutions, thereby 
enabling and constraining action.  
The main argument explored in this study is that the ideational infrastructure of the financial 
markets legitimates, constitutes and performs neoliberal financial markets and regulatory 
neoliberalism, within the transnational and national financial regulatory institutions. By 
presenting neoliberal financial markets, and regulatory neoliberalism as the only rational form 
of economic organization, this ideational infrastructure conceals their reproduction of 
inequality and power asymmetries between developed and developing countries in 
デヴ;ﾐゲﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐが ;ﾐS ;ﾉゲﾗ HWデ┘WWﾐ ﾉWﾐSWヴゲ ;ﾐS Hﾗヴヴﾗ┘Wヴゲ ｷﾐ KWﾐ┞;げゲ IヴWSｷデ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲく Iデ 
also restricts the regulatory possibilities available to Third World policy makers and regulators 
for addressing the externalities of neoliberal financial markets, including, as explored in the 




The related key findings of the thesis are four-pronged. The first finding is the transformation 
of neoliberal hegemony in global financial markets from the centralized structural, military and 
economic power of the US and other developed countries, to a more decentralized, diffused 
hegemony embedded in ideologies, discourses, performative practices, and technologies. This 
is evident in the transformation of liberal hegemony in response to Third World contestation. 
TｴW ゲWIﾗﾐS aｷﾐSｷﾐｪ ｷゲ デｴW けヴWﾉ;デｷ┗Wﾉ┞ ;┌デﾗﾐﾗﾏﾗ┌ゲげ ;ｪWﾐデｷ;ﾉ ヮﾗ┘Wヴ ﾗa ﾉWｪ;ﾉが WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ;ﾐS 
technological ideas and practices underpinning regulatory neoliberalism, when decoupled from 
their originators. This is demonstrated by the origination and diffusion of ideas to and from the 
Bretton Woods institutions, and also their embedding within the bureaucracies of Kenya 
financial markets regulators. 
The third insight is the complex, co-constitutive, but not necessarily causal, relationships 
between legal formalism, neoclassical economic theories, technological ideas, and their related 
practices, which contribute to the resilience and durability of transnational regulatory 
neoliberalism. The thesis demonstrates the embodiment of these ideas and practices in the 
credit information sharing infrastructure, and their simultaneous constitution of neoliberal 
interest rates markets in Kenya. The fourth insight is the conceptual indeterminacy, 
inconsistency, and contradiction at the heart of the legal, economic and technological 
ideologies, and possibilities of harnessing their ideological and performative power towards 
establishing alternative economic organizations. The three Kenya case studies demonstrates 
the failure of the legal, economic and technological ideologies and practices employed by 
Kenyan financial regulators in the interest rates market. 
The thesis concludes that the present Third World efforts aimed at contesting the regulatory 
neoliberalism at the heart of the transnational financial regulatory order should also focus on 
the ideological and performative power of the ideational infrastructure of the global financial 
markets. In doing so, TWAIL practitioners should of necessity adopt an interdisciplinary 
approach in their reflection, conceptualization, articulation, dissemination and legal 
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The Ideological and Performative Role of Ideas and Practices in the Reproduction of 
Regulatory Neoliberalism in Financial Markets 
1. Introduction and Statement of the Problem 
Since its 1944 foundation at the Bretton Woods conference, the global financial regulatory 
order has been subjected to on-going First World/Third World contestation, focusing on both 
its institutional and normative aspects. The global North has sought to maintain institutional 
control of the transnational financial regulators, including the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the World Bank (WB), the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), and the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB), through majority voting rights and higher representation in their 
governance organs.1 This institutional control has been achieved through (among other 
strategies) デｴW SｷゲI┌ヴゲｷ┗W ┌ゲW ﾗa ｷSW;ゲが ｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ けGヴﾗゲゲ DﾗﾏWゲデｷI PヴﾗS┌Iデげ ふGDPぶが ;ﾐS IﾗﾐIWヮデゲ 
of けdevelopmentげ ;ﾐS け┌ﾐSWヴ-SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデげが デﾗ SWデWヴﾏｷﾐW allocation of voting rights and board 
representations among States.2 This institutional control has been necessary for preserving 
デｴWゲW ｷﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐゲげ ﾐWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉ ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ ﾐﾗヴﾏゲが ｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ デｴW ﾏﾗHｷﾉｷデ┞ ﾗa ｪﾉﾗH;ﾉ I;ヮｷデ;ﾉが デｴW 
liberalization of domestic financial markets, and a market-centred regulatory model, with 
minimalist State intervention.3  
                                                          
1 Roberデ H┌ﾐデWヴ W;SWが けU“ HWｪWﾏﾗﾐ┞ ;ﾐS デｴW WﾗヴﾉS B;ﾐﾆぎ TｴW Fｷｪｴデ ﾗ┗Wヴ PWﾗヮﾉW ;ﾐS ISW;ゲげ ふヲヰヰヲぶ Γ ‘W┗ｷW┘ 
of International Political Economy 215, 215. Wade argues that the US structures international financial 
institutions in a manner that seems to be for the mutual benefit of all the member countries, but which in 
actual fact caters to its national interests. 
2 Lorenzo Fioramonti, Gヴﾗゲゲ DﾗﾏWゲデｷI PヴﾗHﾉWﾏぎ TｴW PﾗﾉｷデｷIゲ BWｴｷﾐS デｴW WﾗヴﾉSげゲ Mﾗゲデ Pﾗ┘Wヴa┌ﾉ N┌ﾏHWヴ (Zed 
Books Ltd 2013) 3. 
3 TｴW デWヴﾏ けﾐWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉｷゲﾏげ ｷゲ ┌ゲWS ｷﾐ デｴｷゲ デｴWゲｷゲ デﾗ ヴWaWヴ デﾗ デｴW デｴWﾗヴ┞ ﾗa ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞が ┘ｴｷIｴ ;ゲゲWヴデゲ デｴ;デ 
human well-being is best secured by a minimalist State that liberates individual entrepreneurial freedoms 
and skills by enabling the protection of property rights, free markets and free trade. This eliminates 
bureaucratic barriers to trade, increase efficiency and productivity, improve quality, and reduce costs, 
through cheaper commodities and reduced tax burdens. The argument against State intervention is based on 
the assertion that, first, the State has inferior information compared to the market, and will therefore make 
sub-optimal decisions, and second, that the interventionist State is bound to be biased due to regulatory 
capture by organized labour. At a policy and regulatory level, this translates to economic policies such as 
deregulation, privatization, trade liberalization, capital account liberalization, weakening of labour 
protections, capital markets liberalization, and other related policies. See David Harvey, A Brief History of 
Neoliberalism ふOUP O┝aﾗヴS ヲヰヰΑぶ ヲき TｴW デｴWゲｷゲ ┌ゲWゲ デｴW デWヴﾏゲ けﾐWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉｷゲﾏげ ;ﾐS けﾐWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉ I;ヮｷデ;ﾉｷゲﾏげ 
interchangeably, to refer to free-market capitalism, where market forces and market relations are given a 
predominant role in the economy, while the State plays a restrained, minimalist role. Neoliberal capitalism is 
distiﾐｪ┌ｷゲｴWS aヴﾗﾏ けヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デWS I;ヮｷデ;ﾉｷゲﾏげが ┘ｴｷIｴ ｷゲ ; aﾗヴﾏ ﾗa I;ヮｷデ;ﾉｷゲﾏ ┘ｴWヴW ﾐﾗﾐ-market institutions such 
as the regulatory State and trade unions play major roles in restricting market forces and market relations. 




Regulatory Neoliberalism in Transnational Financial Regulation 
Towards this goal of sustaining transnational regulatory hegemony, the global North has 
championed transnational and national financial regulatory practices of the intellectually-
dominant paradigm that W;ﾉデWヴ ｴ;ゲ I;ﾉﾉWS けヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ ﾐWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉｷゲﾏげく Tｴｷゲ ヴWaWヴゲ デﾗ ｷSW;ﾉｷ┣WS 
Anglo-American regulatory practices, including technocratic, apolitical, market-oriented and 
(politically) independent financial regulatory agencies.4 This model has informed the legal 
structuring of central banks and financial regulators in both developed and developing 
countries, including Kenyaげゲ CWﾐデヴ;ﾉ B;ﾐﾆ, as politically-independent agencies. Key 
;ゲゲ┌ﾏヮデｷﾗﾐゲ ┌ﾐSWヴﾉ┞ｷﾐｪ デｴW デWIｴﾐﾗIヴ;I┞ ﾗa けヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ ﾐWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉｷゲﾏげ ｷﾐclude the claims that 
legal, economic, and technological ideas, practices, artefacts and institutions underpinning 
markets and regulatory practice, are scientific, that is, universal, rational, natural, apolitical, 
and therefore transcendental.5  
The impact of this regulatory technocracy is that these ideas, institutions, technologies and 
practices underlying financial market and regulatory practice are ideologically vested with 
けrelative autonomyげ from their interlocutors. The concept of relative autonomy of ideas, as 
developed in Chapter 2, rejects both the formalist and instrumental theorisation of legal, 
economic and technological ideas. It recognizes that while these ideas are socially constructed, 
they become durable against social reconfigurations, since they are embedded in relatively 
autonomous structures, and in fact end up constituting social relations.6 Nevertheless, despite 
their constitutive nature, these ideas remain inextricably linked in the totality of social relations 
and institutions. However, this link is gradually concealed by the fetishized relationships in 
which individuals conceive themselves as objects, creations or subjects of the ideas they 
formulated.7  
 
                                                          
;┌デｴﾗヴげゲ IﾗﾐIWヮデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ﾐWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉ I;ヮｷデ;ﾉｷゲﾏ ｷゲ ヴWﾉW┗;ﾐデ デﾗ デｴｷゲ デｴWゲｷゲ SｷゲI┌ゲゲｷﾗﾐが ;ゲ ｷデ Wﾏヮｴ;ゲｷ┣Wゲ デｴW 
centrality of globalization, financialization, and ideas underpinning neoliberalism. 
4 Andrew Walter, Gﾗ┗Wヴﾐｷﾐｪ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIWぎ E;ゲデ Aゲｷ;げゲ ASﾗヮデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Sデ;ﾐS;ヴSゲ (Cornell University Press 
2008) 1, 21, 27. 
5 “WW Aﾐデﾗﾐ┞ AﾐｪｴｷWが けIﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ Iﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐゲげ ｷﾐ Cｴヴｷゲデｷ;ﾐ ‘W┌ゲ-Smit (ed), The Politics of 
International Law (Cambridge University Press 2004) 223, 235. Anghie notes, for example, that the regulatory 
technocracy underlying the authority of international financial institutions, is based on their legal autonomy, 
and the belief that they are arbiters of scientific knowledge on economic development and monetary stability, 
and that their politicization waters down their credibility as experts. 
6 “WW ‘ﾗHWヴデ W GﾗヴSﾗﾐが けCヴｷデｷI;ﾉ LWｪ;ﾉ HｷゲデﾗヴｷWゲげ ぷヱΓΒヴへ “デanford Law Review 57, 101. 
7 “WW Iゲ;;I D B;ﾉH┌ゲが けCﾗﾏﾏﾗSｷデ┞ Fﾗヴﾏ ;ﾐS LWｪ;ﾉ Fﾗヴﾏぎ Aﾐ Eゲゲ;┞ ﾗﾐ デｴW さ‘Wﾉ;デｷ┗W A┌デﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞ざ ﾗa デｴW L;┘げ 




Third World Contestation of the Transnational Regulatory Neoliberalism 
First World-Third World, and global North-global South binaries and dichotomies are 
development discourses that have been used by former imperial powers (けdeveloped 
economiesげ) to illustrate and sustain the economic, political, cultural and other divides between 
them and post-Iﾗﾉﾗﾐｷ;ﾉ “デ;デWゲ ふけSW┗Wﾉﾗヮｷﾐｪ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷWゲげぶ.8 These discourses invariably conceal 
the historical and consequential relationships between North/South and First/Third World. 
They oversimplify and distort the complex historical and cultural dynamics within these 
countries, while justifying the relations of domination between them, systematized in 
multilateral regulatory systems such as the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs).9 This is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 3, which examines how the US appropriated discourses of 
developed and underdeveloped countries in distributing voting rights among member States 
of the BWIs, with a pre-determined outcome of US hegemony.  
Nevertheless, the 150 so-I;ﾉﾉWS けｪﾉﾗH;ﾉ “ﾗ┌デｴげ ﾗヴ けTｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉSげ Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴｷWゲが ┘ｴｷﾉW Wﾐデ;ｷﾉｷﾐｪ Sｷ┗WヴゲW 
historical, cultural, political, economic and social differences, perspectives and interests, also 
ゲｴ;ヴW IWヴデ;ｷﾐ Iｴ;ヴ;IデWヴｷゲデｷIゲが ｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデｷﾐｪ aﾗヴ ﾏﾗゲデ ﾗa デｴW WﾗヴﾉSげゲ poor. These 
Iﾗﾏﾏﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデｷWゲ ｴ;┗W ヮヴﾗﾏヮデWS デｴWゲW Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴｷWゲ デﾗ ;ヮヮヴﾗヮヴｷ;デW デｴW SｷゲI┌ヴゲｷ┗W デ;ｪゲ ﾗa デｴW けｪﾉﾗH;ﾉ 
“ﾗ┌デｴげ ;ﾐS デｴW けTｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉSげ ;ゲ ｪWﾗヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ I;┌I┌ゲWゲ ふｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ デｴW Gヴﾗ┌ヮ ﾗa ΑΑが ;ﾐS デｴW ﾐﾗﾐ-
aligned movement), aimed at contesting the hegemony of tｴW ヮﾗ┘Wヴa┌ﾉ けｪﾉﾗH;ﾉ Nﾗヴデｴげく10 While 
exploring the power of ideas, concepts and rationalities in transnational financial regulation, 
this thesis adapts these discursively-reclaimed dichotomies to advance the Third World 
Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) project of resetting International Law and regulation 
to speak to Third World concerns and interests, as discussed at length in Chapters 1 and 2. 
Thus, the Third World has, in this effort, ;ﾉゲﾗ ｴｷゲデﾗヴｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ ;S┗ﾗI;デWS aﾗヴ ｷデゲ “デ;デWゲげ Wケ┌ｷデ;HﾉW 
inclusion, representation, and democratic participation in the transnational financial regulatory 
institutions.11 It has recognised this institutional reform as necessary for transforming the 
                                                          
8 Sundhya Paｴ┌ﾃ;が けTWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪｷWゲ ﾗa EﾏヮｷヴWぎ IMF CﾗﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデ┞ ;ﾐS デｴW ‘WｷﾐゲIヴｷヮデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW Nﾗヴデｴっ“ﾗ┌デｴ 
Dｷ┗ｷSWげ ふヲヰヰヰぶ ヱン LWｷSWﾐ Jﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉ ﾗa IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘ ΑヴΓが ΑヴΓに750. 
9 “WW “デW┗Wﾐ ‘;デ┌┗;が け“┌H;ﾉデWヴﾐｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW GﾉﾗH;ﾉ “ﾗ┌デｴぎ Cヴｷデｷケ┌W ﾗa M;ｷﾐゲデヴW;ﾏ さWWゲデWヴﾐざ “WI┌ヴｷデ┞ 
DiscouヴゲWゲげ ふヲヰヱヶぶ ヲΒ C┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ D┞ﾐ;ﾏｷIゲ ヲヱヱが ヲヱヱに212. 
10 See generaﾉﾉ┞が “ｷ┗;ﾐ K;ヴデｴ;が けDｷゲIﾗ┌ヴゲWゲ ﾗa デｴW GﾉﾗH;ﾉ “ﾗ┌デｴげ ｷﾐ Jﾗｴﾐ “ Dヴ┞┣Wﾆが ‘ｷIｴ;ヴS B Nﾗヴｪ;;ヴS ;ﾐS D;┗ｷS 
Schlosberg (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society (Oxford University Press 2011). 
11 See Stephen D Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism (University of 
C;ﾉｷaﾗヴﾐｷ; PヴWゲゲ ヱΓΒヵぶ ンく DｷゲIﾗ┌ﾐデｷﾐｪ デｴW ｪﾉﾗH;ﾉ Nﾗヴデｴげゲ Iﾗﾐ┗Wﾐtional belief that the Third World merely wants 




normative aspects of the transnational financial regulations to speak for the differentiated 
concerns and interests of Third World people. These concerns include: State sovereignty and 
equality within International Law; “デ;デWゲげ Iﾗﾐデヴﾗﾉ ﾗa SﾗﾏWゲデｷI ヴWゲﾗ┌ヴIWゲき ;ﾐS デｴW ヮヴWゲWヴ┗;デｷﾗﾐ 
of national regulatory policy space, to alleviate the harsh consequences of economic 
globalization on the poorer segments of their populations.12 A key assertion of the Third 
WﾗヴﾉSげゲ ﾗヮヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐ デﾗ ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ ﾐWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉｷゲﾏ ｴ;ゲ HWWﾐ that the State plays an important 
constitutive and regulatory role in markets, and that their regulation should therefore be 
politicised. This argument has formed the main basis of Third World opposition to IMF 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and subsequent Poverty Reduction Strategy Programs 
(PRSPs), including in Kenya, where financial markets liberalization has resulted in very high cost 
of credit.13 Third World contestation of the transnational financial regulatory order has 
therefore entailed a critique of the alleged universality of ideas and practices underpinning 
neoliberalism, and an assertion of their historical, social and geographical contingency.14 
As discussed more substantively in Chapter 1, Third World contestation of the transnational 
financial regulatory order has resulted in both gains and losses. For example, Third World 
contestation, alongside periodic financial crises, and significant geopolitical events (such as the 
fall of Communism), have precipitated the transformation of the institutional and normative 
aspects of the regulatory institutions. These transformations include greater Third World 
“デ;デWゲげ ｷﾐIﾉ┌ゲｷﾗﾐが ヴWヮヴWゲWﾐデ;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS SWﾏﾗIヴ;デｷI ヮ;ヴデｷIｷヮ;デｷﾗﾐが ;ﾐS ;ﾉゲﾗ デｴW ｷﾐデヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa 
new governance norms such as the New International Economic Order (NIEO), the 
International Law of Development (ILD), and the Right to Development.15 They have also 
precipitated the transformation of the nature of Western financial regulatory hegemony, from 
essentially structural hegemony (maintained principally through superior military, economic, 
and market power), to a more hybrid and decentred type of hegemony that includes structural 
power, material power, commonality of interests, and ideational or discursive power.  
                                                          
argues that the Third World recognizes its political weakness and vulnerability, and actually wants not only 
more wealth and development, but also more control in transnational governance. 
12 See generally, FV Garcia-Amador, The Emerging International Law of Development: A New Dimension of 
International Economic Law (Oceana Publications 1990). 
13 See, for example P Thandika Mkandawire, African Voices on Structural Adjustment (Africa World Press 
2003). 
14 “WWが aﾗヴ W┝;ﾏヮﾉWが L┌ｷゲ Eゲﾉ;┗; ;ﾐS “┌ﾐSｴ┞; P;ｴ┌ﾃ;が けBWデ┘WWﾐ ‘Wゲｷゲデ;ﾐIW ;ﾐS ‘Waﾗヴﾏぎ TWAIL ;ﾐS デｴW 
Universality ﾗa IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘げ ふヲヰヱヱぶ ン Tヴ;SWが L;┘ ;ﾐS DW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ ヱヰンが ヱヲヲく TｴW ;┌デｴﾗヴゲ IヴｷデｷIｷ┣W 
IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘げゲ a;ﾉゲW Iﾉ;ｷﾏ デﾗ ┌ﾐｷ┗Wヴゲ;ﾉｷデ┞が ;ﾐS ;ﾉゲﾗ TWAILげゲ ケ┌Wゲデ デﾗ ヴW;ﾉｷ┣W デｴW ヮヴﾗﾏｷゲW ﾗa ┌ﾐｷ┗Wヴゲ;ﾉｷデ┞ ｷﾐ 
International Law. 




This transformation has occurred alongside the transformation of the global financial markets, 
including the emergence and diffusion of new financial technologies. Increased technological 
innovation has increased financial market integration, decentred and vested regulatory power 
in non-“デ;デW WﾐデｷデｷWゲが ;ﾐS ┌ﾐｷ┗Wヴゲ;ﾉｷ┣WS aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲげ ﾐﾗヴﾏゲが ｷSW;ゲ ;ﾐS ヮヴ;IデｷIWゲく16 A 
related development has been the increasing financialization of both national and global 
economies. Financialization in this context refers to the increase, nationally and globally, of 
aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲげ ｪWﾗｪヴ;ヮｴｷI;ﾉ ゲｷ┣Wが ゲｴ;ヴW ﾗa GDP ;ﾐS ｷﾐIﾗﾏWが ゲｷｪﾐｷaｷI;ﾐIW デﾗ デｴW ヴW;ﾉ 
economy, and political power.17 According to Epstein, this entails the increasingly dominant 
role played by financial motives, markets, actors, and institutions, in the operation of both 
domestic and international economies.18 Financialization has impacted on the distribution of 
power, income and wealth, and also in the pattern of economic growth occurring globally and 
nationally19.  
In concert with regulatory neoliberalism and globalization, financialization favours 
accumulation and profit-making through financial channels rather than through trade and 
commodity production.20 This has impacted negatively on the Third World, for example, 
デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ IﾗﾏﾏﾗSｷデ┞ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲげ ┗ﾗﾉ;デｷﾉｷデ┞ I;┌ゲWS H┞ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ゲヮWI┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐが ;ﾐS aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ IヴｷゲWゲ デｴ;デ 
lead to global recessions.21 Chapter 4 also discusses the concerns of Kenyan Parliamentarians 
over the increasing financialization of the Kenyan economy, as evidenced by high lending rates 
;ﾐS ｷﾐIヴW;ゲWS H;ﾐﾆ ヮヴﾗaｷデゲ ;ﾏｷSゲデ ; SWヮヴWゲゲWS ヴW;ﾉ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞が ;ﾐS H;ﾐﾆWヴゲげ ヮヴWaWヴWﾐIW aﾗヴ 
investing in financial instruments such as government bonds, rather than financing the real 
economy.  
In addition, financialization has dispersed regulatory power away from transnational and 
national financial regulatory institutions, to various financial market stakeholders and, as 
                                                          
16 “WW M;デｷ;ゲ E M;ヴｪ┌ﾉｷゲ ;ﾐS Tﾗﾐ┞ PﾗヴデWヴが けGﾗ┗Wヴﾐｷﾐｪ デｴW GﾉﾗH;ﾉ L;ﾐS Gヴ;Hぎ M┌ﾉデｷヮﾗﾉ;ヴｷデ┞が ISW;ゲが ;ﾐS 
CﾗﾏヮﾉW┝ｷデ┞ ｷﾐ Tヴ;ﾐゲﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Gﾗ┗Wヴﾐ;ﾐIWげ ふヲヰヱンぶ ヱヰ GﾉﾗH;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐゲ ヶヵが ヶヶに68. The authors underscore the 
emerging multi-polarity of power relations in transnational governance, and the assertion of the ideational 
and material dimensions of transnational governance. 
17 M;デデｴW┘ D “デWヮｴWﾐが け‘ｷゲｷﾐｪ Pﾗ┘Wヴゲが GﾉﾗH;ﾉ C;ヮｷデ;ﾉｷゲﾏ ;ﾐS LｷHWヴ;ﾉ GﾉﾗH;l Governance: A Historical 
M;デWヴｷ;ﾉｷゲデ AIIﾗ┌ﾐデ ﾗa デｴW B‘ICゲ Cｴ;ﾉﾉWﾐｪWげ ふヲヰヱヴぶ ヲヰ E┌ヴﾗヮW;ﾐ Jﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉ ﾗa IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ‘Wﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲ Γヱヲが Γヲヲく 
18 Gerald A EpゲデWｷﾐ ふWSぶが けIﾐデヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐぎ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS デｴW WﾗヴﾉS EIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞げが Financialization and the 
World Economy (Edward Elgar Publishing 2005) 3. As noted by Epstein, the meaning of the term 
けaｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐげ ｷゲ IﾗﾐデWゲデWSく 
19 Ronald Dore, けFｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW GﾉﾗH;ﾉ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞げ ふヲヰヰΒぶ ヱΑ IﾐS┌ゲデヴｷ;ﾉ ;ﾐS Cﾗヴヮﾗヴ;デW Cｴ;ﾐｪW ヱヰΓΑが 
1097. 
20 GヴWデ; ‘ KヴｷヮヮﾐWヴが けTｴW Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW AﾏWヴｷI;ﾐ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞げ ふヲヰヰヵぶ ン “ﾗIｷﾗ-Economic Review 173, 
174. 
21 EヮゲデWｷﾐ ふﾐ ヱΒぶ ヵき “;ﾏ Aゲｴﾏ;ﾐが BWﾐ FｷﾐW ;ﾐS “┌ゲ;ﾐ NW┘ﾏ;ﾐが けTｴW Cヴｷゲｷゲ ｷﾐ “ﾗuth Africa: Neoliberalism, 




argued in this thesis, marketゲげ ideational and technical infrastructure, further embedding 
regulatory neoliberalism. Hansen ;ヴｪ┌Wゲ デｴ;デ ;ゲ ; ヴWゲ┌ﾉデ ﾗa aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐが aｷﾐ;ﾐIW さｪヴﾗ┘ゲ ﾗ┌デ 
of control and shapes the world in its own image, by enacting and circulating a specific 
ﾐ;ヴヴ;デｷ┗Wざく22 This results in the capture and framing of the social domain by, and according to, 
financial imperatives, and consequently contributes to neoliberal globalization, transnational 
regulatory neoliberalism, and financial market and social instability.23   
Resilience and Reproduction of Regulatory Neoliberalism in Financial Markets 
As argued in Chapter 1, Third World contestation has not deterred the reproduction of 
transnational regulatory neoliberalism, and its negative impacts on the more vulnerable 
segments of Third World people.24 Thus, the 2008 global financial crisis was hailed as a 
revolutionary moment for a fundamental transformation of the transnational financial 
regulatory order. Indeed, as demonstrated by the tone and content of the various reports 
produced by various high-level inquiries (including the G-20, FSB, IMF and World Bank), 
transnational and national regulators across the Atlantic signalled their loss of faith in market-
centred financial regulatory models, and called for regulatory reforms to stem systemic, macro-
prudential and micro-prudential risk.25 
However, as discussed in Chapter 1, the post-2008 reforms have not yielded the anticipated 
fundamental shift in ideational paradigms of regulatory policy. For example, the revised bank 
capital adequacy standards adopted under the BCBS (Basel III Framework) in 2011 retained the 
neoliberal, market-centric mechanisms for risk-management, including the use of risk-
weighting methodologies and technologies of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs), underpinned by 
                                                          
22 PWヴ H H;ﾐゲWﾐが けFヴﾗﾏ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIW C;ヮｷデ;ﾉｷゲﾏ デﾗ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐぎ A C┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ;ﾐS N;ヴヴ;デｷ┗W PWヴゲヮWIデｷ┗W ﾗﾐ ヱヵヰ 
YW;ヴゲ ﾗa Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ Hｷゲデﾗヴ┞げ ふヲヰヱヴぶ ヱヵ EﾐデWヴヮヴｷゲW わ;ﾏヮき “ﾗIｷWデ┞ ヶヰヵが ヶヰΓく 
23 ibid. See also Stephen (n 17) 922. 
24 For example, after the 2008 crisis, the International Labour Organization warned that the economic crisis 
would morph into a social crisis, as some 200 million workers, mostly in developing countries, will be pushed 
ｷﾐデﾗ ヮﾗ┗Wヴデ┞ ｷa ヴ;ヮｷS ;Iデｷﾗﾐ ┘;ゲ ﾐﾗデ デ;ﾆWﾐ デﾗ ;ヴヴWゲデ デｴW ｷﾏヮ;Iデ ﾗa デｴW Iヴｷゲｷゲく “WW UﾐｷデWS N;デｷﾗﾐゲが け‘Wヮﾗヴデ ﾗa デｴW 
Commission of Experts of the President of the United Nations General Assembly on Reforms of the 
IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ MﾗﾐWデ;ヴ┞ ;ﾐS Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ “┞ゲデWﾏげ ふUﾐｷデWS N;デｷﾗﾐゲ ヲヰヰΓぶ ヱヲく 
25 See generall┞ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ “デ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ Fﾗヴ┌ﾏが け‘Wヮﾗヴデ ﾗa デｴW Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ “デ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ Fﾗヴ┌ﾏ ﾗﾐ Eﾐｴ;ﾐIｷﾐｪ M;ヴﾆWデ ;ﾐS 
Iﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ‘WゲｷﾉｷWﾐIWげ ふFｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ “デ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ Fﾗヴ┌ﾏ ヲヰヰ8). “WW ;ﾉゲﾗ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ “Wヴ┗ｷIWゲ A┌デｴﾗヴｷデ┞が けTｴW T┌ヴﾐWヴ 





the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH), which regulatory paradigm was blamed for the 2008 
crisis.26  
The inability to deliver a radical shift in the regulatory norms underpinning global financial 
markets has been traced to at least デｴヴWW a;Iデﾗヴゲく Fｷヴゲデが TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS “デ;デWゲげ ┗ﾗｷIWゲ granted 
representation within transnational regulatory institutions have been underwhelming in the 
regulatory debates.27 Second, the more dominant Third World States coalescing around the 
BRICS, have seemed to support status quo regulatory paradigms that favour them as emerging 
powers, and even shot down radical financial regulatory proposals such as the Financial 
Transactions Tax (FTT).28 Third, within their domestic markets, Third World policy makers and 
regulators have continued to champion the discredited neoliberal financial regulatory policies 
they have historically contested at the transnational level, including, for example, financial 
market liberalization. This Third World preference for regulatory neoliberalism is demonstrated 
in the Kenya case studies on the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) ;ﾐS N;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ TヴW;ゲ┌ヴ┞ ﾗaaｷIｷ;ﾉゲげ 
resistance to the interest rate regulation.    
Consequently, almost ten years since the 2008 crisis, the failure of the promised radical 
financial regulatory reform has become apparent. In 2015, for example, the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) noted the failure of transnational financial 
reforms to tackle the root causes of global financial instability and recurrent crises, including 
rapid financial market liberalization, and the removal of capital controls as policy and 
regulatory tools.29 TWAIL scholars, including Chimni, also argued that market-based financial 
regulations remain the dominant regulatory paradigm among Third World regulators and policy 
makers, as demonstrated by their continued deregulation of financial markets and 
maintenance of capital account convertibility.30  
                                                          
26 Financial Services Authority (n 25) 22. The Turner review concluded that the sophisticated mathematics 
underpinning risk valuation in the securitised credit market incorporated erroneous market-based 
assumptions, including in the concept of Value-at-Risk. 
27 EヴｷI HWﾉﾉWｷﾐWヴが けW;ゲ デｴW M;ヴﾆWデ-Friendly Nature of International Financial Standards O┗Wヴデ┌ヴﾐWSいげが The 
Status Quo Crisis: Global Financial Governance After the 2008 Meltdown (Oxford University Press 2014) 92. 
28 EヴｷI HWﾉﾉWｷﾐWヴが けIﾐデヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS O┗Wヴ┗ｷW┘げが The Status Quo Crisis: Global Financial Governance After the 
2008 Meltdown (Oxford University Press 2014) 18. 
29 United Nations Conference on Tヴ;SW ;ﾐS DW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデが けFｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ‘Wｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ ‘Waﾗヴﾏ ;aデWヴ デｴW Cヴｷゲｷゲげが Trade 
and Development Report 2015: Making the International Financial Architecture Work for Trade and 
Development (United Nations Publications 2015) 111. 
30 B“ Cｴｷﾏﾐｷが けCヴｷデｷI;ﾉ TｴWﾗヴ┞ ;ﾐS IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI L;┘ぎ A TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS Aヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴ デﾗ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘ 
ふTWAILぶ PWヴゲヮWIデｷ┗Wげ ｷﾐ Jﾗｴﾐ Lｷﾐ;ヴWﾉﾉi (ed), Research Handbook on Global Justice and International Economic 




Porter also observes that the three-decade trend of transnational interdependence in financial 
transactions and governance is increasing rather than reversing.31 In addition, Herr also 
contends that the post-crisis transnational financial regulatory system retains the logic of 
financialization, and a faith in the role of efficient capital markets, and unregulated financial 
innovation in economic growth, while leaving unchallenged the interest rate regimes, 
international capital flows and current account imbalances that were the causes of financial 
instability in global markets.32 
Scholars from different disciplinary traditions have weighed in on the various reasons 
accounting for the resilience of regulatory neoliberalism both within the transnational and 
national financial sector policy making and regulatory circles. First, structuralists, including 
Helleiner, contend that transnational financial regulatory neoliberalism is maintained by US 
structural power, a hegemony underpinned by its superior financial market size, and economic 
;ﾐS ﾏｷﾉｷデ;ヴ┞ ヮﾗ┘Wヴく Tｴ┌ゲが デｴW ヮヴWaWヴWﾐIWゲ ﾗa デｴW U“ けW;ﾉﾉ “デヴWWデ-TヴW;ゲ┌ヴ┞ CﾗﾏヮﾉW┝げ ;ヴW 
reflected in the policy choices of transnational regulators.33 Second, historical materialists, 
including Stephen, discount this structuralist conception of a unipolar regulatory hegemony, 
and contend that this hegemony is also aided by the embedding of financial globalization by 
technological and structural trends inherent in financialization of the global economy.34 
According to Wigan, this includes the development of financial innovations, such as synthetic 
financial instruments, which have denationalized finance, and shifted power from States to 
transnational financial institutions.35  
This neoliberal materiality is ヴWIﾗｪﾐｷ┣WS ｷﾐ TWAILげゲ ゲｴｷaデ ﾗa aﾗI┌ゲ ﾗﾐ デｴW ﾗヮWヴ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa 
international law and regulation, from the international plane of transnational regulatory 
institutions, to the local sites in the Third World, where International Law is performed in 
quotidian econoﾏｷI ﾉｷaWく TｴWゲW ｷﾐIﾉ┌SW ┘ｴ;デ Eゲﾉ;┗; ;ﾐS P;ｴ┌ﾃ; ｴ;┗W デWヴﾏWS さデｴW ゲｷデWゲ ;ﾐS 
ﾗHﾃWIデゲ ｷﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ﾉ;┘ ﾗヮWヴ;デWゲ デﾗS;┞ぐぷｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪへ ;Sﾏｷﾐｷゲデヴ;デｷ┗W ヮヴﾗIWS┌ヴWゲが 
subject formations, spaces and artefacts, that are usually identified as expressions of other 
                                                          
31 Tﾗﾐ┞ PﾗヴデWヴが けIﾐデヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐぎ Pﾗゲデ-Crisis Transnational Financial Regulation and Complexity in Global 
GovernanIWげ ｷﾐ Tﾗﾐ┞ PﾗヴデWヴ ふWSぶが Transnational Financial Regulation after the Crisis (Routledge 2014) 5. 
32 HWヴヴ H;ﾐゲﾃﾜヴｪが けAaデWヴ デｴW Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ Cヴｷゲｷゲぎ ‘Waﾗヴﾏゲ ;ﾐS ‘Waﾗヴﾏ Oヮデｷﾗﾐゲ aﾗヴ Fｷnance, Regulation and 
Iﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ “デヴ┌Iデ┌ヴWげ ふヲヰヱヶぶ ン Jﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉ ﾗa EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIゲ BｷHﾉｷﾗｪヴ;ヮｴ┞ ヱΑヲが ヱヶく 
33 HWﾉﾉWｷﾐWヴが けIﾐデヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS O┗Wヴ┗ｷW┘げ ふﾐ ヲΒぶ ヱヵに16. 
34 Stephen (n 17) 912, 930. 
35 D┌ﾐI;ﾐ Wｷｪ;ﾐが けCヴWSｷデ ‘ｷゲﾆ Tヴ;ﾐゲaWヴ ;ﾐS Cヴ┌ﾐIｴWゲぎ GﾉﾗH;ﾉ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIW VｷIデﾗヴｷﾗ┌ゲ ﾗヴ V;ﾐケ┌ｷゲｴWSいげ ふヲヰヱヰぶ ヱヵ 




ﾐﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗W ﾗヴSWヴゲが ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ゲヮｴWヴWゲが ﾗヴ ゲｷﾏヮﾉ┞ ｷﾐﾐﾗI┌ﾗ┌ゲ デWIｴﾐｷI;ﾉ ﾗヴ IﾗﾏﾏWヴIｷ;ﾉ デｴｷﾐｪゲざく36 Third, 
Neo-Marxist scholars, including TWAIL scholar Chimni, also identify the emerging commonality 
ﾗa ｷﾐデWヴWゲデゲ HWデ┘WWﾐ TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS WﾉｷデWゲ ;ﾐS デｴW けデヴ;ﾐゲﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ I;ヮｷデ;ﾉｷゲデ Iﾉ;ゲゲげが ;ゲ ;ﾐﾗデｴWヴ 
reason for the resilience of regulatory neoliberalism.37 
Ideology and Performativity of Financial Markets Infrastructure and Regulatory 
Neoliberalism 
TｴW ヴﾗﾉW ﾗa けヴWﾉ;デｷ┗Wﾉ┞ ;┌デﾗﾐﾗﾏﾗ┌ゲげ ｷSW;ゲが デWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪｷWゲ ;ﾐS ヮヴ;IデｷIWゲ ｷﾐ デｴW reproduction of 
transnational regulatory neoliberalism is also emerging as a significant factor in the 
reproduction of transnational regulatory neoliberalism. One of the theoretical bases of Critical 
Legal Studies (CLS) and TWAIL, articulated by Scott, Marks, Thompson and others, has been a 
recognition of the ideological and discursive nature of mainstream legal ideas, which exercise 
power on regulators, policy makers and other financial markets stakeholders, through the 
construction of meaning.38  
Ideology-critique has also been extended to other academic disciplines, including neoclassical 
economics and technology studies. For example, Critical Realism scholars, including OげHﾗ┞ﾉW 
and Macdonough, contend that the packaging of neoclassical economics as rigorous science 
has given the discipline an ideological power, through its subsequent claims to universality, 
rationality, transcendence and naturality.39 Some scholars in デｴW けCヴｷデｷI;ﾉ TｴWﾗヴ┞ ﾗa TWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪ┞げ 
research rubric, including Marcuse, Habermas, and Feenberg, have argued that some ideas and 
ヮヴ;IデｷIWゲ ┌ﾐSWヴヮｷﾐﾐｷﾐｪ デWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ ゲﾗIｷWデ┞が ｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ けデWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ SWデWヴﾏｷﾐｷゲﾏげが ;ﾐS 
けデWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ ;┌デﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞げが ;ヴW ;ﾉゲﾗ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ. This is because they constitute technology as 
neutral, apolitical and universal, despite its social origins, and its concealing of relations of 
domination.40     
                                                          
36 Eslava and Pahuja (n 14) 109. 
37 Cｴｷﾏﾐｷが けCヴｷデｷI;ﾉ TｴWﾗヴ┞ ;ﾐS IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI L;┘ぎ A TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS Aヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴ デﾗ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘ 
ふTWAILぶ PWヴゲヮWIデｷ┗Wげ ふﾐ ンヰぶ ヲΑヰに271. 
38 “ｴｷヴﾉW┞ V “Iﾗデデが けIﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘ ;ゲ ISWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ぎ TｴWﾗヴｷ┣ｷﾐｪ デｴW ‘Wﾉ;デｷonship between International Law and 
IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ PﾗﾉｷデｷIゲげ ふヱΓΓヴぶ ヵ E┌ヴく Jく Iﾐデげﾉ Lく ンヱンが ンヱΒく “Iﾗデデ ;ヴｪ┌Wゲ デｴ;デ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ Iヴｷデｷケ┌W ﾗa ﾉ;┘ ;ヴデｷI┌ﾉ;デWゲ 
けデｴW ┘;┞ゲ ｷﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ ﾏW;ﾐｷﾐｪ I;ﾐ HW ┌ゲWS ;ゲ ; ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ デﾗﾗﾉげく “WW ;ﾉゲﾗ “┌ゲ;ﾐ M;ヴﾆゲが けBｷｪ BヴﾗデｴWヴ Iゲ BﾉWWヮing Us-
┘ｷデｴ デｴW MWゲゲ;ｪW Tｴ;デ ISWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ DﾗWゲﾐげデ M;デデWヴげ ふヲヰヰヱぶ ヱヲ E┌ヴﾗヮW;ﾐ Jﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉ ﾗa IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘ ヱヰΓが ヱヱヱく 
39 Bヴｷ;ﾐ OげBﾗ┞ﾉW ;ﾐS TWヴヴWﾐIW MIDﾗﾐﾗ┌ｪｴが けTｴW State of Nature and Natural States: Ideology and Formalism 
ｷﾐ デｴW Cヴｷデｷケ┌W ﾗa NWﾗIﾉ;ゲゲｷI;ﾉ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIゲげ ｷﾐ J;ﾏｷW Mﾗヴｪ;ﾐ ふWSぶが What is Neoclassical Economics?: Debating 
the origins, meaning and significance (Routledge 2015) 216. 
40 HWヴHWヴデ M;ヴI┌ゲWが けIﾐS┌ゲデヴｷ;ﾉｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS C;ヮｷデ;ﾉｷゲﾏ ｷﾐ デｴW Wﾗヴﾆ ﾗa M;┝ WWHWヴげ ｷﾐ JWヴWﾏ┞ J “ｴ;ヮｷヴﾗ ふデヴぶが 
Negations: essays in critical theory (MayFlyBooks 2009) 223. “WW ;ﾉゲﾗが J┑ヴｪWﾐ H;HWヴﾏ;ゲが けTWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ;ﾐS 




A more recent research program that explores the power of ideas and their related 
technologies and practices in constituting markets, is that of Performativity Theory, first 
arデｷI┌ﾉ;デWS H┞ JL A┌ゲデｷﾐ ｷﾐ ｴｷゲ “ヮWWIｴ AIデ TｴWﾗヴ┞が ┘ｴWヴW ｴW ;ヴデｷI┌ﾉ;デWゲ けｴﾗ┘ デﾗ Sﾗ デｴｷﾐｪゲ ┘ｷデｴ 
┘ﾗヴSゲげく41 This theory has been extended to various disciplines, including by Butler in Feminist 
studies, and Searle, in philosophy.42 Within the sociology of markets, Callon has systematized 
it into a theory of Economic Performativity, wherein he argues that the body of knowledge or 
ideas known as economics (which includes neoclassical economic theory, accounting 
techniques, and marketing), does not merely descrｷHW H┌デ ;Iデ┌;ﾉﾉ┞ さヮWヴaﾗヴﾏゲが ゲｴ;ヮWゲ ;ﾐS 
aﾗヴﾏ;デゲ デｴW WIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞が ヴ;デｴWヴ デｴ;ﾐ ﾗHゲWヴ┗ｷﾐｪ ｴﾗ┘ ｷデ a┌ﾐIデｷﾗﾐゲくざ43 Economic Performativity 
Theory has been instrumental in extending the role of ideas and related technologies and 
practices beyond their ideological function, to that of active constitution or construction of 
neoliberal and other alternative markets.44  
Performativity Theory has also gained traction within Critical Legal Studies, whose scholars, 
including Lang and Birla, explore the けconstitutiveげ role of law in economic markets, and argue 
that market institutions, including property, contract, economic liberties, and the corporation, 
are not natural, and are in fact けconstitutedげ by legal ideas, to the extent that law defines them 
into existence.45 Thus, legal performativity has been explored by Birla, in the context of the 
establishment of capitalist market economies in colonial India.46 In addition, TWAIL scholars 
                                                          
“WW ;ﾉゲﾗが AﾐSヴW┘ FWWﾐHWヴｪが け“┌H┗Wヴゲｷ┗W ‘;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐぎ TWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪ┞が Pﾗ┘Wヴが ;ﾐS DWﾏﾗIヴ;I┞げ ふヱΓΓヲぶ 35 
Inquiry 301, 318. 
41 See generally, John Langshaw Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford University Press 1975). Austin 
distinguishes between two kinds of speech acts: illocutionary and perlocutionary. The illocutionary act is one 
in which, ｷﾐ ゲ;┞ｷﾐｪ ゲﾗﾏWデｴｷﾐｪが ﾗﾐW ｷゲ ;デ デｴW ゲ;ﾏW デｷﾏW Sﾗｷﾐｪ ゲﾗﾏWデｴｷﾐｪが Wくｪく ; J┌SｪW ゲ;┞ｷﾐｪが けI ゲWﾐデWﾐIW ┞ﾗ┌げく 
Perlocutionary acts, on the other hand, are those utterances that initiate a set of consequences...[that] are 
not the same as the act of speech. 
42 “WW ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉﾉ┞ J┌Sｷデｴ B┌デﾉWヴが けPWヴaﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗W AIデゲ ;ﾐS GWﾐSWヴ Cﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デion: An Essay in Phenomenology and 
Feminist Theoryげ ふヱΓΒΒぶ ヴヰ TｴW;デヴW Jﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉ ヵヱΓく See also John R Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 
(Simon and Schuster 1995). 
43 MｷIｴWﾉ C;ﾉﾉﾗﾐが けIﾐデヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐぎ TｴW EﾏHWSSWSﾐWゲゲ ﾗa EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI M;ヴﾆWデゲ ｷﾐ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIゲげ ふヱΓΓΒぶ ヴヶ TｴW 
Sociological Review 1, 2. 
44 “WWが aﾗヴ W┝;ﾏヮﾉWが MｷIｴWﾉ C;ﾉﾉﾗﾐが けHﾗ┘ デﾗ DWゲｷｪﾐ AﾉデWヴﾐ;デｷ┗W M;ヴﾆWデゲぎ TｴW C;ゲW ﾗa GWﾐWデｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ 
Modified/Non-GWﾐWデｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ MﾗSｷaｷWS CﾗW┝ｷゲデWﾐIWげ ｷﾐ JK GｷHゲﾗﾐ-Graham (ed), Making Other Worlds Possible: 
Performing Diverse economies (2015). 
45 “WW AﾐSヴW┘ TF L;ﾐｪが けTｴW LWｪ;ﾉ Cﾗﾐゲデヴ┌Iデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ‘;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデｷWゲいげ ふヲヰヱンぶ ヴヰ Journal of Law and 
Society 155. “WW ;ﾉゲﾗ ‘ｷデ┌ Bｷヴﾉ;が けPWヴaﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗ｷデ┞ HWデ┘WWﾐ Lﾗｪﾗゲ ;ﾐS Nﾗﾏﾗゲぎ L;┘が TWﾏヮﾗヴ;ﾉｷデ┞ ;ﾐS デｴW Nﾗﾐ-
EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI Aﾐ;ﾉ┞ゲｷゲ ﾗa Pﾗ┘Wヴげ ふヲヰヱヱぶ ヲヱ Cﾗﾉ┌ﾏく Jく GWﾐSWヴ わ Lく Γヰく 
46 See generally, Ritu Birla, Stages of Capital: Law, Culture, and Market Governance in Late Colonial India 




such as Kennedy, have also recognized the role of legal ideas in the shaping of economic 
realities.47  
Performativity Theory has also been extended to technology studies, where Actor-Network 
Theory (ANT) scholars have argued that the power of technological ideas extends beyond 
ideology, in at least two ways. First, contend Law and Singleton, the ideas, narratives or 
ideologies about technologies are not merely descriptive, but actually enact or perform those 
particular notions of the nature of technological organization. They may affect, alter, or 
reinforce the existing arrangements of technological reality, despite the possibility of multiple 
technological realities.48 For example, as explored in the Chapter 6 Kenya case study, credit 
information sharing (CIS) technologies are performative because they actualize their prediction 
(irrespective of accuracy) that a borrower will default on their loan obligations. By representing 
to credit providers that a borrower is not creditworthy, credit reports restrict the Hﾗヴヴﾗ┘Wヴげゲ 
financing options and makes default inevitable.  
Second, argue Caliskan and Callon, as assemblages of various ideologies and practices, these 
technological artefacts, arrangements and practices are performative in the sense that they 
perform the other ideologies with which they are politically-encoded, including formal-liberal 
legal ideologies and neoclassical economic ideologies.49 Since technological ideologies and 
practices constitute, and are constituted by, other ideologies and related practices, they are 
also enrolled in the processes of economic performativity, and legal performativity or 
constitution of social and economic reality. Chapter 6, for example, explores how CIS embeds 
on the cognition of borrowers a psychological individualism that constitutes them as the homo 
economicus of neoclassical economics, and the ideologically abstracted legal subject with equal 
rights and duties.   
As evident in the overview of the various research programs on the role of ideas and related 
technological practices, there is scope for a more systematic and integrated inter-disciplinary 
study of the ways in which the ideological and performative power of neoclassical economic, 
legal-formalist and technological ideas and related technologies and practices have contributed 
                                                          
47 See generally David Kennedy, A World of Struggle: How Power, Law, and Expertise Shape Global Political 
Economy (Princeton University Press 2016). 
48 Jﾗｴﾐ L;┘ ;ﾐS VｷIﾆ┞ “ｷﾐｪﾉWデﾗﾐが けPWヴaﾗヴﾏｷﾐｪ TWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪ┞げゲ “デﾗヴｷWゲぎ Oﾐ “ﾗIｷ;ﾉ Cﾗﾐゲデヴ┌Iデｷ┗ｷゲﾏが PWヴaﾗヴﾏ;ﾐIWが 
and Performativityげ ふヲヰヰヰぶ ヴヱ TWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ;ﾐS C┌ﾉデ┌ヴW Αヶヵが ΑヶΒに769. 
49 AﾐSヴW┘ B;ヴヴ┞ ;ﾐS Dﾗﾐ “ﾉ;デWヴが けTWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪ┞が PﾗﾉｷデｷIゲ ;ﾐS デｴW M;ヴﾆWデぎ Aﾐ IﾐデWヴ┗ｷW┘ ┘ｷデｴ MｷIｴWﾉ C;ﾉﾉﾗﾐげ ふヲヰヰヲぶ 




to the reproduction of regulatory neoliberalism within the transnational and also the Third 
World financial regulatory orders.      
2. Research Questions and the Thesis Statement 
This thesis examines how ideas and their related technologies and practices in financial markets 
legitimate neoliberal financial markets and regulatory neoliberalism as the only possible 
economic organization, specifically through the けconstitution of meaningげ in social life, that is, 
ideological legitimation.50 As it will be argued, economic, legal and technological ideas and 
practices are ideological to the extent that they construct the meaning of property, contractual 
rights, and individual liberties, thereby legitimating and/or concealing certain relations of 
domination, through various strategies, including universalization, reification, naturalization, 
rationalization, and narrativization.51  
In addition, the thesis also examines how the role of these ideas and related technologies and 
practices goes beyond description and ideational legitimation, to the actual constitution, 
shaping and enacting of neoliberal financial market relations and regulatory neoliberalism, that 
is, ideational performativity.52 It explores how, for example, by embodying neoclassical 
economic, liberal legal-formalist and technological ideas that discipline consumers, financial 
technologies and practices can enact neoliberal financial markets.  
The discussion illustrates how, through their ideological and performative power, these ideas, 
technologies and related practices construct meaning, relationships and institutions, allocate 
identities, interests and capacities, define problems and their solutions, and thereby enable 
and constrain action. In this effort, the thesis explores the ideological and performative role of 
the ideational infrastructure of financial markets, in the reproduction of regulatory 
neoliberalism within both the transnational and Third World ふｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ KWﾐ┞;げゲぶ financial 
                                                          
50 Aゲ SｷゲI┌ゲゲWS ;デ ﾉWﾐｪデｴ ｷﾐ Cｴ;ヮデWヴ ヲが デｴW デWヴﾏ けｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞げ ｷゲ IﾗﾐIWヮデ┌;ﾉｷ┣WS ;ﾐS ┌ゲWS ｷﾐ ┗;ヴｷﾗ┌ゲ ┘;┞ゲく TｴW 
specific conceptual framework for the use of ideology in this study is the relationship between meaning and 
power, or the exercise of power through the constitution of meaning. See Marks (n 38) 110に112. See also 
John B Thompson, Ideology and Modern Culture: Critical Theory in the Era of Mass Communication (Polity 
Press 1990) 56. 
51 Marks (n 38) 110に112; Thompson (n 50) 58. 
52 As discussed more elaborately in Chapter 2, ideas and related technologies and practices are deemed 
けIﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷ┗Wげ ﾗヴ けヮWヴaﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗Wげ デﾗ デｴW W┝デWﾐデ デｴ;デ デｴW ヮヴﾗ┗ｷSW Iﾗｪﾐｷデｷ┗W ヮﾗゲゲｷHｷﾉｷデｷWゲ ;ﾐS ┗;ﾉ┌Wゲ デｴ;デ Hヴｷﾐｪ 
various social, economic and market institutionゲ ｷﾐデﾗ W┝ｷゲデWﾐIWく “WW L;┌ヴWﾐ B ESWﾉﾏ;ﾐ ;ﾐS ‘ﾗHｷﾐ “デヴ┞ﾆWヴが けA 
“ﾗIｷﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ Aヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴ デﾗ L;┘ ;ﾐS デｴW EIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞げ ｷﾐ NWｷﾉ J “ﾏWﾉゲWヴ ;ﾐS ‘ｷIｴ;ヴS “┘WSHWヴｪ ふWSゲぶが The handbook 
of economic sociology (Princeton University Press; Russell Sage Foundation 2005) 540.; See also Lang (n 45); 




regulatory orders, despite the expectation of radical regulatory reforms, after various periods 
of financial crises.  
The study is premised on the problematic observation that Third World contestation has 
registered both progress and challenges, but regulatory neoliberalism and financialization of 
the global ;ﾐS ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ふｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ KWﾐ┞;げゲぶ economies grows more resilient, despite periodic 
setbacks. While acknowledging the significance of structural power of hegemonic States, the 
common interests of a transnational capitalist class, and material embedding of globalized 
financialization and neoliberal philosophy in the reproduction of regulatory neoliberalism, the 
thesis identifies and focuses on specificが けヴWﾉ;デｷ┗Wﾉ┞ ;┌デﾗﾐﾗﾏﾗ┌ゲげ ideas and related technologies 
and practices as making an under-stated contribution. It therefore explores the ideological and 
performative power of neoclassical economic theories, doctrines of legal formalism, 
technological ideas, artefacts, and their related practices, which form the ideational 
infrastructure of contemporary financial markets.  
The ideational infrastructure is conceptualized as entailing at least three key ideational 
disciplines with complex, co-constitutive, but not necessarily causal, relationships, due to their 
roles and prevalence in contemporary financial markets. First, as noted by Callon and Lang, the 
dominant branch of economics に neoclassical (financial) economics に ｷゲ デｴW ﾏ;ｷﾐ さI;ﾉI┌ﾉ;デｷ┗Wざ 
framework which equips financial markets players with causal models for interpreting the 
consequences of various trends and courses of action in the financial markets.53  
Second, as argued by Eslava, Cutler, Pistor, and Edelmann & Stryker, legal norms に originating 
from Lex Mercatoria, and now embedded in international and national law に also play not only 
a regulatory but also a constitutive role, in creating cognitive possibilities for bringing into 
existence various legal institutions in financial markets, including juridical persons, property, 
and contract.54  
                                                          
53 Lang discusses how the practice of trading in foreign exchange markets requires a causal model to assess 
the likely consequences of different actions. See Lang (n 45) 165. “WW ;ﾉゲﾗが MｷIｴWﾉ C;ﾉﾉﾗﾐが けAIデﾗヴ-Network 
TheoryねデｴW M;ヴﾆWデ TWゲデげ ふヱΓΓΓぶ ヴΑ TｴW “ﾗIｷﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ ‘W┗ｷW┘ ヱΒヱが ヱΓヲく C;ﾉﾉﾗﾐ ;ヴｪ┌Wゲ デｴ;デ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI デｴWﾗヴ┞ 
serves as a frame of reference for market calculation. 
54 See Luis Eslava, Local Space, Global Life (Cambridge University Press 2015) xvi. Eslava argues that 
Interﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘ ｷゲ Hﾗデｴ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ ;ﾐS Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷ┗Wが デﾗ デｴW W┝デWﾐデ デｴ;デ ｷデ けaﾗヴﾏゲ ;ﾐS ヴWゲｴ;ヮWゲ ﾗ┌ヴ 
surrounding realities to such an extent that it actually becomes impossible to conceive of international law 
as existing and operating except through the very デｴｷﾐｪゲ ;ﾐS HﾗSｷWゲ ｷデ IヴW;デWゲげく “WW ;ﾉゲﾗが A Cﾉ;ｷヴW C┌デﾉWヴが 
Private Power and Global Authority: Transnational Merchant Law in the Global Political Economy (Cambridge 
Uﾐｷ┗Wヴゲｷデ┞ PヴWゲゲ ヲヰヰンぶ ヶく C┌デﾉWヴ ;ヴｪ┌Wゲ デｴ;デ デｴW ﾉ;┘ ｷゲ ﾐﾗデ ; ﾐW┌デヴ;ﾉ ﾗHﾃWIデｷ┗W aﾗヴIW けﾗ┌デ デｴWヴWげが H┌デ ｷゲ けｷﾐ ｴWヴWげが 
both constituting and constituted by social, economic and political forces. See also, Simon Deakin and others, 




Third, as argued by Callon & Muniesa, and Preda, technological artefacts and practices, 
prevalent in contemporary financial markets, play constitutive, deliberative and 
representational roles in market transactions and their regulation.55 In addition, this ideational 
infrastructure is conceptualized as both local and transnational, being diffused from multiple 
sites in the developed and Third World.  
Research Questions 
The ideological and performative role of the ideational infrastructure of financial markets in 
reproducing regulatory neoliberalism globally and especially in Third World economies is 
explored through one main research question: 
1. How has the ideational infrastructure of global financial markets impacted on the 
regulatory reforms within the transnational and Third World financial regulatory 
orders? 
The thesis explores this research question through a series of sub-questions explored in the 
succeeding chapters: 
1. Why ｴ;ゲ デｴW TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉSげゲ ｴｷゲデﾗヴｷI;ﾉ IﾗﾐデWゲデ;デｷﾗﾐ failed to radically transform the 
transnational financial regulatory order? 
2. To what extent can interdisciplinary ideology critique and performativity theory form 
theoretical assemblages within TWAIL praxis of resetting the international financial 
regulatory order to speak for Third World concerns? 
3. How has the ideological and performative power of economic, legal and technological 
ideas and related practices reproduced regulatory neoliberalism within the IMF and 
World Bank? 
                                                          
192に193. The authors argue, for example, that law constitutes the institution of property through legal 
definition, and through setting up systems of State accreditation, legitimation and enforcement of property 
rights. See also Edelman and Stryker (n 52) 540. 
55 AﾉW┝ PヴWS;が け“ﾗIｷﾗ-TWIｴﾐｷI;ﾉ AｪWﾐI┞ ｷﾐ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ M;ヴﾆWデゲぎ TｴW C;ゲW ﾗa デｴW “デﾗIﾆ TｷIﾆWヴげ ふヲヰヰヶぶ ンヶ “ﾗIｷ;ﾉ 
Studies of Science 753, 221. Preda argues that five features constitute agential aspects of financial 
technologies, in which these technologies constitute the markets: temporal structures, visualization modes, 
representational and interpretive languages, cognitive tools and categories, and group boundaries. See also 
Fabian Muniesa, Yuval Millo and Michel C;ﾉﾉﾗﾐが けAﾐ IﾐデヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐ デﾗ M;ヴﾆWデ DW┗ｷIWゲげ ふヲヰヰ7) 55 The sociological 
review 1. “WW ;ﾉゲﾗ MｷIｴWﾉ C;ﾉﾉﾗﾐ ;ﾐS F;Hｷ;ﾐ M┌ﾐｷWゲ;が けPWヴｷヮｴWヴ;ﾉ Vｷゲｷﾗﾐ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI M;ヴﾆWデゲ ;ゲ C;ﾉI┌ﾉ;デｷ┗W 




4. How has the ideological and performative power of economic, legal and technological 
ideas and related practiceゲ ヴWヮヴﾗS┌IWS ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ ﾐWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉｷゲﾏ ｷﾐ KWﾐ┞;げゲ interest rate 
markets? 
Main Argument 
The main argument explored in this study is that the ideational infrastructure of the financial 
markets legitimates, constitutes and performs neoliberal financial markets and regulatory 
neoliberalism, within the transnational and national financial regulatory institutions. This 
ideational infrastructure ideologically legitimates and performs regulatory neoliberalism as the 
only rational regulatory paradigm, while concealing their reproduction of inequality and power 
asymmetries. It also restricts the regulatory possibilities available to Third World policy makers 
and regulators for addressing the externalities of neoliberal financial markets, including, as 
explored in the Kenya case studies, high interest rates and high indebtedness.  
Theoretical Framework 
The earlier overview of the various research programs on the role of ideas and related 
technological practices has introduced the distinct and separate disciplinary and conceptual 
boxes within which the discussions have been conducted. However, the relationship between 
legal, economic and technological ideas and practices is one of inclusivity, co-constitutiveness 
and reflexivity, which relationship is concealed when they are housed in separate conceptual 
silos. In fact, Scott contends that ﾉWｪ;ﾉ ;ﾐS ﾗデｴWヴ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪｷWゲ さﾗ┗Wヴﾉ;ヮが IﾗﾏヮWデWが ;ﾐS Iﾉ;ゲｴが 
Sヴﾗ┘ﾐが ﾗヴ ヴWｷﾐaﾗヴIW W;Iｴ ﾗデｴWヴざく56 In addition, Hunt sees the power of ideology in its ability to 
さIﾗﾐﾐWIデ ;ﾐS IﾗﾏHｷﾐW Sｷ┗WヴゲW mental elements (concepts, ideas, etc.) into combinations that 
ｷﾐaﾉ┌WﾐIW ;ﾐS ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴW デｴW ヮWヴIWヮデｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS Iﾗｪﾐｷデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ;ｪWﾐデゲぐざ.57 Sumner also argues 
デｴ;デ デｴW Iﾗﾐゲデヴ┌Iデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ; ｴWｪWﾏﾗﾐ┞ H;ゲWS ﾗﾐ ﾉWｪ;ﾉ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ さSWヮWﾐSゲ ┌ヮﾗﾐ ｷデゲ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ 
encapsulation of a consensus constructed outside of itself in other economic, political and 
I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ヮヴ;IデｷIWゲざく58 
This ideological co-constitution is demonstrated by Cottier in International Economic Law, 
which, he argues, is shaped by classical economic theories, iﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ D;┗ｷS ‘ｷI;ヴSﾗげゲ デｴWﾗヴ┞ ﾗa 
                                                          
56 Scott (n 38) 319. 
57 Aﾉ;ﾐ H┌ﾐデが けTｴW ISWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ﾗa L;┘ぎ AS┗;ﾐIWゲ ;ﾐS PヴﾗHﾉWﾏゲ ｷﾐ ‘WIWﾐデ AヮヮﾉｷI;デｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa デｴW CﾗﾐIWヮデ ﾗa ISWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ 
デﾗ デｴW Aﾐ;ﾉ┞ゲｷゲ ﾗa L;┘げ ふヱΓΒヵぶ ヱΓ L;┘ わ “ﾗIｷWデ┞ ‘W┗ｷW┘ ヱヱが ヱヶく 
58 Colin Sumner, Reading Ideologies: An Investigation into the Marxist Theory of Ideology and Law (Academic 




Cﾗﾏヮ;ヴ;デｷ┗W AS┗;ﾐデ;ｪWが ;ﾐS AS;ﾏ “ﾏｷデｴげゲ TｴWﾗヴ┞ ﾗa IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Dｷ┗ｷゲｷﾗﾐ ﾗa L;Hﾗ┌ヴく59 In their 
exploration of the International Law on sea-bed resources, Koskenniemi and Lehto also 
demonstrate the dialectic between the legal form and the political-economic substance, 
arguing that international law expresses conflicting economic ideologies and political power, 
by transforming them into a shared language and institutional process.60 
The co-constitutive nature of legal, economic and technological ideologies and practices thus 
highlights the limitations and partial perspectives of such conceptual-silo approaches. There is 
therefore scope for a more systematic and integrated inter-disciplinary study of the ways in 
which the ideological and performative power of neoclassical economic, legal-formalist and 
technological ideas and related technologies and practices have contributed to the 
reproduction of regulatory neoliberalism within the transnational and Third World financial 
regulatory orders. Exploring the research question in this thesis therefore necessitates an 
eclectic theoretical approach that draws from Critical Theory (including Critical Legal Studies, 
Critical Realism, and Critical Theory of Technology), Actor-Network Theory (ANT), and 
Performativity Theory, and deploying them through TWAIL methodologies and sensibilities.  
As discussed above, Critical Legal Scholars, including Trubek and Marks, are interested in the 
ideological nature and role of law, that is, relationships among ideas and images we hold about 
the law and society, the structures of social life we are engaged in, and how these ideas and 
images affect the actions we take.61 The core objective of this approach is critique: laying bare 
the relationship between ideological legitimation and domination in capitalist societies, and 
consequently altering meaning and those relationships, in the process of emancipatory 
politics.62 TWAIL scholars, including Chimni, have called for engagement with ideology-critique, 
to understand how the transnational capitalist class influences the foreign economic policy of 
Third World States towards regulatory neoliberalism.63  
                                                          
59 Tｴﾗﾏ;ゲ CﾗデデｷWヴが けCﾗゲﾏﾗヮﾗﾉｷデ;ﾐ V;ﾉ┌Wゲ ｷﾐ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI L;┘ぎ M┞デｴゲ ;ﾐS ‘W;ﾉｷデｷWゲげ ｷﾐ BW;デ “ｷデデWヴ-
Liver (ed), Universality, from Theory to Practice: An Intercultural and Interdisciplinary Debate about Facts, 
Possibilities, Lies and Myths (Academic Press Fribourg 2009) 34. 
60 M KﾗゲﾆWﾐﾐｷWﾏｷ ;ﾐS M LWｴデﾗが けTｴW Pヴｷ┗ｷﾉWｪW ﾗa Uﾐｷ┗Wヴゲ;ﾉｷデ┞ぎ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘が EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ISWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ;ﾐS 
“W;HWS ‘Wゲﾗ┌ヴIWゲげ ふヱΓΓヶぶ ヶヵ NﾗヴSｷI Jﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉ ﾗa IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘ ヵンンが ヵンンく 
61 D;┗ｷS M Tヴ┌HWﾆが けWｴWヴW デｴW AIデｷﾗﾐ Iゲぎ CヴｷデｷI;ﾉ LWｪ;ﾉ “デ┌SｷWゲ ;ﾐS EﾏヮｷヴｷIｷゲﾏげ ふヱΓΒヴぶ ンヶ “デ;ﾐaﾗヴS L;┘ ‘W┗ｷW┘ 
575, 575. 
62 ibid 590に591. 
63 B“ Cｴｷﾏﾐｷが けC;ヮitalism, Imperialism, and International Law in the Twenty-Fｷヴゲデ CWﾐデ┌ヴ┞げ ふヲヰヱヲぶ ヱヴ OヴWｪﾗﾐ 




Scholars in the Critical Realism schoolが ｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ L;┘ゲﾗﾐが OげHﾗ┞ﾉW わ Dﾗﾐﾗｪｴﾗ┌が ;ﾐS K;ﾐデｴが also 
engage in the ideology-critique of neoclassical economics. They question its appropriation of 
デｴW けIﾉﾗゲWS-ゲ┞ゲデWﾏげ ;ゲゲ┌ﾏヮデｷﾗﾐゲ ;ﾐS ﾏWデｴﾗSﾗﾉﾗｪｷWゲ ﾗa ﾐ;デ┌ヴ;ﾉ ゲIｷWﾐIWが ｷﾐ ; HｷS デﾗ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ 
legitimate neoliberal capitalism, and naturalize its excesses (including poverty and inequality) 
as inevitable and acceptable.64 Ideology-critique of neoclassical economics is indeed 
ｷﾐSｷゲヮWﾐゲ;HﾉW デﾗ TWAILげゲ IヴｷデｷI;ﾉ ;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴ デﾗ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI L;┘が ┘ｴｷIｴ Cｴｷﾏﾐｷ 
argues, includes さヴW┗W;ﾉぷｷﾐｪへ デｴW ヴﾗﾉW ﾗa WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ and power in assigning meaning to 
[IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI L;┘へ デW┝デゲざ S┌ヴｷﾐｪ Sｷゲヮ┌デW ヴWゲﾗﾉ┌デｷﾗﾐ ヮヴﾗIWゲゲWゲ ;ﾐS ﾉWｪ;ﾉ 
interpretation.65    
The increasing digitization of finance and financial markets has also necessitated the ideology-
critique of technological ideas and practices through Critical Theory of Technology, and Science 
and Technology Studies. Scholars in this field, including Marcuse, Habermas, and Feenberg, 
argue that some ideas and practices underpinning technological society, including 
けデWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ SWデWヴﾏｷﾐｷゲﾏげが ;ﾐS けデWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ ;┌デﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞げが ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ ﾉWｪｷデｷﾏ;デW デWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ 
as neutral, apolitical and universal, thereby concealing its social origins and embedded relations 
of neoliberal, capitalist domination.66 
Actor-Network Theory (ANT) and Performativity Theory are also deployed in this thesis to 
demonstrate how regulatory power in transnational and national financial markets are 
deployed through hybrid assemblages of humans and non-humans (including ideas, discourses, 
texts, metrics, artefacts, and computing technologies) known as socio-technical Agencements 
(STAs). L;┘ SWaｷﾐWゲ ANT ;ゲ さ; Sｷゲヮ;ヴ;デW a;ﾏｷﾉ┞ ﾗa ﾏ;デWヴｷ;ﾉ-semiotic tools, sensibilities and 
methods of analysis that treats everything in the social and natural worlds as a continuously 
ｪWﾐWヴ;デWS WaaWIデ ﾗa デｴW ┘WHゲ ﾗa ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲ ┘ｷデｴｷﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ デｴW┞ ;ヴW ﾉﾗI;デWSくざ67  
                                                          
64 “WW ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉﾉ┞ Tﾗﾐ┞ L;┘ゲﾗﾐが けM;デｴWﾏ;デｷI;ﾉ MﾗSWﾉﾉｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS ISWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ｷﾐ デｴW EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIゲ AI;SWﾏ┞ぎ CﾗﾏヮWデｷﾐｪ 
Exヮﾉ;ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa デｴW F;ｷﾉｷﾐｪゲ ﾗa デｴW MﾗSWヴﾐ DｷゲIｷヮﾉｷﾐWいげ ふヲヰヱヲぶ ヱ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI Tｴﾗ┌ｪｴデき Bヴｷ;ﾐ OげBﾗ┞ﾉW ;ﾐS 
TWヴヴWﾐIW MIDﾗﾐﾗ┌ｪｴが けCヴｷデｷI;ﾉ ‘W;ﾉｷゲﾏが M;ヴ┝ｷゲﾏ ;ﾐS デｴW Cヴｷデｷケ┌W ﾗa NWﾗIﾉ;ゲゲｷI;ﾉ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIゲげ ふヲヰヱヱぶ ンヵ 
C;ヮｷデ;ﾉ わ Cﾉ;ゲゲ ンき ‘;ﾃ;ﾐｷ K;ﾐデｴが けAｪ;ｷﾐゲデ E┌ヴﾗIWﾐデヴWS Eヮistemologies: A Critique of Science, Realism and 
EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIゲげ ｷﾐ “デW┗W FﾉWWデ┘ﾗﾗS ふWSぶが Critical realism in economics: Development and debate, vol 12 (Routledge 
1999). 
65 Cｴｷﾏﾐｷが けCヴｷデｷI;ﾉ TｴWﾗヴ┞ ;ﾐS IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI L;┘ぎ A TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS Aヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴ デﾗ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘ 
ふTWAILぶ PWヴゲヮWIデｷ┗Wげ ふﾐ ンヰぶ ヲヵヵく 
66 M;ヴI┌ゲWが けIﾐS┌ゲデヴｷ;ﾉｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS C;ヮｷデ;ﾉｷゲﾏ ｷﾐ デｴW Wﾗヴﾆ ﾗa M;┝ WWHWヴげ ふﾐ ヴヰぶ ヲヲンき H;HWヴﾏ;ゲ ふﾐ ヴヰぶ Βヱき 
FWWﾐHWヴｪが け“┌H┗Wヴゲｷ┗W ‘;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐげ ふﾐ ヴヰぶ ンヱΒく 
67 Jﾗｴﾐ L;┘が けAIデﾗヴ NWデ┘ﾗヴﾆ TｴWﾗヴ┞ ;ﾐS M;デWヴｷ;ﾉ “WﾏｷﾗデｷIゲげ ぷヲヰヰΓへ TｴW ﾐW┘ Bﾉ;Iﾆ┘ell companion to social 




C;ﾉﾉﾗﾐげゲ IﾗﾐIWヮデ ﾗa ANTが ﾗヴ けデｴWﾗヴ┞ ﾗa デヴ;ﾐゲﾉ;デｷﾗﾐげ ｷゲ ; ┌ゲWa┌ﾉ ;ﾐ;ﾉ┞デｷI;ﾉ デﾗﾗﾉ aﾗヴ W┝;ﾏｷﾐｷﾐｪ ｴﾗ┘ 
these hybrid assemblages (including financial market ideas, technologies and practices), 
stabilize, organise and convert other actors, become durable, enrol others into their own 
programmes, bestow qualities and motivations on other actors, simplify complexity, and 
become functionally indispensable.68 It enables the exploration of ｴﾗ┘ けヴWﾉ;デｷ┗Wﾉ┞ ;┌デﾗﾐﾗﾏﾗ┌ゲげ 
ideas and technological practices contribute to the reproduction of regulatory neoliberalism. 
Performativity Theory, on the other hand, while drawing heavily on insights of ANT, is used to 
demonstrate how neoclassical economic, legal and technological ideas and concepts do not 
merely describe economy, society and technology, but actively intervene by bringing up or 
raising economies, markets, technological organizations, and societies in their theoretical and 
ideological images. TｴW ヮWヴaﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗ｷデ┞ デｴWﾗヴ┞ ﾉｷデWヴ;デ┌ヴW Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞WS ｷﾐIﾉ┌SWぎ C;ﾉﾉﾗﾐげゲ デｴWﾗヴ┞ ﾗa 
economic performativity;69 C┌デﾉWヴが L;ﾐｪ ;ﾐS Bｷヴﾉ;げゲ ｷSW;ゲ ﾗﾐ デｴW Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷ┗W ﾗヴ ヮWヴaﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗W 
role of law70き ;ﾐS L;┘ わ “ｷﾐｪﾉWデﾗﾐが ;ﾐS C;ﾉﾉﾗﾐ わ M┌ﾐｷWゲ;げゲ デｴWﾗヴｷWゲ ﾗﾐ デｴW ヮWヴaﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗ｷデ┞ of 
technologies and related practices.71   
This eclectic approach demonstrates the insights that TWAIL can levy from ANT, Performativity 
Theory, and the ideology critiques of neoclassical economics and technology. These insights 
include the agential, ideological and performative role of ideas, discourses, texts, metrics, 
artefacts, and computing technologies within financial markets, and their role in making 
durable the power structures produced by legal and economic ideologies. 
Key Findings 
The key finding of this thesis is the significance of the ideological and performative power of 
neoliberal economic, legal and technological ideas and practices underpinning the cognitive 
infrastructure of the financial markets, in the reproduction of regulatory neoliberalism in 
transnational and Third World financial regulatory institutions. This is articulated in four related 
insights.  
 
                                                          
68 MｷIｴWﾉ C;ﾉﾉﾗﾐが け“ﾗﾏW EﾉWﾏWﾐデゲ ﾗa ; “ﾗIｷﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ﾗa Tヴ;ﾐゲﾉ;デｷﾗﾐげげ ぷヲヰヰΑへ TｴW PﾗﾉｷデｷIゲ ﾗa IﾐデWヴ┗Wﾐデｷﾗﾐゲ ヵΑき MｷIｴWﾉ 
C;ﾉﾉﾗﾐが けTｴW “ﾗIｷﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ﾗa ;ﾐ AIデﾗヴ-NWデ┘ﾗヴﾆぎ TｴW C;ゲW ﾗa デｴW EﾉWIデヴｷI VWｴｷIﾉWげが Mapping the dynamics of science 
and technology (Springer 1986). 
69 C;ﾉﾉﾗﾐが けIﾐデヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐげ ふﾐ ヴンぶ ヲく 
70 Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority ふﾐ ヵヴぶき L;ﾐｪ ふﾐ ヴヵぶき Bｷヴﾉ;が けPWヴaﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗ｷデ┞ HWデ┘WWﾐ Lﾗｪﾗゲ ;ﾐS 
Nomos: Law, Temporality and the Non-EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI Aﾐ;ﾉ┞ゲｷゲ ﾗa Pﾗ┘Wヴげ ふﾐ ヴヵぶく 




Transformation of Neoliberal Hegemony in Financial Markets 
First, as discussed in Chapter 2, neoliberal hegemony in the transnational financial regulatory 
order continues to react dynamically to Third World contestation. It has metamorphosed and 
reinvented itself from brute force and coercive authority, to discursive, ideological and 
technological power. Neoliberal hegemony has diffused to unaccountable non-State 
institutions such as transnational corporations (TNCs), academia and media, while assimilating 
Third World hegemonic elites, and incorporating new centres of accumulation, including 
technological systems and practices.72  
In addition, neoliberalism has also transformed from legal to material hegemony, where power 
has been redistributed through the material reorganization of the economy, as demonstrated 
by the aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲげ IヴW;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ゲ┞ﾐデｴWデｷI aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ;ゲゲWデゲ that governments have been 
compelled to recognize, due to systemic risk concerns.73 As demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 6, 
power has also been redistributed through the diffusion of financial technologies and practices 
such as macro-econometric models and credit information sharing technologies, in which 
neoliberal regulatory rationalities are embedded.   
Agential Power of the Ideational Infrastructure of Financial Markets 
The second insight is the significant power of the ideational infrastructure underpinning the 
financial markets, which has been under-emphasized in contrast to the structural aspects of 
global hegemony, including the economic, military, and market power of the US and its 
developed economy allies such as Britain, France, and Germany.74 As explored especially in 
Chapter 3, ideas and related practices underpinning financial market liberalization, including 
the Mckinnon-Shaw Hypothesis, and the New Institutional Economics theories, are over time 
decoupled from their originators. Consequently, they acquire the けヴWﾉ;デｷ┗Wﾉ┞-autonomousげ, 
neutral and apolitical nature of expertise, which is diffused and acts upon transnational and 
national H┌ヴW;┌Iヴ;デゲげ ;ﾐS ﾏ;ヴﾆWデ ヮﾉ;┞Wヴゲげ Iﾗｪﾐｷデｷﾗﾐが デｴWヴWH┞ ゲｴ;ヮｷﾐｪ ｴﾗ┘ デｴW┞ IﾗﾐIWヮデ┌;ﾉｷ┣W 
problems and the available solutions. 
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73 Wigan (n 35) 118. 
74 “WW Lﾗ┌ヴSWゲ Gﾗ┌┗Wｷ;が け‘WﾗヮWﾐｷﾐｪ Tﾗデ;ﾉｷデｷWゲぎ VWﾐW┣┌Wﾉ;げゲ ‘Wゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS TｴW GﾉﾗH;ﾉｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ DWH;デWげ ｷﾐ 
David Goodman and Michael Watts (eds), Globalising food: agrarian questions and global restructuring 
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Co-constitutive Nature of Legal, Economic and Technological Ideas and Practices 
The third insight is the complex, co-constitutive, but not necessarily causal, relationships 
between legal formalism, neoclassical economic theories, technological ideas, and their related 
practices, which contribute to the resilience and durability of transnational regulatory 
neoliberalism. Chapter 5 demonstrates the co-constitutive relationship between the Rule of 
Law and New Institutional Economics, in articulating the essentialism of the institution of 
private property in economic and financial market development. Chapter 6 demonstrates the 
nature of credit information sharing technologies as hybrid assemblages of co-constitutive 
legal, economic and technological ideas and practices.  
The inter-disciplinary nature of ideologies underpinning neoliberal regulatory discourse, their 
performation through practice, and further embedding in technologies and other materialities, 
reveals the need for the Third World to expand its focus in contesting legal norms, to include 
equally exigent economic and technological ideas, practices, and artefacts. This insight is 
デｴWヴWaﾗヴW ｷﾏヮﾗヴデ;ﾐデ aﾗヴ TWAIL ヮヴ;IデｷデｷﾗﾐWヴゲげ a;ゲｴｷﾗﾐｷﾐｪ ﾗa ヴWﾉW┗;ﾐデ デﾗﾗﾉゲ aﾗヴ ヮヴ;┝ｷゲく   
Emancipatory Potential of the Legitimating and Performative Power of Ideas and Practices 
The fourth insight is the conceptual indeterminacy, inconsistency, and contradiction at the 
heart of the legal, economic and technological ideologies. This finding is relevant to the debate 
among TWAIL practitioners, on whether they should resist and contest the neoliberal 
transnational financial regulatory order from outside, reform it from within, or comply with the 
hegemonic ordering. It supports ｷﾏﾏ;ﾐWﾐデ Iヴｷデｷケ┌Wげゲ call to exploit the contradictions and 
indeterminacies of legal formalism, neoclassical economics, and technological ideas and 
related practices, in conceptually reorienting them to speak for the concerns of the Third World 
peoples, as was attempted, for example, through the New International Economic Order 
(NIEO). This finding of conceptual indeterminacy is also relevant to the harnessing of the 
ideological and performative power of economic and technological ideas and practices towards 
designing alternative economic and technological organizations. 
The thesis concludes that the present Third World efforts aimed at contesting the regulatory 
neoliberalism at the heart of the transnational financial regulatory order should also focus on 
the ideological and performative power of the ideational infrastructure of the global financial 




approach in their reflection, conceptualization, articulation, dissemination and legal 
operationalization of an alternative international financial law praxis.   
3. Methodology 
This research relies on secondary sources of information. The discussion undertakes an 
extensive, qualitative analysis of various data capturing the financial markets regulatory debate 
at the transnational and national (Kenyan) level. These include: the reports and regulatory 
standards of transnational regulators such as the IMF, the World Bank, the G20, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, and the Financial Stability Board (FSB); reports and 
regulatory policies and standards of US, EU and UK financial markets regulators; and reports, 
transcripts and documents capturing the regulatory debates between the Kenyan Central Bank, 
National Treasury, Parliament, judiciary, research institutions, think tanks and academic 
scholars. The nature of the material analysed include international law instruments, national 
(Kenyan) statutory and case law material; institutional reports, Parliamentary Hansards, 
government policy papers, civil society monitoring and evaluation reports, and regulatory 
impact assessment reports. 
A few issues related to the limitation of the scope of the discussion, the limitations of the 
theoretical and conceptual frameworks adopted, and the choice of case studies require 
clarification.  
Ideology Critique as Immanent Critique 
First, the critical theoretical approach adopted in this thesis is one of immanent critique, rather 
than transcendental critique. The latter, entrenched in Kantian philosophy, is a totalizing style 
of critｷケ┌Wが ┘ｴｷIｴ Wﾐデ;ｷﾉゲ デｴW ;ヮヮﾉｷI;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ; さゲIｷWﾐデｷaｷIざ ;ﾐS デｴ┌ゲ ﾗHﾃWIデｷ┗Wが ヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉが ﾐ;デ┌ヴ;ﾉ 
and transcendental criteria for argument.75 The problem with transcendental critique is its a 
priori ;ゲゲ┌ﾏヮデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW さﾗ┌デ デｴWヴWざ ヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデ┞が ┘ｴｷIｴ IﾗﾐIW;ﾉゲ デｴW ｴｷゲデﾗヴｷI;ﾉly, socially, and 
spatially contingent nature of ideas.76 Iﾏﾏ;ﾐWﾐデ Iヴｷデｷケ┌Wが M;ヴﾆゲ ;ヴｪ┌Wゲが さWゲIｴW┘ゲ デｴW 
;ヴヴﾗｪ;ﾐIW ﾗa ぷデヴ;ﾐゲIWﾐSWﾐデ;ﾉへ IヴｷデｷIｷゲﾏげゲ W┝デWヴﾐ;ﾉ ゲデ;ﾐSヮﾗｷﾐデが ┘ｴｷﾉW ;ﾉゲﾗ ヴWa┌ゲｷng the complicity 
ﾗa ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞げゲ ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;ﾉ ゲWﾉa-┌ﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐSｷﾐｪざが ｷﾐゲデW;S aﾗI┌ゲｷﾐｪ ﾗﾐ さｴﾗ┘ デｴ;デ ゲWﾉa-understanding 
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ゲデヴ;ｷﾐゲ ;デ ｷデゲ ﾗ┘ﾐ ﾉｷﾏｷデ;デｷﾗﾐゲが ヮﾗｷﾐデゲ HW┞ﾗﾐS ｷデゲWﾉaざく77 Thus immanent critique seeks to reveal 
societal contradictions that can then be appropriated as determinate possibilities for 
emancipatory politics. It entails deconstructing the ideologically-legitimated social reality, 
while at the same time using historical context to question its own self-understanding.78 
Thus, ideology critique of legal formalism and the rule of law, neoclassical economics, and 
technological ideas and practices in this thesis eschews nihilism and engages in immanent 
critique in four steps. First, it unravels the processes by which social inequalities are 
ideologically legitimated within the infrastructure of ideas, technologies and related practices, 
including the processes of universalization, reification, naturalization, rationalization, and 
narrativization.79 For example, Chapter 2 explores how these processes have ideologically 
legitimated a Eurocentric conceptualization of international law in which Third World States 
are objects rather than subjects, as universal, objective, neutral, transcendental, and therefore 
unchangeable.  
Second, immanent (ideology) critique focusses attention on the reality, contingency and 
historicity of these inequalities, and on the gap between them and the normative aspects of 
ideas underpinning social ordering, such as justice equity, and the rule of law.80 Thus, for 
example, Chapter 3 examines デｴW ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ Iﾗﾐゲデヴ┌Iデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW けTｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉSげ ;ﾐS ｷデゲ 
subjugation in transnational financial regulatory institutions such as the BWIs, through the 
Iﾗﾉﾗﾐｷ;ﾉ WﾐIﾗ┌ﾐデWヴが ;ﾐS デｴW ｪ;ヮ HWデ┘WWﾐ デｴｷゲ ｴｷゲデﾗヴｷI;ﾉ ヴW;ﾉｷデ┞ ;ﾐS IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘げゲ ヮヴﾗﾏｷゲW 
of universality, sovereign State equality, and egalitarianism.  
Third, immanent critique emphasizes the indeterminacy and contradictions inherent in the 
ideologies and their related technologies and practices, thereby upsetting their cognitive hold 
underpinning power asymmetries, and stimulates reflection on the unrealized potential within 
the normative ideas. In this effort, Chapter 6, for example, discusses the indeterminacies and 
contradictions inherent in credit information sharing technologies that ideologically legitimate 
                                                          
77 Marks (n 38) 115. 
78 ‘ﾗHWヴデ J Aﾐデﾗﾐｷﾗが けIﾏﾏ;ﾐWﾐデ Cヴｷデｷケ┌W ;ゲ デｴW CﾗヴW ﾗa CヴｷデｷI;ﾉ TｴWﾗヴ┞ぎ Iデゲ Oヴｷｪｷﾐゲ ;ﾐS DW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデゲ ｷﾐ HWｪWﾉが 
M;ヴ┝ ;ﾐS CﾗﾐデWﾏヮﾗヴ;ヴ┞ Tｴﾗ┌ｪｴデげ ふヱΓΒヱぶ ンヲ TｴW Bヴｷデｷゲｴ Jﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉ ﾗa “ﾗIｷﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ンンヰが ンンΒく 
79 Tｴｷゲ aヴ;ﾏW┘ﾗヴﾆ ｷゲ SWヴｷ┗WS aヴﾗﾏ Tｴﾗﾏヮゲﾗﾐげゲ ﾏWデｴﾗSﾗﾉﾗｪ┞が ;ゲ ;S;ヮデWS H┞ “┌ゲ;ﾐ M;ヴﾆゲく “WW Tｴﾗﾏヮゲﾗﾐ ふﾐ 
50) 58; See also Marks (n 38); See also Susan Marks, The Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, 
Democracy, and the Critique of Ideology (Oxford University Press 2003). 
80 See Marks (n 38) 115; As argued by Besta and Stams, the deconstructive methodology of immanent critique 




and constitute liberalized interest rate markets as efficient, and the possibility of establishing 
alternative technological arrangements within consumer credit markets.  
Fourth, immanent critique inspires emancipatory (political) action. By emphasizing the 
indeterminate nature of the ideological and performative power of the ideational 
infrastructure of the global financial markets, the thesis invites States, social movements, and 
TWAIL practitioners to harness these powers in the contestation of global financialization and 
transnational regulatory neoliberalism.81 This includes Cｴ;ヮデWヴ ヵげs discussion of the need for 
reconstituting ﾗa デｴW ﾉWｪ;ﾉ IﾗﾐIWヮデ ﾗa けヮヴﾗヮWヴデ┞げが デﾗ ヴWIﾗｪﾐｷゲW ｷデゲ ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ;ゲヮWIデゲ ;ﾐS ヴWﾉｷ;ﾐIW ﾗﾐ 
State regulation, and also the Chapter 6 recommendations on the need to re-code the 
technological algorithms that drive neoliberal economic rationality in the digital financial 
economy. Thus, while recognising the conceptual value of, for example, the Rule of Law, in 
financial markets, the discussion focuses not so much on the rationality of the mainstream 
discourses but rather their immanent critique.  
Ideational Performativity as Political Praxis 
Second, the performativity of ideas, practices and technologies, especially with reference to 
economic theory, is applied with, on the one hand, an explicit recognition of the political 
context of its working, while, on the other hand, appreciating the indeterminate nature that 
makes any idea with a non-liberal orientation capable of performing its assertions. In other 
words, the argument for the performative power of neoclassical economics in global and 
ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲ ｷゲ ﾐﾗデ デﾗ WﾐSﾗヴゲW デｴW SｷゲIｷヮﾉｷﾐW ;ゲ ﾐWIWゲゲ;ヴｷﾉ┞ けゲﾗ┌ﾐSげ ゲIｷWﾐIW デｴ;デ Iﾗﾐゲデヴ┌Iデゲ 
perfect markets, but merely to recognize it as the mainstream theoretical paradigm of the 
moment. The thesis acknowledges the explicit and implicit political, economic and military 
efforts that have been deployed by States, transnational regulators, civil society, and market 
participants to mainstream neoclassical economics, and to enable its performativity.  
Consequently, the thesis argues that other heterodox theoretical approaches to economics, 
law and technology have performative potential, especially when enrolled into the political 
resources that have historically sustained neoliberal hegemony. The thesis thus demonstrates 
the potential for assemblages between weaker versions of more politically-oriented 
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structuralist (neo-Marxist) approaches and less politically-oriented post-structuralist (Actor-
Network Theory) approaches to the study of globally-connected financial markets. 
Collapsing the Global-Local Dichotomy in Financial Markets 
Third, the choice of the Kenya and IMF case studies reflects the intention to demonstrate the 
manifestation of ideational power at both the local level, as advocated by the Actor-Network 
Theory ゲIｴﾗﾗﾉ ｷﾐ ｷデゲ けﾐWデ┘ﾗヴﾆげ ﾏWデ;ヮｴﾗヴゲが ;ﾐS デｴW ｪﾉﾗH;ﾉ ﾉW┗Wﾉが ;ゲ ;S┗ﾗI;デWS H┞ デｴW 
structuralist/neo-M;ヴ┝ｷゲデ ゲIｴﾗﾗﾉゲ デｴ;デ Wﾏヮｴ;ゲｷ┣W ; けゲ┌ヮWヴゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴWげく Tｴ┌ゲが ; ゲデ┌S┞ ﾗa デｴW 
KWﾐ┞;げゲ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デW ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ SWH;デW I;ヮデ┌ヴWゲ デｴW ﾉﾗI;ﾉ ﾏanifestation of the ideological and 
performative power of ideas in the domestic lending market, while the study of the Bretton 
Woods Institutions (BWIs) demonstrates the impact of the global on the local, and the local on 
the global. Collapsing this global-local distinction is important for demonstrating the potential 
of performative financial markets practices in Nairobi having global influence, as much as the 
neoliberal financial markets practices of Wall Street in the US are global.  
Kenya as a Case Study Representation of the Third World 
L;ゲデﾉ┞が デｴW IｴﾗｷIW ﾗa KWﾐ┞;げゲ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲ ;ゲ ; I;ゲW ゲデ┌S┞ ﾗﾐ デｴW ヴﾗﾉW ﾗa WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIが ﾉWｪ;ﾉ 
and technological ideas on the regulatory reform debate and process, is informed by the 
Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴ┞げゲ ┌ﾐｷケ┌W Iｴ;ヴ;IデWヴｷゲデｷIゲが ;ゲ related to the research questions. Kenya is a Third World 
economy and a post-colonial State that has been subjected to Bretton Woods Iﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐゲげ 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), Poverty Reduction Strategy Programs (PRSPs) and 
other market liberalization reforms over the last 40 years.  
Kenya is also a study in contradiction. On the one hand, its financial markets regulators, 
supervisors and policy makers have accepted and implemented the BWI market liberalization 
orthodoxy without much contestation. On the other hand, the country has, at least since the 
2003 Ministerial meeting in Cancun, become an active member ﾗa TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS “デ;デWゲげ 
negotiation of the World Trade Organizationげゲ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ｪﾉﾗH;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ;ｪWﾐS;, including the 
liberalization of financial services under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
treaty.  
As one of the emerging economic powers in Africa, and with a rapidly developing financial 
market, Kenya presents a relevant case study for the triumph of regulatory neoliberalism within 
financial markets, and at the same time, active political contestation of its domestic market 




デｴW IｴﾗｷIW ﾗa I;ゲW ゲデ┌S┞ ｷゲ デｴ;デ KWﾐ┞;げゲ ｴｷゲデﾗヴｷI;ﾉが ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉが WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIが ;ﾐS ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ S┞ﾐ;ﾏｷIゲ Sﾗ 
not necessarily represent the majority or all of the Third World countries, and therefore the 
relevance of some of the findings may be restricted to its context.    
4. Key Contributions 
The objective of this thesis is to contribute to the already rich academic literature on the power 
of ideas in global neoliberal hegemony. 
First, the thesis demonstrates the ideological and performative role of the ideational 
ｷﾐaヴ;ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴW ﾗa aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲ ｷﾐ KWﾐ┞;げゲ IヴWSｷデ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデく Iデ ｷﾉﾉ┌ゲデヴ;デWゲ デｴW Iﾗ-constitutive 
role of the rule of law, macro-econometric modelling, and credit information sharing 
technology in deepening the power asymmetries between lenders and borrowers, and thus 
reproducing high interest rates and high indebtedness. More importantly, the thesis 
demonstrates the reproduction of regulatory neoliberalism in Kenya and other Third World 
countries through the ideational infrastructure of financial markets. 
Second, the thesis maps out the theoretical and conceptual advantages and new insights 
generated from adopting an interdisciplinary approach to the study of international financial 
law and national regulation using TWAIL, Critical Theory, Actor-Network Theory and 
Performativity Theory. This includes, on the one hand, the structural, global, macro-level pillars 
of neoliberal hegemony, and on the other hand, the local, micro-level hybrid associations that 
form the building blocks that ensure durability of the global hegemonic structures. Critical 
Theory demonstrates the political economy of ideology, while ANT and performativity 
approaches demonstrate the power and mechanics of socio-technical assemblages. 
Third, the thesis articulates the complex, co-constitutive, and reflexive relationship between 
neoclassical economic theory, doctrines of legal formalism, technological ideas, and their 
related practices and artefacts in contemporary financial markets. Understanding the 
integrated nature of the ideational infrastructure of regulatory neoliberalism sheds more light 
into the resilience of neoliberal regulatory philosophy, despite Third World contestation. 
Fourth, the thesis contributes to the various studies on TWAIL, by suggesting how Third World 
contestation of transnational financial regulatory neoliberalism can harness the ideological and 
performative power of economic, legal and technological ideas, practices and artefacts, 




approach that focusses not only on legal norms, but also economic and technological ideas and 
practices, considering the increasing embedding of contested ideologies in technological 
arrangements. TWAIL praxis should also encompass performative projects aimed at 
constituting alternative local and global financial markets and related regulatory structures that 
are based on Third World normative concerns, including equity, equality and justice.    
5. Chapter Summaries 
The key contributions to the literature on Third World contestation of transnational regulatory 
neoliberalism are explored in more detail throughout the following six chapters  
Third World Contestation of Transnational Financial Regulation and the Reproduction of 
Regulatory Neoliberalism  
Chapter 1 examines the economic, legal and technological ideas that were enrolled in 
successfully countering Third World contestation of the transnational financial regulatory 
order. The discussion demonstrates the various ways in which neoliberal hegemony has 
metamorphosed, reconstituted and reinvented itself in key revolutionary moments, and thus 
secured its continuity, especially in Third World countries. The discussion concludes that 
ideological and performative power of neoliberal philosophy and practice has been key to the 
resilience of regulatory neoliberalism, especially after the 2008 crisis, and recommends that 
TWAIL practitioners focus their attention on the power of ideas and technical practices in 
counter-hegemonic praxis in International Law.  
Theorizing the Role of Legal, Economic and Technological Ideas and Practices in the 
Reproduction of Neoliberal Financial Markets  
Chapter 2 outlines the eclectic theoretical framework for articulating the ideological and 
performative power of economic, legal and technological ideas in reproducing regulatory 
neoliberalism in Third World countries. It demonstrates the theoretical possibilities of 
aゲゲWﾏHﾉ;ｪWゲ HWデ┘WWﾐ CヴｷデｷI;ﾉ TｴWﾗヴ┞げゲ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ Iヴｷデｷケ┌W ﾗa WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIゲが ﾉ;┘ ;ﾐS デWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪ┞が ﾗﾐ 
the one hand, and Performativity Theory and Actor-Network Theory, on the other hand. The 
discussion demonstrates the co-constitutive nature of the various ideas, practices and 
materialities that underpin neoliberal philosophy, and International Law, thereby making a 
case for Third World contestation to focus not only on legal but also economic and 




The Agency of Ideas and Practices within Bretton Woods Institutions 
Chapter 3 examines the ideological and performative role of economic, legal and technological 
ｷSW;ゲ ;ﾐS ヮヴ;IデｷIWゲ ｷﾐ SWデWヴﾏｷﾐｷﾐｪ デｴW IMF ;ﾐS WﾗヴﾉS B;ﾐﾆげゲ ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ ヴﾗﾉW ｷﾐ デヴ;ﾐゲﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ 
finance. Departing from the conventiﾗﾐ;ﾉ ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴ;ﾉｷゲデ W┝ヮﾉ;ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW BWIゲげ ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲｴｷヮ 
with the Third World as determined by US structural power (the Treasury-Wall Street Complex), 
the discussion conceptualizes these international financial institutions as sites for active 
ideational and ideological contestation, legitimation, and diffusion to Third World States and 
markets. In this conceptualization, the discussion focusses on the role of ideas in producing and 
fixing meanings of social reality, producing identities and respective capacities that 
consequently enable and constrain the action of individuals, institutions, States and other 
actants in the global financial markets.  
The Agency of Neoclassical Economics in the Constitution and Regulation of the Kenyan 
Interest Rates Markets 
Chapter 4 examines the ideological and performative role of neoclassical economic theories 
and related practices such as macroeconomic modelling in restricting how the phenomenon of 
high consumer lending rates should be described, and the feasible regulatory responses 
available to Kenyan legislators, regulators and policy makers.  
TｴW Iｴ;ヮデWヴ W┝;ﾏｷﾐWゲ ﾐWﾗIﾉ;ゲゲｷI;ﾉ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIゲげ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ ﾉWｪｷデｷﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa KWﾐ┞;げゲ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ 
ﾏ;ヴﾆWデ ﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ┌ﾐSWヴ BWI “APゲが ;ﾐS ｷデげゲ IﾗﾐIW;ﾉｷﾐｪ ﾗa ｴｷｪｴ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デWゲ ;ゲ ; 
consequence of the SAPs. It also examines the efforts of democratically-elected legislators to 
politicize high interest rates as a systemic flaw of unregulated financialized economies, and the 
oppositional efforts of regulatory technocrats and economists to frame and insulate it as a 
technical and economic issue to be responded to through the prescriptions of New Institutional 
Economics, that is, establishing lending market institutions such as credit reference bureaus 
and information-sharing. 
The Agency of the Rule of Law in the Constitution and Regulation of the Kenyan Credit Market 
Cｴ;ヮデWヴ ヵ W┝;ﾏｷﾐWゲ デｴW ヴﾗﾉW ﾗa デｴW け‘┌ﾉW ﾗa L;┘げ ;ゲ ﾉWｪ;ﾉ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞が ;ﾐS ┌ﾐヮ;Iﾆゲ ｷデゲ IﾗﾐIW;ﾉWS 
constitutive and performative power in the financial markets. The discussion explores the rule 
ﾗa ﾉ;┘げゲ WﾐデヴWﾐIｴｷﾐｪ ﾗa ﾐWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉ デヴ;ﾐゲﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ ゲデ;ﾐS;ヴSゲ ｷﾐ デｴW Kenyan financial 
sector, through various BWI loan conditionalities and reform programs. Even though the Rule 




about nature, role and functioning of markets, and economic development. In addition, 
through its reifying and naturalising strategies, this ideology obfuscates the role of law in 
constituting market relations, shaping identities and respective capacities to act.  
Consequently, the discussion demonstrates how the rule of law as a legal concept acts upon 
policy paradigms of financial market policy makers and regulators, legislators and other market 
stakeholders, thereby delineating, and restricting the possibilities for constructing (through 
regulation) fairer and affordable interest rate markets in Kenya. The rule of law indeed has a 
positive impact in the deepening of financial markets, and the provision of credit. However, it 
also has the potential to reproduce systemic inequalities in liberalised financial markets. 
Credit Information Sharing Technologies as Neoliberal Socio-Technical Agencements 
This chapter is the third instalment of the Kenya case study, and examines the technification of 
the interest rates market, that is, the enrolment, adoption or imposition of technical methods 
into the overarching process of economisation and juridification of the lending market. 
Technification has occurred in the adoption and operationalisation of credit scoring and credit 
reporting technologies and practices as a policy and regulatory response in addressing the 
problem of high interest rates and high consumer indebtedness in Kenya. The discussion 
demonstrates the nature of credit scoring and reporting (or Credit Information Sharing) 
technologies as Socio-Technical Assemblages or Agencements (STAs) of neoliberal deregulatory 
politics, neoclassical economic theories, formal-liberal legal norms, and technological 
rationalities and related practices. As STAs, these CIS technologies are material and discursive 
assemblages that have an agential power to intervene in the constitution and performance of 
the lending market.  
The discussion demonstrates the neoliberal ideological scripting of CIS technologies in 
IﾗﾐIWヮデ┌;ﾉｷゲｷﾐｪ けIヴWSｷデ SWa;┌ﾉデ ヴｷゲﾆげが ;ﾐS ﾉWｪｷデｷﾏ;デｷﾐｪ ┌ﾐS┌ﾉ┞ ｴｷｪｴ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デWゲ ;ﾐS ｴｷｪｴ 
indebtedness as a private problem of financially imprudent, untrustworthy and unethical debt 
consumers, while prescribing interest rate deregulation and consumer credit information 
sharing as the best regulatory solutions. CIS ideologically conceals its deepening of power 
asymmetries between lenders and borrowers, and reproduction of high interest rates and 







This chapter summarises the main conclusions of the various chapters, and recommendations 
for future research. Echoing the call by TWAIL practitioners to engage in praxis, that is, the 
application of theories and philosophies of TWAIL, Third World States, and Social Movements, 
into practical social action, the thesis calls for the Third World to focus on actively 
conceptualizing and implementing alternative visions of the international and local economic 
order financial order. This includes not only actively challenging the neoliberal ideas 
underpinning the current hegemonic international order, but also conceptualizing, articulating 




















Third World Contestation of The Transnational Financial Regulatory Order, Economic Crises, 
and the Reproduction of Regulatory Neoliberalism 
1. Introduction 
This thesis seeks to examine how the transnational ideational infrastructure of global financial 
markets has impacted on the regulatory reforms within the transnational and Third World 
financial regulatory orders. It argues that this ideational infrastructure legitimates, constitutes 
and performs neoliberal market economies, and undergirds the related practices of regulatory 
neoliberalism, while concealing the possibilities available for constituting alternative global and 
local markets.    
This chapter explores the first research sub-ケ┌Wゲデｷﾗﾐぎ ┘ｴ┞ ｴ;ゲ デｴW TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉSげゲ ｴｷゲデﾗヴｷI;ﾉ 
contestation failed to radically transform the transnational financial regulatory order? Various 
reasons have been advanced for the resilience of regulatory neoliberalism and the globalization 
of financial markets, especially in Third World countries, despite the successive financial crises 
that have de-legitimated the logic of regulatory neoliberalism. They are roughly grouped into 
four related factors: the structural power of neoliberal hegemony; the material basis of 
neoliberal financial markets; Third World transnational capitalist class (TCC) interests; and the 
ideational power of neoliberalism.  
This chapter provides a historical account of the successes and set-backs to Third World 
contestation, and outlines the key moments of rapture, crisis, reconstruction and neoliberal 
continuity. While also highlighting the other three related factors (structural power, materially 
embedded power, and Third World elite interests), the discussion focuses on some of the key 
ideas and technological practices that have been instrumental in the construction of 
transnational regulatory hegemony. The chapter argues that despite Third World contestation 
and the periodic financial crises, these relatively autonomous ideas and technological practices 
continue to exert ideological and performative power within global financial markets and 
related transnational regulatory institutions.  
Section 2 examines Third World resistance across five key moments of rapture: establishment 
of the New International Economic Order; the 1973 oil crisis and collapse of the Bretton Woods 




international financial architecture; and the 2008 global financial crisis. It argues that 
ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ ﾐWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉｷゲﾏげゲ hegemony reconstituted and reinvented itself through discourses 
on the universality of International Law, economic theories of Comparative Advantage and 
division of labour, human rights, governance, the Rule of Law, market institutions, 
technological rationality, and macroprudential regulation. Section 3 takes stock of the reasons 
advanced for the failure of the post-2008 global financial regulatory reform process, and argues 
that the ideological and performative power of ideas has emerged as a key factor, alongside 
the other structural factors. Section 4 concludes by urging the Third World, including TWAIL, 
States, and social movements, to give adequate focus to the ideological and performative 
power of ideas, technologies and related practices, if it is to achieve a radical overhaul of the 
transnational financial regulatory order. 
2. Third World Contestation of the Transnational Financial Regulatory Order 
The relationship between the Third World and the transnational financial regulatory order, 
since its 1944 establishment, continues to evolve. TｴW けTｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉSげ ｴ;ゲ ゲｷﾏ┌ﾉデ;ﾐWﾗ┌ゲﾉ┞ HWWﾐ ; 
ゲ┌HﾃWIデ ;ﾐS ;ﾐ ﾗHﾃWIデ ﾗa ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ﾉ;┘が ;ﾐS ;ﾉゲﾗ けｷﾐゲ┌ヴｪWﾐデげ ┘ｷデｴｷﾐ デｴW デヴ;nsnational 
governance order.82 The role of Third World resistance in the narrative of the International Law 
of Finance has been under-theorised, despite shaping the evolution and expansion of the 
transnational regulatory orderが デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ デｴW ﾉ;デデWヴげゲ ﾗヮヮﾗゲｷデｷon to, capitulation to, and co-
option of, Third World demands.83 This thesis ;Sﾗヮデゲ ‘;ﾃ;ｪﾗヮ;ﾉげゲ IﾗﾐIWヮデ┌;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW TｴｷヴS 
World as referring to post-colonial States, peasants, social movements, and their global allies84, 
and adapts it into a typology of three overlapping and inter-related modes of resistance of the 
transnational financial regulatory order: State contestation; TWAIL contestation; and Social 
Movements. 
                                                          
82 B“ Cｴｷﾏﾐｷが けTｴW P;ゲデが PヴWゲWﾐデ ;ﾐS F┌デ┌ヴW ﾗa IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘ぎ A CヴｷデｷI;ﾉ TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS Aヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴげ ふヲヰヰΑぶ Β 
MWﾉHく Jく Iﾐデげﾉ Lく ヴΓΓが ヵヰヱく Cｴｷﾏﾐｷ IﾗﾐデWﾐSゲ デｴ;デ デｴW Iｷ┗ｷﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐっH;ヴH;ヴｷ;ﾐ SｷIｴﾗデﾗﾏ┞ ;デ デｴW ｴW;ヴデ ﾗa 
international law and its imperial origins, alienated it from the peoples of the Third World, making them and 
their territory objects rather than subjects of International Law. The moment the Third World became a 
subject of international law was at the point of complete subjugation, that is, surrendering sovereignty to 
colonial masters. 
83 B;ﾉ;ﾆヴｷゲｴﾐ;ﾐ ‘;ﾃ;ｪﾗヮ;ﾉが けFヴﾗm Resistance to Renewal: The Third World, Social Movements, and the 
E┝ヮ;ﾐゲｷﾗﾐ ﾗa IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Iﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐゲげ ふヲヰヰヰぶ ヴヱ H;ヴ┗;ヴS IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘ Jﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉ ヵヲΓが ヵンヲく TｴW ;┌デｴﾗヴ 
contends that the expansion and renewal of international institutions, and the architecture of contemporary 
ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ﾉ;┘が ゲｴﾗ┌ﾉS HW ┌ﾐSWヴゲデﾗﾗS ;ゲ Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デWS H┞ デｴW けIﾗﾐデｷﾐ┌ﾗ┌ゲ W┗ﾗI;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ;ﾐS ｷﾐデWヴ;Iデｷﾗﾐ ┘ｷデｴ 
デｴW I;デWｪﾗヴ┞ さTｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉSざが ┘ｴｷIｴ ｴ;ゲ ｷﾐIﾉ┌SWS ﾐﾗデ ﾗﾐﾉ┞ “デ;デWゲが H┌デ デｴWゲW “ﾗIｷ;ﾉ Mﾗ┗WﾏWﾐデゲげく 




TｴW aｷヴゲデ ;ゲゲWﾏHﾉ;ｪW ﾗa け“デ;デW IﾗﾐデWゲデ;デｷﾗﾐげ ヴWaWヴゲ デﾗ デｴW Sｷヮﾉﾗﾏ;デｷI Waaﾗヴデゲ H┞ TｴｷヴS World 
States and their related groups and State allies within the International Law system, to contest 
the hegemonic and neoliberal financial regulatory order through the institutional rules of 
International Law and related organizations. The second grouping, for which is conveniently 
appropriated the tag of TWAIL practitioners, refers to a diverse group of loosely-labelled 
international law practitioners (including lawyers, judges, academics, economists, and political 
scientists) who adopt a distinct Third World perspective to International Law. TWAIL 
practitioners engage in reflection, conceptualization, articulation, dissemination and legal 
operationalization of a Third World perspective of the imperial and exploitative relationship 
between International Law and Third World States, and a progressive vision of how this 
relationship can be reset for the benefit of the latter.85  
While what is referred to as TWAIL I was at its beginning part and parcel of Third World State 
contestation, the succeeding TWAIL II resistance has distinguished itself from State 
contestation. As discussed more elaborately in Section 3, this careful distancing of TWAIL II 
from the Third World State is a result of the realization that the latter: is compromised by class, 
race, gender and other conflicts and tensions; frequently resorts to violence, authoritarian 
tendencies; and often sides with interests that are oppositional to those of its citizens.86 In 
addition, State contestation of the international financial regulatory order is limited by: its 
being bound to the institutional and normative constraints as a State Party in international law; 
its ideological legitimation of international law and its institutions, e.g. through borrowing from 
the Bretton Woods institutions (BWIs)87; and the co-option of State elites into the neoliberal 
project. Consequently, TWAIL contestation of international law and its institutions comes from 
a recognition of its impact on the distribution of power between the Third World State and its 
Iｷデｷ┣Wﾐゲが ;ﾐS ;ﾉゲﾗ デｴ;デ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘ ゲｴﾗ┌ﾉS HW ｷﾐデWヴヮヴWデWS ;ﾐS W┗;ﾉ┌;デWS デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ けデｴW 
;Iデ┌;ﾉｷ┣WS W┝ヮWヴｷWﾐIW ﾗa デｴｷヴS ┘ﾗヴﾉS ヮWﾗヮﾉWが ヴ;デｴWヴ デｴ;ﾐ TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS “デ;デWゲげく88 
                                                          
85 Georges Abi-“;;Hが けTｴW TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS IﾐデWﾉﾉWIデ┌;ﾉ ｷﾐ Pヴ;┝ｷゲぎ Cﾗﾐaヴﾗﾐデ;デｷﾗﾐが P;ヴデｷIｷヮ;デｷﾗﾐが ﾗヴ OヮWヴ;デｷﾗﾐ HWｴｷﾐS 
EﾐWﾏ┞ LｷﾐWゲいげ (2016) 37 Third World Quarterly 1957, 1962. 
86 Aﾐデﾗﾐ┞ AﾐｪｴｷW ;ﾐS B“ Cｴｷﾏﾐｷが けTｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS Aヮヮヴﾗ;IｴWゲ デﾗ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘ ;ﾐS IﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉ ‘WゲヮﾗﾐゲｷHｷﾉｷデ┞ 
ｷﾐ IﾐデWヴﾐ;ﾉ CﾗﾐaﾉｷIデゲげ ふヲヰヰンぶ ヲ CｴｷﾐWゲW Jく ｷﾐデげﾉ Lく ΑΑが Βヲに83. 
87 Ngaire Woods, The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and Their Borrowers (Cornell University Press 
2006) 5. Woods argues that the persuasive influence of the Bretton Woods institutions is strongest when 
SW;ﾉｷﾐｪ ┘ｷデｴ け;HﾉW ;ﾐS ┘ｷﾉﾉｷﾐｪ ｷﾐデWヴﾉﾗI┌デﾗヴゲ ｷﾐ Hﾗヴヴﾗ┘ｷﾐｪ ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデゲげ ┘ｴﾗ ;ヴW ゲ┞ﾏヮ;デｴWデｷI デﾗ デｴW ﾉWﾐSWヴゲげ 
ﾐWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉ ヮﾗﾉｷIｷWゲが ;ﾐS ┘ｴﾗ ヴW┗Wﾉ ｷﾐ デｴW ヮﾗ┘Wヴ ;ﾐS ;┌デｴﾗヴｷデ┞ デｴ;デ IﾗﾏWゲ ┘ｷデｴ ｷﾏヮﾉWﾏWﾐデｷﾐｪ デｴW ﾉWﾐSWヴゲげ 
policies. 




Nevertheless, TWAIL contestation of the transnational financial order retains a strong linkage 
with the diplomatic initiatives of Third World States, as evidenced by the efforts of TWAIL I and 
Third World States to change the Sources Doctrine of International Law to include majority-
backed United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions, by making the latter binding.89 
TWAIL II ｴ;ゲ IヴｷデｷIｷゲWS ｷデゲ ヮヴWSWIWゲゲﾗヴゲげ ﾏｷゲヮﾉ;IWS a;ｷデｴ ｷﾐ デｴW ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ ﾗa ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ 
organizations such as the United Nations (UN) to usher in a just legal order, as this seemed to 
ignore, or failed to discern, the imperialist logic of international law institutions. Despite this 
criticism, TWAIL II recognises its role as not merely academic, but rather praxis, that is, the 
さ┘ｷﾉﾉWS ;Iデｷﾗﾐ H┞ ┘ｴｷIｴ ; デｴWﾗヴ┞ ﾗヴ ヮｴｷﾉﾗゲﾗヮｴ┞ HWIﾗﾏWゲ ヮヴ;IデｷI;ﾉ ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ;Iデｷ┗ｷデ┞ざく90  
TWAIL praxis therefore entails introducing new norms of international law in society, and 
デヴ;ﾐゲaﾗヴﾏｷﾐｪ デｴWﾏ ｷﾐデﾗ I┌ヴヴWﾐデ ヮヴ;IデｷIW ﾗa ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ﾉ;┘く TｴW ゲ┌IIWゲゲ ﾗa TWAILげゲ ヴWゲｷゲデ;ﾐIW 
to the transnational financial regulatory order デｴWヴWaﾗヴW SWヮWﾐSゲ ﾗﾐ ｷデゲ ヮヴ;IデｷデｷﾗﾐWヴゲげ 
engagement with Third World State and non-State contestation of International Law, including: 
litigating on behalf of Third World States or peoples; advising Third World States on diplomatic 
engagements; and participating as members of Third World State delegations and negotiating 
teams. In addition, it also entails engaging in international contestation as insiders of 
transnational financial institutions, e.g. employees, advisors, and consultants introducing new 
perspectives into the bureaucracies, and also as arbitrators, judges and members of 
ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ デヴｷH┌ﾐ;ﾉゲ ;ﾐS Iﾗ┌ヴデゲが ｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ デｴW WﾗヴﾉS B;ﾐﾆげゲ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ CWﾐデヴW aﾗヴ デｴW 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate 
Body.91 
The third assemblage of Third World resistance to international financial law and regulation is 
that of social movements. Rajagopal describes this group as including peasant rebellions, 
environmental and human rights movements, and their global allies, who participate in popular 
organizing as a result of their concerns as victims of the social and human costs of the policies, 
regulations and programs promoted and implemented by transnational financial institutions 
not only in Third World but also developed countries.92 Both Old Social Movements (OSMs) 
                                                          
89 ibid 81. 
90 Abi-Saab (n 85) 1961. 
91 For example, in 2017, Obiora Okafor, a TWAIL founder, accepted an appointment as the chairperson of the 
UN Human Rights Council Advisory Committee. “WW Yﾗヴﾆ Uﾐｷ┗Wヴゲｷデ┞が けPヴﾗaWゲゲﾗヴ OHｷﾗヴ; Oﾆ;aﾗヴ AヮヮﾗｷﾐデWS 
Cｴ;ｷヴヮWヴゲﾗﾐ ﾗa UN H┌ﾏ;ﾐ ‘ｷｪｴデゲ Cﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾉ AS┗ｷゲﾗヴ┞ CﾗﾏﾏｷデデWWげ ふOsgoode Hall Law School) 
<https://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/news/professor-obiora-okafor-appointed-chairperson-un-human-rights-
council-advisory-committee/> accessed 8 January 2018. 




concerned with the class implications of global capitalism on workers, and New Social 
Movements (NSMs) articulating new groups of oppression, e.g. gender and race, have engaged 
in popular resistance against transnational financial regulatory institutions and their State 
accomplices, and have, in the process, shaped the structure and normative content of 
transnational financial law and regulation, and its relationship with the Third World.93   
As this very truncated historical account of Third World resistance against the transnational 
financial regulatory order below demonstrates, these three groups are actually three aspects 
of a Third World whole, but are also at the same time oppositional, with differentiated and 
conflicting paradigms, aims, interests, and methodologies. The account of Third World 
contestation, and the resultant successes, failures and impact on the hegemonic regulatory 
projects looks at five key moments of rapture, crisis, hegemonic reconstruction and both liberal 
and neoliberal continuity. These five phases are: the 1960s clamour for and ultimate 
establishment of the New International Economic Order; the 1973 Oil Crisis, establishment of 
floating exchange rates and advent of IMF conditionalities; the 1989 end of the Cold War and 
WﾐデヴWﾐIｴﾏWﾐデ ﾗa デｴW W;ゲｴｷﾐｪデﾗﾐ CﾗﾐゲWﾐゲ┌ゲき デｴW ヱΓΓヰゲ WﾏWヴｪｷﾐｪ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲげ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ CヴｷゲWゲ ;ﾐS 
the establishment of the New International Financial Architecture; and the 2008 global 
financial crisis and the emergence of the macro-prudential regulatory agenda.   
2.1. Establishment of the New International Economic Order (NIEO)  
The North-South debate over the establishment of a NIEO was at once a negotiation of State, 
institutional and geographical interests, a debate about the aspired structure of global 
economic relations, and (more significantly) a Third World challenge to ﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉｷゲﾏげゲ intellectual 
hegemony in international law and international trade relations.94 The NIEO debate represents 
; ゲデヴ┌ｪｪﾉW HWデ┘WWﾐ TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS aﾗヴIWゲ ;ｷﾏｷﾐｪ デﾗ SWIﾗﾐゲデヴ┌Iデが ;ﾐS DW┗WﾉﾗヮWS “デ;デWゲげ Waaﾗヴデゲ デﾗ 
ideologically rejuvenate, at least two key ideologies: the universality of international law, and 
the rationality of liberal economic orthodoxy.  
                                                          
93 ibid 532に533. ‘;ﾃ;ｪﾗヮ;ﾉが aﾗヴ W┝;ﾏヮﾉWが IﾗﾐデWﾐSゲ デｴ;デ デｴW BWIゲげ IﾗﾐIWヴﾐゲ ┘ｷデｴ ヮﾗ┗Wヴデ┞が デｴW Wﾐ┗ｷヴﾗﾐﾏWﾐデが 
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TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS “デ;デWゲげ IﾗﾐデWゲデ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW transnational financial regulatory order dates back to 
their 1960s dissatisfaction with the ideology of ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ﾉWｪ;ﾉ ﾗヴSWヴげゲ putative, yet false, 
universality, and non-responsiveness to issues important to them, including global inequality 
and underdevelopment.95 For example, the Third World countries advocated for the 
establishment of UNCTAD as an institutional counter-weight to the market-oriented General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).96 Consequently, in concert with UNCTAD, Third World 
States called for a NIEO, whose offspring was ultimately the International Law of Development 
(ILD), which established new norms including the right to development, and the duty on States 
to cooperate on promoting development.97 The emergence of ILD changed the character of 
International Economic Law (IEL), and specifically International Financial Law in at least three 
key ways that nudged it towards actual universality. These included the shift from the law of 
co-existence to the law of cooperation; the practice of multilateral rather than only bilateral 
negotiations and agreements; and the use of consensus rather than majority voting, in the 
adoption of resolutions by International Institutions.98 
Gamani Corea, a leading economist from the global South, who served as Secretary General of 
UNCTAD (1974-1984), actively institutionalized Third World misgivings about the ideological 
nature of International Law and liberal economic orthodoxy, especially the theories of 
Comparative Advantage, and the international division of labour between the raw commodity-
exporting Third World, and the manufactured goods-exporting developed economies.99 This 
ヴWゲ┌ﾉデWS ｷﾐ UNCTADげゲ Wゲデ;HﾉｷゲｴﾏWﾐデ ﾗa デｴW IﾐデWｪヴ;デWS Pヴﾗｪヴ;ﾏ aﾗヴ CﾗﾏﾏﾗSｷデｷes (Corea Plan), 
which was a mechanism for international intervention in international commodity trading and 
stabilization commodity prices, largely to the advantage of Third World economies. Reflecting 
the intellectual attitudes regarding the irrationality of any theories that departed from 
liberalismげゲ IヴWSﾗ ﾗa aヴWW ｪﾉﾗH;ﾉｷ┣WS ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲ, this initiative was widely criticized in the 
economic orthodoxy circles, including by economist Harry Johnson, who derided the 
さWIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ｷﾉﾉｷデWヴ;I┞ ﾗa デｴW UNCTAD WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ゲWIヴWデ;ヴｷ;デざく100 
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The NIEO demands and concerns in relation to the international monetary order were more 
specific. They questioned the ヴﾗﾉW ﾗa デｴW U“ ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ｴWｪWﾏﾗﾐ┞が ｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ デｴW Sﾗﾉﾉ;ヴげゲ ゲデ;デ┌ゲ 
as international reserve currency, in acute instability of the international monetary system, and 
the adverse impact that the resultant balance-of-payment deficits and international liquidity 
were having on Third World economies.101 In addition, Third World States called for radical 
reforms to the structure, functioning, policy orientation, and actual operations of the IMF. They 
argued that it had become irrelevant to the mission of realizing an orderly international 
monetary system, and had become an instrument of the Group of Ten countries in the 
hegemonic domination of Third World countries.102 They also contended that IMF policy 
orthodoxies of balance-of-payment adjustments through austerity measures (demand 
contraction, wage control and exchange-rate adjustment) did not recognize the structural 
differences between developed and developing countries, and thus not only limited the 
prospects for Third World economic development, but also frustrated the wider goals of the 
NIEO.103  
These calls for a radical overhaul of the international financial system was met by politically-
engaged intellectual efforts of networks of political, business and academic individuals and 
institutions. One faction, coalescing around the Trilateral Commission, engaged in an outright, 
realist-ゲIｴﾗﾗﾉ SWaWﾐIW ﾗa ﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉ ｴWｪWﾏﾗﾐ┞が H┞ aﾗI┌ゲゲｷﾐｪ ﾗﾐ けWaaｷIｷWﾐI┞げ ;ゲ ;ﾐ ;ゲヮｷヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ 
economic norm.104 It also argued for governmental intervention only in support of the 
liberalized global markets, and supported hegemonic control of international financial 
institution by developed countries, as a useful bully pulpit to ensure compliance by developing 
countries.105  
A less hawkish wing of these networks engaged in ideological manoeuvring, by expressing 
support for efforts to alleviate the underdevelopment and poverty in Third World countries, 
while essentially supporting the systemic status quo espoused by the Trilateralists.106 This 
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ideological manoeuvring thus sought to defang the NIEO of its radical demands, by offering 
poverty reduction and economic growth programs, which were in fact later unveiled under IMF 
and World Bank lending programsが ;ﾐS ┘ｴｷIｴ Sヴ;ﾏ;デｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ W┝ヮ;ﾐSWS デｴWゲW ｷﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐゲげ ヮﾗ┘Wヴゲ 
over Third World economies. This is discussed in greater detail in section 2.2 below, and in 
Chapter 3. 
During this period, TWAIL I scholars, including RP Anand, Mohammed Bedjaoui, Georges Abi-
Saab, S.P. Sinha, Negandra Singh and Christopher Weeramantry articulated デｴW TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉSげゲ 
suspicions of International Lawげゲ claims to universality.107 They indicted International law for 
legitimizing imperial and colonial oppression of the Third World, by denying them legal 
sovereignty, and upholding unequal treaties.108 They also critiqued the Eurocentric nature of 
international law, and identified various legal and normative doctrines and principles within 
Third World legal systems and cultures, which could arguably enrich and make International 
Law more just.109 By undertaking immanent critique of International Law, TWAIL I recognised 
the promise that the UN system held for the achievement of sovereign equality, non-
intervention and economic liberation of the Third World States, as demonstrated by its 
articulation of, alongside diplomatic efforts, the NIEO.110  
Nationalist, anti-authoritarian and anti-neoliberal protests in Third World States and abroad 
also provided a crucial political context for the legitimation of the novel demands of the NIEO 
within international institutions.111 For example, the anti-colonial and apartheid movements of 
the 1960s and 1970s pushed the UN to give legal legitimacy to the Third World claims to 
sovereignty over national resources and foreign investments. Thus, even social movements 
recognized and converted international law and its related institutions into an arena of political 
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struggle for equity, democratization, accountability, and actual universality, despite their 
imperial origins and operating logic.112 
 Within TWAIL, opinion remains divided on whether the NIEO was a success or failure. Abi-Saab 
notes that the NIEO legal blueprint remains unimplemented largely because Third World 
countriesげ ;デデWﾏヮデゲ to include UNGA majority resolutions as binding sources of International 
L;┘ ┘WヴW aヴ┌ゲデヴ;デWS H┞ SW┗WﾉﾗヮWS Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴｷWゲげ ヮﾗゲｷデｷ┗ｷゲデ ;ヴｪ┌ﾏWﾐデゲ ヴWｪ;ヴSｷﾐｪ ゲﾗ┌ヴIWゲ ﾗa 
international law, and consent.113 Sornarajah, nevertheless, contends that despite the 
declaration of the death of the NIEO project, its principles live on through important changes 
effected in the practice of States. He concedes, however, that the NIEO has been eclipsed and 
made dormant by the 1990s rise of neoliberalism in the Third World, though it could still be 
reactivated through hegemonic power shifts and the promotion of justice-based norms.114   
2.2. The 1973 Oil Crisis, Establishment of Floating Exchange Rates, and Advent of IMF 
Conditionalities      
This period is characterized by the emergence of the political ideology of neoliberalism, and a 
new rationality of neoclassical economics, which emphasized the scientific nature of financial 
markets, and the need for an apolitical and technocratic approach to their regulation, ushering 
in the era of regulatory neoliberalism. This refers to idealized Anglo-American regulatory 
practices, including technocratic, apolitical, market-oriented and (politically) independent 
financial regulatory agencies.115 This era was preceded by a series of successive events in the 
1970s, which coincided to change the character of the international financial markets, 
transnational financial law, and their relationship to the Third World. The 1971 replacement of 
the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates for floating exchange rates (the けNixon 
shockげ), and the 1973 oil crisis occasioned by geopolitical conflicts between the West and 
Middle East, precipitated global financial market volatility. Consequently, this increased the 
vulnerability of Third World countries to market swings, as they suffered balance-of-payment 
and foreign exchange reserve deficits.  
                                                          
112 ‘ｷIｴ;ヴS F;ﾉﾆが B;ﾉ;ﾆヴｷゲｴﾐ;ﾐ ‘;ﾃ;ｪﾗヮ;ﾉ ;ﾐS J;Iケ┌WﾉｷﾐW “デW┗Wﾐゲが けIﾐデヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐげ ｷﾐ ‘ｷIｴ;ヴS F;ﾉﾆが B;ﾉ;ﾆヴｷゲｴﾐ;ﾐ 
Rajagopal and Jacqueline Stevens (eds), International Law and the Third World: Reshaping Justice (Routledge 
2008) 6.113 Anghie and Chimni (n 86) 81. 
113 Anghie and Chimni (n 86) 81. 
114 M “ﾗヴﾐ;ヴ;ﾃ;ｴが けOﾐ Fｷｪｴデｷﾐｪ aﾗヴ GﾉﾗH;ﾉ J┌ゲデｷIWぎ TｴW ‘ﾗﾉW ﾗa ; TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘┞Wヴげ ふヲヰヱヶぶ ンΑ 
Third World Quarterly 1972, 1976. 




These events foregrounded the emergence of neoliberalism as a political ideology and 
neoclassical economic orthodoxy as economic policy in developed countries, with the 1979 and 
1980 rise to power of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the UK and US, respectively, 
with the political mandate to curb trade unionism, deregulate the economy, and especially the 
national and global financial markets.116 The IMF capitalised on the vulnerabilities wrought by 
financial market volatility to expand its mandate to lending to Third World countries suffering 
balance of payment deficits, thereby extending its institutional power through conditionalities, 
that is, lending on the condition that the borrower countries implemented packages of 
neoliberal economic reforms, informed by the neoclassical economic theories.  
These policy reforms included domestic economic liberalization, and the roll-back of the 
developmental State model, which fundamentally closed oaa デｴW TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS “デ;デWゲげ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ 
space and ability to respond to their citizens economic and political welfare concerns, while 
deepening the suffering of vulnerable citizens.117 However, the ideology of the rationality of 
neoclassical economic theories, and a belief in the expertise of IMF technocrats, legitimated 
the necessity of these adverse impacts, if the Third World was to achieve poverty reduction 
and economic development. Third World bureaucrats uncritically accepted and implemented 
these policy proposals.  
TｴW IMFげゲ ゲ┘ｷデIｴ デﾗ ｷデゲ ﾐW┘ ヴﾗﾉW ;ゲ ﾉWﾐSWヴ デﾗ TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS “デ;デWゲ ｴ;S ゲｷｪﾐｷaｷI;ﾐデ ｷﾏヮﾉｷI;デｷﾗﾐゲが 
since it was the basis for the production and reproduction of hegemonic power relations with 
its borrowers. For example, its mandate expanded to include economic growth as an objective. 
Iﾐ ;SSｷデｷﾗﾐが デｴW ﾉﾗ;ﾐ IﾗﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデｷWゲ Sヴ;ﾏ;デｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ W┝ヮ;ﾐSWS デｴW IMFげゲ AヴデｷIﾉW IV ゲ┌ヴ┗Wｷﾉﾉ;ﾐIW 
role, to the extent that the transnational regulator embedded its own technocrats within Third 
WﾗヴﾉS Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴｷWゲげ Iｷ┗ｷﾉ ゲWヴ┗ｷIW bureaucracies, and also intensified the reporting mechanisms. Its 
programmatic interests in good governance also meant that デｴW IMFげゲ mandate expanded to 
broad areas of non-economic issues, including poverty alleviation, income distribution, 
environmental protection, anti-corruption campaigns, and reduction of military expenditure.118  
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Thus, in light of this increasingly political nature of the involvement of Bretton Woods 
Institutions (BWIs) in Third World economies, the democratic reform and accountability of 
these institutions, and the opposition to the neoliberal loan conditionalities became exigent 
;ゲヮWIデゲ ﾗa TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS “デ;デWゲげ ヴWゲｷゲデ;ﾐIW デﾗ デｴW transnational financial regulatory order. Third 
World States specifically contested the replacement of conventional loan collateral with policy 
conditionalities, the inadequate amount of financial resources provided by the BWIs to these 
poor countries. In addition, Third World countries questioned the distribution of institutional 
decision-making power between them developed economies, within the governance organs of 
the lender.119 However, the diffusing ideologically-legitimated infrastructure of neoclassical 
economic rationality and neoliberal politics was not confronted by the Third World States. 
In the case of the IMF, Third World countries registered some modest, albeit not radical, 
successes, including: the increase in allocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) to Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs) from 14% to 28%; an increase in the allocation of voting power of 
LDCs from 22% in 1947 to 35.8 in the 1980s; an increase in the number of Third World executive 
directors from 5/13 in 1947 to 11/22 in 1983; and the appointment of the 1972 Committee of 
Twenty, to study reform of the international monetary system (consisting of 9 Third World 
members) in place of the earlier Committee of Ten (exclusively from developed countries).120 
Nevertheless, despite these changes, the developed economies still retained significant control 
of the IMF, and the latter retained a significant influence over Third World States through its 
lending conditionalities. 
The 1980s implementation of the IMF-sanctioned neoliberal reform packages in Third World 
economies, in the form of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), represented the 
operationalization of regulatory neoliberalism, and had a severe impact on the poor and 
vulnerable citizens forming the majority of the respective countries.121 This was primarily due 
to the Third World State withdrawal from or reduced engagement in the provision and funding 
of essential public services such as health, education, and agriculture.122 This resulted in 
ヮﾗヮ┌ﾉ;ヴ ;ｪｷデ;デｷﾗﾐ H┞ Iｷデｷ┣Wﾐゲ ;ｪ;ｷﾐゲデ デｴWｷヴ ヴWゲヮWIデｷ┗W ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデゲげ “APゲが ;ﾐS ;ﾉゲﾗ ｪﾉﾗH;ﾉ 
campaigns against the BWIs loan conditionalities, which were critiqued for ignoring the social 
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dimensions of economic development.123 The IMF and the World Bank responded to these 
ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ﾏﾗ┗WﾏWﾐデゲげ ;ｪｷデ;デｷﾗﾐ H┞ WﾏHヴ;Iｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS ;Sﾗヮデｷﾐｪ ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ IﾗﾐIWヴﾐゲが ｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ ヮﾗ┗Wヴデ┞ 
alleviation, protection of human rights and the environment, as part of their mandates.124 
The response of TWAIL I practitioners to the establishment of the floating exchange rate era, 
and the era of global inflation and market volatility in Third World, was initially to articulate the 
claims under the NIEO, through their academic praxis. TWAIL I therefore welcomed the 
economic growth project of the BWIs, especially its extension of financial assistance to Third 
World States. When the harsh social impacts of the loan conditionalities became apparent, 
TWAIL I practitioners articulated the concerns of the vulnerable members of the Third World, 
H┞ ;ｪｷデ;デｷﾐｪ aﾗヴ デｴW ヴWaﾗI┌ゲｷﾐｪ ﾗa Waaﾗヴデゲ H┞ デｴW BWIゲ デﾗ デｴW ヮヴﾗﾏﾗデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa けSW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデげ ;ﾐS 
the protection of the human rights of the Third World peoples.  
With the benefit of historical reflection, TWAIL II has critiqued this stance adopted by TWAIL I. 
Rajagopal, for example, contends that TWAIL I ignored or failed to realize the manner in which 
デｴW IﾗﾐIWヮデゲ ﾗa けSW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデげ ;ﾐS けｴ┌ﾏ;ﾐ ヴｷｪｴデゲげ W┝デWﾐSWS デｴW Iﾗﾉﾗﾐｷ;ﾉ ﾉﾗｪｷIゲ ﾗa ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ 
law, in the management of the Third World by the First World, including racial hierarchy and 
settler rights, respectively.125 Chimni also argues that they lacked a deeper understanding of 
デｴW ｷﾏヮWヴｷ;ﾉ ﾐ;デ┌ヴW ﾗa デｴW BWIゲげ SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ ヴﾗﾉW, and HWﾉｷW┗WS デｴW ﾉ;ﾐｪ┌;ｪW ﾗa けSW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデげ 
;ﾐS けｴ┌ﾏ;ﾐ ヴｷｪｴデゲげ デﾗ HW ﾐW┌デヴ;ﾉ. In addition, he argued, TWAIL I scholars failed to examine the 
ideological and legitimating role of the BWIs, and uncritically trusted and endorsed 
ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ｷﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐゲげ ゲ┌ヮヮﾗヴデ aﾗヴ デｴW TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS “デ;デWげゲ ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ-building project, without 
realizing the lattWヴげゲ ｷﾐｴWヴWﾐデ IﾗﾐaﾉｷIデゲ ;ﾐS デWﾐゲｷﾗﾐゲ, including oppression of their own Third 
World citizens.126  
The rationality of neoclassical economics as the ideational infrastructure for economic and 
aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲ ヴWaﾗヴﾏゲが ;ﾐS デｴW ﾉWｪｷデｷﾏ;I┞ ﾗa デｴW SｷゲIﾗ┌ヴゲWゲ ﾗa けSW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデげ ;ﾐS けｴ┌ﾏ;ﾐ 
ヴｷｪｴデゲげ デｴ;デ ┘WヴW ヮヴWゲWﾐデWS ;ゲ ﾉｷﾐIデ┌ゲ aﾗヴ デｴW ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ┌ヮｴW;┗;ﾉゲ デｴ;デ デｴW ﾐW┘ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ﾗヴデｴﾗSﾗ┝┞ 
ﾉWaデ ｷﾐ ｷデゲ ┘;ﾆWが デｴWヴWaﾗヴW a┌ヴデｴWヴ WﾐデヴWﾐIｴWS デｴW ｪﾉﾗH;ﾉ Nﾗヴデｴげゲ ｴWｪWﾏﾗﾐ┞ ┘ｷデｴｷﾐ ｪﾉﾗH;ﾉ 
financial markets, and regulatory neoliberalism within the transnational regulators. 
                                                          
123 ‘;ﾃ;ｪﾗヮ;ﾉが けFヴﾗﾏ ‘Wゲｷゲデ;ﾐIW デﾗ ‘WﾐW┘;ﾉぎ BヴWデデﾗﾐ WﾗﾗSゲ Iﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐゲ ;ﾐS デｴW EﾏWヴｪWﾐIW ﾗa デｴW さNW┘ざ 
DW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ AｪWﾐS;げ ふﾐ ヱヱΒぶ ヱヲΓく 
124 ibid. 
125 B;ﾉ;ﾆヴｷゲｴﾐ;ﾐ ‘;ﾃ;ｪﾗヮ;ﾉが けIﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘ ;ﾐS デｴW DW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ EﾐIﾗ┌ﾐデWヴぎ Violence and Resistance at 
デｴW M;ヴｪｷﾐゲ VｷﾗﾉWﾐIWげ ふヱΓΓΓぶ Γン AﾏWヴｷI;ﾐ “ﾗIｷWデ┞ ﾗa IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘ PヴﾗIWWSｷﾐｪゲ ヱヶが ヲヱく 




2.3. The 1989 End of the Cold War and Entrenchment of the Washington Consensus 
D┌ヴｷﾐｪ デｴｷゲ ヮWヴｷﾗSが デｴW BWIゲ SｷゲIﾗ┌ヴゲWゲ ﾗa けｪﾗ┗Wヴﾐ;ﾐIWげが デｴW け‘┌ﾉW ﾗa L;┘げが ;ﾐS NW┘ Iﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ 
EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIゲ デｴWﾗヴｷWゲ ﾗﾐ デｴW ヴﾗﾉW ﾗa けｷﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐゲげ ｷﾐ デｴW SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ ﾗa aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲが ヮﾉ;┞WS 
key ideological and performative roles in the continued entrenchment of regulatory 
neoliberalism within transnational and Third World financial markets (the Chapter 5 case study 
discusses in greater depth デｴW ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ ;ﾐS Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷ┗W WaaWIデ ﾗa デｴW ‘┌ﾉW ﾗa L;┘ ｷﾐ KWﾐ┞;げゲ 
financial markets).  
The end of the Cold War between 1989 and 1990 had significant implications on Third World 
contestation of the transnational financial regulatory structure and neoliberal norms. During 
the Cold War, Third World States formed the non-Aligned Movement, which was actively 
courted by the West and the Soviet bloc, enabling them to assert influence in the shaping of 
international law norms related to justice.127 The end of the Cold War therefore saw the 
┘;デWヴｷﾐｪ Sﾗ┘ﾐ ﾗa TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS “デ;デWゲげ ｷﾐaﾉ┌WﾐIWが ;ﾐS デｴW ;ゲIWﾐS;ﾐIW ﾗa デｴW UN “WI┌ヴｷデ┞ Cﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾉ 
as a powerful organ in international law and politics. It also led to the ideological ascendancy 
of neoliberal politics and neoclassical economic theory, and the belief that capitalism had 
デヴｷ┌ﾏヮｴWS ﾗ┗Wヴ ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉｷゲﾏが ;ヮデﾉ┞ I;ヮデ┌ヴWS H┞ Fヴ;ﾐIｷゲ F┌ﾆ┌┞;ﾏ;げゲ SWIﾉ;ヴ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa けデｴW WﾐS ﾗa 
ｴｷゲデﾗヴ┞げく128 Thus, within transnational financial law and regulation, the neoliberal policy 
conditionalities touted by the BWIs were canonised as the Washington Consensus, a set of ten 
economic policy prescriptions recommended as reform packages for crisis-prone developing 
economies, including: macro-economic stability; trade and financial liberalization; privatization 
and roll-back of the State; and legal protection of property rights.129  
In this context, the IMF and the World Bank doubled down on their policy interventions in 
developing countries, increasing their power over these countries through the deployment of 
economic theories such as New Institutional Economics (NIE), and legal and constitutional 
                                                          
127 M Sornarajaｴが けPﾗ┘Wヴ ;ﾐS J┌ゲデｷIWぎ TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS ‘Wゲｷゲデ;ﾐIW ｷﾐ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘げ ふヲヰヰヶぶ ヱヰ “ｷﾐｪ;ヮﾗヴW YW;ヴ 
Book of International Law 19, 19に20. 
128 Fヴ;ﾐIｷゲ F┌ﾆ┌┞;ﾏ;が けTｴW EﾐS ﾗa Hｷゲデﾗヴ┞いげ ぷヱΓΒΓへ TｴW N;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ IﾐデWヴWゲデ ンが ン F┌ﾆ┌┞;ﾏ; ;ヴｪ┌WS デｴ;デ デｴW a;ﾉﾉ ﾗa 
デｴW “ﾗ┗ｷWデ Uﾐｷﾗﾐ ヴWヮヴWゲWﾐデWS デｴW け┌ﾐ;H;ゲｴWS ┗ｷIデﾗヴ┞ ﾗa WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ;ﾐS ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ ﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉｷゲﾏげ ﾗ┗Wヴ ;Hゲﾗﾉ┌デｷゲﾏが 
HﾗﾉゲｴW┗ｷゲﾏが a;ゲIｷゲﾏ ;ﾐS ┌ヮS;デWS M;ヴ┝ｷゲﾏ デｴ;デ けデｴヴW;デWﾐWS デﾗ ﾉW;S デﾗ デｴW ┌ﾉデｷmate apocalypse of nuclear 
┘;ヴげく 
129 “WW ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉﾉ┞が Jﾗｴﾐ Wｷﾉﾉｷ;ﾏゲﾗﾐが けTｴW W;ゲｴｷﾐｪデﾗﾐ CﾗﾐゲWﾐゲ┌ゲ ;ゲ PﾗﾉｷI┞ PヴWゲIヴｷヮデｷﾗﾐ aﾗヴ DW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデげ 
ふIﾐゲデｷデ┌デW aﾗヴ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIゲ ヲヰヰヴぶ TｴW ;┌デｴﾗヴ IﾗｷﾐWS デｴW デWヴﾏ けW;ゲｴｷﾐｪデﾗﾐ CﾗﾐゲWﾐゲ┌ゲげ デﾗ ヴWaWヴ デﾗ 
a summary of ten key policy proposals that the IMF, World Bank, and the US Treasury agreed upon as 




discourses and ideologies such as the WorﾉS B;ﾐﾆげゲ けｪﾗ┗Wヴﾐ;ﾐIWげ ;ﾐS け‘┌ﾉW ﾗa L;┘げ ;ｪWﾐS;く130 
Developed by Douglas North and Robert Coase, NIE theorised that well-functioning markets 
ヴWケ┌ｷヴWS ｷﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐゲが デｴ;デ ｷゲが さｴ┌ﾏ;ﾐﾉ┞ SW┗ｷゲWS Iﾗﾐゲデヴ;ｷﾐデゲ デｴ;デ ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴW ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉが WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI 
;ﾐS ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ｷﾐデWヴ;Iデｷﾗﾐざく131 It argued that institutions provide the incentive structure for 
economic growth by creating order, reducing uncertainty, defining choice sets, determining 
transaction and production costs, and the profitability and feasibility of engaging in economic 
activity.132  
Tｴｷゲ ﾐW┘ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデ┞ ﾗヮWﾐWS デｴW Sﾗﾗヴ aﾗヴ デｴW WﾗヴﾉS B;ﾐﾆげゲ けｪﾗﾗS ｪﾗ┗Wヴﾐ;ﾐIWげ ;ﾐS 
け‘┌ﾉW ﾗa L;┘げ ;ｪWﾐS;が ;ゲ ｷデ ;ヴｪ┌WS デｴ;デ デｴW IﾗﾐﾐWIデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW ヴ┌ﾉW ﾗa ﾉ;┘ ┘ｷデｴ WaaｷIｷWﾐデ ┌ゲW ﾗa 
resources and productive investment, is the aspect most important to economic development, 
and hence to World Bank assistance.133 This was partly a response to Third World criticisms of 
the neoclassical economic basis of the neoliberal SAPs, which had failed to stimulate economic 
development in developing countries, and had in fact increased the economic suffering of the 
poor.134 As discussed in greater depth in Chapter 5, these theories were ideological, as they 
ignored evidence from the economic growth registered experience of the Asian countries such 
as China, which proved that various institutions alternative to the Rule of Law could spur 
economic development.135 
During this period, Third World countries uncritically bought into the financial market 
liberalization reforms prescribed by the BWIs, believing that these policies would indeed lead 
to the deepening of financial markets and economic development. Indeed, this cooperative 
perspective towards regulatory neoliberalism was exhibited in the expansion of the 
international investment law (IIL) sector, where the number of bilateral investment treaties 
                                                          
130 Fﾗヴ ; SｷゲI┌ゲゲｷﾗﾐ ﾗa NW┘ Iﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIゲが ゲWW Dﾗ┌ｪﾉ;ゲゲ C Nﾗヴデｴが けIﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐゲげ ふヱΓΓヱぶ ヵ TｴW Jﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉ 
of EconomｷI PWヴゲヮWIデｷ┗Wゲ ΓΑき Fﾗヴ デｴW WﾗヴﾉS B;ﾐﾆげゲ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ゲデ;デWﾏWﾐデ ﾗﾐ デｴW ヴﾗﾉW ﾗa デｴW ‘┌ﾉW ﾗa L;┘ ｷﾐ 
WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデが ゲWW WﾗヴﾉS B;ﾐﾆが けGﾗ┗Wヴﾐ;ﾐIW ;ﾐS DW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデげ ふTｴW WﾗヴﾉS B;ﾐﾆ ヱΓΓヲぶ ヱヰヶヵヰく 
131 North (n 130) 97. 
132 ibid. 
133 WﾗヴﾉS B;ﾐﾆが けGﾗ┗Wヴﾐ;ﾐIW ;ﾐS DW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデげ ふﾐ ヱンヰぶ ヲΒに30. The report also acknowledged that a fairer 
legal system is, in a general sense, conducive to balanced development that facilitates growth and responds 
to needs of the poor. However, it endorsed the formalistic conception of the rule of law, which emphasizes 
the efficiency of the legal system rather than its content. 
134 Tor KヴW┗Wヴが けTｴW LWｪ;ﾉ T┌ヴﾐ ｷﾐ L;デW DW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ TｴWﾗヴ┞ぎ TｴW ‘┌ﾉW ﾗa L;┘ ;ﾐS デｴW WﾗヴﾉS B;ﾐﾆげゲ 
DW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ MﾗSWﾉげ ふヲヰヱヱぶ ヵヲ H;ヴ┗;ヴS IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘ Jﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉ ヲΒΑが ンヰヵく Iﾐ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲW デﾗ デｴW IヴｷデｷIｷゲﾏゲ ﾗa 
the failure of their neoliberal policy reform prescriptions in developing countries, the BWIs argued that the 
failures of the SAPs were due to the absence of proper governance structures, including the rule of law, in 
these countries. 
135 “WW ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉﾉ┞ D;ﾐｷ ‘ﾗSヴｷﾆが けAaデWヴ NWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉｷゲﾏが Wｴ;デいげが Remarks at the BNDES seminar on New Paths of 




entered into to secure the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) from the developed to the 
developing countries ballooned from about 500 in 1990 to nearly 3,000 a decade later.136  
These bilateral treaties were actively promoted by the BWIs through various means. One was 
ideological persuasion of legal and economic orthodoxy, especially after the fall of the Soviet 
Union; neoliberalism had emerged as an uncontested economic and political philosophy, and 
NW┘ Iﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIゲが けｪﾗﾗS ｪﾗ┗Wヴﾐ;ﾐIWげ ;ﾐS デｴW け‘┌ﾉW ﾗa L;┘げ ┘WヴW デｴW ﾐW┘ ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ 
rationality.137 The second was market persuasion e.g. through BWIゲげ publication of 
authoritative metrics such as the Doing Business series and Rule of Law indexes, popular with 
investors, which, Perry-Kessaris argues, construct legitimacy in and through orthodox 
economic rationalities.138 Lastly, the BWIs employed the tactic of economic coercion through 
loan conditionalities.139   
The normative tenets of the bilateral investment treaties entered into between developed and 
Third World countries fundamentally rolled back the normative gains secured under the NIEO. 
Fｷヴゲデが デｴW ｷﾐ┗WゲデﾏWﾐデ デヴW;デ┞ ヴWｪｷﾏWゲ ﾉW┗Wヴ;ｪWS aﾗヴﾏ;ﾉｷゲデ ﾉWｪ;ﾉ ﾐﾗヴﾏゲ ﾗa けデｴW ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷ┣WS 
Iﾗﾐデヴ;Iデげ ;ﾐS けｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ヮヴﾗヮWヴデ┞ ヴｷｪｴデゲげ デﾗ ┘ヴWゲデﾉW aヴﾗﾏ “デ;デWゲ Iﾗﾐデヴﾗﾉ ﾗ┗Wヴ ﾐ;デ┌ヴ;ﾉ 
ヴWゲﾗ┌ヴIWゲが ｷﾐ デｴW ﾐ;ﾏW ﾗa けｷﾐ┗WゲデﾏWﾐデ ヮヴﾗデWIデｷﾗﾐげく140 SWIﾗﾐSが TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS “デ;デWゲげ ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ 
policy space was severely constricted by the narrow construction of the defence of necessity, 
as would be seen in the Argentina cases relating to regulatory steps taken during the financial 
                                                          
136 M “ﾗヴﾐ;ヴ;ﾃ;ｴが け‘Wゲｷゲデ;ﾐIW ;ﾐS Cｴ;ﾐｪW ｷﾐ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Iﾐ┗WゲデﾏWﾐデ L;┘げが Resistance and Change in the 
International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge University Press 2015) 396. 
137 ibid 411. 
138 See Amanda Perry-KWゲゲ;ヴｷゲが けTｴW ‘W-Co-Construction of Legitimacy of/through the Doing Business 
IﾐSｷI;デﾗヴゲげ (2017) 13 International Journal of Law in Context 498, 502; See also Amanda Perry-Kessaris, 
けPヴWヮ;ヴW Yﾗ┌ヴ IﾐSｷI;デﾗヴゲぎ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIゲ IﾏヮWヴｷ;ﾉｷゲﾏ ﾗﾐ デｴW “ｴﾗヴWゲ ﾗa L;┘ ;ﾐS DW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデげ ふヲヰヱヱぶ Α 
International Journal of Law in Context 401, 403. Perry-Kessaris argues that the deployment of Doing Business 
ｷﾐSｷI;デﾗヴゲ ｷゲ ; aﾗヴﾏ ﾗa けWIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIゲ ｷﾏヮWヴｷ;ﾉｷゲﾏげが デｴ;デ ｷゲが デｴW Iﾗﾉﾗﾐｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ H┞ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIゲ ﾗa けデｴW ゲ┌HﾃWIデ ﾏ;デデWヴ 
ﾗa ﾗデｴWヴ ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ゲIｷWﾐIWゲげが デﾗ デｴW W┝デWﾐデ デｴ;デ デｴWヴW ｷゲ ;ﾐ Wﾏヮｴ;ゲｷゲ ﾗﾐ けﾏ;ヴﾆWデｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐが ﾏ;デｴWﾏ;デｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ;nd 
quantification, which are respectively the normative, analytical and empirical approaches of choice in 
ﾏ;ｷﾐゲデヴW;ﾏ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIゲげく 
139 See, for example, D;ﾐｷWﾉ K;ﾉSWヴｷﾏｷゲが けIMF CﾗﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデ┞ ;ゲ Iﾐ┗WゲデﾏWﾐデ ‘Wｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐぎ A TｴWﾗヴWデｷI;ﾉ Aﾐ;ﾉ┞ゲｷゲげ 
(2004) 13 Social & Legal Studies 103, 105. The author argues that through loan conditionalities, the IMF has 
made international investment regulation one of its main areas of operation, despite lacking the legal 
jurisdiction. 
140 “WW AFM M;ﾐｷヴ┌┣┣;ﾏ;ﾐが け“デ;デW Cﾗﾐデヴ;Iデゲ ｷﾐ CﾗﾐデWﾏヮﾗヴ;ヴ┞ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘ぎ Mﾗﾐｷゲデ ┗Wヴゲ┌ゲ D┌;ﾉｷゲデ 
Cﾗﾐデヴﾗ┗WヴゲｷWゲげ ふヲヰヰヱぶ ヱヲ E┌ヴﾗヮW;ﾐ Jﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉ ﾗa IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘ ンヰΓ Tｴe author critically examines how the 
theory of internationalization of State contracts over-rides express contractual clauses regarding applicable 
law, and the dispute resolution forum, in favour of international law choices. See also Vicki Been and Joel C 
BW;┌┗;ｷゲが けTｴW GﾉﾗH;ﾉ Fｷaデｴ AﾏWﾐSﾏWﾐデ - NAFTAげゲ Iﾐ┗WゲデﾏWﾐデ PヴﾗデWIデｷﾗﾐゲ ;ﾐS デｴW Mｷゲｪ┌ｷSWS Q┌Wゲデ aﾗヴ ;ﾐ 
IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ‘Wｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ T;ﾆｷﾐｪゲ DﾗIデヴｷﾐWげ ふヲヰヰンぶ ΑΒ NW┘ Yﾗヴﾆ Uﾐｷ┗Wヴゲｷデ┞ L;┘ ‘W┗ｷW┘ ンヰ TｴW ;┌デｴﾗヴゲ 
examine the internationalization of the US Constitutioﾐげゲ ヵデｴ AﾏWﾐSﾏWﾐデ ヴｷｪｴデ デﾗ IﾗﾏヮWﾐゲ;デｷﾗﾐ aﾗヴ SｷヴWIデ 




crisis.141 Third, the removal of jurisdiction over investment disputes from the national courts to 
ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ;ヴHｷデヴ;デｷﾗﾐ デヴｷH┌ﾐ;ﾉゲ ゲ┌Iｴ ;ゲ デｴW WﾗヴﾉS B;ﾐﾆげゲ IC“ID a┌ヴデｴWヴ ┗WゲデWS ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ 
power on transnational corporations (TNCs) to whom the dispute resolution system was 
biased.142 Fourth, an expansionist orientation to interpretation of International Investments 
Law and related investments agreements shifted international law-making power from 
international organizations with State membership, to democratically unaccountable and 
opaque international arbitrators.143 
These biases of the international investment regime towards transnational capital soon 
triggered Third World backlash. State contestation of these investment treaties was noticeably 
weak during the 1990s. Earlier Third World ;デデWﾏヮデゲ ;デ Sｷﾉ┌デｷﾐｪ デｴW ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ;ヴHｷデヴ;デﾗヴゲげ 
norm expansion through vigorous assertions of competing norms via General Assembly 
resolutions were dismissed by the arbitration fraternity as lacking legal legitimacy as sources 
of international law.144 This weak State resistance is also explained by: State bureaucrats belief 
in the economic orthodoxy of financial liberalization, foreign direct investments, and increased 
economic development; the common interests between TNCs and State elites, who in most 
instances formed joint ventures; and BWI pressure in the form of loan conditionalities.145 
Social movements, in the form of popular protests organized by NGOs played a big role in 
pushing back against the international investments regime during this period. For example, the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI), which was proposed in 1996 by the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as a multilateral investments law among 
rich countries, was disrupted and abandoned as a result of global protests demanding the 
                                                          
141 “WW LF C;ゲデｷﾉﾉﾗ Aヴｪ;ﾓ;ヴ=ゲが けTｴW “デ;デW ﾗa NWIWゲゲｷデ┞ ;ゲ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ DWaWﾐゲW ‘;ｷゲWS H┞ ; “デ;デW UﾐSWヴｪﾗｷﾐｪ ; 
Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ Cヴｷゲｷゲく A C;ゲW “デ┌S┞げ ふヲヰヰΑぶ ヴ Tヴ;ﾐゲﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Dｷゲヮ┌デW M;ﾐ;ｪWﾏWﾐデ ふTDMぶき “WW ;ﾉゲﾗ A┌ｪ┌ゲデ ‘WｷﾐｷゲIｴが 
けNWIWゲゲｷデ┞ ｷﾐ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐal Investment Arbitration - An Unnecessary Split of Opinions in Recent ICSID Cases - 
CﾗﾏﾏWﾐデゲ ﾗﾐ CM“ ┗く AヴｪWﾐデｷﾐ; ;ﾐS LGわE ┗く AヴｪWﾐデｷﾐ;げ ふヲヰヰΑぶ Β Jﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉ ﾗa WﾗヴﾉS Iﾐ┗WゲデﾏWﾐデ わ Tヴ;SW ヱΓヱく 
142 Hﾗ┘;ヴS M;ﾐﾐが けI“D“ぎ Wｴﾗ Wｷﾐゲ MﾗヴWが Iﾐ┗Wゲデﾗヴゲ ﾗヴ “デ;デWゲいげ ふIﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Iﾐゲデｷデ┌デW aﾗヴ “┌ゲデ;ｷﾐ;HﾉW 
Development 2015) 2. Mann contends デｴ;デが SWゲヮｷデW デｴW ﾏｷゲｷﾐデWヴヮヴWデ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa UNCTADげゲ S;デ; デﾗ デｴW WaaWIデ 
that States win more often than they lose, it is the investors that have actually won most of the time: 72% of 
the decisions on jurisdiction, and 60% of the cases decided on merit. See generally United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment Governance 
(25 edition, United Nations Publications 2015). 
143 See generally Yves Dezalay and Bryant G Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration 
and the Construction of a Transnational Legal Order (University of Chicago Press 1998) The authors detail 
how an elite group of transnational lawyers constructed an autonomous legal field that has given them a 
central and powerful role in the global marketplace. 
144 “ﾗヴﾐ;ヴ;ﾃ;ｴが けPﾗ┘Wヴ ;ﾐS J┌ゲデｷIWげ ふﾐ ヱヲΑぶ ンヱく TｴW ;┌デｴﾗヴ ヮﾗｷﾐデゲ ﾗ┌デ デｴW ｷヴﾗﾐ┞ ｷﾐ デｴW ｷﾐ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ ﾗa デｴW IﾗﾉﾉWIデｷ┗W 
wishes of States in the form of UNGA resolutions to create International Law, while uncontested arbitral 
awards of a few scholars could create International Law. 




inclusion of non-elite interests.146 While these protests succeeded without of State support, 
デｴW ﾉ;デデWヴげゲ IﾗﾐデWゲデ;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾉゲﾗ デ┌ヴﾐWS ﾗ┌デ デﾗ HW ｷﾐゲデヴ┌ﾏWﾐデ;ﾉが ┘ｴWﾐ in 1998 the EU attempted 
to bring the MAI agenda under the auspices of the WTO. A coalition of Third World countries, 
led by Brazil, India and China (BRICs) rejected this proposal on the basis that it did not address 
the issue of corporate responsibility and other duties of TNCs.147        
This period also provided a vital context in which the second phase of ideology-critique and 
deconstruction of the neoliberal transnational financial order emerged, in the form of TWAIL 
II. Building on the lessons on the successes and failures of TWAIL I and related State and Social 
Movement contestation, TWAIL II sought to establish a systematic engagement with the 
academic discipline and practice of international law, to rival the mainstream approaches to 
International Law. James Gathii, a founding member of TWAIL II, has recounted the series of 
conversations and conferences, starting from 1996, that sought to systematize and mainstream 
TWAIL II as a recognised academic approach to, and practice of International Law.148 This came 
from the recognition that successful contestation of the universalized Eurocentric ideational 
infrastructure and practice of international law depended on the extent to which TWAIL II 
reflections could be: disseminated through international law journal publications, law school 
and political science curricula in universities; implemented as new normative structures within 
national and international policy and legal systems; and entrenched in international law and 
institutions through State practice.  
TｴWゲW SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデゲ ヴWヮヴWゲWﾐデWS TWAILげゲ ゲ┞ゲデWﾏ;デｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ; ヮヴ;┝ｷゲ デｴ;デ ;Iﾆﾐﾗ┘ﾉWSｪWS デｴW 
power of the ideational infrastructure of neoliberalism in sustaining and reproducing not only 
neoliberal hegemony, generally, but also regulatory neoliberalism in global financial markets. 
This is reflected in TWAIL IIげゲ critique of IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘げゲ normative foundations 
undergirding the liberalized global financial markets, and the engagement between 
transnational financial regulatory institutions and Third World countries. This included 
questioning the BWIs version of globalization, its contradictory demands on Third World 
                                                          
146 Fﾗヴ ; ﾐ;ヴヴ;デｷ┗W ﾗﾐ デｴW ｪﾉﾗH;ﾉ Wﾐｪ;ｪWﾏWﾐデ ﾗa NGOゲ ｷﾐ ヴWゲｷゲデｷﾐｪ デｴW MAIが ゲWW K;デｷ; TｷWﾉWﾏ;ﾐが けTｴW F;ｷﾉ┌ヴW ﾗa 
the Mulデｷﾉ;デWヴ;ﾉ AｪヴWWﾏWﾐデ ﾗﾐ Iﾐ┗WゲデﾏWﾐデ ふMAIぶ ;ﾐS デｴW AHゲWﾐIW ﾗa ; GﾉﾗH;ﾉ P┌HﾉｷI PﾗﾉｷI┞ NWデ┘ﾗヴﾆげ ぷヲヰヰヰへ 
UN Vision Project on Global Public Policy Networks. 
147 Sornarajaｴが け‘Wゲｷゲデ;ﾐIW ;ﾐS Cｴ;ﾐｪW ｷﾐ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Iﾐ┗WゲデﾏWﾐデ L;┘げ ふﾐ ヱンヶぶ ンヰΒく 
148 J;ﾏWゲ Tｴ┌ﾗ G;デｴｷｷが けTWAILぎ A BヴｷWa Hｷゲデﾗヴ┞ ﾗa Iデゲ Oヴｷｪｷﾐゲが Iデゲ DWIWﾐデヴ;ﾉｷ┣WS NWデ┘ﾗヴﾆが ;ﾐS ; TWﾐデ;デｷ┗W 




Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴｷWゲが ;ﾐS デｴW Iﾉﾗゲｷﾐｪ Sﾗ┘ﾐ ﾗa デｴW ﾉ;デデWヴげゲ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ゲヮ;IW デﾗ alleviate the harsh effects of 
globalization on their citizens.149  
In addition, TWAIL II critically interrogated not only the role of globalization in the 
corporatization of International Human Rights Law150, but also the role of the discourse of 
universal human rights in entrenching regulatory neoliberalism in Third World economies.151 
TｴW SｷゲIﾗ┌ヴゲWゲ ﾗa けSW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデげ ;ﾐS けWIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ｪヴﾗ┘デｴげ ;ﾉゲﾗ I;ﾏW ┌ﾐSWヴ IヴｷデｷI;ﾉ ヴW┗ｷW┘が ;ゲ 
デWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪｷWゲ ﾗa けｪﾗ┗Wヴﾐｷﾐｪ aヴﾗﾏ ; Sｷゲデ;ﾐIWげく TWAIL II ケ┌WゲデｷﾗﾐWS デｴW ｷﾐIヴW;ゲｷﾐｪ SW-
territorialisation of national currencies, the BWIs insistence on capital account convertibility, 
and the loss by Third World States of monetary sovereignty in an increasingly volatile global 
financial market.152   
2.4. TｴW ヱΓΓヰゲ EﾏWヴｪｷﾐｪ M;ヴﾆWデゲげ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ CヴｷゲWゲ ;ﾐd the New International Financial 
Architecture 
Despite the State, popular and TWAIL II resistance outlined in the previous sub-section, the 
hegemonic hold of regulatory neoliberalism in the international financial order remained 
strong, as the ideational fundamentals of the Washington Consensus, New Institutional 
Economics, good governance and the Rule of Law, remained in place. In addition, increasing 
techno-innovation and the diffusion of computing technology in the 1990s also spurred the 
computerization of finance and related market infrastructure. This was key to the application 
of neoclassical economic theories and related practices to finance, including mathematical 
ﾏﾗSWﾉﾉｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS ﾗデｴWヴ けIﾉﾗゲWS-ゲ┞ゲデWﾏげ ﾏWデｴﾗSﾗﾉﾗｪｷWゲ デｴ;デ ;ｷSWS デｴW ヮヴWSｷIデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ﾏ;ヴﾆWデ 
trends.153  
Tｴｷゲ けデWIｴﾐｷaｷI;デｷﾗﾐげ ヴWｷﾐaﾗヴIWS デｴW ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ﾗa aｷﾐ;ﾐIW ;ゲ ; デWIｴﾐﾗ-scientific practice, and by 
validating the neoclassical economic theories underpinning efficiency of the markets, enabled 
financial innovation, and increased faith in financial market liberalization. In fact, financial 
technologies powered the process of financialization, by enabling the trading of complex, risky 
                                                          
149 Antony Anghieが けTｷﾏW PヴWゲWﾐデ ;ﾐS TｷﾏW P;ゲデぎ GﾉﾗH;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐが IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ Iﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐゲが ;ﾐS デｴW 
TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉSげ ふヱΓΓΓぶ ンヲ NW┘ Yﾗヴﾆ Uﾐｷ┗Wヴゲｷデ┞ Jﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉ ﾗa IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘ ;ﾐS PﾗﾉｷデｷIゲ ヲヴンが ヲヴヴく 
150 ibid. 
151 “WW M;ﾆ;┌ W; M┌デ┌;が けTｴW ISWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ﾗa H┌ﾏ;ﾐ ‘ｷｪｴデゲげ ふヱΓΓヵぶ ンヶ Vｷヴｪｷﾐｷ; Jﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉ ﾗa IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘ ヵΒΓき 
“WW ;ﾉゲﾗが M;ﾆ;┌ W M┌デ┌;が けふBﾗﾗﾆ ‘W┗ｷW┘ぶ E┝ヮﾗヴデｷﾐｪ AﾏWヴｷI;ﾐ DヴW;ﾏゲぎ Tｴ┌ヴｪﾗﾗS M;ヴゲｴ;ﾉﾉげゲ African Journey 
H┞ M;ヴ┞ Lく D┌S┣ｷ;ﾆげ ふヲヰヰΓぶ ンヱ H┌ﾏ;ﾐ ‘ｷｪｴデゲ Q┌;ヴデWヴﾉ┞ ヱヱヴヶく 
152 B“ Cｴｷﾏﾐｷが けTｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS Aヮヮヴﾗ;IｴWゲ デﾗ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘ぎ A M;ﾐｷaWゲデﾗげ ふヲヰヰヶぶ Β Iﾐデげﾉ Cﾗﾏﾏく Lく ‘W┗く ンく 
153 Donald Mackenzie, An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape Markets (MIT Press 2008) 20. 
The author notes that computers were needed to apply finance theory to trading, and also to test the models 




financial products.154 Consequently, these trends spurred the development of self-regulatory 
financial technologies, including credit risk management technologies, which were argued to 
be technically and rationally sound, and superior to public regulation of the financial 
markets.155 The global diffusion of these credit risk management technologies, and the 
increased power of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) in self-regulation of liberalized financial 
markets, therefore established technological rationality as an ideology and practice that 
reinforced regulatory neoliberalism. 
These ideas underpinning regulatory neoliberalism would come into question after the series 
of regional financial crises that swept through emerging market economies, including Mexico 
in 1994, East Asia in 1997, Brazil and the Russian Federation in 1999, and Argentina and 
Uruguay in 2002.156 Critical accounts of the causes of these crises identified the rapid IMF-
prescribed financial market liberalization programs that were implemented in these regions in 
the 1980s and 1990s, without proper sequencing, and in the absence of strong market and 
macro-prudential regulatory institutions. The financial liberalization programs made these 
Third World countries vulnerable to financial market volatility and macroeconomic 
instability.157 In addition, the failure of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), the largest 
hedge fund in the world, also revealed the misplaced faith in the computer-enabled 
calculability of risks underlying the complex techno-financial innovations, including derivatives. 
The limits of computing models, and the biased nature of some of their underlying 
                                                          
154 Luiz Carlos Bresser-PWヴWｷヴ;が けTｴW ヲヰヰΒ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ Cヴｷゲｷゲ ;ﾐS NWﾗIﾉ;ゲゲｷI;ﾉ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIゲげ ふヲヰヱヰぶ ンヰ Bヴ;┣ｷﾉｷ;ﾐ 
Journal of Political Economy 03, 9. 
155 ibid 9. The author contends that computing technology allowed complicated risk calculations that gave 
market players the illusion that their financial transactions were prudent. See also Alexandros-Andreas 
K┞ヴデゲｷゲが けIﾐデヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐぎ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ DWヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS TWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ Cｴ;ﾐｪWげ ｷﾐ AﾉW┝;ﾐSヴﾗゲ-Andreas Kyrtsis (ed), 
Financial Markets and Organizational Technologies: System Architectures, Practices and Risks in the Era of 
Deregulation (Springer 2010) 4. 
156 World Bank, Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform (World Bank Publications 
2005) 238. 
157 JﾗゲWヮｴ E “デｷｪﾉｷデ┣が けC;ヮｷデ;ﾉ-M;ヴﾆWデ LｷHWヴ;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐが GﾉﾗH;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐが ;ﾐS デｴW IMFげ ふヲヰヰヴぶ ヲヰ O┝aﾗヴS ‘W┗ｷW┘ ﾗa 
Economic Policy 57, 65. Stiglitz lays the origins of the crisis on IMF liberalization policies. He argues that capital 
market liberalization theories have been discredited even within the economics profession, and that the IMF, 
rather than coercing developing economies to liberalize, should instead work with developing countries in 
designing interventions that stabilize capital flows and the exchange rate and interest rate risks of global 
financial flows, rather than relying on ideologies of free markets. Reuven Glick, Ramon Moreno and Mark M 
“ヮｷWｪWﾉが けFｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ CヴｷゲWゲ ｷﾐ EﾏWヴｪｷﾐｪ M;ヴﾆWデゲぎ Aﾐ IﾐデヴﾗS┌Iデﾗヴ┞ O┗Wヴ┗ｷW┘げ ｷﾐ ‘W┌┗Wﾐ GﾉｷIﾆが ‘;ﾏﾗﾐ MﾗヴWﾐﾗ 
and Mark M Spiegel (eds), Financial Crises in Emerging Markets (Cambridge University Press 2001) 2. The 
authors note that the 1990s financial crises shared several features, including extensive financial markets 




assumptions, questioned the notion of the superiority of technological rationality over human 
supervision of markets.158 
The post-crises debates questioned the wisdom of removing capital controls and maintaining 
current account convertibility. In South-East Asia, while affected countries including Thailand, 
Indonesia and South Korea accepted IMF bailouts and maintained the same discredited 
financial market liberalization policies, similarly affected countries such as Malaysia and the 
Philippines not only rejected the IMF bailouts, but also instituted capital controls to arrest the 
crisis, revolting against the BWI economic orthodoxy.159 This move has been credited for 
arresting the deepening of the financial crisis in Malaysia.160 In addition, discontent with what 
was deemed the role of the IMF in precipitating the financial crisis, and its restrictive post-crisis 
bailout conditionalities, prompted parallel initiatives among the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) countries, aimed at regional financial cooperation, establishing a self-help 
mechanism for prevention and management of financial crisis, and reducing reliance on IMF 
crisis management infrastructure.161 One of the proposals put forward by Japan at the G7-IMF 
September 1997 meeting was the establishment of the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF)く J;ヮ;ﾐげゲ 
incentive was デﾗ ヴｷ┗;ﾉ デｴW IMFげゲ neoliberal regulatory hegemony over Asian economies, and 
replace its preferred model of regulatory neoliberalism with State-led economic development, 
predominant in Asia.162 The proposal was strongly opposed by the G7 countries, China and the 
IMF, forcing Japan to drop the proposal. The ASEAN countries instead launched the Chiang Mai 
                                                          
158 See Dimitris N Chorafas, Risk Management Technology in Financial Services: Risk Control, Stress Testing, 
Models, and IT Systems and Structures (Elsevier 2011) 92に95. The authors note that too much faith was put 
in the models, and too little interest was placed on the need for human supervision. In addition, lust and 
greed tainted some of the assumptions underlying the models, with bias. See also Charles G Leathers and J 
P;デヴｷIﾆ ‘;ｷﾐWゲが けTｴW “Iｴ┌ﾏヮWデWヴｷ;ﾐ ‘ﾗﾉW ﾗa Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ Iﾐﾐﾗ┗;デｷﾗﾐゲ ｷﾐ デｴW NW┘ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞げゲ B┌ゲｷﾐWゲゲ C┞IﾉWげ ふヲヰヰヴぶ 
28 Cambridge Journal of Economics 667, 675. The authors note that LTCM traded derivatives so complicated 
that even the experts in the fund did not understand them. 
159 Suthiphand Chirathivat, けTWﾐ YW;ヴゲ ;aデWヴ デｴW Aゲｷ;ﾐ Cヴｷゲｷゲぎ Tﾗ┘;ヴS EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI “┌ゲデ;ｷﾐ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ ｷﾐ “ﾗ┌デｴW;ゲデ Aゲｷ;げ 
(Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2007) 8. 
160 “デｷｪﾉｷデ┣が けC;ヮｷデ;ﾉ-M;ヴﾆWデ LｷHWヴ;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐが GﾉﾗH;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐが ;ﾐS デｴW IMFげ ふﾐ ヱヵΑぶ ヵΒに63. Stiglitz notes the 
significance of the Malaysian Prime Minister, rather than his Finance Minister, standing up to the IMF and 
adopting capital controls, which prevented the deepening of the financial crisis. In addition, Stiglitz notes that 
Malaysia was able to avoid imposing the high interest rates, which were mandated under the IMF bailouts, 
and which not only deepened the crisis in the recipient countries, but also led to more bankruptcies. 
161 Cｴｷヴ;デｴｷ┗;デ ふﾐ ヱヵΓぶ ヱヰく Iﾐ Aゲｷ;が デｴW aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ Iヴｷゲｷゲ ┘;ゲ ヴWaWヴヴWS デﾗ ;ゲ けデｴW IMF Iヴｷゲｷゲげが ┌ﾐSWヴゲIﾗヴｷﾐｪ デｴW Hﾉ;ﾏW 
assigned to the international regulator. 
162 “WW ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉﾉ┞ Yﾗﾐｪ Wﾗﾗﾆ LWWが けJ;ヮ;ﾐ ;ﾐS デｴW Aゲｷ;ﾐ MﾗﾐWデ;ヴ┞ F┌ﾐSぎ Aﾐ ISWﾐデｷデ┞にIntention Apprﾗ;Iｴげ 




Initiative (CMI), a regional financing arrangement enabling currency swaps, to provide liquidity 
support.163   
After these regional financial crises, and in the context of this fresh resistance to regulatory 
neoliberalism of the transnational financial regulatory order, the G7 in its 1999 Cologne summit 
(at the behest of the US) co-opted the calls for further institutional reform, in the establishment 
of the New International Financial Architecture (NIFA), but only as a bid to preserve the 
regulatory and market status quo.164 The NIFA entailed the establishment of the Group of 20 
(G20), the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), and a surveillance mechanism for 11 new financial 
regulatory standards and codes, known as the Reports on Observance of Standards and Codes 
(ROSCs).165 
The G20 is an informal State-State contact group consisting of the G7 countries (Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States), international 
financial institutions (the IMF, World Bank and European Union), and emerging market States 
SWWﾏWS けゲ┞ゲデWﾏ;デｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ ｷﾏヮﾗヴデ;ﾐデげ ふｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ AヴｪWﾐデｷﾐ;が A┌ゲデヴ;ﾉｷ;が Bヴ;┣ｷﾉが Cｴｷﾐ;が IﾐSｷ;が 
Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea and Turkey).166  
Porter notes that, curiously, there is no evidence that the establishment of NIFA was 
precipitated by Third World negotiation or advocacy for institutional reform, immediately after 
the crisis.167 This is because the reform process was initiated and championed by the G7. 
However, while it may have seemed to the emerging market States that their co-option into 
the G20 was meant to democratise the transnational financial regulatory order, the actual 
objective was to legitimate the neoliberal financial regulatory standards of developed 
economies (fashioned as ROSCs), facilitate their adoption by Third World countries, and 
                                                          
163 Cｴ;ﾉﾗﾐｪヮｴﾗH “┌ゲゲ;ﾐｪﾆ;ヴﾐが けTｴW Cｴｷ;ﾐｪ M;ｷ Iﾐｷデｷ;デｷ┗W M┌ﾉデｷﾉ;デWヴ;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐぎ Oヴｷｪｷﾐが DW┗Wﾉﾗpment and 
O┌デﾉﾗﾗﾆげ ふAゲｷ;ﾐ DW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ B;ﾐﾆ Iﾐゲデｷデ┌デW ヲヰヱヰぶ Wﾗヴﾆｷﾐｪ P;ヮWヴ ヲンヰ ヶく 
164 “┌ゲ;ﾐﾐW “ﾗWSWヴHWヴｪが けOﾐ デｴW Cﾗﾐデヴ;SｷIデｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa デｴW NW┘ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Financial Architecture: Another 
PヴﾗIヴ┌ゲデW;ﾐ BWS aﾗヴ EﾏWヴｪｷﾐｪ M;ヴﾆWデゲいげ ふヲヰヰヲぶ ヲン TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS Q┌;ヴデWヴﾉ┞ ヶヰΑが ヶヱヴく 
165 ibid 607. 
166 See generally Peter I Hajnal, The G8 System and the G20: Evolution, Role and Documentation (Ashgate 
P┌Hﾉｷゲｴｷﾐｪが LデS ヲヰヱンぶ ヱヵヲく TｴW Gヲヰげゲ ｷﾐ;┌ｪ┌ヴ;ﾉ Iﾗﾏﾏ┌ﾐｷケ┌Y ゲデ;デWゲ デｴ;デ デｴW ｪヴﾗ┌ヮ さ┘;ゲ Wゲデ;HﾉｷゲｴWS デﾗ ヮヴﾗ┗ｷSW 
a new mechanism for informal dialogue in the framework of the Bretton Woods institutional system, to 
broaden the discussions on key economic and financial policy issues among systemically significant 
economies and promote co-operation to achieve stable and sustainable world economic growth that benefits 
;ﾉﾉざく 
167 Toﾐ┞ PﾗヴデWヴが けTｴW G-7, the Financial Stability Forum, the G-20, and the Politics of International Financial 




ヮヴWゲWヴ┗W デｴW GΑげゲ Iﾗﾐデヴﾗﾉ ﾗa デｴWゲW ｪﾗ┗Wヴﾐ;ﾐIW ｷﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐゲく168 In fact, rather than examine the 
role of financial market liberalization in the crisis, the US blamed emerging markets for the 
contagion. Thus, the regulatory neoliberalism paradigm of developed economies was 
ideologically legitimated into ostensibly neutral, technical, apolitical, and scientific standards, 
which necessitated adoption by the emerging market and developing economies, to arrest 
future financial crises.  
The FSF was established as an informal, political, surveillance body consisting of 40 national 
financial regulators and supervisors from G7 and other developed countries, and the 
International Financial Institutions, and tasked with coordinating the efforts of its members to 
promote international financial stability, improve the functioning of markets, and reduce 
systemic risk.169 While the G7 lauded the creation of the FSF as necessary for regulatory 
cooperation and surveillance among both the developed and developing economies, more 
IヴｷデｷI;ﾉ ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデゲ ゲ┌Iｴ ;ゲ MﾗゲIｴWﾉﾉ;げゲ Iﾗ┌ﾐデWヴWS デｴ;デ デｴW F“B ┘;ゲ IヴW;デWS H┞ デｴW GΑ デﾗ ｴWﾉヮ 
them in collecting systemic risk information from emerging market and developing economies 
(EMDEs) more efficiently, and to protect the developed economies from contagion emanating 
from emerging economies.170  
TｴW F“Fげゲ ﾏ;ｷﾐ IﾗﾐデヴｷH┌デｷﾗﾐ デﾗ デｴW NIFA ┘;ゲ ｷデゲ ヲヰヰヰ Iﾗﾏヮｷﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ; CﾗﾏヮWﾐSｷ┌ﾏ ﾗa ┌ヮ デﾗ ヶヴ 
financial standards formulated by the various transnational financial regulatory institutions and 
standard-setting bodies (e.g. the BCBS, International Organization of Securities Commission 
(IOSCO), International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC), Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS), Financial Action 
Task Force, and the OECD), and which were later streamlined into 12 core standards for 
promotion worldwide.171 The task of promoting and assessing the implementation of the 
standards worldwide was assigned to the IMF and World Bank, through their voluntary 
                                                          
168 Soederberg (n 164) 607; Porter (n 167) 2にン PﾗヴデWヴ ケ┌ﾗデWゲ デｴW C;ﾐ;Sｷ;ﾐ PヴｷﾏW MｷﾐｷゲデWヴげゲ ﾗHゲWヴvation that 
ゲﾗ┗WヴWｷｪﾐ ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデゲ I;ﾐ ﾗﾐﾉ┞ けH┌┞ ｷﾐデﾗげ ヮヴﾗヮﾗゲWS デヴ;ﾐゲﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ ヴWaﾗヴﾏゲ ｷa デｴW┞ aWWﾉ ; ゲWﾐゲW ﾗa 
participation, as a basis for the legitimating role of Third World inclusion into the G20. 
169 J;ゲﾗﾐ LｷHWヴｷが けTｴW Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ “デ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ Fﾗヴ┌ﾏぎ A “デWヮ ｷﾐ デｴW ‘ｷｪｴデ DｷヴWIデｷﾗﾐくくくNﾗデ F;ヴ Eﾐﾗ┌ｪｴげ ふヲヰヰンぶ ヲヴ 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 549, 553 The membership of the FSF was 
limited to Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Singapore, the 
United Kingdom and the United States.  
170 M;ﾐ┌Wﾉ; MﾗゲIｴWﾉﾉ;が けDesigning the Financial Stability Board: A Theoretical Investigation of Mandate, 
DｷゲIヴWデｷﾗﾐが ;ﾐS MWﾏHWヴゲｴｷヮげ ふヲヰヱンぶ ヱヶ Jﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉ ﾗa IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ‘Wﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲ ;ﾐS DW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ ンΒヰが ンΒヶく 
171 Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ “デ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ Fﾗヴ┌ﾏが けIゲゲ┌W P;ヮWヴ ﾗa デｴW T;ゲﾆ FﾗヴIW ﾗﾐ IﾏヮﾉWﾏWﾐデ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa “デ;ﾐS;ヴSゲげ ふFｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ 
Stability Forum 2000) 22. The core policy areas included: monetary and financial policy transparency; fiscal 
policy transparency; data dissemination; insolvency; corporate governance; accounting; auditing; payment 




Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs) and ROSCs.172 The Compendium of Standards 
did not have a significant effect on transnational financial regulation, due to a number of 
shortcomings, including: inconsistencies between the standards; lack of transparency in their 
formulation; and absence of a strong national implementation and enforcement mechanism.173 
In addition to the FSF Compendium of Standards, NIFA delivered another set of transnational 
regulatory standards and codes, which were a set of 12 core areas that the IMF and World Bank 
recognised as crucial to their operational work in international financial governance. These fell 
onto four broad policy areas: policy transparency; financial sector regulation and supervision; 
and institutional and market infrastructure.174 Countries have submitted to voluntary 
;ゲゲWゲゲﾏWﾐデ ﾗa デｴWｷヴ ｷﾏヮﾉWﾏWﾐデ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴWゲW ヱヲ ゲデ;ﾐS;ヴSゲが デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ デｴW BWIゲげ Iﾗﾉﾉ;Hﾗヴ;デｷ┗W 
preparation of ROSCs.   
Soederberg has argued that the NIFA represented the ideological and policy continuation of 
regulatory neoliberalism of the Washington Consensus, as a basis for structuring global 
financial markets in three ways. First, the post-crisis reforms were informed by the rationale 
that the financial market volatility was precipitated by weak corporate governance structures 
in emerging market economies, rather than SAPs implemented by their respective 
governments.175 Hence the regulatory reform focussed on corporate transparency, 
accountability, etc, rather than volatility of capital inflows. Second, since the emerging markets 
were to blame, the international financial markets did not contribute to the crisis, and 
therefore did not require structural reform, such as the introduction of universal capital 
controls.176 Third, by including developing countries in the decision-making forums of the G20 
and the BWIs, the Western States actually legitimised the status quo reform proposals, and 
                                                          
172 EヴｷI HWﾉﾉWｷﾐWヴが けM┌ﾉデｷﾉ;デWヴ;ﾉｷゲﾏ ‘WHﾗヴﾐい IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ CﾗﾗヮWヴ;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS デｴW GﾉﾗH;ﾉ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ Cヴｷゲｷゲげ ｷﾐ N;ﾐI┞ 
Bermeo and Jonas Pontusson (eds), Coping with Crisis (Russell Sage Foundation 2012) 78. 
173 Eﾐヴｷケ┌W ‘ C;ヴヴ;ゲIﾗが けTｴW GﾉﾗH;ﾉ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ Cヴｷゲｷゲ ;ﾐS デｴW Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ “デ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ Fﾗヴ┌ﾏぎ TｴW A┘;ﾆWﾐｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS 
Tヴ;ﾐゲaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ;ﾐ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ BﾗS┞げ ふヲヰヱヰぶ ヱΓ Tヴ;ﾐゲﾐ;デげﾉ Lく わ CﾗﾐデWﾏヮく PヴﾗHゲく ヲヰンが ヲヰΑに208; Rolf H 
Weber and Douglas W AヴﾐWヴが けTﾗ┘;ヴS ; NW┘ DWゲｷｪﾐ aﾗヴ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ‘Wｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐげ ふヲヰヰΑぶ ヲΓ 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 391, 416にヴヱΑき “WW ;ﾉゲﾗが GWﾗヴｪW W;ﾉﾆWヴが けA 
NW┘ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ AヴIｴｷデWIデ┌ヴW ;ﾐS デｴW Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ “デ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ Fﾗヴ┌ﾏげ ｷﾐ ‘ﾗsa M Lastra (ed), The Reform of the 
International Financial Architecture (Kluwer Law International 2000) 430. 
174 IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ MﾗﾐWデ;ヴ┞ F┌ﾐS ;ﾐS TｴW WﾗヴﾉS B;ﾐﾆが けAゲゲWゲゲｷﾐｪ デｴW IﾏヮﾉWﾏWﾐデ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa “デ;ﾐS;ヴSゲぎ A ‘W┗ｷWw 
ﾗa E┝ヮWヴｷWﾐIW ;ﾐS NW┝デ “デWヮゲげ ふIﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ MﾗﾐWデ;ヴ┞ F┌ﾐS ヲヰヰヱぶ ヵに6 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sac/2001/eng/review.htm>. 





reigned in the more radical proposals for reforming global finance, thus preserving the 
neoliberal structure of global finance.177  
The normative impact of the various financial regulatory standards focusing on corporate 
governance, promulgated by various transnational regulatory institutions and promoted and 
enforced by the BWIs, was the further entrenchment of the market mechanism as the main 
regulator of global finance, and further diffusion of transnational regulatory power to non-
State, market actors. For example, the revision of bank capital adequacy standards under the 
auspices of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in the formulation of Basel II, 
shifted regulatory power from national banking supervisors to financial institutions and private 
credit rating agencies.178 Through their industry representatives, including the IIF and the G30, 
the international banks lobbied the BCBS to reduce the originally proposed capital adequacy 
levels, and adopting market-based supervisory and market disclosure models, as opposed to 
regulator-based supervision.179 The adoption of complex, market-based automated risk-
management systems of banks and credit rating agencies ultimately tilted the competition in 
favour of international banks headquartered in predominantly G7 countries, and to the 
disadvantage of smaller banks and micro-finance institutions based in EMDEs.  
However, these risk-management systems were calibrated with erroneous neoclassical 
economic orthodoxy of efficient markets, the allocative efficiency of markets, and rational 
individual economic actors, and rational markets, which underpin regulatory neoliberalism.180 
The adoption of market-based risk-management regulatory mechanisms would thus play a key 
role in the collapse of too-big-to-fail financial institutions in the UK and the US, ┘ｴｷIｴ けﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉげ 
                                                          
177 ibid. 
178 “WW ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉﾉ┞が B;ゲWﾉ CﾗﾏﾏｷデデWW ﾗﾐ B;ﾐﾆｷﾐｪ “┌ヮWヴ┗ｷゲｷﾗﾐが けIﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Cﾗﾐ┗WヴｪWﾐIW ﾗa C;ヮｷデ;ﾉ 
Measurement and Capital Standards: A RW┗ｷゲWS Fヴ;ﾏW┘ﾗヴﾆげ ふB;ﾐﾆ aﾗヴ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ “WデデﾉWﾏWﾐデゲ ヲヰヰヶぶ B;ゲWﾉ 
II attempted to deal with the shortcomings of Basel I by introducing new requirements to enhance capital 
adequacy requirements to cover credit risk, market risk and operational risk, under Pillar I. The Accord 
introduced a Pillar II, which introduced risk management and supervisory review standards, and a Pillar III 
that enhanced market discipline mechanisms such as enhanced disclosure requirements for banks. Due to 
the deep engagement of IIF and G30 in the formulation process, Basel II was largely market friendly, and 
adopted the neoliberal regulatory logics for policing financial markets. 
179 AﾐSヴW┘ B;ﾆWヴが け‘Wゲデヴ;ｷﾐｷﾐｪ ‘Wｪ┌ﾉ;tory Capture? Anglo-America, Crisis Politics and Trajectories of Change 
ｷﾐ GﾉﾗH;ﾉ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ Gﾗ┗Wヴﾐ;ﾐIWげ ふヲヰヱヰぶ Βヶ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Aaa;ｷヴゲ ヶヴΑき EﾉWﾐｷ Tゲｷﾐｪﾗ┌が けTヴ;ﾐゲﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Pヴｷ┗;デW 
Governance and the Basel Process: Banking Regulation and Supervision, Private IﾐデWヴWゲデゲ ;ﾐS B;ゲWﾉ IIげ ｷﾐ JW;ﾐ-
Christophe Graz and Andreas Nölke (eds), Transnational Private Governance and its Limits (Routledge 2008). 




crises would snowball into a global financial crisis, as a result of the global interconnectedness 
of financial institutions and markets.181 
Iﾐ デｴW ┘;ﾆW ﾗa デｴW WﾏWヴｪｷﾐｪ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲげ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ IヴｷゲWゲが TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS “デ;デW IﾗﾐデWゲデ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ｪﾉﾗH;ﾉ 
regulatory neoliberalism took various forms. As mentioned earlier above, East Asian States 
such as Malaysia rejected IMF interventions so as to claw back domestic policy space, and 
instituted capital controls.182 In Latin America, Chile instituted a tax on financial transactions, 
while other countries prescribed a fixed period of stay for foreign financial inflows, before 
departure, in a bid to arrest the effects of capital flight. At the geopolitical level, the ASEAN 
bloc strengthened its regional monetary cooperation. In September 2006, the foreign ministers 
of Brazil, Russia, India and China had their first informal meeting at the margins of the UN 
General Assembly meeting, which precipitated the 2008 establishment of the BRICS 
geopolitical bloc. Opining then (in 2006), Sornarajah hoped that this 2006 meeting signalled 
デｴ;デ さ;ﾐ ;ﾉデWヴﾐ;デｷ┗W IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘ ｷゲ ｷﾐ aﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐざが ;ﾐS デｴ;デ デｴW B‘ICゲ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS IﾗﾐデヴｷH┌デW デﾗ 
デｴｷゲ さﾐW┘ ;ﾉデWヴﾐ;デｷ┗W ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ﾉ;┘ ｷﾐ ﾗヮヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐ デﾗ デｴW ﾉ;┘ IヴW;デWS H┞ デｴW ｴWｪWﾏﾗﾐｷI 
power and ｷデゲ ヮﾉｷ;ﾐデ ;ﾉﾉｷWゲざく183    
In the area of International Investment Law, Third World contestation took the form of creative 
litigation strategies in which developed countries such as the US and Canada found themselves 
as respondents in arbitration cases, forcing them to aggressively defend the rights of States to 
regulate domestic investments.184 In addition, Latin American States filed cases against foreign 
investment companies, using litigation as bargaining chips in treaty re-negotiations.185 These 
cases developed the law of international investments in favour of Third World positions, and 
ヮ;┗WS ┘;┞ aﾗヴ デｴW ヴWaﾗヴﾏ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW “デ;デW SWaWﾐIW ﾗa けﾐWIWゲゲｷデ┞げが ;ﾐS デｴW SWゲｷｪﾐｷﾐｪ ﾗa 
けH;ﾉ;ﾐIWS デヴW;デｷWゲげ デｴ;デ ヮヴWゲWヴ┗WS デｴW ヴﾗﾉW ﾗa デｴW ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ “デ;デWく186 In addition, Latin 
                                                          
181 Tゲｷﾐｪﾗ┌ ふﾐ ヱΑΓぶき EﾉWﾐｷ Tゲｷﾐｪﾗ┌が け‘Wｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ ‘W;Iデｷﾗﾐゲ デﾗ デｴW GﾉﾗH;ﾉ CヴWSｷデ Cヴｷゲｷゲぎ Aﾐ;ﾉ┞┣ｷﾐｪ ; PﾗﾉｷI┞ 
Cﾗﾏﾏ┌ﾐｷデ┞ ┌ﾐSWヴ “デヴWゲゲげ ぷヲヰヱヰへ GﾉﾗH;ﾉ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIW ｷﾐ Cヴｷゲｷゲ. The Politics of International Regulatory Change. 
LﾗﾐSﾗﾐ ;ﾐS NW┘ Yﾗヴﾆぎ ‘ﾗ┌デﾉWSｪW ヲヱき D;ﾐｷWﾉ E Hﾗが けCﾗﾏヮﾉｷ;ﾐIW ;ﾐS IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ “ﾗaデ L;┘ぎ Wｴ┞ Dﾗ Cﾗ┌ﾐデヴｷWゲ 
IﾏヮﾉWﾏWﾐデ デｴW B;ゲﾉW AIIﾗヴSいげ ふヲヰヰヲぶ ヵ Jﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉ ﾗa IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI L;┘ ヶヴΑく 
182 “デｷｪﾉｷデ┣が けC;ヮｷデ;ﾉ-M;ヴﾆWデ LｷHWヴ;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐが GﾉﾗH;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐが ;ﾐS デｴW IMFげ ふﾐ ヱヵΑぶ ヵΒに63. 
183 “ﾗヴﾐ;ヴ;ﾃ;ｴが けPﾗ┘Wヴ ;ﾐS J┌ゲデｷIWげ ふﾐ ヱヲΑぶ ヲヵく 
184 “ﾗヴﾐ;ヴ;ﾃ;ｴが け‘Wゲｷゲデ;ﾐIW ;ﾐS Cｴ;ﾐｪW ｷﾐ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Iﾐ┗WゲデﾏWﾐデ L;┘げ ふﾐ ヱンヶぶ ンΓヶく 
185 For example, in the 2008 case of Nicaragua v Barcelo, Nicaragua sued Barcelo, a Spanish company, for 
non-compliance with yearly payments owed to the government under an investment project. See Katia Fach 
GﾗﾏW┣が けL;デｷﾐ AﾏWヴｷI; ;ﾐS IC“IDぎ D;┗ｷS ┗Wヴゲ┌ゲ Gﾗﾉｷ;デｴげ ふヲヰヱヱぶ ヱΑ L;┘ ;ﾐS B┌ゲｷﾐWゲゲ ‘W┗ｷW┘ ﾗa デｴW AﾏWヴｷI;ゲ 
195, 199. 




American and other States re-adopted the Calvo Doctrine.187 In April 2007, Nicaragua, Bolivia, 
Venezuela, Cuba and Ecuador announced their withdrawal from ICSID in order to preserve their 
sovereign rights to regulate foreign investments in their economies.188  
TWAIL II contestation of the international monetary and financial law during the NIFA era 
doubled down on the pre-crisis criticisms of the use of ideas, discourses and concepts in the 
globalisation of regulatory neoliberalism. Anghie, for example, focused on the use of expert 
discourse and concepts such as individual human rights economic growth, and development, 
in the expansion of BWI authority and role of transnational corporations in international law 
making and regulation of Third World economies.189 Okafor also underscored the deployment 
ﾗa ; SｷゲIﾗ┌ヴゲW ﾗa さﾐW┘ﾐWゲゲざ ﾗa IヴｷゲWゲが ｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ ヮﾗゲデ-9/11 global terrorism, to ideologically 
legitimate otherwise untenable reforms to the international legal order, which entrench the 
hegemony on the powerful developed countries.190 
2.5. The 2008 Global Financial Crisis and the Emergence of the Macro-Prudential Regulatory 
Agenda 
The continuity in regulatory neoliberalism as embedded in the logic of the NIFA unravelled 
when the global financial markets experienced turmoil that originated in the 2007 US subprime 
housing market crisis, spread to Europe, and led to a global banking crisis and a credit crunch. 
The liquidity problems ultimately led to the insolvency and collapse of a number of 
systemically-important global financial institutions, including Lehman Brothers and AIG Group 
in the US, and Northern Rock Building Society in the UK. Since the collapse of these institutions 
threatened the entire global financial system, US and UK governments extended taxpayer-
funded bailouts to these financial institutions. The global financial crisis extended to 2009, but 
┘;ゲ aﾗﾉﾉﾗ┘WS H┞ ; ｪﾉﾗH;ﾉ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI Sﾗ┘ﾐデ┌ヴﾐが S┌HHWS デｴW けGヴW;デ ‘WIWゲゲｷﾗﾐげが ;ﾐS ; ﾉﾗﾐｪ-drawn 
                                                          
187 The Calvo doctrine states that foreign investment disputes are to be settled by domestic courts, that the 
applicable law is the domestic law of the host State, and that the investor may not apply to its home State 
aﾗヴ Sｷヮﾉﾗﾏ;デｷI ヮヴﾗデWIデｷﾗﾐく C;デｴ;ヴｷﾐW Tｷデｷが けIﾐ┗WゲデﾏWﾐデ AヴHｷデヴ;デｷﾗﾐ ｷﾐ L;デｷﾐ AﾏWヴｷI;ぎ TｴW UﾐIWヴデ;ｷﾐ VWヴ;Iｷデ┞ ﾗa 
Pre-CﾗﾐIWｷ┗WS ISW;ゲげ ふヲヰヱヴぶ ンヰ AヴHｷデヴ;デｷﾗﾐ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ンヵΑが ンヶヰに362. Titi notes that, since the mid-2000s, 
international arbitration started losing legitimacy in Latin America, alongside a resurgence of the Calvo 
doctrine. 
188 Iｪﾐ;Iｷﾗ A VｷﾐIWﾐデWﾉﾉｷが けTｴW UﾐIWヴデ;ｷﾐ F┌デ┌ヴW ﾗa IC“ID ｷﾐ L;デｷﾐ AﾏWヴｷI;げ ふヲヰヱヰぶ ヱヶ L;┘ ;ﾐS B┌ゲｷﾐWゲゲ ‘W┗ｷW┘ 
of the Americas 409, 421に422. 
189 AﾐｪｴｷWが けTｷﾏW PヴWゲWﾐデ ;ﾐS TｷﾏW P;ゲデげ ふﾐ ヱヴΓぶ ヲヵヴ The author warned that the language of human rights 
was being appropriated and distorted by powerful global economic actors, to justify and legitimize their own 
ｪﾗ;ﾉゲ ﾗa ヮヴﾗaｷデ ;ﾐS け; ヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏ;デｷI aﾗヴﾏ ﾗa WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデげく 
190 OHｷﾗヴ; CｴｷﾐWS┌ Oﾆ;aﾗヴが けNW┘ﾐWゲゲが IﾏヮWヴｷ;ﾉｷゲﾏが ;ﾐS IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ LWｪ;ﾉ ‘Waﾗヴﾏ ｷﾐ O┌ヴ TｷﾏWぎ A T┘;ｷﾉ 




debt crisis in the Eurozone, all of which had dire economic consequences for emerging market 
and developing economies that had come to depend on foreign capital inflows for economic 
growth. 
At the height of the 2008 global financial crisis, regulatory technocrats and politicians were 
forced to rethink the adequacy of the regulatory model for global finance. A series of high-level 
inquiries, including at the FSF191, the IMF192が デｴW U“ PヴWゲｷSWﾐデげゲ Wﾗヴﾆｷﾐｪ Gヴﾗ┌ヮ ﾗﾐ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ 
Markets193, the Jacques de Larosiere High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU194, 
;ﾐS デｴW UKげゲ T┌ヴﾐWヴ ‘W┗ｷew195, seemed to build consensus on the failure of the market-based 
regulatory mechanism underpinning the NIFA. These inquiries agreed on a number of causes 
of the global financial crisis, including: global macro-imbalances; the low interest rates and 
credit booms especially in the US and UK; housing market asset bubbles and busts; increased 
financial innovation in complex and opaque financial instruments; increased opaqueness in the 
financial markets; and consequent failure of credit rating agency (CRA) and risk management 
methodologies to adequately price risks.  
Other causes included: the failure of corporate governance mechanisms; perverse incentives 
driving the CRA-based regulatory mechanisms; poor regulation of cross-border banks; and 
increased international financial integration. The UK Turner report was perhaps more explicit 
in attacking the neoclassical economic orthodoxy of efficient markets, market rationality, the 
allocative efficiency of markets, and rational individual economic actors, and rational markets, 
which underpin the light-touch regulatory approach to national and global financial markets.196 
The findings of these reports, and the comments of US, UK and EU policy makers and 
regulators, convinced commentators that the 2008 crisis had finally dealt a fatal blow to 
regulatory neoliberalism in national and international financial markets, and that the ensuing 
                                                          
191 Financial Stability Forum (n 25). 
192 IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ MﾗﾐWデ;ヴ┞ F┌ﾐSが けTｴW ‘WIWﾐデ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ T┌ヴﾏﾗｷﾉねInitial Assessment, Policy Lessons, and 
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194 TｴW SW L;ヴﾗゲｷXヴW Gヴﾗ┌ヮが け‘Wヮﾗヴデ ﾗa デｴW Hｷｪｴ-Level Group on Financial Supervisioﾐ ｷﾐ デｴW EUげ ふE┌ヴﾗヮW;ﾐ 
Commission 2009) 7に12. 
195 Financial Services Authority (n 25) 11. 




reforms to transnational institutional structures and international regulatory standards 
reforms would signal the final burial rights to this regulator paradigm.197   
The institutional reforms precipitated by the 2008 crisis were aimed at reforming supervisory 
structures to facilitate regulatory cooperation and crisis management.198 They included the 
replacement of the G8 with the G20 as the agenda-setting apex of the transnational financial 
regulatory order, tasked with originating and spearheading the international financial 
regulatory agenda, especially the regulation of systemic risk and the restoring global financial 
stability.199 The G20 was subsequently expanded to include the IMF, World Bank, and the 
Financial Stability Forum as ex-officio members.200  
The IMF also underwent two rounds of institutional reforms. In April 2008, 54 of its members 
received an increase in their quotas - with China, Korea, India, Brazil, and Mexico as the largest 
beneficiaries, while another 135 members, including low-income countries, saw an increase in 
their voting power as a result of the increase in basic votes.201 In December 15, 2010, the IMF 
Board approved a doubling of quotas, with a more than a 6% point shift in quota share to 
dynamic emerging market and developing countries while protecting the voting shares of the 
poorest member countries. There was also a shift to a more representative, fully elected 
Executive Board, including a commitment by developed countries to relinquish two board 
positions.202 The IMF was also vested with a new mandate in: conducting macro-prudential 
supervision of countries; conducting a strengthened FSAP for all developed economies; and 
conducting an early-warning exercise in conjunction with the Financial Stability Board (FSB).203 
Another significant institutional reform was the restructuring of the informal FSF into the more 
formally structured FSB, in line with the G20 November 2008 declaration. The new FSB was 
                                                          
197 “WW ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉﾉ┞が D;┗ｷS M Kﾗデ┣が けTｴW Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ;ﾐS EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI Cヴｷゲｷゲ ﾗa ヲヰヰΒぎ A “┞ゲデWﾏｷI Cヴｷゲｷゲ ﾗa NWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉ 
C;ヮｷデ;ﾉｷゲﾏげ ふヲヰヰΓぶ ヴヱ ‘W┗ｷW┘ ﾗa ‘;SｷI;ﾉ PﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIゲ ンヰヵ Kﾗデ┣ ;ヴｪ┌WS デｴ;デ デｴW ｪﾉﾗH;ﾉ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ Iヴｷゲｷゲ 
was the start of a systemic crisis of neoliberal capitalism, and that major economic restructuring was likely to 
aﾗﾉﾉﾗ┘く EヴｷI HWﾉﾉWｷﾐWヴが けA BヴWデデﾗﾐ WﾗﾗSゲ MﾗﾏWﾐデい TｴW ヲヰヰΑにヲヰヰΒ Cヴｷゲｷゲ ;ﾐS デｴW F┌デ┌ヴW ﾗa GﾉﾗH;ﾉ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIWげ 
(2010) 86 International Affairs 619, 620. The author contends that the global financial crisis is not a Bretton 
Woods moment, as the creation of a new international financial system is the outcome of a more extended 
historical process. 
198 Emilios Avgouleas, Governance of Global Financial Markets: The Law, the Economics, the Politics 
(Cambridge University Press 2012) 204. 
199 ibid; See also, Hajnal (n 166) 20. 
200 Colin I Bradford and Wonhyuk Lim (eds), Global Leadership in Transition: Making the G20 More Effective 
and Responsive ふKﾗヴW; DW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ Iﾐゲデｷデ┌デW票き Bヴﾗﾗﾆｷﾐｪゲ Iﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ PヴWゲゲ ヲヰヱヱぶく 
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Fund 2016) Factsheet 4. 
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expanded to include emerging market economies represented in the G20, including Argentina, 
Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa. In 
addition, the FSB admitted into its membership all the major transnational financial institutions 
and standard-setting bodies, including the IMF, World Bank, Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS), the BCBS, Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS), Committee on Payments 
and Market Infrastructure (CPMI), International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), and International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO).  
Acknowledging that the main regulatory failure was the fragmented international standard-
setting and regulation, the G20 mandated the FSB to be the central technical regulatory 
authority that would coordinate regulatory efforts among all the other international regulators 
and standard-setters.204 The main functions of the FBS are to provide a central forum for 
formulation of international financial standards, and also the coordination of standard-setting 
functions of other international regulatory bodies. In addition, the FSB has a greater role in 
monitoring, supervision and peer review of the implementation of international financial 
standards, by both members and non-ﾏWﾏHWヴゲく TｴW F“B ┌ﾐSWヴデ;ﾆWゲ さヮWヴゲ┌;ゲｷ┗Wざ ﾗヴ さヮWWヴ-
ヮヴWゲゲ┌ヴWざ WﾐaﾗヴIWﾏWﾐデ ﾗa ｷデゲ ゲデ;ﾐS;ヴSゲ ;ﾏﾗﾐｪ デｴW ﾏWﾏHWヴ ;ﾐS ﾐﾗﾐ-member countries.205  
A significant role of the FSB underpinned by the lessons from the crisis, is its risk-based 
approach to regulation. According to its charter, the FSB is tasked with taking a pre-emptive 
;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴ デﾗ さ;SSヴWゲゲ ┗┌ﾉﾐWヴ;HｷﾉｷデｷWゲ ;aaWIデｷﾐｪ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ゲ┞ゲデWﾏゲ ｷﾐ デｴW ｷﾐデWヴWゲデゲ ﾗa ｪﾉﾗH;ﾉ 
fiﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ゲデ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞くざ206 TｴW F“B ｴ;ゲ ;ﾉゲﾗ ｷﾏヮﾉWﾏWﾐデWS デｴW Gヲヰげゲ Nﾗ┗WﾏHWヴ ヲヰヰΒ I;ﾉﾉ デﾗ さゲWデ ┌ヮ 
supervisory colleges for all major cross-border financial institutions, as part of efforts to 
strengthen the surveillance of cross-HﾗヴSWヴ aｷヴﾏゲざく TｴW ゲ┌ヮWヴ┗ｷゲﾗヴ┞ Iﾗﾉﾉeges are working groups 
of national financial regulators and supervisors, which engage in the supervision of 
transnational financial institutions, to close the regulatory gap in their cross-country 
operations, and to contain contagion witnessed in 2008.207 
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AﾐﾗデｴWヴ ゲｷｪﾐｷaｷI;ﾐデ ｷﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ヴWゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴｷﾐｪ ﾏ;ﾐS;デWS H┞ デｴW Gヲヰげゲ ヲヰヰΒ ゲ┌ﾏﾏｷデ ┘;ゲ デｴW 
2009 and 2014 expansion of the BCBS to include systematically important emerging market 
economies such as Argentina Australia, Brazil, China, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Korea, 
Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey.208 This was an important step in the 
inclusion and representation of the interests of EMDEs in transnational regulatory standard 
ゲWデデｷﾐｪが W┗Wﾐ デｴﾗ┌ｪｴ デｴW ｷﾐデWヴWゲデゲ ﾗa さゲ┞ゲデWﾏｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ ｷﾐゲｷｪﾐｷaｷI;ﾐデざ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷWゲ ｴ;┗W HWWﾐ 
entrusted to major emerging market economies, especially the BRICS, whose interests may not 
necessarily be aligned with the rest of the EMDEs. 
There have been numerous reforms to the transnational financial regulatory standards, and 
the issuance of new standards, including: the Basel III capital adequacy framework; regulatory 
frameworks for global systemically-important banks (G-SIBs). In December 2010, the BCBS 
issued the new Basel III framework, which included higher global minimum capital adequacy 
standards for commercial banks.209 Pillar I of the new framework: increased the quality and 
quantity of regulatory capital; strengthened the risk coverage of securitizations, trading books, 
counterparty credit risk and central counterparty exposures; and introduced non-risk based 
leverage ratio requirement to contain leveraging.  
Pillar II of the framework strengthened corporate governance and risk management and 
supervision requirements of financial institutions, including off-balance sheet exposures, 
incentive structures and compensation practices, valuation practices, stress-testing, 
accounting standards, and supervisory colleges. Pillar III also enhanced disclosure requirements 
to augment the market discipline mechanism. Basel III also introduced new global liquidity 
standards such as the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR), 
and supervisory monitoring principles.210 Lastly, Basel III introduced a higher loss-absorbency 
capacity requirement for G-SIBs.  
TｴWゲW ヴWaﾗヴﾏゲ ヴWヮヴWゲWﾐデ デｴW けﾏ;Iヴﾗ-ヮヴ┌SWﾐデｷ;ﾉげ ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ ;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴ デｴ;デ ｴ;ゲ WﾏWヴｪWS ;aデWヴ 
the 2008 crisis, an approach aimed at mitigating risk to the global financial system (systemic 
risk). However, as discussed in section 3 below, this macro-prudential approach has not 
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fundamentally transformed either the structure or ideational infrastructure of the global 
financial system. These reforms merely strengthened the market-based mechanisms of 
regulation, while preserving both the ideational and technical infrastructure in which 
discredited practices of regulatory neoliberalism continue to be embedded. This includes the 
use of credit rating agencies, and their related risk calculation technologies which had failed to 
detect the sub-prime housing crisis in the US. 
Despite the revolutionary context presented by the 2008 global financial crisis and its 
aftermath, Third World State contestation of the transnational financial regulatory order has 
been disappointingly ambivalent, considering the dire economic and social consequences on 
emerging market and developing economies. On the one hand, Helleiner notes that Third 
World challenge to Anglo-American hegemony turned out to be less significant than 
anticipated, as countries such as China, newly admitted into the transnational regulatory 
institutions, played a low-key role in the reform deliberations, perhaps due to their inferior 
market power.211 While they generally supported the tighter international standards and 
macroprudential approaches, their main objections were geared towards protecting capital 
controls as macroprudential tools.  
However, their stances were sometimes contradictory, such as when some Third World 
countries opposed the 2010 international Financial Transactions Tax (FTT) initiative proposed 
by the EU, due to their concerns that the tax would be diverted to help the Eurozone countries, 
rather than poor countries.212 In fact, the policy preferences of major emerging market 
economies such as China were instrumental in maintaining the status quo of regulatory 
neoliberalism, such as their preferences for export-oriented growth strategies.213 The 
ideational infrastructure of the global financial markets thus remained intact, despite their de-
legitimation by the 2008 crisis.   
On the other hand, emerging market and developing economies have undertaken some 
notable moves outside the transnational regulatory order, which have attempted to challenge 
Anglo-American hegemony. The BRICS (including South Africa, since 2010) coalition of 
emerging market economies has flexed its geopolitical weight, and formalizing its engagements 
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;ゲ デｴW けB‘IC“ Fﾗヴ┌ﾏげが WﾏWヴｪｷﾐｪ ;ゲ ; ｪWﾗヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ ヴｷ┗;ﾉ デﾗ デｴW GΒく “ﾗﾏW ﾗa デｴW ゲｷｪﾐｷaｷI;ﾐデ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ 
regulatory initiatives challenging the status quo order include the BRICS (New) Development 
Bank (NDB), the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) and the BRICS Payment System.  
The NDB is a multilateral development bank, formed by the BRICS in July 2014, さto support 
public or private projects through loans, guarantees, equity participation and other financial 
instruments" and to "cooperate with international organizations and other financial entities, 
and provide technical assistance for projects to be supported by the Bank."214 The NDB has 
been touted as a not very significant challenge to the hegemony of the IMF and World Bank, 
;ゲ ｷデゲ U“ガ ヱヰヰ Bｷﾉﾉｷﾗﾐ ｷﾐｷデｷ;ﾉ I;ヮｷデ;ﾉ ヮ;ﾉWゲ ｷﾐ Iﾗﾏヮ;ヴｷゲﾗﾐ デﾗ デｴW IMFげゲ U“ガ Αヵヰ Bｷﾉﾉｷﾗﾐ ﾉｷケ┌ｷSｷデ┞が 
デｴW WﾗヴﾉS B;ﾐﾆげゲ U“ガ ヲヰヰ Bｷﾉﾉｷﾗﾐが ;ﾐS デｴW Aゲｷ;ﾐ DW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ B;ﾐﾆげゲ U“ガ ヱヶヵ Bｷﾉﾉｷﾗﾐ ﾉWﾐding 
capacity, respectively.215 More importantly, other than promising cheaper and faster loans, the 
NDB has not indicated an ideational shift from the BWIs policy orthodoxy.   
TｴW C‘Aが ;ﾉゲﾗ aﾗヴﾏWS H┞ デｴW B‘IC“ ｷﾐ J┌ﾉ┞ ヲヰヱヴが ｷゲ ; さゲWﾉa-managed contingent reserve 
arrangement to forestall short-term balance of payments pressures, provide mutual support 
;ﾐS a┌ヴデｴWヴ ゲデヴWﾐｪデｴWﾐ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ゲデ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ざく ‘WIﾗｪﾐｷゲｷﾐｪ デｴW ﾉｷケ┌ｷSｷデ┞ ヮヴWゲゲ┌ヴWゲ a;IWS H┞ EMDEゲ 
that have undergone rapid liberalization under the BWI policies, the CRA is a framework for 
providing liquidity and other support against global financial market pressures, and is largely 
seen as a challenge to the jurisdiction of the IMF.216 The CRA, however, has also been criticized 
for not representing any significant shift from the BWI policy orthodoxy of neoliberal financial 
globalization.217  
The BRICS Payment System was mooted at the 2015 BRICS summit in Russia, as an alternative 
デﾗ デｴW “WIFT ヮ;┞ﾏWﾐデ ゲ┞ゲデWﾏぎ さ; デヴ;ﾐゲﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ﾏ┌ﾉデｷﾉ;デWヴ;ﾉ ヮ;┞ﾏWﾐデ ゲ┞ゲデWﾏ デｴ;デ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS 
provｷSW ｪヴW;デWヴ ｷﾐSWヮWﾐSWﾐIWが ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS IヴW;デW ; SWaｷﾐｷデW ｪ┌;ヴ;ﾐデWW aﾗヴ B‘IC“ざく ‘┌ゲゲｷ; ｴ;ゲ 
promoted the establishment of a rival to SWIFT as its banks and politically-connected 
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Iデゲ Pﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐ ｷﾐ デｴW EﾏWヴｪｷﾐｪ GﾉﾗH;ﾉ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ AヴIｴｷデWIデ┌ヴWげ ふ“ﾗ┌デｴ AaヴｷI;ﾐ Iﾐゲデｷデ┌デW ﾗa IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Aaa;ｷヴゲ 
ヲヰヱヵぶ “AIIA PﾗﾉｷI┞ Iﾐゲｷｪｴデゲ ヱヰ TｴW C‘Aが ;IIﾗヴSｷﾐｪ デﾗ デｴW ;┌デｴﾗヴゲが Iﾗ┌ﾉS ゲｷｪﾐ;ﾉ WﾏWヴｪｷﾐｪ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷWゲげ 
independence from the IMF. 
217 M;┞;ﾏｷﾆﾗ Bｷ┣ｷ┘ｷIﾆが NｷIﾗﾉWデデW C;デデ;ﾐWﾗ ;ﾐS D;┗ｷS Fヴ┞Wヴが けTｴW ‘;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉW for and Potential Role of the BRICS 




individuals have increasingly become targets of US financial sanctions. This therefore 
represents a structural, rather than ideational challenge to US neoliberal hegemony.     
In late 2014, China originated other multilateral monetary partnerships to challenge BWI 
hegemony, including the Silk Road Infrastructure Fund (SRIF) and the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB). The SRIF is a State-owned investment fund of the Chinese government, 
which aims to promote infrastructure and linkages within Central and Southern Asia. The AIIB, 
with a membership of 56 States, is a multilateral development bank that aims to support the 
building of infrastructure in the Asia-Pacific region. It has attracted the membership of 
emerging market and developing countries in Asia, and also developed countries such as the 
UK, Germany, France, Italy, Australia and South Korea, against the protestations of the US, 
which has argued that the AIIB will not operate to the high standards of the BWIs. In April 2015, 
L;ヴヴ┞ “┌ﾏﾏWヴゲが ; aﾗヴﾏWヴ U“ TヴW;ゲ┌ヴ┞ “WIヴWデ;ヴ┞が ヴWﾏ;ヴﾆWS デｴ;デ さデｴｷゲ ヮ;ゲデ ﾏﾗﾐデｴ ﾏ;┞ HW 
remembered as the moment the United States lost its role as the underwriter of the global 
WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ゲ┞ゲデWﾏざく218  
Despite not necessarily challenging the ideational foundations of BWI hegemony, these 
initiatives have challenged the structural dominance of the US and BWIs in transnational 
finance, to the extent that they have signalled a multipolar evolution of financial markets 
power. Other Third World State challenges to US structural power in global financial regulation 
have also included bilateral currency swap arrangements between countries, especially with 
China and Russia, as a challenge to the dominance of the US dollar in international finance. 
Third World countries have also made symbolic challenges to the post-crisis domination of the 
regulatory reform debate by the G20/BWI axis, which has discursively omitted radical proposals 
to the reform of the transnational financial regulatory order. For example, in 2009, the G77 and 
China managed to push through a Resolution of the UNGA, asserting the legal and political 
competence, jurisdiction and legitimacy of the UN to discuss and make recommendations on 
the 2008 financial crisis and international regulatory reforms.219 This effort was made against 
                                                          
218 Lawrence H Summeヴゲが けTｷﾏW U“ LW;SWヴゲｴｷヮ WﾗﾆW Uヮ デﾗ NW┘ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI Eヴ;げ 
<http://larrysummers.com/2015/04/05/time-us-leadership-woke-up-to-new-economic-era/> accessed 11 
January 2018. 
219 UﾐｷデWS N;デｷﾗﾐゲ GWﾐWヴ;ﾉ AゲゲWﾏHﾉ┞が け‘Wゲ ヶンっヲΑΑ ﾗﾐ Oヴｪ;ﾐｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ; UﾐｷデWS N;デｷﾗﾐゲ CﾗﾐaWヴWﾐIW ;デ デｴW 
Highest Level on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and Its Impact on Development (9 April 2009) UN 
DﾗI Aっ‘E“っヶンっヲΑΑげき “WW ;ﾉゲﾗ UﾐｷデWS N;デｷﾗﾐゲ GWﾐWヴ;ﾉ AゲゲWﾏHﾉ┞が け‘Wゲ ヶンっンヰン ﾗﾐ O┌デIﾗﾏW ﾗa デｴW CﾗﾐaWヴWﾐIW 





objections of the US and other developed countries, who argued that the UN lacked the 
expertise or mandate to undertake such deliberations.220  
The significance of the UN review, and the qualms of the US and its allies to the process, were 
evident in the conceptual tangent of the report authored by the Stiglitz Commission, and 
adopted by the Assembly. The report reframed the 2008 crisis as not merely financial but also 
social, and also as exhibiting the inherent nature of the global financial system, rather than the 
failure of regulatory design, and as a product of the deliberate choice of regulators and policy 
makers. In addition, the report noted the side-lining of fundamental aspects of the neoliberal 
financial market structure e.g. market failure, economic externalities, public goods and social 
Wケ┌ｷデ┞が ;ゲ さｷﾐIｷSWﾐデ;ﾉ ヴ;デｴWヴ デｴ;ﾐ a┌ﾐS;ﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ ｷゲゲ┌Wゲ ﾗa WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ﾏ;ﾐ;ｪWﾏWﾐデざ デﾗ HW SW;ﾉデ 
with in the post-crisis reform program.221 In this effort, Third World countries sought to reorient 
the discursive and ideational tangent of transnational financial regulation, and the 2008 crisis. 
Third World countries have also used the UNCTAD, an international organization that has 
デヴ;Sｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉﾉ┞ Wゲヮﾗ┌ゲWS デｴW TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉSげゲ ゲWﾐゲｷHｷﾉｷデｷWゲ ﾗﾐ ｷデゲ ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲｴｷヮ ┘ｷデｴ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘が 
to reframe the discourse of the 2008 crisis. In its 2015 Trade and Development Report, which 
discusses how the international financial architecture can work for development, UNCTAD 
critiqued the increasing financialization of the global and national economies, and the resultant 
ゲｴヴｷﾐﾆｷﾐｪ ﾗa “デ;デWゲげ ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ ゲヮ;IW ;ﾐS ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ｷﾐゲデヴ┌ﾏWnts.  
The report ;ﾉゲﾗ ケ┌Wゲデｷﾗﾐゲ デｴW SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ ｷﾏヮ;Iデ ﾗa BWIゲげ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ﾗヴデｴﾗSﾗ┝┞ ﾗa ヮヴｷﾗヴｷデｷ┣ｷﾐｪ 
foreign capital inflows into developing economies. The report also takes issue with the growing 
disconnect between the real and financial economies, and the prominence of speculative 
capital over entrepreneurial capital, emphasizing the need for finance to serve the needs of the 
real economy and society.222 The Stiglitz Commission and UNCTAD 2015 reports are indeed 




                                                          
220 United Nations (n 24) 9. 
221 See United Nations (n 24). 





3. Resilience of Regulatory Neoliberalism after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis 
3.1. The Post-Crisis Resilience of Neoliberalism 
According to Helleiner, the 2008 global financial crisis was interpreted by many as a 
revolutionary moment spelling the death knell of regulatory neoliberalism, and there was wide 
expectation that the ensuing reforms to transnational and national financial markets and 
attendant regulations would be fundamentally restructured.223 However, a consensus is 
emerging that, like previous moments of rapture in the international financial order, regulatory 
neoliberalism has proven its resilience against the crisis. Chimni argues that market-driven 
regulation of global markets remains the leading view of regulators and policy makers, as 
W┝ｴｷHｷデWS H┞ TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴｷWゲげ Iﾗﾐデｷﾐ┌WS SWヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲ ;ﾐS 
maintenance of capital account convertibility.224 Porter also observes that the three-decade 
trend of transnational interdependence in financial transactions and governance is increasing 
rather than reversing.225  
Herr also contends that the post-crisis transnational financial regulatory reforms have not 
fundamentally changed the global financial system. They retain the logic of financialization, and 
a faith in the role of efficient capital markets and unregulated financial innovation in economic 
growth, while leaving unchallenged the interest rate regimes, international capital flows and 
current account imbalances that were the causes of financial instability in global markets.226  
This view of the reforms is also shared by UNCTAD, which in its 2015 Trade and Development 
report, further argues that the post-crisis transnational financial reforms are designed to 
preserve the status quo of regulatory neoliberalism.227 In the International Investments Law 
ヴWｪｷﾏWが PWヴヴﾗﾐW ;ﾉゲﾗ IﾗﾐデWﾐSゲ デｴ;デ デｴW けH;ﾉ;ﾐIｷﾐｪ ヴWｪｷﾏWげ ｴ;ゲ ヮヴWゲWヴ┗WS デｴW ﾉWｪ;ﾉ デWIｴﾐｷケ┌Wゲ 
that TNCs invoke to control local resources, e.g. contractualization of foreign investment 
                                                          
223 HWﾉﾉWｷﾐWヴが けW;ゲ デｴW M;ヴﾆWデ-FヴｷWﾐSﾉ┞ N;デ┌ヴW ﾗa IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ “デ;ﾐS;ヴSゲ O┗Wヴデ┌ヴﾐWSいげ ふﾐ ヲΑぶ 
Helleiner states that this expectation was based on the combination of: political weakening of private 
financial interests, lost credibility of free market ideas; challenge to Anglo-American leadership. 
224 Cｴｷﾏﾐｷが けCヴｷデｷI;ﾉ TｴWﾗヴ┞ ;ﾐS IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI L;┘ぎ A TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS Aヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴ デﾗ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘ 
ふTWAILぶ PWヴゲヮWIデｷ┗Wげ ふﾐ ンヰぶ ヲヶヱく 
225 Porter (n 31) 5. 
226 Hansjörg (n 32) 16. 





relations, and fails to deal with the rising inequality and excessive power of MNCs thereby 
preserving the logic of neoliberal legality.228 
3.2. Neoliberal Regulatory Continuity in the Third World 
Abi-Saab notes that despite originating from, and largely manifesting in the US and the UK, the 
2008 financial crisis was significant for Third World historical resistance to transnational 
regulatory neoliberalism in finance, as it exposed the fundamental failings, inequality and 
inherently speculative nature of the financialized global economy, and gave fresh impetus to 
calls for deep restructuring that would reign in its abuses and manipulations.229 Chimni also 
called for a class approach that would examine the impact of the global financial system on the 
lives of ordinary people, rather than markets, international financial institutions, and States.230  
UNCTAD also identified the taming of speculative international capital movements, especially 
from foreign banks with EMDE subsidiaries as a priority area for regulatory reform.231 As 
observed by Sornarajah, neoliberalism has lingered on, particularly in international law, 
ensuring the domination of Third World economies by developed country economies, and 
preservation of the status quo.232 Taylor also argues that, despite their touted rise, the BRICS 
and other powerful emerging market economies are unlikely to challenge the 
transnationalization of global finance.233 Iﾐ a;Iデが ﾏﾗヴW ゲｷｪﾐｷaｷI;ﾐデ ｷゲ Cｴｷﾏﾐｷげゲ ﾗHゲWヴ┗;デｷﾗﾐ デｴ;デ 
the liberal international economic order continues to receive the support of powerful 
developing economy States.234 
Various TWAIL and non-TWAIL scholars have provided different reasons for the resilience of 
regulatory neoliberalism and the globalization of financial markets, especially in Third World 
countries, despite the successive financial crises that have delegitimated neoliberal regulatory 
logic. They are roughly grouped into four related factors: the structural power of neoliberal 
                                                          
228 Nicolas M PerヴﾗﾐWが けTｴW IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Iﾐ┗WゲデﾏWﾐデ ‘WｪｷﾏW ;aデWヴ デｴW GﾉﾗH;ﾉ Cヴｷゲｷゲ ﾗa NWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉｷゲﾏぎ ‘┌ヮデ┌ヴW 
ﾗヴ Cﾗﾐデｷﾐ┌ｷデ┞げ ふヲヰヱヶぶ ヲン IﾐSｷ;ﾐ; Jﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉ ﾗa GﾉﾗH;ﾉ LWｪ;ﾉ “デ┌SｷWゲ ヶヰンが ヶヰンに604. 
229 Abi-Saab (n 85) 1961. 
230 B“ Cｴｷﾏﾐｷが けPヴﾗﾉWｪﾗﾏWﾐ; デﾗ ; Cﾉ;ゲゲ Aヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴ デﾗ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘げ ふヲヰヱヰぶ ヲヱ E┌ヴﾗヮW;ﾐ Jﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉ ﾗa 
International Law 57, 58. 
231 UﾐｷデWS N;デｷﾗﾐゲ CﾗﾐaWヴWﾐIW ﾗﾐ Tヴ;SW ;ﾐS DW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデが けFｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ‘Wｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ ‘Waﾗヴﾏ ;aデWヴ デｴW Cヴｷゲｷゲげ ふﾐ 
29) 104. 
232 “ﾗヴﾐ;ヴ;ﾃ;ｴが けOﾐ Fｷｪｴデｷﾐｪ aﾗヴ GﾉﾗH;ﾉ J┌ゲデｷIWげ ふﾐ ヱヱヴぶ ヱΓΑΑく 
233 Taylor (n 72) 6. 
234 Cｴｷﾏﾐｷが けCヴｷデｷI;ﾉ TｴWﾗヴ┞ ;ﾐS IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI L;┘ぎ A TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS Aヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴ デﾗ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘ 




hegemony; the material basis of neoliberal financial markets; Third World transnational 
capitalist class (TCC) interests; and the ideational power of neoliberalism. 
3.2.1. Structural Power of Neoliberal Hegemony 
Helleiner argues that US structural power in the global economy is the main determinant of the 
post-crisis status quo financial regulatory outcomes, and is in fact more significant than 
transnational elite dominance or neoliberal hegemony. This structural power emanates from 
デｴW Sﾗﾉﾉ;ヴげゲ ｪﾉﾗH;ﾉ ヴﾗﾉW ;ゲ デｴW ﾏ;ｷﾐ デヴ;ﾐゲ;Iデｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS ヴWゲWヴ┗W I┌ヴヴWﾐI┞ ｷﾐ ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ デヴ;SW ;ﾐS 
finance.235 In addition, the attractiveness of the US financial markets, its strength as an export 
market, its geopolitical strength, and control of transnational financial regulatory institutions, 
has ensured that the debate on transnational financial regulation mirrors the preferences of 
デｴW けW;ﾉﾉ “デヴWWデ-TヴW;ゲ┌ヴ┞ CﾗﾏヮﾉW┝げく236  
However, Baker argues that the role of the Wall-Street Treasury complex in dictating emerging 
ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷWゲげ ヴWaﾗヴﾏゲが ┘ｴWデｴWヴ SｷヴWIデﾉ┞ ﾗヴ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ BWIゲが ｷゲ ｪヴﾗゲゲﾉ┞ ﾗ┗Wヴ-estimated, and 
constraints on them under-estimated, and that the relationship between the US Treasury and 
transnational regulators can be explained more by a shared world-view of neoliberal ideas and 
intellectual prejudices.237 Thus, this project argues that while Third World contestation of US 
structural power through BRICS multilateral monetary cooperation initiatives such as the NDB, 
the CRA and the AIIB are important steps, they do not significantly challenge the neoliberal 
globalization of financial markets, unless they adopt a radically different ideational 
infrastructure and State practice that focuses on issues of justice, equity and equality in 
financial market relations, in favour of Third World peoples, as called for by Sornarajah.238     
3.2.2. Neoliberal Materiality in the Global Financial Markets 
The theory of the US structural power as a unipolar, hegemonic force in international financial 
regulation has also been questioned by Stephen, who argues that the emergence of the BRICS 
will not challenge economic globalization, or transnational eIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐが ;ゲ さｪﾉﾗH;ﾉ 
                                                          
235 HWﾉﾉWｷﾐWヴが けIﾐデヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS O┗Wヴ┗ｷW┘げ ふﾐ ヲΒぶ ヱヵに16. 
236 ｷHｷSき TｴW デWヴﾏ けW;ﾉﾉ “デヴWWデ-TヴW;ゲ┌ヴ┞ IﾗﾏヮﾉW┝げ ┘;ゲ aｷヴゲデ IﾗｷﾐWS H┞ Bｴ;ｪ┘;デｷ ｷﾐ J;ｪSｷゲｴ Bｴ;ｪ┘;デｷが けTｴW 
Capital Myth - TｴW DｷaaWヴWﾐIW HWデ┘WWﾐ Tヴ;SW ｷﾐ WｷSｪWデゲ ;ﾐS Dﾗﾉﾉ;ヴゲげ ふヱΓΓΒぶ ΑΑ FﾗヴWｷｪﾐ Aaa;ｷヴゲ Αが Αく 
237 AﾐSヴW┘ B;ﾆWヴが けFｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ CヴｷゲWゲ ;ﾐS U“ TヴW;ゲ┌ヴ┞ PﾗﾉｷI┞ぎ TｴW Iﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ;ﾐS ISW;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ B;ゲｷゲ ﾗa AﾏWヴｷI;ﾐ 
C;ヮ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞げ ｷﾐ J ‘ﾗHWヴデゲﾗﾐ ふWSぶが Power and Politics After Financial Crises: Rethinking Foreign Opportunism in 
Emerging Markets (Palgrave Macmillan 2008) 49に50. 
238 “ﾗヴﾐ;ヴ;ﾃ;ｴが けOﾐ Fｷｪｴデｷﾐｪ aﾗヴ GﾉﾗH;ﾉ J┌ゲデｷIWげ ふﾐ ヱヱヴぶ ヱΓΑヶく “ﾗヴﾐ;ヴ;ﾃ;ｴ I;ﾉﾉゲ aﾗヴ TWAIL ﾉ;┘┞Wヴゲ デﾗ ;S┗ﾗI;デW 
strongly for a desired norm on the basis of justice, and to marshal support for it from the academic community 




networks of production and exchange are underpinned not by a unipolar distribution of 
ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ヮﾗ┘Wヴが H┌デ H┞ デｴW ﾏ;デWヴｷ;ﾉ ヴWﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW ｪﾉﾗH;ﾉ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞ざく239 This 
neoliberal materiality is exhibited in the embedding or underwriting of market integration and 
WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI SWﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ H┞ さデWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ ;ﾐS ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴ;ﾉ デヴWﾐSゲ WﾐSﾗｪWﾐﾗ┌ゲ デﾗ ┘ﾗヴﾉS 
I;ヮｷデ;ﾉｷゲﾏざく240 This perhaps explains the status quo nature of the BRICS multilateral financial 
arrangements, such as the NDB and デｴW C‘A SｷゲI┌ゲゲWS W;ヴﾉｷWヴ ;Hﾗ┗Wく ‘Wﾉ┞ｷﾐｪ ﾗﾐ “デWヮｴWﾐげゲ 
thesis, Taylor argues that neoliberalism has emerged more resilient from the crisis, having 
incorporated new centres of accumulation, and assimilated hegemonic classes from the 
emerging market economies.241 
Wigan has expounded on the material embedding of neoliberalism in examining what he calls 
デｴW さW┝ﾗヴHｷデ;ﾐデ ヮヴｷ┗ｷﾉWｪW ﾗa aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ヮヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐざく242 He argues that since financial innovation 
exhibited in contemporary financial markets has broken the limits of traditional financial 
production, it has forced governments to recognize (through practices of bailouts and asset 
swaps) these synthetic or artificial financial assets as global money, out of a concern for global 
systemic stability. Consequently, this recognition, legitimation and legalizing of these material 
products of private financial innovation has shifted power to private actors in financial 
markets.243 This material reorganization of the global financial markets has stripped States and 
transnational regulators of the ability to structure the financial system, and allowed market 
actors to continue to define the nature of the problems and possible solutions in the global 
economy, thereby sustaining the status quo.244 
The implication of this material reorganization of neoliberal hegemony is that neoliberal 
transnational regulatory standards are no longer embedded in international law texts and 
regulatory standards, but rather an assemblage of ideas, texts, financial innovations, 
technologies, artefacts, routines and practices that form part of the everyday life of global, 
                                                          
239 Stephen (n 17) 930. 
240 ibid 930. Stephen argues that the integration of BRICS into the historical structure of global capitalism has 
reduced traditional sources of great power conflict, and made them heavily dependent on the existing 
institutional framework established by the liberal West. This facilitates their integration into the existing 
neoliberal governance order. 
241 Taylor (n 72) 6. 
242 Wigan (n 35) 118. 
243 ibid. 
244 ES┘;ヴS “ CﾗｴWﾐが けAゲゲWゲゲｷﾐｪ デｴW Iﾏヮ;Iデ ﾗa デｴW GﾉﾗH;ﾉ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ Cヴｷゲｷゲ ﾗﾐ Tヴ;ﾐゲﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ‘Wｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ 
Governance: The Case of Public-Pヴｷ┗;デW H┞HヴｷS ‘Wｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ NWデ┘ﾗヴﾆゲげが Third Biennial Conference of the ECPR 
Standing Group on Regulatory Governance, University College, Dublin (2010) 18 




ｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS ヮWﾗヮﾉWゲく Tｴｷゲ ﾐWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉ ﾏ;デWヴｷ;ﾉｷデ┞ ｷゲ ヴWIﾗｪﾐｷ┣WS ｷﾐ TWAILげゲ ゲｴｷaデ ﾗa aﾗI┌ゲ 
on the operation of international law and regulation, from the international plane of 
transnational regulatory institutions, to the local sites in the Third World, where International 
Law is performed in quotidian economic life. These include what Eslava and Pahuja have 
デWヴﾏWS さデｴW ゲｷデWゲ ;ﾐS ﾗHﾃWIデゲ ｷﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ﾉ;┘ ﾗヮWヴ;デWゲ デﾗS;┞ぐぷｷﾐcluding] 
administrative procedures, subject formations, spaces and artefacts, that are usually identified 
as expressions of other normative orders, social spheres, or simply innocuous technical or 
IﾗﾏﾏWヴIｷ;ﾉ デｴｷﾐｪゲざく245  
This thesis explores this neoliberal materialism in financial technologies and related practices, 
including credit information sharing technology, discussed in the Chapter 6 Kenya case study.  
3.2.3. Third World Transnational Capitalist Class (TCC) Interests 
Another reason for the resilience of regulatory neoliberalism, and the status quo outcomes of 
regulatory reforms, is the commonality of interests between Third World and global 
ﾐWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉｷゲﾏく Cｴｷﾏﾐｷ ;ヴｪ┌Wゲ デｴ;デ デｴWヴW ｴ;ゲ WﾏWヴｪWS ｪﾉﾗH;ﾉﾉ┞が ;ﾐ けｷﾏヮWヴｷ;ﾉ ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ aﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐげ ｷﾐ 
the form of a transnational capitalist class (TCC), wherein the interests of particular classes in 
emerging economies have coincided with those of their counterparts in the developed 
countries, as they both gain from financial globalization and regulatory neoliberalism.246  
This TCC is described by Sklair as consisting of: TNCs and their local affiliates (the corporate 
faction); the globalizing State and inter-State bureaucrats and politicians (the State faction); 
globalizing professionals (the technical faction); and merchants and media (the consumerist 
faction)247 Thus, the various factions of this TCC within Third World countries, including 
financial markets actors, financial markets policy makers and regulators, technocrats and 
professionals such as lawyers and economists, and market consumers, such as bank customers 
and currency traders, are more likely to champion the status quo of a globalized financial 
markets, as it serves their particular interests well.  
This argument is reflected in Cｴｷﾏﾐｷげゲ ﾗHゲWヴ┗;デｷﾗﾐ デｴ;デ デｴW ヮﾗ┘Wヴa┌ﾉ WﾏWヴｪｷﾐｪ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデ ;ﾐS 
SW┗Wﾉﾗヮｷﾐｪ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷWゲ ｴ;┗W ;H;ﾐSﾗﾐWS デｴWｷヴ ヮ┌ヴゲ┌ｷデ aﾗヴ さデヴ;Sｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉが ;ﾐデｷ-ｷﾏヮWヴｷ;ﾉｷゲデ ヮﾗﾉｷIｷWゲざ 
and for the retrieval of critical policy space from international economic institutions, and have 
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inste;S ﾗヮデWS デﾗ ｷﾏヮﾉWﾏWﾐデ ﾐWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉ ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ ヴWaﾗヴﾏゲ ゲﾗ ;ゲ デﾗ さa;Iｷﾉｷデ;デW デｴW Wﾐデヴ┞ ﾗa 
I;ヮｷデ;ﾉが ｪﾗﾗSゲ ;ﾐS ゲWヴ┗ｷIWゲ aヴﾗﾏ デｴW ｷﾐS┌ゲデヴｷ;ﾉｷ┣WS ┘ﾗヴﾉSざく248 Ikenberry also argues that the 
BRICS have no interest in contesting the transnational financial regulatory order, as they wish 
to gain more authority and leadership within it, thus a deep interest to preserve the system.249 
Taylor has also argued that the hegemonic classes from emerging economies have been 
assimilated into the neoliberal ideological project.250  
3.2.4. Ideational and Ideological Power of Neoliberalism   
A key reason for the post-crisis resilience of regulatory neoliberalism (and which this thesis 
argues, accounts for the structural power and materiality of financial neoliberalism, and shapes 
the interests of the Third World in financial globalization) is the ideological and performative 
power of neoliberalism. UNCTAD blames ideological obstacles (the view that an unregulated 
private sector optimally allocates financial resources remains embedded in national and 
international policy circles) as one of the reasons for regulatory reform failure.251 The 
IﾗﾐIWヮデ┌;ﾉ ヮﾗ┘Wヴ ﾗa ﾐWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉｷゲﾏ ｷゲ W┗ｷSWﾐデ ｷﾐ “ﾗヴﾐ;ヴ;ﾃ;ｴげゲ ;ヴｪ┌ﾏWﾐデ デｴ;デ デｴW ヮﾗゲデ-crisis 
neoliberal regulatory paradigm has been strengthened by conceptual links to altruism and 
universal standards of civilization, through ideas such as universal norms of governance, the 
autonomy and technocracy of international investment tribunals, the rule of law, and global 
administrative law.252 Cohen also sees the resilience of the transnational governance system as 
rooted in the logic of  financialization in contemporary global capitalism, and as being 
preserved by an intact transnational epistemic community which continues to define the 
nature of the crisis and potential solutions and regulatory responses.253 
Thus, at the national level, Engelen et al argue, the implications of an embedded ideational 
infrastructure of neoliberal legal, economic, and technological ideas and practices, is that 
democratically elected politicians who ゲﾗ┌ｪｴデ デﾗ けヮﾗﾉｷデｷIｷ┣Wげ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲ ;ﾐS デｴWｷヴ 
regulation, were soon marginalized by regulatory technocrats whose mission was to preserve 
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Foreign Affairs 56, 56に57. 
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the ideational regulatory paradigm.254 At the transnational level, Chimni argues that the 
transnational capitalist class used its ideological primacy to shape the foreign economic policy 
of emerging powers, explaining their support for structures of global capitalism, despite their 
imperialistic and exploitative nature.255  
One example of the ideational power of neoliberalism to preserve the status quo in global 
finance is the emergence of macroprudential regulation (the mitigation of systemic risk) as a 
regulatory response to global systemic risk. While the concept of macroprudential regulation 
challenged neoliberal ideas of deregulation and justified more stringent regulation of financial 
markets, it excluded the more radical reform proposals that could have addressed the systemic 
flaws of global capitalism.256 Fﾗヴ W┝;ﾏヮﾉWが HWI;┌ゲW デｴW IﾗﾐIWヮデ ﾗa けゲ┞ゲデWﾏｷI ヴｷゲﾆげ ヴWﾏ;ｷﾐゲ ヴ;デher 
vague and hard to define, its meaning and policy significance has also remained unclear, giving 
cover to minimalist versions of macroprudential regulation that constrain markets only in so 
far as they threaten market stability, thereby leaving unaddressed more significant 
distributional issues, such as the role of financial markets in the real economy, and increasing 
inequality.257 Thus UNCTAD, for example, has labelled prudential regulation insufficient, and 
called for structural reforms that would focus both on financial stability and on development 
and social objectives.258   
Helleiner has therefore contended that the 2008 crisis does not represent a Bretton Woods 
moment. He argues that, similar to the lull between the 1933 Great Depression and the 1944 
establishment of the Bretton Woods system, it will take years for old neoliberal regulatory 
ideas and practices to lose their legitimacy, and for new ideas and practices to emerge and 
replace them.259  
4. Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the first research sub-ケ┌Wゲデｷﾗﾐぎ ┘ｴ┞ ｴ;ゲ デｴW TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉSげゲ ｴｷゲデﾗヴｷI;ﾉ 
contestation failed to radically transform the transnational financial regulatory order? The 
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discussion has provided a historical account of the successes and set-backs to Third World 
contestation, and outlines the key moments of rapture, crisis, reconstruction and neoliberal 
continuity. While also highlighting the structural power of neoliberal hegemony, the material 
basis of neoliberal financial markets, and Third World transnational capitalist class (TCC), the 
discussion has focused on some of the key ideas and technological practices that have been 
instrumental in the construction of transnational regulatory hegemony.  
Section 2 of the chapter has explored the ideas and technological practices across five phases 
of Third World contestation of transnational financial regulation: the establishment of the 
NIEO; the 1973 Oil Crisis, establishment of floating exchange rates and advent of IMF 
conditionalities; the 1989 end of the Cold War and entrenchment of the Washington 
CﾗﾐゲWﾐゲ┌ゲき デｴW ヱΓΓヰゲ WﾏWヴｪｷﾐｪ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲげ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ CヴｷゲWゲ ;ﾐS デｴW Wゲデ;HﾉｷゲｴﾏWﾐデ ﾗa デｴW NIFA; 
and the 2008 global financial crisis and the emergence of the macro-prudential regulatory 
agenda. The debate on the establishment of the NIEO was an ideological struggle, to the extent 
that the Third World sought to deconstruct, while the developed States sought to re-legitimate, 
key ideas underpinning the post-WW2 liberal economic order, including the universality of 
international law, and the economic orthodoxies of Comparative Advantage, and the 
international division of labour. The resilience of these ideas sabotaged the reform agenda of 
the NIEO.  
The era succeeding the 1973 oil crisis and floating exchange rates was marked by the 
ascendancy of the political ideology of neoliberalism, and a new rationality of neoclassical 
economics, which emphasized the scientific nature of financial markets, and the need for an 
apolitical and technocratic approach to their regulation, ushering in the era of regulatory 
neoliberalism. These ideas undergirded the IMF and World Bank expansion of their regulatory 
role over Third World States, through loan conditionalities and Structural adjustment 
programs, which emphasized the rationality of financial markets liberalization policies, and the 
expertise of BWI bureaucrats in managing Third World economies. In addition, in response to 
Third World contestation of these SAPs, the BWIs appropriated the discourses of 
けSW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデげが けヮﾗ┗Wヴデ┞げが けWﾐ┗ｷヴﾗﾐﾏWﾐデげが ;ﾐS けｴ┌ﾏ;ﾐ ヴｷｪｴデゲげ デﾗ a┌ヴデｴWヴ W┝ヮ;ﾐS デｴW ゲIﾗヮW ﾗa 
their management of Third World economies.  
The 1989 end of the Cold war witnessed the consolidation of neoliberal hegemony, as 
neoliberalism emerged the ideological victor, and further legitimated the set of financial 




from the BWIs during this era included SｷゲIﾗ┌ヴゲWゲ ﾗa けｪﾗ┗Wヴﾐ;ﾐIWげが デｴW け‘┌ﾉW ﾗa L;┘げが ;ﾐS NW┘ 
Institutional Economics theories on デｴW ヴﾗﾉW ﾗa けｷﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐゲげ ｷﾐ デｴW SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ ﾗa aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ 
ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲく TｴWゲW ｷSW;ゲが WﾏHWSSWS ｷﾐ BWIゲげ ﾉﾗ;ﾐ IﾗﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデｷWゲが ;ﾐS ┗;ヴｷﾗ┌ゲ ｷﾐ┗WゲデﾏWﾐデ Iﾉｷﾏ;デW 
ｷﾐSｷI;デﾗヴゲが ｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ デｴW WﾗヴﾉS B;ﾐﾆげゲ Dﾗｷﾐｪ B┌ゲｷﾐWゲゲ ｷﾐSｷI;デﾗヴゲが ;ﾐS デｴW ‘┌ﾉW ﾗa L;┘ ｷﾐSW┝Wゲが 
were key to the further liberalization of Third World financial markets, as evidenced by the 
explosion of bilateral investment treaties signed with developed countries.  
The 1990s emerging markets financial crises demonstrated the hegemonic hold of regulatory 
neoliberalism in the international financial order. The ideational fundamentals of the 
Washington Consensus, New Institutional Economics, good governance and the Rule of Law, 
remained in place within the NIFA, despite coming into question as a result of the emerging 
ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲげ financial crises. This included the policy of liberalizing capital controls, championed by 
the IMF. TｴW a;ｷﾉ┌ヴW ｷﾐ TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS IﾗﾐデWゲデ;デｷﾗﾐ ┘;ゲ ヴWaﾉWIデWS ｷﾐ NIFAげゲ ;Sﾗヮデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ﾉ;ヴｪWﾉ┞ 
corporate governance-related international standards, rather than a radical overhaul of the 
regulatory neoliberalism underpinning the transnational financial markets. 
The 2008 global financial crisis, at least while it lasted, once again shook the foundations of 
regulatory neoliberalism, and promised to finally provide a context for the radical overhaul of 
the transnational financial regulatory order. However, ten years later, it is clear that the 
champions of the status quo neoliberal hegemony have triumphed over those calling for radical 
reforms. In place of fundamental change, the former have offered a discourse of 
macroprudential regulation that all but addresses the foundations of the periodic global and 
regional financial crises, which favour the financialization of the global economy over other 
social goals.     
Both TWAIL and non-TWAIL scholars have underscored the various factors reproducing 
neoliberal regulatory hegemony in global financial markets, including: the structural power of 
(especially) the US and other developed countries; materially-embedded nature of regulatory 
neoliberalism; the emergence of a transnational capitalist class that assimilates Third World 
hegemons; and the ideational and ideological power of neoliberal discourse and philosophies. 
The discussion has therefore demonstrated the Ch;ヮデWヴげゲ ;ヴｪ┌ﾏWﾐデ デｴ;デ SWゲヮｷデW デｴW ヮWヴｷﾗSｷI 
financial crises, legal, economic and technological ideas and technological practices continue 
to exert ideological and performative power that reproduces and sustains regulatory 





The power of the ideational and technological infrastructure of the financial markets has been 
key to the resilience of regulatory neoliberalism, especially after the 2008 crisis. It is therefore 
crucial that TWAIL and other Third World practitioners give adequate focus to the ideological 
and performative power of legal, economic and technological ideas and related practices in 
counter-hegemonic praxis. In addition, this praxis should engage not only International Law but 
also national (Third World) regulation of financial markets. The next Chapter explores the 
power of neoclassical economic ideas, doctrines of legal formalism, technological ideas, and 
their related practices, within the BWIs, and how this power ゲｴ;ヮWゲ デｴW ﾉ;デデWヴげゲ ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲｴｷヮ 



















Theorizing the Role of Legal, Economic and Technological Ideas and Practices in 
Reproducing Neoliberal Financial Markets 
1. Introduction 
This chapter outlines the theoretical framework for articulating the role of legal, economic, and 
technological ideas and their related practices in the regulation and reproduction of neoliberal 
financial markets in Third World countries. This ideational role is key to unravelling the failure 
of the Third World to successfully contest and reform the neoliberal regulatory paradigms in 
transnational and national financial regulatory orders. Chapter 1 has discussed some of the 
factors that have contributed to デｴW TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉSげゲ a;ｷﾉ┌ヴW デﾗ ゲｷｪﾐｷaｷI;ﾐデﾉ┞ ヴWaﾗヴﾏ デｴW ﾐWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉ 
デヴ;ﾐゲﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ ﾗヴSWヴ デﾗ ヴWaﾉWIデ ｷデゲ ヮWﾗヮﾉWゲげ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデゲ. These include: US 
structural power; neoliberal materiality in the global financial markets; transnational capitalist 
class interests in the Third World; and the ideational power of neoliberalism. The thesis focuses 
on the last factor - the neoliberal hegemony constituted by legal formalism, neoclassical 
economic theory, and technological ideas, and their related practices and institutions which, it 
is argued, also reproduces neoliberal financial markets and regulatory neoliberalism in Third 
World countries. 
The main argument explored in this study is that the ideational infrastructure of the financial 
markets legitimates, constitutes and performs neoliberal financial markets and regulatory 
neoliberalism, within the transnational and national financial regulatory institutions. This 
ideational infrastructure ideologically legitimates and performs regulatory neoliberalism as the 
only rational regulatory paradigm, while concealing their reproduction of inequality and power 
asymmetries. It also restricts the regulatory possibilities available to Third World policy makers 
and regulators for addressing the externalities of neoliberal financial markets, including, as 
explored in the Kenya case studies, high interest rates and high indebtedness.  
Based on this broader argument, this chapter discusses the second research sub-question: to 
what extent can interdisciplinary ideology-critique and performativity theory form theoretical 
assemblages within TWAIL praxis of resetting the international financial regulatory order to 
speak for Third World concerns? The chapter argues that the nature of neoliberal hegemony in 




United States, to a multipolar hegemony augmented by ideas and technological materialities. 
This necessitates the appreciation of the ideological and performative power of distinct 
ideational disciplines and related practices in financial markets, thus calling for an 
interdisciplinary theoretical approach beyond traditional TWAIL frameworks. 
Exploring the co-constitutive ideological and performative nature of legal, economic and 
technological ideas and practices (normally pigeonholed in distinct disciplines and theoretical 
approaches), necessitates an eclectic theoretical approach that draws from Critical Theory 
(including Critical Legal Studies, Critical Realism, and Critical Theory of Technology), Actor-
Network Theory (ANT), and Economic Performativity Theory. This eclectic approach 
demonstrates the insights that traditional theoretical frameworks deployed in analysis and 
critique of transnational financial regulatory institutions from a Third World perspective, 
including Marxist Approaches to International Law, and TWAIL, can levy from ANT and 
Economic Performativity. These insights include the agential and performative power of ideas, 
discourses, texts, metrics, artefacts, and computing technologies within financial markets, and 
their role in making durable the power structures produced by legal and economic ideologies. 
The chapter is organized into six other sections. Section 2 outlines the ideational infrastructure 
of financial markets as including legal, economic and technology ideas and practices, and 
argues for an inter-disciplinary approach to theorising its ideological and performative power. 
Section 3 underscores the critical context of the study, as Third World contestation of 
neoliberal hegemony in the transnational financial regulatory order. It argues that TWAIL 
theorists and scholars have recognised the ideological and performative power of ideas, 
practices, and technologies, and their role in sustaining Western hegemony in International 
Law.  
Section 4 explores ideology critique as critical theory for analysing the neoliberal ideational 
infrastructure of financial markets. It argues that ideas underpinning legal formalism, 
neoclassical economic theory, and technological determinism and autonomy, are ideological 
to the extent that they legitimate neoliberal capitalism and regulatory neoliberalism as the 
neutral, rational, and natural, while concealing their establishment and exacerbation of 
inequalities and relations of domination.260 Section 5 discusses Performativity Theory, and its 
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market capitalism, where market forces and market relations are given a predominant role in the economy, 




articulation of the power of ideas in constituting financial markets. It articulates the power of 
legal, economic and technological ideas and practices beyond mere ideological legitimation, to 
actual constitution or performance of those ideologies, within financial markets.  
Section 6 examines how neoliberal financial markets are ideologically and performatively co-
constituted by the composite ideational infrastructure, through five key strategies: 
universalization, reification, naturalization, rationalization, and narrativization. Section 7 
concludes by restating the potential of an assemblage between ideology critique and 
performativity theory in the TWAIL praxis of not only deconstructing neoliberal capitalism and 
regulatory neoliberalism, but also constituting diverse economies and regulatory paradigms.    
2. The Ideational Infrastructure of Financial Markets 
TｴWﾗヴWデｷI;ﾉ ;ヮヮヴﾗ;IｴWゲ デｴ;デ W┝ヮﾉ;ｷﾐ ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉゲげ Iﾗｪﾐｷデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW ゲﾗIｷWデ┞が WIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞ ;ﾐS 
markets, and their subsequent action, traditionally take two main (by no means exhaustive) 
conceptual trajectories. The first is the mainstream economics approach, which assumes the 
individual に homo economicus - as the only economic actor, with inherent capacities for 
rational, individualistic, utility-maximising economic action.261 The second is economic 
sociology, which theorizes an actor-in-society に the homo sociologicus に as a complex, variable, 
cultural, expressive, with fluid preferences not necessarily informed by personal gain, and who 
is engaged in both individual and collective, economic and non-economic action.262  
Even though economic sociology has evolved into a valuable critique of mainstream economic 
デｴWﾗヴ┞げゲ ｴWｪWﾏﾗﾐｷI SWゲIヴｷヮデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa WIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞が ゲﾗIｷWデ┞ ;ﾐS ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲが Hﾗデｴ ;ヮヮヴﾗ;IｴWゲ ﾏ;ｷﾐデ;ｷﾐ 
an anthropocentric view of agency, which disregards or gives less emphasis on the role of non-
human elements, including ideas, discourses, texts, artefacts and technologies, in the 
constitution of meaning, and the enabling and restriction of reflexive action. This 
anthropocentric theoretical disposition is not inconsequential: this instrumental 
conceptualization of these non-human elements ignores their ability to construct meaning, 
allocate identities, interests and capacities, and also enable and constrain action. 
Consequently, theories of international law and regulation, and international relations, have 
                                                          
261 P;┌ﾉ HｷヴゲIｴが “デ┌;ヴデ MｷIｴ;Wﾉゲ ;ﾐS ‘;┞ FヴｷWSﾏ;ﾐが けDｷヴデ┞ H;ﾐSゲざ ┗Wヴゲ┌ゲ さIﾉW;ﾐ MﾗSWﾉゲゎぎ Iゲ “ﾗIｷﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ｷﾐ D;ﾐｪWヴ 
ﾗa BWｷﾐｪ “WS┌IWS H┞ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIゲいげ ふヱΓΒΑぶ ヱヶ TｴWﾗヴ┞ ;ﾐS ゲﾗIｷWデ┞ ンヱΑが ンヲヲく 
262 ｷHｷSき AﾉW┝ PヴWS;が けTｴW “ﾗIｷﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ Aヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴ デﾗ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ M;ヴﾆWデゲげ ふヲヰヰΑぶ ヲヱ Jﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉ ﾗa WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ゲ┌ヴ┗W┞ゲ 
506, 508. Preda argues that since homo sociologicus is not rational, and is aware of his limitations, he forms 




focused on human agency in the exercise of power in transnational and national financial 
market regulation.   
Recent work in Science and Technology Studies (STS), Social Studies of Finance (SSF) and ANT 
have explored the agential role of non-humans in social life, including in market construction 
and performance.263 Following this queue, the theoretical framework adopted in this discussion 
to analyse financial markets expands the scope of agency within financial markets to include 
ideas, technologies, metrics, texts, and practices, which play a significant role in the operation 
of markets. As cognitive infrastructure for market activity, they constitute the paradigms of 
market actors, including traders, consumers, regulators and policy makers, and consequently 
construct meaning, and enable or constrain certain types of action.  
TｴWヴWaﾗヴWが デｴW ┗ﾗI;H┌ﾉ;ヴ┞ ﾗa デｴW けｷSW;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ｷﾐaヴ;ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴWげ ﾗa aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲ ｷゲ ;SﾗヮデWSが デﾗ 
conceptualize legal doctrines, economic theories, technological ideas, artefacts and their 
related practices, as not merely functional tools of human economic action, but rather 
economic agents that co-constitute economic action. けCﾗ-Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐげ ﾏW;ﾐゲ デｴ;デが SWゲヮｷデW 
their inanimate nature, these ideas and artefacts have a capacity to act, but only within a 
specifically-configured assemblage of other human and non-ｴ┌ﾏ;ﾐ け;Iデ;ﾐデゲげが ┘ｴWヴWｷﾐ ;ｪWﾐI┞ 
is distributed in relative degrees.264 In addition, the unifying vocabulary stresses the complex 
co-constitutive relationship between legal, economic, technological and other ideas and 
practices. This is explored more explicitly in the discussion of ideology critique and 
performativity theory in sections 4 and 5 below. 
The ideational infrastructure of financial markets is thus conceptualized as entailing at least 
three key ideational disciplines with complex, co-constitutive, but not necessarily causal, 
relationships, due to their roles and prevalence in contemporary financial markets. First, as 
noted by Callon and Lang, the dominant branch of economics に neoclassical (financial) 
economics に ｷゲ デｴW ﾏ;ｷﾐ さI;ﾉI┌ﾉ;デｷ┗Wざ aヴ;ﾏW┘ﾗヴﾆ ┘ｴｷIｴ Wケ┌ｷヮゲ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲ ヮﾉ;┞Wヴゲ ┘ｷデｴ 
causal models for interpreting the consequences of various trends and courses of action in the 
financial markets.265 Second, as argued by Eslava, Cutler, Pistor, and Edelmann & Stryker, legal 
                                                          
263 See generally Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (Oxford 
Uﾐｷ┗Wヴゲｷデ┞ PヴWゲゲ ヲヰヰヵぶき MｷIｴWﾉ C;ﾉﾉﾗﾐが け“ﾗﾏW EﾉWﾏWﾐデゲ ﾗa ; “ﾗIｷﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ﾗa Tヴ;ﾐゲﾉ;デｷﾗﾐぎ DﾗﾏWゲデｷI;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW 
“I;ﾉﾉﾗヮゲ ;ﾐS デｴW FｷゲｴWヴﾏWﾐ ﾗa “デ BヴｷW┌I B;┞げ ふヱΓΒヴぶ ンヲ TｴW “ﾗIｷﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ ‘W┗ｷW┘ ヱΓヶ; Preda (n 55). 
264 J;ﾐW BWﾐﾐWデデが けESｷHﾉW M;デデWヴげ ふヲヰヰΑぶ ヴヵ NW┘ LWaデ ‘W┗ｷW┘ ヱンンに134. 
265 Lang (n 45) 165. Lang discusses how the practice of trading in foreign exchange markets requires a causal 
ﾏﾗSWﾉ デﾗ ;ゲゲWゲゲ デｴW ﾉｷﾆWﾉ┞ IﾗﾐゲWケ┌WﾐIWゲ ﾗa SｷaaWヴWﾐデ ;Iデｷﾗﾐゲく C;ﾉﾉﾗﾐが けAIデﾗヴ-Network Theoryねthe Market 




norms に originating from Lex Mercatoria, and now embedded in international and national law 
に also play not only a regulatory but also a constitutive role. They create cognitive possibilities 
for bringing into existence various legal institutions in financial markets, including juridical 
persons, property, and contract.266 Third, as argued by Callon & Muniesa, and Preda, 
technological artefacts and practices, prevalent in contemporary financial markets, play 
ideological, constitutive, deliberative and representational roles in market transactions and 
their regulation.267  
3. Third World Contestation of Transnational Financial Regulatory Neoliberalism 
As discussed in the introduction Chapter and also Chapter 1, this study aims to contribute to 
the body of academic and political projects that critically examine the relationship between, on 
the one hand, Third World countries and, on the other hand, International Law, and the 
transnational financial regulatory order. These projects have historically contested the 
neoliberal bias of transnational law and regulation, and its negative impact on Third World 
countries, through the related theoretical prisms of TWAIL and Marxist approaches to 
International Law.  
TWAIL (which includes MAIL, critical, feminist, post-modern, post-colonial theory, literal 
theory, modernist, Marxist theory, and critical race theory as theoretical frameworks) has 
traditionally been concerned with how international law can be used by the Third World to 
advance their own interests within the globalized economy.268 Recognising the duplicity of 
international law, as a result of the political, cultural and economic biases embedded within it, 
giving it both an oppressive and alienating and at the same time an emancipatory potential, 
TWAIL scholars are concerned with calibrating or resetting International Law in favour of the 
                                                          
266 Eslava (n 54) xvi. Eslava argues that International Law is both ideological and constitutive, to the extent 
デｴ;デ ｷデ けaﾗヴﾏゲ ;ﾐS ヴWゲｴ;ヮWゲ ﾗ┌ヴ ゲ┌ヴヴﾗ┌ﾐSｷﾐｪ ヴW;ﾉｷデｷWゲ デﾗ ゲ┌Iｴ ;ﾐ W┝デWﾐデ デｴ;デ ｷデ ;Iデ┌;ﾉﾉ┞ HWIﾗﾏWゲ ｷﾏヮﾗゲゲｷHﾉW デﾗ 
conceive of international la┘ ;ゲ W┝ｷゲデｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS ﾗヮWヴ;デｷﾐｪ W┝IWヮデ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ デｴW ┗Wヴ┞ デｴｷﾐｪゲ ;ﾐS HﾗSｷWゲ ｷデ IヴW;デWゲげく 
Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority (n 54) 6. Cutler argues that the law is not a neutral objective force 
けﾗ┌デ デｴWヴWげが H┌デ ｷゲ けｷﾐ ｴWヴWげが Hﾗデｴ Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS Iﾗﾐゲデｷデuted by social, economic and political forces. Deakin 
and others (n 54) 192に193. The authors argue, for example, that law constitutes the institution of property 
through legal definition, and through setting up systems of State accreditation, legitimation and enforcement 
of property rights. See also Edelman and Stryker (n 52) 540. 
267 Preda (n 55) 221. Preda argues that five features constitute agential aspects of financial technologies, in 
which these technologies constitute the markets: temporal structures, visualization modes, representational 
and interpretive languages, cognitive tools and categories, and group boundaries. See also Muniesa, Millo 
and Callon (n 55); See also Callon and Muniesa (n 55). 
268 Gathii (n 1ヴΒぶ ンΑく G;デｴｷｷ ﾐﾗデWゲ デｴ;デ けTWAIL ｴ;ゲ ; aﾉ┌ｷS ;ヴIｴｷデWIデ┌ヴW ﾗa ﾏ;ﾐ┞ SｷaaWヴWﾐデ ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉゲ ┘ｴﾗ ﾏｷ┝が 




さﾗデｴWヴゲざ ┘ｷデｴｷﾐ ｷデが デｴ;デ ｷゲが デｴW ｪﾉﾗH;ﾉ “ﾗ┌デｴく269 TWAILげゲ ;ﾐ;ﾉ┞ゲｷゲ ﾗa ヮﾗ┘Wヴ ｷﾐ ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ﾉ;┘ 
and international relations has conceptualized roughly four perspectives.  
The first conception of power (part of TWAIL I) critically examined the international law-
sanctioned brute force or coercive authority deployed in imperial, colonial and post-colonial 
conquests of the Third World.270 The second conception of power (TWAIL II) entailed the 
discursive force of the language and practices of international law, including in concepts such 
as human rights, economic development, and democracy, which reigned in the radical reform 
demands by Third World States.271 The third conception of power  explored the emergence of 
non-State actors such as transnational corporations and standard-setting industry associations, 
which played a significant role in transnational regulation, yet were legally unrecognized, and 
thus unaccountable under international law.272 The fourth conception of power has focused on 
the role of ideas, practices, and artefacts at the local, rather than international level, which 
translate international law into the everyday life of Third World citizens.273   
TWAILげゲ aﾗI┌ゲ ﾗﾐ デｴW ヴW;ゲゲWヴデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ｷSW;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ;ﾐS デWIｴﾐｷI;ﾉ ;ｪWﾐI┞ ｷゲ ヴWaﾉWIデWS ｷﾐ デｴW ゲｴｷaデ デﾗ 
the operation of international law and regulation, from the international plane of international 
institutions such as the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs), to the local sites in the Third World, 
where International Law is performed in quotidian economic life. These include what Eslava 
;ﾐS P;ｴ┌ﾃ; ｴ;┗W デWヴﾏWS さデｴW ゲｷデWゲ ;ﾐS ﾗHﾃWIデゲ ｷﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ﾉ;┘ ﾗヮWヴ;デWゲ 
デﾗS;┞ぐぷｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪへ administrative procedures, subject formations, spaces and artefacts, that 
are usually identified as expressions of other normative orders, social spheres, or simply 
                                                          
269 Eslava and Pahuja (n 14) 104に105. 
270 AﾐｪｴｷW ;ﾐS Cｴｷﾏﾐｷ ふﾐ Βヶぶ Βヰ AﾐｪｴｷW ;ﾐS Cｴｷﾏﾐｷ ﾐﾗデW デｴ;デ TWAIL I けｷﾐSｷIデWS Iﾗﾉﾗﾐial international law for 
ﾉWｪｷデｷﾏｷ┣ｷﾐｪ デｴW ゲ┌Hﾃ┌ｪ;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS ﾗヮヮヴWゲゲｷﾗﾐ ﾗa TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS ヮWﾗヮﾉWゲげ H┞ ﾉWｪ;ﾉｷゲｷﾐｪ E┌ヴﾗヮW;ﾐ Iﾗﾐケ┌Wゲデ ﾗa ﾐﾗﾐ-
European Sovereign societies. 
271 See Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2005) The author argues that the Bretton Woods institutions were discursively scripted and 
institutionally structured according to the Dual Mandate, that is, the civilizing mission of the League of 
Nations. See also Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: Development, Economic Growth, and the 
Politics of Universality (Cambridge University Press 2011) 2. The author examines how the discourses of 
development and economic growth, and their universality, were used to reign in the Third World calls for 
radical refom to International Law and its related institutions. 
272 Chimni, けTｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS Aヮヮヴﾗ;IｴWゲ デﾗ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘げ ふﾐ ヱヵヲぶ ヱンく Cｴｷﾏﾐｷ ﾐﾗデWゲ デｴ;デ ｪﾉﾗH;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ｴ;ゲ 
broken the historical unity of law and State in international law, and decentered law-making processes. In 
this context, the transnational corporation has emerged ;ゲ けデｴW ヮヴｷﾐIｷヮ;ﾉ ﾏﾗ┗ｷﾐｪ aﾗヴIW ｷﾐ SWIWﾐデヴ;ﾉｷ┣WS ﾉ;┘-
ﾏ;ﾆｷﾐｪげが SWゲヮｷデW ｷデゲ ﾉ;Iﾆ ﾗa SWﾏﾗIヴ;デｷI ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞く 
273 Eslava (n 54) xiv. Eslava explores how international law, when working with norms, discourses, bodies, 
artefacts and institutions associated with the idea of development, expands covertly into multiple realms of 




ｷﾐﾐﾗI┌ﾗ┌ゲ デWIｴﾐｷI;ﾉ ﾗヴ IﾗﾏﾏWヴIｷ;ﾉ デｴｷﾐｪゲざく274 Nevertheless, there remains scope for explicit 
recognition, within TWAIL, of the agential role of non-humans in, for example, economic action, 
the constitution of markets, the construction of meaning, allocation of interests, and the 
enabling and restriction of courses of economic action.  
As explored in the next sections, this study therefore explores the agential power of the 
ideational infrastructure of financial markets using ideology critique and performativity theory, 
デﾗ H┌ｷﾉS ﾗﾐ TWAILげゲ ;I;SWﾏｷI ;ﾐS ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ ヮヴﾗﾃWIデ ﾗa ヴWゲWデデｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS Iｴ;ﾐﾐWﾉﾉｷﾐｪ the discursive 
and technological elements of International law, to speak for the Third World. 
4. The Ideological Turn: Ideology Critique of Ideas, Technologies and Practices 
4.1. Ideology Critique: The Relationship between Meaning and Power 
Despite its roots in Marxist ideology, the critical conception of ideology employed in this study 
is markedly different. A number of Marxist-inspired analyses of ideology have used the term in 
various ways, three of which need to be discounted first, before articulating this sデ┌S┞げゲ 
IﾗﾐIWヮデｷﾗﾐく Fｷヴゲデ ｷゲ デｴW ヴWaWヴWﾐIW デﾗ けISWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞げ ;ゲ ; ゲ┞ゲデWﾏ;デｷI ;ﾐS デﾗデ;ﾉｷゲｷﾐｪ ┘ﾗヴﾉS-view or 
framework of beliefs about life held by a particular social group which, though existent, are 
rare and exceptional.275 Second is the reference to ideology as さa;ﾉゲW IﾗﾐゲIｷﾗ┌ゲﾐWゲゲざが ; ﾉ;Iﾆ ﾗa 
;┘;ヴWﾐWゲゲ ﾗa ﾗﾐWげゲ ﾗ┘ﾐ デヴ┌W ゲｷデ┌;デｷﾗﾐが ┌ゲ┌;ﾉﾉ┞ ヴWゲ┌ﾉデ;ﾐデ aヴﾗﾏ ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴWゲ ﾗa Sﾗﾏｷﾐ;デｷﾗﾐく276 The 
problem with false consciousness is its implication that a third party may have privileged access 
to the truth of a deluded persoﾐげゲ ヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐが ;ﾐS デｴW ヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏ;デｷI ;ゲゲ┌ﾏヮデｷﾗﾐゲ ;Hﾗ┌デ デｴW 
relationship between objective reality and the knowledge of the experience of that reality.277 
The third use of ideology is as systems of belief of groups or classes.278 This conception is equally 
problematic as the existence of distinct classes with distinct interests should be identified 
empirically rather than assumed conceptually.279 
This study uses the concept of ideology to articulate the relationship between meaning and 
power. Ideology is used to refeヴ デﾗ さデｴW ┘;┞ゲ ｷﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ ﾏW;ﾐｷﾐｪ ゲWヴ┗Wゲ デﾗ Wゲデ;Hﾉｷゲｴ ;ﾐS ゲ┌ゲデ;ｷﾐ 
                                                          
274 Eslava and Pahuja (n 14) 109. 
275 Hunt (n 57) 13; Marks (n 38) 110. 
276 M;ヴﾆゲ ふﾐ ンΒぶ ヱヱヰき A┌ゲデｷﾐ “;ヴ;デ ;ﾐS ﾗデｴWヴゲが けFヴﾗﾏ デｴW “ヮWIｷ;ﾉ Iゲゲ┌W ESｷデﾗヴゲげ ふヱΓΒΒぶ ヲヲ L;┘ わ “ﾗIｷWデ┞ ‘W┗ｷW┘ 
629, 629. 
277 Marks (n 38) 110, 112; Hunt (n 57) 13. 
278 Sarat and others (n 276) 629. 




ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa Sﾗﾏｷﾐ;デｷﾗﾐざが280 and also to articulate the relationship between ideas and 
ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴWゲ ﾗa ヮﾗ┘Wヴが ;ﾐSが ｷﾏヮﾗヴデ;ﾐデﾉ┞が さデｴW ┘;┞ゲ ｷﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ ﾏW;ﾐｷﾐｪ I;ﾐ HW ┌ゲWS ;ゲ ; ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ 
デﾗﾗﾉざく281 Understood in a critical rather than a neutral sense, ideology is therefore associated 
with ideas that maintain domination by one group over others. To the extent that this analysis 
of ideology calls for change, it engages in critique.282 The power of ideology is located in its 
ability to connect and combine diverse mental elements (including concepts and ideas) into 
combinations that influence and structure the perception and cognition of social agents, and 
create a basis for action or inaction.283  
While different ideologies are inherent in various ideational systems, and are products of how 
meaning is produced, diffused, understood and used in different contexts, they employ a few 
general strategies. Marks identifies five (by no means exhaustive) closely-related strategies 
that will be explored in the rest of the study: universalisation, reification, naturalization, 
rationalisation, and narrativization.284 Universalization involves presenting legal, economic, 
social and political institutions as objective, impartial, and inclusive, thus creating an illusory 
unity that masks power asymmetries. The second, reification, entails the conversion of 
products of human action into transcendental essences, which then dominate their creators; 
domains of action are converted into fixed and unchangeable, and sometimes, fetishized, 
phenomena.  
The third strategy, naturalization, makes contested arrangements appear obvious and self-
evident, and are separate from domains of social action (despite being proxies for normative 
arrangements), thus foreclosing the imagination of alternatives.285 The fourth strategy, 
ヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐが ｷﾐ┗ﾗﾉ┗Wゲ さデｴW Iﾗﾐゲデヴ┌Iデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ; Iｴ;ｷﾐ ﾗa ヴW;ゲﾗﾐｷﾐｪ ﾗa ┘ｴｷIｴ デｴW ゲデ;デ┌ゲ ケ┌ﾗ ｷゲ デｴW 
ﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ IﾗﾐIﾉ┌ゲｷﾗﾐぐぷ┘ｴWヴWへ ｷデ ﾏ;┞ HW ﾏ;SW デﾗ ゲWWﾏ ;ゲ ｷa デｴWヴW ;ヴW ｪﾗﾗS ヴW;ゲﾗﾐゲ ┘ｴy things are 
;ゲ デｴW┞ ;ヴWくざ286 Consequently, imagining a change in the status quo is deemed irrational. The 
fifth strategy, narrativization, involves the historicizing of particular developments through 
                                                          
280 Thompson (n 50) 56. 
281 Scott (n 38) 318. 
282 M;ヴﾆゲ ふﾐ ンΒぶ ヱヱヱき Tヴ┌HWﾆが けWｴWヴW デｴW AIデｷﾗﾐ Iゲげ ふﾐ ヶヱぶ ヵΓヱく 
283 Scott (n 38) 318; Hunt (n 57) 16. 
284 Marks (n 38) 112 This typology is adapteS aヴﾗﾏ Tｴﾗﾏヮゲﾗﾐげゲ ﾗヴｷｪｷﾐ;ﾉ Iﾉ;ゲゲｷaｷI;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa aｷ┗W ゲデヴ;デWｪｷWゲぎ 
legitimation, dissimulation, unification, fragmentation, and reification. See Thompson (n 50) 60. 
285 VｷIデﾗヴｷ; Nﾗ┌ヴゲWが けL;┘げゲ Cﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐぎ A ‘Wﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Cヴｷデｷケ┌Wげ ふヲヰヰヲぶ ヱΑ WｷゲIﾗﾐゲｷﾐ WﾗﾏWﾐげゲ L;┘ Jﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉ ヲンが 
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particular narratives that endow respectability on particular practices and institutions, and 
legitimises their perpetuation as progressive.287 
The ideological nature of the ideational infrastructure of financial markets - that is, its capacity 
to constitute meaning and thereby influence and structure the perception and cognition of 
social agents, and to create a basis for action or inaction に is examined below through ideology 
critique of mainstream legal doctrine, economic theory, technological ideas and related 
practices. 
4.2. Ideology Critique of Formal-Liberal Legal Doctrine 
Law as Ideology 
Ideology critique of law is one of the core aspects of the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) approach, 
and which explores the production of ideological images of law, and how these images 
influence social relations. The core objective of this approach is critique: to not only lay bare 
the relationship between the understanding of legal concepts and domination in capitalist 
societies, but also to alter that understanding and those relationships, so as to engage in 
progressive politics.288 How legal ideology defines the way social relations are lived and 
experienced, and also the process of identification and resolution of social and political 
IﾗﾐaﾉｷIデゲが ｷゲ IWﾐデヴ;ﾉ デﾗ ┌ﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐSｷﾐｪ デｴW ﾉ;┘げゲ ヴWヮヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ﾐWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉ ｴWｪWﾏﾗﾐ┞ ｷﾐ ﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉ-
democratic States.289  
Legal Formalism as Ideology 
Legal positivism, or legal formalism, is ideological as far as its four core claims. The first and 
most significant aspect is the autonomy of law に さデｴW ;Hゲﾗﾉ┌デWが ┌ﾐケ┌;ﾉｷaｷWS ;┌デﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞ ﾗa デｴW 
ﾉWｪ;ﾉ ﾗヴSWヴ aヴﾗﾏ ゲﾗIｷWデ┞ざく290 The claim of law as self-W┗ｷSWﾐデが さゲWﾉa-contained system of norms 
デｴ;デ ｷゲ けデｴWヴWげが ｷSWﾐデｷaｷ;HﾉW ┘ｷデｴﾗ┌デ ;ﾐ┞ ヴWaWヴWﾐIW デﾗ デｴW IﾗﾐデWﾐデが ;ｷﾏ ;ﾐS SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ ﾗa デｴW 
ヴ┌ﾉWゲ デｴ;デ IﾗﾏヮﾗゲW ｷデぐざが ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ IﾗﾐIW;ﾉゲ ｷデゲ ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ;ﾐS ｴｷゲデﾗヴｷI;ﾉ ﾗヴｷｪｷﾐゲく291 The second 
aspect of law, a consequence of its autonomy, is its ostensible separation from other varieties 
of social control. These include morality, politics, the economy, and, generally the social, which 
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289 N “;ヴｪWﾐデが けL;┘が ISWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ;ﾐS Cﾗヴヮﾗヴ;デW CヴｷﾏWぎ A Cヴｷデｷケ┌W ﾗa Iﾐゲデヴ┌ﾏWﾐデ;ﾉｷゲﾏげ ふヱΓΒΓぶ ヴ C;ﾐ;Sｷ;ﾐ Jﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉ 
of Law and Society 39, 45. 
290 Balbus (n 7) 572. 




are deemed impurities that can only contaminate the rationality of legality. A third related 
;ゲヮWIデ ｷゲ デｴW ヴWﾐSWヴｷﾐｪ ﾗa ﾉ;┘ ;ゲ さSｷゲデｷﾐIデが ┌ﾐｷaｷWS ;ﾐS ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;ﾉﾉ┞ IﾗｴWヴWﾐデざが ;ﾐS ;ﾉゲﾗ ;ゲ 
determinate and predictable in their rendering of outcomes of the juridical process.292 Because 
of its autonomy, purity and predictability, legal formalism makes a fourth claim of the law as 
an objective and legitimate normative mechanism.  
LWｪ;ﾉ aﾗヴﾏ;ﾉｷゲﾏげゲ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ ヴWヮヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ﾐWﾗﾉｷHWヴal financial markets and practices of 
regulatory neoliberalism is evident in its claims. First, the role of law in formalist ideology is 
ｪﾉW;ﾐWS aヴﾗﾏ ┘ｴ;デ GﾗヴSﾗﾐ I;ﾉﾉゲ さW┗ﾗﾉ┌デｷﾗﾐ;ヴ┞ a┌ﾐIデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷゲﾏざが ┘ｴｷIｴ ｴﾗﾉSゲ デｴ;デ さデｴW ﾐ;デ┌ヴ;ﾉ 
and proper evolution of a [progressive] society is towards the type of liberal capitalism seen in 
the advanced Western nations (especially the US) and that the natural and proper function of 
; ﾉWｪ;ﾉ ゲ┞ゲデWﾏ ｷゲ デﾗ a;Iｷﾉｷデ;デW ゲ┌Iｴ ;ﾐ W┗ﾗﾉ┌デｷﾗﾐくざ293 Second, formal equality under the law 
ideologically abstracts qualitatively distinct individuals into equal legal subjects able to engage 
in political and market exchange, while masking and concealing class and social inequalities, 
and depoliticising capitalist property relations through the separation of the economic and the 
political spheres. In this way, law neutralises, depoliticises, and maintains coercive, 
exploitative, and inherently political capitalist relations.294 The commodity form theory of law 
articulates the abstracting nature of legal ideology, by originating it in the imperatives of 
commodity exchange in capitalist economic relations.295 
CutlWヴ Iｴ;ヴ;IデWヴｷゲWゲ ﾉWｪ;ﾉ aﾗヴﾏ;ﾉｷゲﾏ ;ゲ ;ﾐ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ HWI;┌ゲW さｷデ SWヮｷIデゲ デｴW ┘ﾗヴﾉSが ﾐﾗデ ;ゲ ｷデ ｷゲが 
H┌デ ;ゲ ｷデ ﾗ┌ｪｴデ デﾗ HWぐ; ┘ﾗヴﾉS ﾗa ﾗHﾃWIデｷ┗W ;ﾐS ;┌デﾗﾐﾗﾏﾗ┌ゲ ﾉWｪ;ﾉｷデ┞ ｷﾐ デｴW ｴﾗヮWゲ ﾗa IヴW;デｷﾐｪ ;ﾐ 
autonomous analytical legal science by purging law of historical, poﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ ;ﾐS ﾏﾗヴ;ﾉ IﾗﾐデWﾐデざく296 
Legal autonomy weakens the links between the law, society, economy, and the political, and 
aWデｷゲｴｷ┣Wゲ デｴW ﾉ;┘が ┘ｴｷIｴ デｴWﾐ さデ;ﾆWふゲぶ ﾗﾐ デｴW Iｴ;ヴ;IデWヴ ﾗa ;Iデｷ┗Wが ヮヴﾗS┌Iデｷ┗W ゲ┌HﾃWIデゲが ┘ｴｷﾉゲデ 
social relations take on the character oa デｴｷﾐｪゲざが ;ﾐS ┌ﾐSWヴﾏｷﾐWゲ Waaﾗヴデゲ ;デ デｴWﾗヴｷゲｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS 
                                                          
292 Peter Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of Modern Law ふ‘ﾗ┌デﾉWSｪW ヲヰヰヲぶ ンき Aﾉ;ﾐ H┌ﾐデが けTｴW TｴWﾗヴ┞ ﾗa CヴｷデｷI;ﾉ 
LWｪ;ﾉ “デ┌SｷWゲげ (1986) 6 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1, 4. 
293 Gordon (n 6) 60に65. 
294 A Claire C┌デﾉWヴが けGヴ;ﾏゲIｷが L;┘が ;ﾐS デｴW C┌ﾉデ┌ヴW ﾗa GﾉﾗH;ﾉ C;ヮｷデ;ﾉｷゲﾏげ ふヲヰヰヵぶ Β CヴｷデｷI;ﾉ ‘W┗ｷW┘ ﾗa 
International Social and Political Philosophy 527, 532. 
295 It holds that just as the commodity form creates the appearance that all products are equal, the legal form 
creates an appearance of equality between peoples as legal subjects, while masking and concealing class and 
social inequalities, and depoliticising capitalist property relations through the separation of the economic and 
the political spheres. In this way, law neutralises, depoliticises, and maintains coercive, exploitative, and 
ｷﾐｴWヴWﾐデﾉ┞ ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ I;ヮｷデ;ﾉｷゲデ ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲく B;ﾉH┌ゲ ふﾐ Αぶ ヵΑヶくき “WW ;ﾉゲﾗ C┌デﾉWヴが けGヴ;ﾏゲIｷが L;┘が ;ﾐS デｴW C┌ﾉデ┌ヴW ﾗa 
GﾉﾗH;ﾉ C;ヮｷデ;ﾉｷゲﾏげ ふﾐ ヲΓヴぶ ヵヲΑにヵンヲくき “WW ;ﾉゲﾗ Cｴｷﾐ; MｷY┗ｷﾉﾉWが けTｴW CﾗﾏﾏﾗSｷデ┞-Form Theory of International 
L;┘ぎ Aﾐ IﾐデヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐげ ふヲヰヰヴぶ ヱΑ LWｷSWﾐ Jﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉ ﾗa IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘ ヲΑヱが ヲΑヱく 




understanding law as not only a historically contingent, ideological social construct, but also as 
constitutive of social and economic relations.297  
CLS therefore engages in an ideology critique of legal formalism, questioning the ability of the 
ﾗゲデWﾐゲｷHﾉ┞ さﾗHﾃWIデｷ┗W ヴ┌ﾉWゲ ┘ｷデｴｷﾐ ; aヴ;ﾏW┘ﾗヴﾆ ﾗa ヮヴﾗIWS┌ヴ;ﾉ ﾃ┌ゲデｷIWざ デﾗ ヴWゲﾗﾉ┗W ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ IﾗﾐaﾉｷIデが 
ゲｷﾐIW デｴW ﾏWSｷ;デｷﾐｪ ヴﾗﾉW ﾗa ﾉ;┘ I;ﾐ ﾗﾐﾉ┞ ;IｴｷW┗W ;デ HWゲデ さ; ゲWデ ﾗa ヴWゲ┌ﾉデゲ ┘ｴｷIｴ ヴWaﾉWIデ デｴW 
unequal distribution of power and resources whilst claiming to act in the name of a set of 
┌ﾐｷ┗Wヴゲ;ﾉ ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ┗;ﾉ┌Wゲざく298 Since legal doctrine merely masks ideological forces, it cannot be 
ﾗHﾃWIデｷ┗Wが ;ﾐS デｴWヴWaﾗヴW I;ﾐﾐﾗデ ヴWゲﾗﾉ┗W SｷﾉWﾏﾏ;ゲが ゲｷﾐIW ｷデ さﾏｷヴヴﾗヴゲ ;ﾐS ヴWｷﾐaﾗヴIWゲ デｴWﾏ 
through ｷデゲ ヴｴWデﾗヴｷI;ﾉ ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴWくざ299 Formalism is therefore deemed an ideological perpetuation 
of the myth of rational, neutral and objective rule-based governance. Chapter 5, for example, 
examines the failure of the formalist conception of the Rule of Law to address the inequality 
and high indebtedness caused by the liberalization of interest rates in Kenya, due to its 
imperative to safeguard neoliberal conceptions of contract, property and individual rights. The 
autonomy and neutrality of legal reasoning and rationality, used by legal specialists to apply 
doctrine to concrete cases, to reach outcomes independent of ethical and political biases, is 
rejected by CLS.  
4.3. Ideology Critique of Neoclassical Economics 
Neoclassical Economics (NE) has come to dominate the economics discipline, and 
consequently, its application has spread outside academia to all aspects of economic, social 
and political life, including, for the interests of this discussion, the financial markets.300 NE 
commands the language of science and objectivity, despite the inappropriateness and 
contradictions inherent in using the methods of natural science in social structures and 
processes, and has commanded hegemonic control over the discourse employed in economic, 
social and political life.301 According to NE, the central economic problem is the scarcity of 
resources, and how they can be optimally allocated.  
                                                          
297 ibid 73. 
298 Hunt (n 292) 5, 6. 
299 Robert J Beck, Anthony C Arend and Robert D Vander Lugt, International Rules Approaches From 
International Law and International Relations (Oxford University Press 1996) 229. 
300 J;ﾏｷW Mﾗヴｪ;ﾐが けIﾐデヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐげ ｷﾐ J;ﾏｷW Mﾗヴｪ;ﾐ ふWSぶが What is Neoclassical Economics?: Debating the origins, 
meaning and significance (Routledge 2015) 1. 
301 For a critical view of this universalisation of the neoclassical methodology, see Morgan (n 300); For a 
celebratory discussion of the universality of econﾗﾏｷIゲが ゲWW ‘ﾗHWヴデ HWｷﾉHヴﾗﾐWヴが けEIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIゲ ;ゲ Uﾐｷ┗Wヴゲ;ﾉ 




This theoretical endeavour is informed by a number of ontological assumptions: 
methodological individualism, methodological instrumentalism/individual rationality, the price 
ﾏWIｴ;ﾐｷゲﾏ ;ﾐS Wケ┌ｷﾉｷHヴｷ┌ﾏく MWデｴﾗSﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉｷゲﾏ ふMIぶ ヮﾗゲｷデゲ デｴ;デ さデｴW W┝Iﾉ┌ゲｷ┗W 
motor of history and social dynamics are the individuals, whose actions produce intentional 
;ﾐS ┌ﾐｷﾐデWﾐデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ WaaWIデゲざく302 In other words, social phenomena are explained in terms of 
unconnected individuals and their interactions.303 Methodological instrumentalism/rationality, 
on the other hand, posits that individuals as economic agents are rational, and that they exhibit 
this rationality in the form of maximising the utility of scarce resources. Hence economic actors 
are only rational individuals, while economic action can only be economically rational action.304 
Neoclassical Economics also assumes that the individual economic actors interact only through 
the price mechanism, and that market prices always strive towards equilibrium.  
These assumptions, however, require, or can only be realised in the context of a closed system, 
where the atomistic economic elements are connected among themselves, without a 
connection to externalities, rather than an open system. This enables the elements to follow 
deterministic and probabilistic laws. It is this assumption of closed systems that enables macro-
economic governability, that is, the deployment of neoclassical economics in predicting and 
precisely measuring the interactions of economic agents using theories that mirror natural laws 
of physics, and consequently making targeted State interventions on the economy.  
In addition, this has enabled the mathematization of neoclassical economics and the economy, 
and also the steering of the economy through macro-econometric modelling.305 Neoclassical 
Economics has developed and adapted various economic theories within the sub-field of 
financial economics, including the General Equilibrium Theory (GET)306, the Efficient Markets 
                                                          
302 F Dｷ Iﾗヴｷﾗが けIゲ MWデｴﾗSﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ IﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉｷゲﾏ ; ‘WS┌Iデｷﾗﾐｷゲデ Aヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴいげ ぷヲヰヱンへ DWヮ;ヴデﾏWﾐデ ﾗa EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIゲ 
New York University 1. 
303 Lars Udehn, Methodological Individualism: Background, History and Meaning (Routledge 2001) 1. 
304 For a discussion and critiquW ﾗa ヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷゲﾏ ﾗa WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ;Iデﾗヴ ;ﾐS ;Iデｷﾗﾐが ゲWW M;ヴﾆ Gヴ;ﾐﾗ┗WデデWヴが けEIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI 
AIデｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS “ﾗIｷ;ﾉ “デヴ┌Iデ┌ヴWぎ TｴW PヴﾗHﾉWﾏ ﾗa EﾏHWSSWSﾐWゲゲげ ふヱΓΒヵぶ Γヱ AﾏWヴｷI;ﾐ Jﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉ ﾗa “ﾗIｷﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ヴΒヱく 
305 On macro-WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ｪﾗ┗Wヴﾐ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞が ゲWW BWﾐﾃ;ﾏｷﾐ Bヴ;┌ﾐが けWｴ┞ MﾗSWﾉゲ M;デデWヴぎ TｴW M;ﾆｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS Uﾐﾏ;ﾆｷﾐｪ 
of Governabilit┞ ｷﾐ M;IヴﾗWIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI DｷゲIﾗ┌ヴゲWげ ふヲヰヱヴぶ Α Jﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉ ﾗa CヴｷデｷI;ﾉ GﾉﾗH;ﾉｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ “デ┌SｷWゲ ヴΒが ヴΒく Bヴ;┌ﾐ 
argues that because of the power of macroeconomic theory to produce a sense of understanding and 
practical control of the economy, its associated macroeconomic models become embedded in the ideational 
infrastructure of the economy. Consequently, macroeconomic models make possible the interpretation of 
past data and prediction of future economic trends. 
306 “WW Fヴ;ﾐﾆ AIﾆWヴﾏ;ﾐ ;ﾐS AﾉWﾃ;ﾐSヴﾗ N;S;ﾉが けIﾐデヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐぎ UﾐSWヴﾐW;デｴ デｴW Fﾉ;┘WS Aゲゲ┌ﾏヮデｷﾗﾐゲげ ｷﾐ Fヴ;ﾐﾆ 
Ackerman, Alejandro Nadal and Kevin P Gallagher (eds), The Flawed Foundations of General Equilibrium 
Theory: Critical Essays on Economic Theory (Routledge 2004) 1に2. General Equilibrium Theory posits that the 
uninterrupted interaction of all prices with the supply and demand for all commodities always leads to a 




Hypothesis (EMH), and the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which have provided backing 
to the neoliberal politics and neoclassical regulatory rationalities of deregulation, privatization, 
and also increasing trends in financialization.307  
Neoclassical economics is conceptualised as ideology due to at least three attributes. First, its 
theoretical and methodological approaches have been uncritically accepted and legitimated as 
the predominant cognitive infrastructure for individuals in capitalist societies despite their 
various partial perspectives, inaccurate assumptions, contradictions, and policy failures.308 For 
example, Guerrien credits the persistent belief in market efficiency in the face of market 
a;ｷﾉ┌ヴWゲが ﾗﾐ ｷデゲ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ ﾐ;デ┌ヴWぎ さｷﾐデ┌ｷデｷ┗W HWﾉｷWaゲ ┘ｴｷIｴ ヴWﾐSWヴ デｴWﾏ HﾉｷﾐSざく309 Callon and 
Ç;ﾉﾀズﾆ;ﾐ ヴWaWヴ デﾗ デｴｷゲ ｴWｪWﾏﾗﾐｷI ｴﾗﾉS ﾗa ﾐWﾗIﾉ;ゲゲｷI;ﾉ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIゲ ﾗﾐ ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ﾉｷaW ;ゲ 
けWIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐげが デｴ;デ ｷゲが デｴW Iﾗﾐデヴﾗ┗Wヴゲｷ;ﾉ ケ┌;ﾉｷaｷI;デｷﾗn, constitution or establishment of 
;Iデｷ┗ｷデｷWゲが HWｴ;┗ｷﾗ┌ヴゲ ;ﾐS ゲヮｴWヴWゲ ﾗヴ aｷWﾉSゲ ;ゲ HWｷﾐｪ けWIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIげく310  
Second, neoclassical economics is ideological due to its successful appropriation of 
assumptions, approaches and methodologies of the natural sciences, and their application to 
ﾗヮWﾐ ヴ;デｴWヴ デｴ;ﾐ IﾉﾗゲWS ゲ┞ゲデWﾏゲが デｴWヴWH┞ さヮ;Iﾆ;ｪWぷｷﾐｪへ Hﾗ┌ヴｪWﾗｷゲ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ;ゲ ヴｷｪﾗヴﾗ┌ゲ 
ゲIｷWﾐIWざく311 It has consequently laid claim to attributes of natural science, including autonomy 
of its laws of motion, value-neutrality, objectivity, and rationality, thereby concealing its social 
and political values.312 ‘WｷデWヴが ;ﾐS OげHﾗ┞ﾉW ;ﾐS MIDﾗﾐﾗ┌ｪｴが aﾗヴ W┝;ﾏヮﾉWが Sヴ;┘ a pattern 
between the utility-based radical individualism of neoclassical economics, on the one hand, 
and the political and intellectual revolutions against authoritarian monarchies and established 
ヴWﾉｷｪｷﾗﾐゲが ;ﾐS デｴW SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ ﾗa デｴW ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ヮｴｷﾉﾗゲﾗヮｴｷWゲ ﾗa AS;ﾏ “ﾏｷデｴげゲ ｷﾐ┗ｷゲｷHﾉW ｴ;ﾐS ;ﾐS 
Laissez Faire market-led economic systems, and a social structure systematically blind to 
exploitation.313 The misplaced autonomy of neoclassical economics has promoted an 
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308 Douglass C North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge university 
press 1990) 23. 
309 BWヴﾐ;ヴS G┌WヴヴｷWﾐが けIヴヴWﾉW┗;ﾐIW ;ﾐS ISWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞げ ぷヲヰヰヴへ Pﾗゲデ-Autistic Economic Review 15. 
310 Kﾗヴ;┞ Ç;ﾉﾀズﾆ;ﾐ ;ﾐS MｷIｴWﾉ C;ﾉﾉﾗﾐが けEIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐが P;ヴデ ヱぎ “ｴｷaデｷﾐｪ AデデWﾐデｷﾗﾐ aヴﾗﾏ デｴW EIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞ デﾗ┘;ヴSゲ 
PヴﾗIWゲゲWゲ ﾗa EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐげ ふヲヰヰΓぶ ン8 Economy and Society 369, 370. 
311 OげBﾗ┞ﾉW ;ﾐS MIDﾗﾐﾗ┌ｪｴ ふﾐ ンΓぶ ヲヱヶく 
312 “;ヴ; Aﾐﾐ ‘WｷデWヴが けEIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI IﾏヮWヴｷ;ﾉｷゲﾏ ;ﾐS デｴW Cヴｷゲｷゲ ｷﾐ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ AIIﾗ┌ﾐデｷﾐｪ ‘WゲW;ヴIｴげ ふヱΓΓΒぶ Γ CヴｷデｷI;ﾉ 





unwarranted presumption of methodological and epistemological superiority over other 
disciplinary approaches such as economic sociology, perpetuating a totalising discourse that 
marginalises other voices, and brands as irrational any critiques of its method.314  
This leads to a third aspect of ideology, whereby the analytical apparatuses of neoclassical 
economics conceal, and at worst, legitimate and sustain socially constructed and systematised 
relations of domination within neoliberal market economies.315 Lawson, for example, argues 
デｴ;デ ヮヴ;IデｷIW ﾗa ﾏ;デｴWﾏ;デｷI;ﾉ ﾏﾗSWﾉﾉｷﾐｪ さゲWヴ┗Wゲ デﾗ SWaﾉWIデ IヴｷデｷIｷゲﾏ aヴﾗﾏ デｴW ゲデ;デ┌ゲ ケ┌ﾗ ;デ デｴW 
level of the economy and thereby work to sustain it (and would do so whatever that status quo 
ｴ;ヮヮWﾐWS デﾗ HWぶざく316 In addition, its assumptions (including closed systems and atomistic 
individuals) disregard, mask or trivialize notions of social relationality, and related issues of 
power asymmetries, domination, conflict and socio-scientific categories of discrimination, 
thereby sustaining and reproducing the status quo.317  
The Chapter 4 Kenya case study discusses how financial market liberalization theories such as 
the Mckinnon-Shaw Hypotheses have concealed and deepened lender-creditor power 
asymmetries in interest rate markets in Kenya. 
4.4. Ideology Critique of Technology 
Technology as Ideology 
Iﾐ デｴW ﾐ;ヴヴ;デｷ┗W ﾗa ﾏﾗSWヴﾐｷデ┞が ゲIｷWﾐIW ;ﾐS デWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ｴ;ゲ SｷゲIヴWSｷデWS ;ﾐS ゲ┌Hゲデｷデ┌デWS けヮヴW-
ﾏﾗSWヴﾐげ ゲ┌ヮWヴゲデｷデｷﾗﾐが ﾏ┞デｴｷI Iﾗﾐsciousness, religion and feudal social practices, for what 
H;HWヴﾏ;ゲ ヴWaWヴゲ デﾗ ;ゲ けヮ┌ヴヮﾗゲｷ┗W-ヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ;Iデｷﾗﾐげが ｷﾐ デｴW ｷﾐIヴW;ゲｷﾐｪ ヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ 
life.318 This narrative embraces an instrumentalist view of technologies and related practices as 
mere tools implicated in the service of modernisation, and the progressive march towards a 
better life for humanity; technology is neutral, apolitical, and universal.319 In this context, 
technological progress, and its increasing enrolment in the mediation of all aspects of social life 
(including the financial markets), is deemed a universal good; conversely, any negative impacts 
                                                          
314 ibid 154; See also Morgan (n 300) 1に3. 
315 OげBﾗ┞ﾉW ;ﾐS MIDﾗﾐﾗ┌ｪｴ ふﾐ ヶヴぶ ヱンく TｴW ;┌デｴﾗヴゲ ;ヴｪ┌W デｴ;デ H┞ ヴWﾉ┞ｷﾐｪ ﾗﾐ ; けI┌ヴｷﾗ┌ゲ ﾃ┌┝デ;ヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa 
ヮﾗゲｷデｷ┗ｷゲﾏ ;ﾐS ┌デｷﾉｷデ;ヴｷ;ﾐｷゲﾏ デﾗ デｴヴﾗ┘ ; ゲヮ┌ヴｷﾗ┌ゲ ┗Wｷﾉ ﾗa ゲIｷWﾐデｷaｷIｷデ┞げが ﾐWﾗIﾉ;ゲゲｷI;ﾉ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIゲ HWIﾗﾏWゲ ;ﾐ 
ideological apoﾉﾗｪ┞ aﾗヴ I;ヮｷデ;ﾉｷゲデ ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデ┞く げく 
316 Lawson (n 64) 17. 
317 ibid 17にヱΒき “WW ;ﾉゲﾗ OげBoyle and McDonough (n 64) 15. 
318 Habermas (n 40) 81. 





of technification are referred to as inefficiencies that can still be resolved using new 
technological innovations.320  
A Critical Theory of Technology has progressively emerged from the works Marcuse, Habermas, 
Feenberg, Callon and the science and technological studies (STS). Social constructivist theories 
of Technology emphasize the social contingency of technological development, and seek to 
deconstruct technological autonomy and determinism by originating technological rationality 
in social processes and interests. Social constructivism also opens the door to exploration of 
the progressive potential of technological rationality and related practices, especially when 
subjected to political processes such as democratisation. One analytical approach to this end 
has been the interpretation of technological rationalisation and related practices as both an 
ideology (technological rationality) and a practice (technification). It is this approach that is 
applied to the analysis of financial technologies and their role in co-constituting legal and 
economic ideologies, reproducing liberal markets, and restricting possibilities for economic 
reforms in the Third World. 
Technological Rationality as Ideology    
Technology takes on the conceptual form of ideology when cognisance is taken of its extensive 
role in mediating social life. This extensive reliance on technology has ontological and 
epistemological implications: the socially, historically, and geographically contingent becomes 
necessary; the particular becomes universal; the occasional, artificial and contingent historical 
experience becomes natural; and what ought to be a part is experienced as a whole; and so 
on.321 Marcuse, for example, saw the concept of technical reason as domination in the form of 
methodical, scientific, calculated, calculating control, and therefore an ideology of technical 
rationality. He argued that specific purposes and interests of domination were not foisted upon 
technology subsequently, and from the outside; they entered the very construction of the 
technical apparatus. Hence, technology, as a historical-ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ヮヴﾗﾃWIデが Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デWS さ┘ｴ;デ ; 
society and its ruling interests iﾐデWﾐS デﾗ Sﾗ ┘ｷデｴ ﾏWﾐ ;ﾐS デｴｷﾐｪゲざく322  
                                                          
320 MｷヴWｷﾉﾉW HｷﾉSWHヴ;ﾐSデが けIﾐデヴｷI;デW Eﾐデ;ﾐｪﾉWﾏWﾐデゲ ﾗa L;┘ ;ﾐS TWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪ┞げが Smart technologies and the end (s) 
of law: Novel entanglements of law and technology (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015) 106. 
321 ‘ﾗHWヴデ B Pｷヮヮｷﾐが けOﾐ デｴW Nﾗデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa TWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ;ゲ ISWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ぎ PヴﾗゲヮWIデゲげ ｷﾐ Y;ヴﾗﾐ E┣ヴ;ｴｷが E┗WヴWデデ MWﾐSWﾉゲﾗｴﾐ 
and Howard P Segal (eds), Technology, Pessimism, and Postmodernism (Univ of Massachusetts Press 1994) 
96. 




Feenberg, who has also critiqued and modified the critical theories of Marcuse, adopts the idea 
ﾗa デWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ ヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデ┞ ;ゲ ;ﾐ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞く HW ;ヴｪ┌Wゲ デｴ;デ デｴW ｷSW;ゲ デｴ;デ けデWIｴﾐｷI;ﾉ ﾐWIWゲゲｷデ┞ 
dictates the path of developﾏWﾐデげが ;ﾐS デｴ;デ けデｴW ヮ┌ヴゲ┌ｷデ ﾗa WaaｷIｷWﾐI┞ ヮヴﾗ┗ｷSWゲ ; H;ゲｷゲ aﾗヴ 
ｷSWﾐデｷa┞ｷﾐｪ デｴ;デ ヮ;デｴげが ;ヴW a;ﾉゲWが ;ﾐS ;ヴW ｷﾐ a;Iデ さｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪｷWゲ Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞WS デﾗ ﾃ┌ゲデｷa┞ ヴWゲデヴｷIデｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗﾐ 
ﾗヮヮﾗヴデ┌ﾐｷデｷWゲ デﾗ ヮ;ヴデｷIｷヮ;デW ｷﾐ デｴW ｷﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ｷﾐS┌ゲデヴｷ;ﾉ ゲﾗIｷWデ┞ざく323 FWWﾐHWヴｪげゲ SWゲｷｪﾐ デｴeory 
of technology employed here unites, on the one hand, the historical context of technological 
design, the social interests of the groups, the prevailing economic relations within the contest, 
and the outcome of political struggles between various groups, with, on the other hand, the 
efficiency imperatives of technological rationality, in articulating the ideological biases 
embedded in technological design. Therefore, according to the design theory, technological 
design, including its related process and product, is an articulation of both an efficiency-
oriented technical rationality, and the historically contingent interests and normative 
preferences of dominant social groups behind the technological design. 
Financial technologies have emerged in the context of financial globalization, financialization, 
economic developmental disparities, the digital divide, and related technology transfer. Hence, 
according to the design theory critique of technology, the interests of global and local capital, 
including managerialism and financialization, control and are incorporated in the design of 
technology.324 Since these financial technologies are normatively and discursively scripted with 
a neoliberal bias, they are not merely neutral tools of economic progress, but rather are 
cognitive infrastructure for neoliberal financial markets. They shape economic, social life, 
thereby reproducing neoliberal financial market relations. Chapter 6 examines the embedding 
of neoclassical economic theories, doctrines of legal formalism and technological rationalities 





                                                          
323 FWWﾐHWヴｪが け“┌H┗Wヴゲｷ┗W ‘;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐげ ふﾐ ヴヰぶ ンヱΒく 
324 Feenberg, Transforming Technology: A Critical Theory Revisited (n 319) 75に76. Feenberg argues that in 
industrial societies, strategies of domination consist primarily in embedding managerialism in technical 
procedures, standards and artefacts in order to establish a framework in which day-to-day technical activity 




5. The Performative Turn: Performativity of Ideas, Technologies and Practices 
5.1. Performativity Theory: The Constitutive Power of Ideas and Practices  
Performativity Theory was first articulated by JL Austin in his Speech Act Theory, where he 
;ヴデｷI┌ﾉ;デWゲ けｴﾗ┘ デﾗ Sﾗ デｴｷﾐｪゲ ┘ｷデｴ ┘ﾗヴSゲげく325 Though it has traditionally explored the exercising 
ﾗa ヮﾗ┘Wヴ ﾗヴ けSﾗｷﾐｪ ﾗa デｴｷﾐｪゲげ ｷﾐ デｴW デヴ;ﾐゲﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ﾉWｪ;ﾉ ﾗヴSWヴ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ SｷゲIﾗ┌ヴゲWゲ ;ﾐS IﾗﾐIWヮデゲ 
ゲ┌Iｴ ;ゲ けヮ┌HﾉｷI-ヮヴｷ┗;デW SｷIｴﾗデﾗﾏ┞げが けSW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデげが けヮヴﾗヮWヴデ┞げ ;ﾐS けｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉ ﾉｷHWヴデｷWゲげが TWAIL 
has not, until recently, adopted the conceptual language of performativity theory. However, 
the doing of things and the creation of social reality through articulation of ideas and technical 
practices is gaining recognition in global political economy studies.  
The performative turn in TWAIL studies is evident in the recent work of David Kennedy, a TWAIL 
aﾗ┌ﾐSｷﾐｪ ﾏWﾏHWヴが ┘ｴｷIｴ ゲデヴWゲゲWゲ さデｴW ヮWヴaﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗W SｷﾏWﾐゲｷﾗﾐ ﾗa W┝ヮWヴデ ヮヴ;IデｷIWぎ W┝ヮWヴデ ┘ﾗヴﾆ 
Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾐｪ デｴW ゲヮ;IW ﾗa ｷデゲ ﾗ┘ﾐ W┝ヮWヴデｷゲWざく326 KWﾐﾐWS┞ ｪﾗWゲ ﾗﾐ デﾗ ;ヴｪ┌W デｴ;デ さW┝ヮWヴデｷゲW 
governs when their articulations are pWヴaﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗Wぎ ┘ｴWﾐ ┘ｴ;デ ｷゲ ;ヴデｷI┌ﾉ;デWS IﾗﾏWゲ デﾗ ヮ;ゲゲくざ327 
TｴW ｷﾏヮﾉｷI;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW ヮWヴaﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗ｷデ┞ ﾗa デｴW ｷSW;ゲ ﾗa けW┝ヮWヴデゲげ ｷﾐ IﾗﾐデWゲデｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS H┌ｷﾉSｷﾐｪ ; ﾐW┘ 
vision of global governance is captured in his observation that: 
さGWﾐWヴ;デｷﾐｪ ; Iﾗﾏﾏﾗﾐ ┗ｷゲｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ; ┘ﾗヴﾉS to be governed is both a communicative and 
performative work of the imagination and a technical institutional project. Seeing a 
world, people build institutions that seem suited to it, design tools to act within it, 
empower leaders to address the problems they think it has. In doing so, they bring that 
world into being and make it visible. With those tools, from that institution, this world 
can be seen. This double-edged activity is a kind of reasoning, a way at once of 
IﾗﾏヮヴWｴWﾐSｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS ゲｴ;ヮｷﾐｪ デｴW ┘ﾗヴﾉSくざ328 
The performative turn thus deepens the insights of ideology critique, in not only elucidating 
the constitutive power of expert advice and common-place ideas that are ;IIWヮデWS ;ゲ けa;Iデげ ｷﾐ 
social life, but also providing the conceptual tools for harnessing the power of ideas, practices 
and their material expressions, in building normatively distinct transnational regulatory 
                                                          
325 Austin (n 41) Austin distinguishes between two kinds of speech acts: illocutionary and perlocutionary. The 
illocutionary act is one in which, in saying something, one is at the same time doing something, e.g. a Judge 
ゲ;┞ｷﾐｪ けI ゲWﾐデWﾐIW ┞ﾗ┌げく PWヴﾉﾗI┌デｷﾗﾐ;ヴ┞ ;Iデゲが ﾗﾐ デｴW ﾗデｴWヴ ｴ;ﾐSが ;ヴW デｴﾗゲW ┌デデWヴ;ﾐIWゲ デｴ;デ ｷﾐｷデｷ;デW ; ゲWデ ﾗa 
consequences...[that] are not the same as the act of speech. 
326 Kennedy, A World of Struggle (n 47) 4. 
327 ibid 9. 




institutions. It is therefore pertinent for Third World resistance to transnational regulatory 
neoliberalism to appreciate and harness the performative power of economic, legal and 
technological ideas and practices.   
5.2. Economic Performativity Theory: Economic Construction of Markets 
The ideology-critique of neoclassical economics outlined above has demonstrated how the 
ヮヴﾗIWゲゲ ﾗa けWIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐげ - that is, the qualification of the domain of certain social 
ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲｴｷヮゲ ;ゲ けWIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIげ に occurs. Economization privileges the deployment of analytical 
apparatuses, language rationalities, institutions and descriptions based on or emanating from 
the (mainstream) economics discipline, above other analytical paradigms.329 While this 
observation is made within the Economic Performativity theory, its interlocutors (Callon and 
Ç;ﾉﾀズﾆ;ﾐぶ ﾏ;ﾆW ;ﾐ ｷﾏヮﾗヴデ;ﾐデ ﾗHﾃWIデｷﾗﾐ デﾗ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞-critique of neoclassical economics, which 
must be distinguished. They argue that Social Constructivism (which asserts that markets are 
socially constructed) engages in social reductionism, that is, making social relationships the 
ヮヴｷﾐIｷヮ;ﾉ W┝ヮﾉ;ﾐ;デﾗヴ┞ WﾉWﾏWﾐデが ;ﾐS ;ﾉゲﾗ ゲWWﾆゲ デﾗ さｪヴ;ﾐデ itself the monopoly of true 
SｷゲIﾗ┌ヴゲWざく330 It sees mainstream economics and related practices as ideological endeavours 
and false science, and in the process, under-rates and devalues the reflexive and theoretical 
activity that is increasingly involved in m;ヴﾆWデ Iﾗﾐゲデヴ┌Iデｷﾗﾐく CﾗﾐゲWケ┌Wﾐデﾉ┞が ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ Iヴｷデｷケ┌Wげゲ 
appreciation of the power of economic ideas is limited to its impact on human cognition, that 
is, how individuals perceive the market or the economy.  
However, the power of neoclassical economic ideas is not restricted to cognitive and normative 
effects on market participants. Neoclassicism also exhibits material and institutional effects on 
デｴW WIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞が ｷﾐ デｴW ゲWﾐゲW デｴ;デ ｷデ IヴW;デWゲ けゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ a;Iデげく Tｴｷゲ ;ﾉﾉ┌SWゲ デﾗ デｴW Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷ┗W ヮﾗ┘Wヴ ﾗa 
economics on market relations, which power has been explored in previous literature, but was 
ﾗﾐﾉ┞ ｷﾐ ヱΓΓΒ ゲ┞ゲデWﾏ;デｷゲWS H┞ MｷIｴWﾉ C;ﾉﾉﾗﾐ ｷﾐデﾗ ; デｴWﾗヴ┞ ﾗa デｴW けヮWヴaﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗ｷデ┞ ﾗa 
WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIゲげく331 Callon, in his introductory thesis, argued that the body of knowledge or ideas 
                                                          
329 Ç;ﾉﾀズﾆ;ﾐ ;ﾐS C;ﾉﾉﾗﾐ ふﾐ ンヱヰぶ ンヶΓが ンΑヰく 
330 Kor;┞ Ç;ﾉﾀズﾆ;ﾐ ;ﾐS MｷIｴWﾉ C;ﾉﾉﾗﾐが けEIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐが P;ヴデ ヲぎ A ‘WゲW;ヴIｴ Pヴﾗｪヴ;ﾏﾏW aﾗヴ デｴW “デ┌S┞ ﾗa M;ヴﾆWデゲげ 
(2010) 39 Economy and Society 1, 4に5. 
331 “WWが aﾗヴ W┝;ﾏヮﾉW PWデWヴ MｷﾉﾉWヴが けAIIﾗ┌ﾐデｷﾐｪ ;ゲ “ﾗIｷ;ﾉ ;ﾐS Iﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Pヴ;IデｷIWぎ Aﾐ IﾐデヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐげ ｷﾐ Aﾐデhony 
G Hopwood and Peter Miller (eds), Accounting as social and institutional practice, vol 24 (Cambridge 
University Press 1994) 4. Miller argues that accounting is a calculative social and institutional practice which 
constitutes and reconstitutes the economic domain through the calculative practices that provide a 
ﾆﾐﾗ┘ﾉWSｪW ﾗa ｷデく “WW ;ﾉゲﾗ PWデWヴ MｷﾉﾉWヴが けC;ﾉI┌ﾉ;デｷﾐｪ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI LｷaWげ ふヲヰヰΒぶ ヱ Jﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉ ﾗa C┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞ ヵヱ 
Miller reviews the various contributions to the focus on the constitutive or performative role of calculative 




known as economics (which includes neoclassical theory, accounting techniques, and 
ﾏ;ヴﾆWデｷﾐｪぶが SﾗWゲ ﾐﾗデ ﾏWヴWﾉ┞ SWゲIヴｷHW H┌デ ;Iデ┌;ﾉﾉ┞ さヮWヴaﾗヴﾏゲが ゲｴ;ヮWゲ ;ﾐS aﾗヴﾏ;デゲ デｴW WIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞が 
ヴ;デｴWヴ デｴ;ﾐ ﾗHゲWヴ┗ｷﾐｪ ｴﾗ┘ ｷデ a┌ﾐIデｷﾗﾐゲくざ332 The performativity thesis therefore transcends the 
passive role of neoclassical economics and its related practices in merely describing an 
けW┝デWヴﾐ;ﾉげ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ヴW;ﾉｷデ┞き WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷゲデゲが デｴWｷヴ ｷSW;ゲが デｴWﾗヴｷWゲが ﾏﾗSWﾉゲが ﾏW;ゲ┌ヴWﾏWﾐデゲ ;ﾐS 
computing artefacts are, part of the (capitalist) economy, reproducing it with every attempt at 
conceptualising, measuring, predicting, and steering economic variables.333  
B┌ｷﾉSｷﾐｪ ﾗﾐ C;ﾉﾉﾗﾐげゲ デｴWﾗヴWデｷI;ﾉ ┘ﾗヴﾆが M;IﾆWﾐ┣ｷW ｴ;ゲ ヮヴﾗヮﾗゲWS four different types of economic 
performativity: generic, effective, Barnesian and counter-performativity. Generic 
performativity is the weakest level of performativity, and is exhibited when economic theories 
are merely used or implemented in the financial markets, by market participants e.g. traders 
and intermediaries, policy makers, financial market regulators, and any other stakeholder that 
interacts with the financial markets using economic knowledge. At this level, economics is seen 
to shape or influence the conduct of market actors (whether human or non-human).334  
Effective performativity, on the other hand, admits Mackenzie, is more complicated 
conceptually and empirically. It refers to the instance where the use or implementation of 
economic theories by market participants, exhibited by their conduct, has an effect on the 
economic process in question. In other words, the use of an economic theory must make a 
difference to the state of the market or process, which effect would not be realized if the theory 
was not used. Mackenzie remarks that this effective performativity cannot merely be observed, 
but must be carefully examined by studying the actual causality of the action. Otherwise, there 
ｷゲ ; S;ﾐｪWヴ ﾗa ;デデヴｷH┌デｷﾐｪ a;ﾉゲW けWaaWIデｷ┗W ヮWヴaﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗ｷデ┞げ デﾗ ヴWﾏﾗデW ヮヴﾗIWゲゲWゲ ┘ｷデｴ ﾐﾗ I;┌ゲ;ﾉ 
link.335 An example of this false causality has been pointed out by Mirowski and Nik-Khah in 
their critique of the study of the performativity of game theory in US spectrum auctions.336  
                                                          
332 C;ﾉﾉﾗﾐが けIﾐデヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐげ ふﾐ ヴンぶ ヲく 
333 Brett Christophers, Banking across Boundaries: Placing Finance in Capitalism (John Wiley & Sons 2013) 9. 
334 Mackenzie (n 153) 16に17. 
335 ibid 18. 
336 See Philip Mirowski and Edward Nik-Kｴ;ｴが けMarkets Made Flesh: Performativity, and a Problem in Science 
“デ┌SｷWゲが A┌ｪﾏWﾐデWS ┘ｷデｴ CﾗﾐゲｷSWヴ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW FCC A┌Iデｷﾗﾐゲげ ｷﾐ Dﾗﾐ;ﾉS A M;IKWﾐ┣ｷWが F;Hｷ;ﾐ M┌ﾐｷWゲ; ;ﾐS 
Lucia Siu (eds), Do Economists Make Markets?: On the Performativity of Economics (Princeton University Press 
2007). The authors critique the case study on the spectrum auctions undertaken by the US Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), in which Callon and Guala demonstrate how game theory was used by 
economists to construct the spectrum auction market. Mirowski and Nik-Khah argue that other influential 




TｴW デｴｷヴS ┗;ヴｷWデ┞ ﾗa ヮWヴaﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗ｷデ┞ ｷゲ ﾉ;HWﾉﾉWS けB;ヴﾐWゲｷ;ﾐ ヮWヴaﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗ｷデ┞げ ┘ｴｷIｴ WﾏHﾗSｷWゲ ﾐﾗデ 
only generic and effective performativity, but also the ability of economics to alter economic 
or market processes to conform or correspond to the respective economic model in 
question.337 This type of performativity relies on self-validating feedback loops, a concept 
traced to the work of Barヴ┞ B;ヴﾐWゲが ｴWﾐIW デｴW ﾉ;HWﾉ けB;ヴﾐWゲｷ;ﾐ ヮWヴaﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗ｷデ┞くげ338 However, this 
stronger sense of Barnesian performativity in which the use of the respective economic model 
ﾗヴ デｴWﾗヴ┞ ﾏ;ﾆWゲ ｷデ けﾏﾗヴW デヴ┌Wげ ;ﾉゲﾗ ﾗヮWﾐゲ ┌ヮ デｴW ヮﾗゲゲｷHｷﾉｷデ┞ ﾗa デｴW ﾗヮヮﾗゲｷデW ﾗa B;ヴﾐWゲｷ;ﾐ 
performativity: counter-performativity. This is where the practical use of an economic theory 
or model alters economic or market processes to conform less well to the theory or model.339  
Tｴｷゲ Iﾗﾐデｷﾐ┌┌ﾏ ﾗa SWｪヴWWゲ ﾗa ヮWヴaﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗ｷデ┞ ｴ;ゲ HﾗﾉゲデWヴWS C;ﾉﾉﾗﾐげゲ ﾗヴｷｪｷﾐal thesis, which had 
previously been criticized as impractical, due to the high improbability of Barnesian 
performativity occurring in the market.340  
Economic performativity theory makes key arguments related to the constitution of the homo 
economicus, markets, and the impact of economic ideas on them, which depart substantially 
from, or may be interpreted to enrich Social Constructivism and ideology-critique. First, homo 
economicus may as well exist, but not in a natural or a-ｴｷゲデﾗヴｷI ゲデ;デWく HW ｷゲ さaﾗヴﾏ;デデWd, framed 
and equipped with prostheses which help him in his calculation, and which are, for the most 
ヮ;ヴデが ヮヴﾗS┌IWS H┞ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷゲデゲざく341  
Second, Economic performativity theory ;ﾉゲﾗ ヴWﾃWIデゲ デｴW WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷゲデゲげ ;ゲゲWヴデｷﾗﾐ デｴ;デ I;ﾉI┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ 
;ヴｷゲWゲ aヴﾗﾏ デｴW ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉげゲ ｷﾐｴWヴWﾐデ ゲWﾉa-ｷﾐデWヴWゲデが ;ﾐS デｴW ゲﾗIｷﾗﾉﾗｪｷゲデゲげ ;ヴｪ┌ﾏWﾐデ デｴ;デ ;Iデｷﾗﾐ 
flows from culturally-ｪｷ┗Wﾐ ┗;ﾉ┌Wゲく C;ﾉI┌ﾉ;デｷﾐｪ ｷゲ ; けIﾗﾏヮﾉW┝ IﾗﾉﾉWIデｷ┗W ヮヴ;IデｷIWげ デｴ;デ ｷﾐ┗ﾗﾉ┗Wゲ a;ヴ 
more than the capacities granted to economic agents by epistemologists and economists, and 
neither is it entirely in socio-cultural frames or institutions, but involves material artefacts such 
as figures, writing mediums, and inscriptions, which are critical to calculation. This includes 
                                                          
stakeholders, including the government, the FCC, bidders, lawmakers, economists drafted by the and bidders, 
ultimately shaped the final structure of the spectrum auction adopted by the parties. 
337 Mackenzie (n 153) 18に20. 
338 “WW B;ヴヴ┞ B;ヴﾐWゲが け“ﾗIｷ;ﾉ LｷaW ;ゲ Bﾗﾗデゲデヴ;ヮヮWS IﾐS┌Iデｷﾗﾐげ ふヱΓΒンぶ ヱΑ “ﾗIｷﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ヵヲヴが ヵヲヴく B;ヴﾐWゲ IﾗﾐデWﾐSゲ 
that much of the references contained in social interaction are self-referencing, and that much inference is 
self-validating, because inductive inferences become permeated with feedback loops. 
339 Mackenzie (n 153) 19. 
340 AC “;ﾐデﾗゲ ;ﾐS J ‘ﾗSヴｷｪ┌Wゲが けEIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIゲ ;ゲ “ﾗIｷ;ﾉ EﾐｪｷﾐWWヴｷﾐｪい Q┌Wゲデｷﾗﾐｷﾐｪ デｴW PWヴaﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗ｷデ┞ TｴWゲｷゲげ 
(2009) 33 Cambridge Journal of Economics 985, 985. 




economic theories and related practices and artefacts.342 Economic performativity theory 
ヴWﾃWIデゲ デｴW WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷゲデゲげ ﾐﾗデｷﾗﾐ デｴ;デ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデ ﾉ;┘ゲ ;ヴW ｷﾐｴWヴWﾐデ ｷﾐ ｴ┌ﾏ;ﾐ ﾐ;デ┌ヴWが ┘;ｷデｷﾐｪ デﾗ HW 
ヴW┗W;ﾉWSが ﾗヴ デｴW WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ゲﾗIｷﾗﾉﾗｪｷゲデゲげ ﾐﾗデｷﾗﾐ of essential social embeddedness.  
Third, oﾐ デｴW ﾐ;デ┌ヴW ﾗa ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲが C;ﾉﾉﾗﾐ SWゲIヴｷHWゲ デｴWﾏ ;ゲ さIﾗﾉﾉWIデｷ┗W SW┗ｷIWゲ aﾗヴ デｴW I;ﾉI┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ 
of goods, which calculation is possible only if goods can be calculated by calculating agencies 
whose encounters are organｷ┣WS ;ﾐS ゲデ;Hｷﾉｷ┣WS デﾗ ; ｪヴW;デWヴ ﾗヴ ﾉWゲゲWヴ SWｪヴWWくざ343 He further 
argues that the essential processes of disentanglement and framing, and rendering calculable, 
ｪﾗﾗSゲ ;ﾐS ゲWヴ┗ｷIWゲ ｷﾐ I;ヮｷデ;ﾉｷゲデ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲが SﾗWゲ ﾐﾗデ ;ヴｷゲW aヴﾗﾏ デｴW さｷﾐデヴｷﾐゲｷI IﾗﾏヮWデWﾐIｷWゲ ﾗa デｴW 
aｪWﾐデ H┌デ デｴ;デ ﾗa デｴW Wケ┌ｷヮﾏWﾐデ ;ﾐS SW┗ｷIWゲぐ┘ｴｷIｴ ｪｷ┗W ｴｷゲ ﾗヴ ｴWヴ ;Iデｷﾗﾐゲ ; ゲｴ;ヮWざく344 
The economic performativity thesis articulates the role of socio-technical agencements and 
calculative devices, including economic theories and their related models, financial 
デWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪｷWゲが ﾉWｪ;ﾉ ﾐﾗヴﾏゲが ;ﾐS ｷﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐゲが ;ゲ デｴW さｴｷｪｴﾉ┞ ;ヴデｷaｷIｷ;ﾉ ゲデｷﾏ┌ﾉ;ﾐデゲざ デｴ;デ ｴ;┗W HWWﾐ 
combined to construct and frame markets according to neoclassical economic theories and 
models, and the rise of market society.345 
5.3. Constitutive Power of Law: Legal Performativity? 
TｴW WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ヮWヴaﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗ｷデ┞ デｴWゲｷゲ ｴ;ゲ ;ﾉゲﾗ ｷﾐaﾉ┌WﾐIWS デｴW W┝ヮﾉﾗヴ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ﾉ;┘げゲ Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷ┗W 
ヴﾗﾉW ｷﾐ デｴW I;ヮｷデ;ﾉｷゲデ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞く Bｷヴﾉ;が aﾗヴ W┝;ﾏヮﾉWが ;ヴｪ┌Wゲ aﾗヴ デｴW ｷSW; ﾗa けﾉ;┘ ;ゲ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞げぎ ｴﾗ┘ 
the performative power of law institutes ﾗヴ Wﾐ;Iデゲ デｴ;デ ;Hゲデヴ;Iデ デｴｷﾐｪ I;ﾉﾉWS デｴW けWIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞げが 
;ﾐS けIﾗSWゲげ ┘ｴ;デ ｷゲ ヴWaWヴヴWS デﾗ ;ゲ ヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ヮヴ;IデｷIWく346 TｴW ﾉ;┘が ;ゲ ; けゲW;ﾉWSが ゲIヴｷヮデWS 
ﾃ┌ヴｷSｷI;ﾉ ﾉﾗｪｷI ;ﾐS ゲﾗ┗WヴWｷｪﾐ ヮWヴaﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗Wげが ｷﾐゲデ;ﾉﾉゲ デｴW ﾏ;ヴﾆWデ ;ゲ ;ﾐ さ;Hゲデヴ;Iデ ﾏﾗSWﾉ aﾗヴ ;ﾉﾉ 
social relatiﾗﾐゲｴｷヮゲざが ;ﾐS ヮヴﾗS┌IWゲ デｴW ｴﾗﾏﾗ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI┌ゲが ｷﾐ デｴW aﾗヴﾏ ﾗa ;ﾐ ;┌デﾗﾐﾗﾏﾗ┌ゲが 
unmediated legal subject capable of contracting and willing into the future.347 In this sense, law 
has the agency to appropriate established non-capitalist conventions, and to enact market-
                                                          
342 ibid 4. 
343 Callon and Muniesa (n 55) 1245. 
344 C;ﾉﾉﾗﾐが けIﾐデヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐげ ふﾐ ヴンぶ ヲヱく 
345 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Beacon Press 1944) 
57. Pﾗﾉ;ﾐ┞ｷ ;ヴｪ┌WS デｴ;デ けデｴW ｪW;ヴｷﾐｪ ﾗa ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲ ｷﾐデﾗ ; ゲWﾉa-regulating system of tremendous power was not 
the result of any inherent tendency of market towards excrescence, but rather the effect of highly artificial 
stimulants administered to the body social in order to meet a situation which was created by the no less 
;ヴデｷaｷIｷ;ﾉ ヮｴWﾐﾗﾏWﾐﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW ﾏ;IｴｷﾐWげく 
346 “WW ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉﾉ┞ ‘ｷデ┌ Bｷヴﾉ;が けL;┘ ;ゲ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞ぎ Cﾗﾐ┗Wﾐデｷﾗﾐが Cﾗヴヮﾗヴ;デｷﾗﾐが C┌ヴヴWﾐI┞げ ふヲヰヱヱぶ ヱ UC Iヴ┗ｷﾐW  L. Rev. 
1015. 
347 Bｷヴﾉ;が けPWヴaﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗ｷデ┞ HWデ┘WWﾐ Lﾗｪﾗゲ ;ﾐS Nﾗﾏﾗゲぎ L;┘が TWﾏヮﾗヴ;ﾉｷデ┞ ;ﾐS デｴW Nﾗﾐ-Economic Analysis of 
Pﾗ┘Wヴげ ふﾐ ヴヵぶ Γヰが ヱヰヰ. Birla relies on the notion of performativity as first postulated by JL Austin, who explored 




centred economic relations.348 Eslava, a TWAIL scholar, also contends that International Law 
Iﾗﾐゲｷゲデゲ ﾗa Hﾗデｴ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ ;ﾐS Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷ┗W ;ゲヮWIデゲぎ さｷデ aﾗヴﾏゲ ;ﾐS ヴWゲｴ;ヮWゲ ﾗ┌ヴ ゲ┌ヴヴﾗ┌ﾐSｷﾐｪ 
realities to such an extent that it actually becomes impossible to conceive of international law 
;ゲ W┝ｷゲデｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS ﾗヮWヴ;デｷﾐｪ W┝IWヮデ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ デｴW ┗Wヴ┞ デｴｷﾐｪゲ ;ﾐS HﾗSｷWゲ デｴ;デ ｷデ IヴW;デWゲくざ349 
Constitutive theory recognises law as not simply a set of ideas or attitudes, but a constitutive 
power that forms and shapes social relationships and practices.350 Iデ ｷゲ さﾐﾗデ ゲｷﾏヮﾉ┞ デｴW ;ヴﾏWS 
receptacle for values and priorities determined elsewhere; it is part of a complex social totality 
ｷﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ ｷデ Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デWゲ ;ゲ ┘Wﾉﾉ ;ゲ ｷゲ Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デWSが ゲｴ;ヮWゲ ;ゲ ┘Wﾉﾉ ;ゲ ｷゲ ゲｴ;ヮWSざく351 Polanyi, for 
example, underscored the constitutive role of law and other institutions when he argued that 
デｴW ﾏ;ヴﾆWデ さ┘;ゲ ﾐﾗデ デｴW ヴWゲ┌ﾉデ ﾗa ;ﾐ┞ ｷﾐｴWヴWﾐデ デWﾐSWﾐI┞ ﾗa ﾏ;ヴﾆWデ デﾗ┘;ヴSゲ W┝IヴWゲIWﾐIWが H┌デ 
rather the effect of highly artificial stimulants administered to the body social in order to meet 
; ゲｷデ┌;デｷﾗﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ ┘;ゲ IヴW;デWS H┞ デｴW ﾐﾗ ﾉWゲゲ ;ヴデｷaｷIｷ;ﾉ ヮｴWﾐﾗﾏWﾐﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW ﾏ;IｴｷﾐWくざ352 
ESWﾉﾏ;ﾐﾐ ;ﾐS “デヴ┞ﾆWヴ SWaｷﾐW ﾉ;┘げゲ Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷ┗W I;ヮ;Iｷデ┞ ;ゲぎ  
さIﾗﾐゲｷゲデｷﾐｪ ﾗa IﾗﾐIWヮデゲが SWaｷﾐｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ I;デWｪﾗヴｷWゲが ﾉ;HWﾉゲ ;ﾐS ｷSW;ゲ デｴ;デ ヮﾉ;┞ ; ゲ┌HデﾉW ;ﾐS 
oftWﾐ ｷﾐ┗ｷゲｷHﾉW ヴﾗﾉW ｷﾐ ｴﾗ┘ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ;Iデﾗヴゲが ぐ IﾗﾏW ｷﾐデﾗ W┝ｷゲデWﾐIWが ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷゲW デｴWｷヴ 
activities and relationships, and arrange their governance. Rather than providing 
procedural tools or substantive rules, the constitutive legal environment provides 
cognitive possibilities and values that influence the structure, form and strategies of 
ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐゲくざ353 
By ideologically legitimating psychological individualism, law constitutes and performs the legal 
subject in capitalist economy, including both the natural and artificial juridical persons, i.e. 
individuals and firms.354 By constituting the juridical person, law defines bargaining power and 
related asymmetries by bestowing different capabilities on each party, thereby shaping the 
                                                          
348 Birla, Stages of Capital: Law, Culture, and Market Governance in Late Colonial India (n 46) 33に66. The 
IﾗﾐデW┝デ ﾗa Bｷヴﾉ;げゲ SｷゲI┌ゲゲｷﾗﾐ ｷゲ デｴW ｴｷゲデﾗヴ┞ ﾗa Iﾗﾉﾗﾐｷ;ﾉ ﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉｷゲﾏが ゲヮWIｷaｷIally the installation of the Rule of Law 
in Colonial India. She discusses the performativity of three commercial and financial legal forms: the 
Companies Act 1882, the Indian Income Tax Act 1886, and the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881. 
349 Eslava (n 54) xvi. 
350 CｴヴｷゲデｷﾐW B H;ヴヴｷﾐｪデﾗﾐ ;ﾐS “;ﾉﾉ┞ EﾐｪﾉW MWヴヴ┞が けISWﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ PヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐぎ TｴW M;ﾆｷﾐｪ ﾗa Cﾗﾏﾏ┌ﾐｷデ┞ 
MWSｷ;デｷﾗﾐげ ふヱΓΒΒぶ ヲヲ L;┘ わ “ﾗIｷWデ┞ ‘W┗ｷW┘ ΑヰΓが Αヱヱく 
351 ibid. 
352 Polanyi (n 345) 57. 
353 Edelman and Stryker (n 52) 540. 
354 D;┗ｷS NWﾉﾆWﾐが けIゲ TｴWヴW ; Cヴｷゲｷゲ ｷﾐ L;┘ ;ﾐS LWｪ;ﾉ ISWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞いげ ふヱΓΒヲぶ Γ Jﾗ┌rnal of Law and Society 177, 180. 
This autonomous individual is contrasted to the pre-capitalism legal subject that was seen as a member of an 
organic community, and was dealt with in terms of their status and other fixed relationships, rather than as 




alternatives and the various strategies available for negotiation by each party.355 Law therefore 
constitutes and performs market society through its doctrines of tort, contract, property, 
corporation law, and employment law, which allocates public resources to private 
corporations.356  
Exchange and contractual relations are also essentially juridical relationships that rely on legal 
constitution. This realization is necessary for a more grounded approach to policy and 
legislative interventions in complex capitalist societies.357 Hale, Cohen and others have also 
argued that market prices are legally constructed, to the extent that they represent the 
expected value stream of specific legal rights associated with the good or service subject to 
contractual exchange. Hence the ideology of rights is crucial to the valuation of goods or 
services exchanged.358 This observation upends the ideological assertions of autonomous, free-
market price mechanisms, the private-public dichotomy, and the minimalist role of the State. 
L;┘げゲ Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷ┗W I;ヮ;Iｷデ┞ ;ﾉゲﾗ ｷﾐIﾉ┌Ses the shaping of social norms, values and preferences 
related to human agency, responsibility and accountability, fairness and the concepts of 
economic and legal rationality and efficiency, all of which provide the cognitive infrastructure 
for market behaviour.359 This entails co-constitutive reflexive, and reciprocal meaning-
attribution processes where legal and economic ideologies and actors interact with each other 
not only within spheres of law such as the court-rooms, but also within industrial set-ups, and 
engage in interpretation and compliance.   
5.4. Technological Performativity: Markets and Society as Socio-Technical Agencements 
(STAs)   
Ideology critique of technological ideas and practices, e.g. technological determinism, and 
technological rationality, have indeed made valuable insights about the social construction, 
design or coding of technologies and their processes. However, this application of social 
constructivism to technology has a downside: by over-emphasizing the contingency, 
                                                          
355 See Lang (n 45) 156; sWW ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉﾉ┞ ‘ﾗHWヴデ L H;ﾉWが けCﾗWヴIｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS DｷゲデヴｷH┌デｷﾗﾐ ｷﾐ ; “┌ヮヮﾗゲWSﾉ┞ Nﾗﾐ-Coercive 
“デ;デWげ ふヱΓヲンぶ ンΒ Pﾗﾉｷデｷcal Science Quarterly 470; see ‘ﾗHWヴデ L H;ﾉWが けB;ヴｪ;ｷﾐｷﾐｪが D┌ヴWゲゲが ;ﾐS EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI LｷHWヴデ┞げ 
(1943) 43 Columbia Law Review 603; see ‘ﾗHWヴデ L H;ﾉWが けFﾗヴIW ;ﾐS デｴW “デ;デWぎ A Cﾗﾏヮ;ヴｷゲﾗﾐ ﾗa さPﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉざ ;ﾐS 
さEIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIざ Cﾗﾏヮ┌ﾉゲｷﾗﾐげ ふヱΓンヵぶ ンヵ Cﾗﾉ┌ﾏHｷ; L;┘ ‘W┗ｷW┘ ヱヴΓく 
356 L┌I┞ E “;ﾉ┞Wヴが けTｴW Cﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷ┗W N;デ┌ヴW ﾗa L;┘ ｷﾐ AﾏWヴｷI;ﾐ Hｷゲデﾗヴ┞げ ふヱΓΓヱぶ ヱヵ LWｪ;ﾉ “デ┌SｷWゲ Fﾗヴ┌ﾏ ヶヱが ヶヲ. 
The author argues that the history of law is a good lens for reviewing the history of a people. 
357 Edelman and Stryker (n 52) 540. 
358 L;ﾐｪ ふﾐ ヴヵぶ ヱヵヶき Mﾗヴヴｷゲ ‘ CﾗｴWﾐが けPヴﾗヮWヴデ┞ ;ﾐS “ﾗ┗WヴWｷｪﾐデ┞げ ふ1927) 13 Cornell LQ 8, 8. 
359 Edelman and Stryker (n 52) 542; Lang (n 45) 170; See generally Richard Lempert and Joseph Sanders, An 




uncertainty, and social coding of technology, social constructivism spirals into cultural 
relativism and ignores the role of the natural world in shaping technological practice and 
belief.360 In other words, social constructivism falls back to the anthropocentric view of 
(human) agency, and ignores the material agency of things, including technologies, and their 
interventions in social and economic life. Actor-Network Theory (ANT) and economic 
performativity theory, which are in their own right versions of social constructivism of 
technology, rescue the latter from this analytical shortcoming by introducing the notion of 
socio-technical agencements or assemblages (STAs), to articulate the agency of things, 
including technologies.361 STAs are hybrid collectives (composed of humans, ideas, discourses, 
materials, technologies, texts, routines and practices) in which action (including its reflexive 
dimension which produces meaning) takes place.362      
On the basis of this socio-technical agency of things, the concept of technological 
performativity thus extends the power of technological and other ideas and practices beyond 
ideology, in two main ways. First, contend Law and Singleton, the ideas, narratives or ideologies 
about technologies are not merely descriptive, but actually enact or perform those particular 
notions of the nature of technological organization. Ideas about technologies may affect, alter, 
or reinforce the existing arrangements of technological reality, despite the possibility of 
multiple technological realities. Technological performativity is therefore achieved when the 
narrativization and practical performance of particular (explicitly or implicitly political) 
technological ideas, brings into reality those specific technological arrangements.363     
Second, as STAs, these technological artefacts, arrangements and practices are performative in 
the sense that they perform the other ideologies with which they are politically-encoded, 
including formal-liberal legal ideologies and neoclassical economic ideologies. Since 
technological ideologies and practices constitute and are constituted by other ideologies and 
related practices, they are also enrolled in the processes of economic performativity, and legal 
performativity or constitution of social and economic reality.  
For example, the embedding of economic theories, rationalities, methods, routines and 
processes into technical apparatuses and methods such as financial technologies and 
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algorithms, add a further layer to the de-ヮﾗﾉｷデｷIｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW けWIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIげ ゲヮｴWヴWく364 As argued 
by Mackenzie, the economic rationalities incorporated in technical systems have effect even if 
those who use them are sceptical of the said rationalities, since the users are unaware of the 
details of the technical systems, and may even be ignorant of their very existence.365 Latour 
;ﾉゲﾗ ﾐﾗデWゲ デｴ;デ さぐﾐﾗ ﾏ;デデWヴ ｴﾗ┘ Iﾗﾐデヴﾗ┗Wヴゲｷ;ﾉ デｴWｷヴ ｴｷゲデﾗヴ┞が ｴﾗ┘ IﾗﾏヮﾉW┝ デｴWｷヴ ｷﾐﾐWヴ ┘ﾗヴﾆｷﾐｪゲが 
how large the commercial or academic networks that hold them in place, only their input and 
ﾗ┌デヮ┌デ Iﾗ┌ﾐデくざ366 
As argued by Muniesa, Millo and Callon, technologies as material and discursive assemblages, 
intervene in the construction of markets, and are essential for the performance of economic 
calculation.367 TｴW┞ ヴWﾐSWヴ デｴｷﾐｪゲ ﾏﾗヴW けWIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIげが ;ﾐS ;ﾉゲﾗ ヴWﾐSWヴ ヮ;ヴデｷI┌ﾉ;ヴ ┗Wヴゲｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa ┘ｴ;デ 
iデ ｷゲ デﾗ HW けWIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIげく368 Technological devices demonstrate their agential capacities in the 
さIﾗﾐIWヮデｷﾗﾐが ヮヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS IｷヴI┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ｪﾗﾗSゲが デｴWｷヴ ┗;ﾉ┌;デｷﾗﾐが Iﾗﾐゲデヴ┌Iデｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS ゲ┌HゲWケ┌Wﾐデ 
transfer of property rights through monetary mediation, exchange mechanisms, and a system 
ﾗa ヮヴｷIWゲくざ369 
6. Legal, Economic and Technological Co-Constitution of Financial Markets 
The discussions in Sections 4 and 5 above have demonstrated two key aspects of the role of 
the ideational infrastructure of financial markets. First, ideas are not merely ideological, but 
are also constitutive and performative of market and social reality in capitalist society. Second, 
legal, economic and technological ideologies constituted and are constituted by other 
ideologies and practices. The relationship between legal, economic and technological ideas and 
practices is one of inclusivity, co-constitution and reflexivity, which relationship is concealed 
when they are housed in separate conceptual silos. In fact, Scott contends that legal and other 
ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪｷWゲ さﾗ┗Wヴﾉ;ヮが IﾗﾏヮWデWが ;ﾐS Iﾉ;ゲｴが Sヴﾗ┘ﾐが ﾗヴ ヴWｷﾐaﾗヴIW W;Iｴ ﾗデｴWヴざく370 In addition, Hunt 
ゲWWゲ デｴW ヮﾗ┘Wヴ ﾗa ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ｷﾐ ｷデゲ ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ デﾗ さIﾗﾐﾐWIデ ;ﾐS IﾗﾏHｷﾐW Sｷ┗WヴゲW ﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ WﾉWﾏWﾐデゲ 
(concepts, ideas, etc.) into combinations that influence and structure the perception and 
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Iﾗｪﾐｷデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ;ｪWﾐデゲぐざ371. Sumner also argues that the construction of a hegemony based 
ﾗﾐ ﾉWｪ;ﾉ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ さSWヮWﾐSゲ ┌ヮﾗﾐ ｷデゲ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ WﾐI;ヮゲ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ; IﾗﾐゲWﾐゲ┌ゲ Iﾗﾐゲデヴ┌IデWS 
outside of itself in other economic, political and culturaﾉ ヮヴ;IデｷIWゲざく372  
This ideological co-constitution is demonstrated by Cottier in International Economic Law, 
┘ｴｷIｴが ｴW ;ヴｪ┌Wゲが ｷゲ ゲｴ;ヮWS H┞ Iﾉ;ゲゲｷI;ﾉ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI デｴWﾗヴｷWゲが ｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ D;┗ｷS ‘ｷI;ヴSﾗげゲ デｴWﾗヴ┞ ﾗa 
Cﾗﾏヮ;ヴ;デｷ┗W AS┗;ﾐデ;ｪWが ;ﾐS AS;ﾏ “ﾏｷデｴげゲ TｴWﾗヴ┞ ﾗa Iﾐデernational Division of Labour.373 In 
their exploration of the International Law on sea-bed resources, Koskenniemi and Lehto also 
demonstrate the dialectic between the legal form and the political-economic substance, 
arguing that international law expresses conflicting economic ideologies and political power, 
by transforming them into a shared language and institutional process.374  
This section outlines how the ideological strategies of legal, economic and technological ideas 
and practices are implicated in the constitution and performation of neoliberal financial 
markets.  
6.1. Universalization of Neoliberal Market Society 
The universality of neoliberal markets as institutions for organizing society, and their related 
transnational and national regulatory structures, are co-constituted and performed by a 
confluence of legal, economic and technological ideas and practices. The ideology of legal 
formalism asserts the universality of certain market concepts, including the rule of law, human 
rights, private property rights, and the freely-contracting legal subject, by presenting them as 
neutral, objective and inclusive. In similar fashion, the appropriation by neoclassical economics 
of closed-system, mechanical analogies of the natural laws of physics, presents its theories as 
autonomous, objective, neutral, and therefore universal.375 Thus, the abstracted legal subject 
and the homo economicus, both representative of capitalist citizenship, and economic markets, 
are abstracted from social, historical and other contexts, and universalized as the models for 
social and economic action.  
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This justifies the global application of neoliberal regulatory rationalities in global financial 
markets, including the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) and the General Equilibrium Theory 
(GET), despite the objection of economists such as Keynes and Minsky, who argued that these 
theories were only valid in specific cases and contexts, and that economies do not always seek 
equilibrium, and are not self-sustaining.376 For example, principles of market liberalism 
underpin the Bretton Woods regulatory system and its policy propositions, such as the 
abolition of currency and exchange controls, which have exacerbated market volatility and 
financial crises in Asia and Latin America. 
The universality of legal and economic ideologies and practices is further co-constituted and 
performed by technological ideas and practices. This includes the ideology of techno-
utopianism: that technologies as neutral and objective tools can be applied to realise the 
progressive goal of a global utopia, which underpins technological globalization, e.g. social 
media and e-IﾗﾏﾏWヴIWく TWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪｷWゲ さshape the entire universe of discourse and action, 
ｷﾐデWﾉﾉWIデ┌;ﾉ ;ﾐS ﾏ;デWヴｷ;ﾉ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴWざ ｷﾐデﾗ さ;ﾐ ﾗﾏﾐｷヮヴWゲWﾐデ ゲ┞ゲデWﾏ ┘ｴｷIｴ ゲ┘;ﾉﾉﾗ┘ゲ ┌ヮ ﾗヴ ヴWヮ┌ﾉゲWゲ 
;ﾉﾉ ;ﾉデWヴﾐ;デｷ┗Wゲざが ; ゲデ;Hｷﾉｷ┣WS ゲﾗIｷWデ┞ ┘ｴWヴW デWIｴﾐｷI;ﾉ ヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデ┞ HWIﾗﾏWゲ ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ ヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデ┞く377 
Technological rationality projects and universalises a particular historical understanding of the 
┘ﾗヴﾉSが ┘ｴWヴWH┞ ヴW;ﾉｷデ┞ HWIﾗﾏWゲ けﾗﾐW-SｷﾏWﾐゲｷﾗﾐ;ﾉげが ;ゲ Iﾗﾐデヴ;SｷIデｷﾗﾐゲ ;ﾐS ヮﾗデWﾐデｷ;ﾉゲ aﾗヴ ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ 
change are obscured.378 This technological universality, inherent in various internet-based 
financial technologies, universalizes neoliberal legal and economic ideas, and in the process, 
さﾉｷﾏｷデふゲぶ デｴW ヮﾗゲゲｷHｷﾉｷデｷWゲ ﾗa Iｴ;ﾐｪW ;ゲ ﾏ┌Iｴ ;ゲ デｴW ;Iデｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa ;ﾐ┞ ;Iデﾗヴざく379  
Financial markets technologies with a global reach perform legal and economic universality by 
mediating interactions between individuals globally, and shaping the meaning of concepts that 
capture the social reality of these individuals, including liquidity, financial flows, and the 
circulation of money.380 Forex trading technologies, for example, embody intersubjective 
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codifications and reflexive communication processes, which are not merely representative, but 
are constitutive of financial and market reality, and the formation of fictitious capital values.381 
These technologies decontextualize markets, including market actors, commodities and related 
economic relationships, stripping them of social meaning and presenting them as mere 
functional economic phenomena. In this way, the norms of neoliberal market capitalism, 
masked as technical codes are universalised and diffused globally, especially to Third World 
countries. 
The contradiction masked by this ideological strategy is that the market economy and the homo 
economicus were not universalised in Third World countries as a result of the inherent and 
natural legal and neoclassical ontologies, but in fact entailed the use of violence and 
indoctrination, sometimes simultaneously. Rajagopal and Anghie both observe that local and 
global economic markets are constructed through overt and covert expressions of violence, 
through the imperial and colonial encounters, and subsequently through international law, and 
are therefore inherently political, rather than naturally occurring.382 
6.2. Reification in Financial Markets 
Reification as a general ideological strategy entails the conversion of products of human action 
with transcendental essences, which then dominate their creators. This entails presenting 
transitory, historical phenomena as natural, eternal, asocial and ahistorical.383 Legal reification 
fetishizes the law as autonomous, asocial, apolitical, and even separate from the economy.384 
By concealing the social construction of law, legal ideology precludes it from the domain of 
social action, and the imagination of alternative legal forms or arrangements.385 In both 
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concern itself with the resistance of mass action unless it was directed at the creation of states in the form of 
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ﾗa Gﾗ┗Wヴﾐ;ﾐIW ｷﾐ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘げが Legitimate governance in Africa: International and domestic legal 
perspectives (Kluwer Law International 1999) 10. The author argues that international law legitimized the 
violence meted against Third World natives under the Mandate System, perpetrated under the guise of the 
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national and international law, legal product of ideological reification include individual 
liberties, private property rights, and contractual rights, which (as discussed in the Chapter 5 
discussion of interest rate regulation) are removed from political deliberation that aims to 
address inequality and domination.386  
The scientification of neoclassical economics has also reified the realm of the market economy, 
rendering it and its theories as asocial and apolitical. This negation of their socially and 
historically contingent character renders economists unable to interrogate the social context, 
and critique the postulates of theory. Reification of mathematical methods employed in 
neoclassical economics, for example, was undertaken as ; ﾏW;ﾐゲ ﾗa さW┝ヮ┌ﾐｪｷﾐｪ デｴW ﾏWゲゲ┞ 
ヴW;ﾉｷデｷWゲ ﾗa Iﾗﾏﾏﾗﾐ ゲWﾐゲW ;ﾐS W┗Wヴ┞S;┞ ヮヴWﾃ┌SｷIWゲ aヴﾗﾏ デｴW ﾉW┝ｷIﾗﾐ ﾗa ゲIｷWﾐIWざく387 To this 
extent, economics engages in the reification of social institutions by masking human creative 
responsibility for the prevailing institutions and conditions in capitalist society.388 Reification 
impedes critique of neoclassical theory and its policy failings, including cyclical economic crises, 
and also aides its global diffusion. For example, macro-econometric models used for monetary 
policy making, forecasting and market interventions are reified from the realities of rate fixing 
and manipulation, oligopolistic market shares, as discussed in the Chapter 4 discussion of the 
CBKげゲ ┌ゲW ﾗa ﾏﾗﾐWデ;ヴ┞ policy transmission mechanisms. 
Within the ideology of technological rationality, reification is exhibited in two related concepts: 
デWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ SWデWヴﾏｷﾐｷゲﾏ ;ﾐS デWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ ;┌デﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞く けTWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ SWデWヴﾏｷﾐｷゲﾏげ ヮﾗゲｷデゲ 
デｴ;デ デWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪｷWゲ ｴ;┗W ;ﾐ ;ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉが ;┌デﾗﾐﾗﾏﾗ┌ゲ a┌ﾐIデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ﾉﾗｪｷIが ┘ｴｷIｴ さSWデWヴﾏｷﾐWゲ ;ﾐS 
dominates the mental and social situatiﾗﾐゲ ﾗa ﾏWﾐ ;ゲ デｴW Sヴｷ┗ｷﾐｪ aﾗヴIW ﾗa ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ Iｴ;ﾐｪWざく389 This 
implies that social institutions must adapt to the imperatives of technology, entailing, for 
example, trade-offs between technological efficiency and social values.390 Social Studies of 
Finance (SSF) has demonstrated the reifying power of technological rationality, especially in 
their co-constitution of similarly reifying legal and economic ideologies. This includes the 
increasing deployment of algorithms in financial markets, and how this has amplified the 
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deference to the technical rationality in mediation of social life.391 The black-boxing of 
algorithms underpinning search engines, which are encoded with assumptions of legal and 
WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞が ;ﾐS ｷﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ デｴW さﾐW┘ ゲヮｷヴｷデ ﾗa I;ヮｷデ;ﾉｷゲﾏ ｴ;ゲ HWWﾐ ｷﾐゲIヴｷHWSざが ﾗHゲI┌ヴWゲ 
their inherent political and social biases.392 Consequently, algorithms close spaces, rather than 
open hermeneutic possibilities for action.393 
Technological black-boxing conceals the social agency responsible for the socially adverse 
impacts of technological mediation, such as the failure of risk management financial systems 
in the 2008 financial crisis, while vesting responsibility on technical inefficiency (rather than the 
failure of neoliberal politics and liberal legal and neoclassical economic paradigms 
underpinning global financial markets).394  
Technological reification also decontextualizes financial markets through the intersubjective 
codifications and reflexive communication processes in financial technologies, which are not 
merely representative, but are constitutive of financial and market reality. For example, within 
consumer credit scoring models, various commodities, including money, are presented in 
functional terms, rather than as social relationships with social contexts. Hence unconscionable 
lending rates appear as mere market prices rather than usury. In addition, the consequences 
of trading certain commodities, such as agricultural derivatives in the global markets, are 
reduced to price swings in computer screens and collateral management in the back offices of 
central counterparties (CCPs), concealing impacts to the real economy, where poor farmers in 
developing countries cannot sell their commodities due to artificially depressed market 
prices.395 
 
                                                          
391 ‘ﾗH KｷデIｴｷﾐが けTｴｷﾐﾆｷﾐｪ CヴｷデｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ ;Hﾗ┌デ ;ﾐS ‘WゲW;ヴIｴｷﾐｪ Aﾉｪﾗヴｷデｴﾏゲげ ふヲヰヱΑぶ ヲヰ Iﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐが Cﾗﾏﾏ┌ﾐｷI;デｷﾗﾐ 
& Society 14, 14. 
392 AゲデヴｷS M;ｪWヴが けAﾉｪﾗヴｷデｴﾏｷI ISWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞げ ふヲヰヱヲぶ ヱヵ Iﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐが Cﾗﾏﾏ┌ﾐｷI;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS “ﾗIｷWデ┞ ΑヶΓが ΑヶΓく 
393 M;ヴI LWﾐｪﾉWデが けCﾗﾐaﾉｷIデｷﾐｪ CﾗSWゲ ;ﾐS CﾗSｷﾐｪゲ Hﾗ┘ AﾉｪﾗヴｷデｴﾏｷI Tヴ;Sｷﾐｪ Iゲ ‘Wゲｴ;ヮｷﾐｪ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ‘Wｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐげ 
(2011) 28 Theory, Culture & Society 44, 62. 
394 See generally Adrian Mackenzie and Theo Vurdubakｷゲが けCﾗSWゲ ;ﾐS CﾗSｷﾐｪゲ ｷﾐ Cヴｷゲｷゲ “ｷｪﾐｷaｷI;デｷﾗﾐが 
PWヴaﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗ｷデ┞ ;ﾐS E┝IWゲゲげ ふヲヰヱヱぶ ヲΒ TｴWﾗヴ┞が C┌ﾉデ┌ヴW わ “ﾗIｷWデ┞ ンが ンく 
395 For a critique of the presentation of financial derivatives in financial markets, see Donatella Alessandrini, 
けFｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ DWヴｷ┗;デｷ┗Wゲ ;ﾐS デｴW Cｴ;ﾉﾉWﾐｪW ﾗa PWヴaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐぎ WｴWヴW CﾗﾐデｷﾐｪWﾐI┞ MWWデゲ CﾗﾐデWゲデ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞げ ｷﾐ EﾏｷﾉｷW 
Cloatre and Martyn Pickersgill (eds), Knowledge, technology and law (Routledge 2015) The author argues that 
さaｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ SWヴｷ┗;デｷ┗Wゲ ;Iデ ;ゲ ; ヮﾗ┘Wヴa┌ﾉ デWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ;HﾉW デﾗ ;aaWIデ I┌ヴヴWﾐデ ┗;ﾉ┌W-making processes. They do 
certain things to the value they are supposed to measure and it is important to take this process into account 





6.3. Naturalization of Financial Market Institutions 
Ideological naturalisation (a consequence of reification) makes contested market institutions 
appear obvious, self-evident and naturally-occurring, and separate from domains of action, 
rather than artificial constructs that stand as proxies for normative arrangements, and thus 
forecloses possibilities for imagining alternative arrangements.396 Legal naturalization is 
demonstrated by the treatment of human rights, property rights, and the market, as 
institutions that precede the establishment of State, and therefore precludes State 
intervention except in instances requiring protection of wider public interest.397 Ideological 
naturalization conceals the constitutive or performative power of law and the State. For 
example, property rights are not natural, as they are defined into existence by law, and are 
accredited, legitimated, and enforced as against third parties, only by the State.398  
In addition, by naturalizing individual liberty and the dichotomy between private and public, 
legal ideology constitutes and performs the individual juridical subject with rights and duties.399 
In the process, it constructs a limited conception of liberty as space that should be protected 
only from State interference, but not interference by other more powerful juridical subjects in 
the private sphere.400 The corporation as a legal person is naturalized through constitutive 
property and contract laws. Pistor et al ;ヴｪ┌Wが ｴﾗ┘W┗Wヴが デｴ;デ さデｴWヴW ｷゲ ﾐﾗデｴｷﾐｪ ﾐ;デ┌ヴ;ﾉ ;Hﾗ┌デ 
the idea that the residual profit from production vests in the entrepreneur; this results from 
デｴW ﾉWｪ;ﾉ ;ﾉﾉﾗI;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ヮヴﾗヮWヴデ┞ ヴｷｪｴデゲ ｷﾐ デｴW ゲ┌ヴヮﾉ┌ゲ aヴﾗﾏ ヮヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐざく401 The naturalization of 
individual liberty and private property rights underpins the philosophy of liberalization of 
financial markets. 
Neoclassical economics, as a result of its universalisation and reification, also naturalises 
certain market institutions that are ideally social constructions, and domains of human action, 
ｷﾐデﾗ さﾗ┌デ デｴWヴWざが ﾐ;デ┌ヴ;ﾉﾉ┞-occurring phenomena, thereby foreclosing any contestation. The 
appropriated positivist science naturalises and de-historicizes the historically-specific social 
ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲｴｷヮゲ ｷﾐ I;ヮｷデ;ﾉｷゲデ ゲﾗIｷWデ┞が ゲﾗ デｴ;デ デｴｷﾐｪゲ けﾃ┌ゲデ ;ヴWげ ;ゲ デｴW┞ ;ヮヮW;ヴく402 The scientist is 
                                                          
396 Thompson (n 50) 66; Marks (n 38) 211. 
397 ‘ﾗｪWヴ CﾗデデWヴヴWﾉﾉが けFW;ゲｷHﾉW ‘Wｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ aﾗヴ DWﾏﾗIヴ;I┞ ;ﾐS “ﾗIｷ;ﾉ J┌ゲデｷIWげ ふヱΓΒΒぶ ヱヵ Jﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉ ﾗa L;┘ ;ﾐS 
Society 5, 10. 
398 Deakin and others (n 54) 192に193. 
399 CﾗデデWヴヴWﾉﾉが けFW;ゲｷHﾉW ‘Wｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ aﾗヴ DWﾏﾗIヴ;I┞ ;ﾐS “ﾗIｷ;ﾉ J┌ゲデｷIWげ ふﾐ ンΓΑぶ ヱヰき Bｷヴﾉ;が けPWヴaﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗ｷデ┞ HWデ┘WWﾐ 
Logos and Nomos: Law, Temporality and the Non-EconﾗﾏｷI Aﾐ;ﾉ┞ゲｷゲ ﾗa Pﾗ┘Wヴげ ふﾐ ヴヵぶく 
400 CﾗデデWヴヴWﾉﾉが けFW;ゲｷHﾉW ‘Wｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ aﾗヴ DWﾏﾗIヴ;I┞ ;ﾐS “ﾗIｷ;ﾉ J┌ゲデｷIWげ ふﾐ ンΓΑぶ ヱヰく 
401 Deakin and others (n 54) 194. 




therefore absolved of the duty to move beyond the appearance, thereby contributing to 
ideological continuity of neoclassical theory and neoliberal market capitalism.403  
For example, if neoliberal capitalist markets are deemed as objective, neutral, apolitical and 
WaaｷIｷWﾐデが ;ﾐS ゲデWWヴWS H┞ デｴW けｷﾐ┗ｷゲｷHﾉW ｴ;ﾐSげ ﾗヴ ﾐ;デ┌ヴ;ﾉ ﾉ;┘ゲ ﾗa ﾏﾗデｷﾗﾐが デｴWﾐ ｷデ ｷゲ ﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ デﾗ 
conclude that the disturbing social inequalities and relations of domination produced in such 
economic systems can co-exist alongside the efficient markets, and are in fact entirely 
natural.404 EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ IﾗﾐIW;ﾉゲ デｴW a;Iデ デｴ;デ けWaaｷIｷWﾐデ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲげ ;ﾐS デｴW ;S┗WヴゲW ｷﾏヮ;Iデゲ 
of neoliberal market capitalism are not naturally-occurring phenomena; markets are deliberate 
constructions of State and civil society, involving various external artificial stimulants, including 
violence, State legitimation, cultural, political, economic and legal ideas, institutions, and 
technological artefacts.405 
Technological naturalisation also occurs when dominant technological designs and processes 
achieve a hegemonic technical lock-in, and are perceived as the one best way for accomplishing 
specific tasks or organisational goals. This naturalizes and elevates a singular technocracy or 
rationality above other alternatives that may, for example, achieve the same goal but place less 
emphasis on efficiency than other moral and ethical concerns. Consequently, it forecloses 
discussions of alternative social and industrial arrangements, thereby concealing political 
choices that pass off as technically efficient choices. Technological naturalization legitimises 
new status and power arrangements which are biased in favour of the social actors 
constructing and maintaining the technological arrangements.406 
Financial technologies reinforce the economic and legal  naturalization of markets through 
their presentation of the nature and functioning of financial markets on the basis of these 
theories and doctrines.407 They present markets as efficient and natural, rather than as 
artificial, socio-technical assemblages made possible by the normative scripting of financial 
technologies, and which assemblages can therefore be altered for the realisation of more 
                                                          
403 OげBﾗ┞ﾉW ;ﾐS MIDﾗﾐﾗ┌ｪｴ ふﾐ ヶヴぶ ヱンき OげBﾗ┞ﾉW ;ﾐS MIDﾗﾐﾗ┌ｪｴ ふﾐ ンΓぶ ヲヰヲく 
404 Frankfurter and McGoun (n 307) 173. 
405 “WW Pﾗﾉ;ﾐ┞ｷ ふﾐ ンヴヵぶ ヵΑき “WW ;ﾉゲﾗ AﾐｪｴｷWが けUﾐｷ┗Wヴゲ;ﾉｷデ┞ ;ﾐS デｴW CﾗﾐIWヮデ ﾗa Gﾗ┗Wヴﾐ;ﾐIW ｷﾐ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘げ 
(n 382). 
406 I┗;ヴ BWヴｪ ;ﾐS AヴﾐW L K;ﾉﾉWHWヴｪが けTｴW NW┝デ Lﾗﾐｪ “┘ｷﾐｪぎ “ヮ;デｷ;ﾉｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐが TWIｴﾐﾗIヴ;デｷI Cﾗﾐデヴﾗﾉが ;ﾐS デｴW 
‘Wゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴｷﾐｪ ﾗa Wﾗヴﾆ ;デ デｴW T┌ヴﾐ ﾗa デｴW CWﾐデ┌ヴ┞げが Sourcebook of Labor Markets: Evolving Structures and 
Processes (Springer Science & Business Media 2012) 118. 




equitable socio-economic organisations.408 For example, as discussed in Chapter 5, the 
ideologically-scripted credit scoring technologies ﾐ;デ┌ヴ;ﾉｷ┣W ;ﾐS Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デW デｴW けSｷゲIｷヮﾉｷﾐWSげが 
prudent, responsible, creditworthy borrower described in the discourse of risk, as the natural 
borrower. 
6.4. Rationalization of Neoliberal Financial Market capitalism 
The ideological strategy of rationalisation is an exercise of power through meaning, to the 
extent that an ideology constructs a chain of logical arguments or reasoning to justify or 
legitimate certain institutional arrangements.409 To the extent that the law is deemed to be 
objective and logical in its nature, role and functioning, then it can be deemed to embody legal 
rationality; in other words, the application of rational legal methods and reasoning is referred 
to as legal rationalisation. Weber defined the rationality of law as the quality that endeared it 
to capitalism in Western States.410 He explained the affinity of Capitalism to law on the basis of 
デｴヴWW aW;デ┌ヴWゲ ﾗa ﾉWｪ;ﾉ aﾗヴﾏ;ﾉｷゲﾏぎ aｷヴゲデが ﾉ;┘げゲ ;┌デﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞が H┌ヴW;┌Iヴ;デｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS 
professionalization; second, formal legal equality, which abstracts all natural and artificial 
ﾃ┌ヴｷSｷI;ﾉ ゲ┌HﾃWIデゲき ;ﾐS デｴｷヴSが ﾉ;┘げゲ ┌ﾐｷ┗Wヴゲ;ﾉｷデ┞く411  
Weber argued that formal-legal rationality facilitated capitalist economic behaviour and 
institutions by: providing stable rules which increased predictability and certainty for 
contracting parties; ideationally constituting new legal-commercial tools such as agency, 
negotiability, and the natural and artificial legal subject, which enhanced calculability, 
predictability and systematisation; and creating legal personhood, which interpellated business 
organisations into legal subjects with rights and duties, entitled to formal treatment under the 
law.412 
Formal legal rationality constitutes, and is also constituted by neoclassical economic theory, 
┘ｴｷIｴ IﾗﾐIWヮデ┌;ﾉｷ┣Wゲ ヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデ┞ ;ゲ けヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ;Iデｷﾗﾐげが デｴ;デ ｷゲが け┌デｷﾉｷデ┞ ﾏ;┝ｷﾏｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa 
ゲI;ヴIW ヴWゲﾗ┌ヴIWゲげが ;ﾐS ┘ｴｷIｴ ｷゲ ｪｷ┗Wﾐ ゲIｷWﾐデｷaｷI ┘Wｷｪｴデ H┞ デｴW ;ヮヮヴﾗヮヴｷ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ﾐ;デ┌ヴ;ﾉ ﾉ;┘ 
                                                          
408 “WW L;┌ヴ; Lﾗデデｷが けF┌ﾐS;ﾏWﾐデ;ﾉゲ ﾗa AﾉｪﾗヴｷデｴﾏｷI M;ヴﾆWデゲぎ Lｷケ┌ｷSｷデ┞が CﾗﾐデｷﾐｪWﾐI┞が ;ﾐS デｴW IﾐIﾗﾏヮ┌デ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ ﾗa 
E┝Iｴ;ﾐｪWげ ぷヲヰヱΑへ Pｴｷﾉﾗゲﾗヮｴ┞ わ TWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ヱ. The author problematises price as an adequate measure of 
financial value, and instead explores a different measure of worth. By resisting the neoliberal naturalisation 
of markets, she proposes a way to see markets as techno-social assemblages capable of adopting progressive 
politics. 
409 Marks (n 38) 211; Thompson (n 50) 61. 
410 See generally, Max Weber and Max Rheinstein, On Law in Economy and Society (Clarion 1967). 
411 D;┗ｷS M Tヴ┌HWﾆが けM;┝ WWHWヴ ﾗﾐ L;┘ ;ﾐS デｴW ‘ｷゲW ﾗa C;ヮｷデ;ﾉｷゲﾏげ ぷヱΓΑヲへ Wｷゲく Lく ‘W┗く Αヲヰが Αヲヴく 
412 ‘ﾗHｷﾐ “デヴ┞ﾆWヴが けTｴW “ﾗIｷﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ﾗa L;┘げ ｷﾐ Cﾉｷaデﾗﾐ D Bヴ┞;ﾐデ ;ﾐS DWﾐﾐｷゲ L PWIﾆ ふWSゲぶが 21st Century Sociology: 




Iﾗゲﾏﾗﾉﾗｪ┞く Tｴｷゲ けヮ┌ヴヮﾗゲｷ┗W-ヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ;Iデｷﾗﾐげ ﾗa ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉゲ ｷﾐ デｴW ﾏ;ヴﾆWデ Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デWゲ ; けﾏW;ﾐゲ-
ends ration;ﾉｷデ┞げ デｴ;デ ヴWヮﾉ;IWゲ デヴ;Sｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ﾏﾗSWゲ ﾗa ﾉWｪｷデｷﾏ;デｷﾗﾐが IﾗﾉﾗﾐｷゲWゲ デｴW IﾗﾐゲIｷﾗ┌ゲﾐWゲゲ ﾗa 
individuals, and mirrors the rationality attributed to capitalist economic systems.413 WWHWヴげゲ 
articulation of the rationality of the capitalist economic system (which, he argued, constitutes 
legal rationality) mirrors this neoclassical economic rationality: 
さヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ふSWﾉｷHWヴ;デW ;ﾐS ゲ┞ゲデWﾏ;デｷIぶ ヮ┌ヴゲ┌ｷデ ﾗa ヮヴﾗaｷデ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ デｴW ヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ふゲ┞ゲデWﾏ;デｷI 
and calculable) organisation of formally-free labour, and through rational (impersonal, 
purely instrumental) exchange on the market, guided by rational (exact, purely 
quantitative) accounting procedures, and guaranteed by rational (rule-governed, 
ヮヴWSｷIデ;HﾉWぶ ﾉWｪ;ﾉ ;ﾐS ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ ゲ┞ゲデWﾏゲざく414  
The constitutive power of formal-legal and neoclassical economic rationality is therefore 
material in shaping the norms of neoliberal capitalism, including human agency, responsibility, 
accountability, rationality and efficiency.415 This ideological rationalisation of the ability of legal 
formalism and neoclassical economics to midwife capitalist modernity, results in the 
SｷゲIヴWSｷデｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS SWﾉWｪｷデｷﾏｷ┣ｷﾐｪ ﾗa ﾗデｴWヴ ;ﾉデWヴﾐ;デｷ┗W ﾉWｪ;ﾉ ;ﾐS WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ゲ┞ゲデWﾏゲ ;ゲ けｷヴヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉげが 
;ﾐS デｴW ヴWゲデヴｷIデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa けｷﾐゲデヴ┌ﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ ヴW;ゲﾗﾐげ ┘ｷデｴｷﾐ デｴW Hﾗ┌ﾐS;ヴｷWゲ ﾗa デｴWゲW け;┌デﾗﾐﾗﾏﾗ┌ゲげ 
logics.416  
Technological rationality is also crucial to the processes of legal and economic rationalization 
of neoliberal capitalism. Marcuse argues that domination appears as rational when a 
hegemonic system can use scientific and technological methods to make the growth of the 
forces of production the basis of its legitimation.417 The main principle of ideological 
                                                          
413 Habermas (n 40) 71. 
414 Roger Brubaker, The Limits of Rationality (Routledge 2013) 1に2. 
415 Edelman and Stryker ふﾐ ヵヲぶ ヵヴヱき “WW ;ﾉゲﾗが ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉﾉ┞ Jﾗｴﾐ W MW┞Wヴ ;ﾐS Bヴｷ;ﾐ ‘ﾗ┘;ﾐが けIﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷ┣WS 
Oヴｪ;ﾐｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐゲぎ Fﾗヴﾏ;ﾉ “デヴ┌Iデ┌ヴW ;ゲ M┞デｴ ;ﾐS CWヴWﾏﾗﾐ┞げ ふヱΓΑΑぶ Βン AﾏWヴｷI;ﾐ Jﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉ ﾗa “ﾗIｷﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ンヴヰ. The 
authors argue that many formal organizational structures arise as reflections of rationalized institutional 
rules, whose elaboration in modern states and societies accounts in part for the expansion and increased 
complexity of formal organizational structures. These institutional rules function as myths which 
organizations incorporate, gaining legitimacy, resources, stability, and enhanced survival prospects. 
416 Qｷ;ﾐ Xく Yくが けTヴ;Sｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ CｴｷﾐWゲW L;┘ ┗く WWHWヴｷ;ﾐ LWｪ;ﾉ ‘;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデ┞げ ふヲヰヱヰぶ ヱヰ M;┝ WWHWヴ “デ┌SｷWゲ ヲΓ. The 
author, who critically examines the casting of non-WWゲデWヴﾐ ﾉ;┘ ;ゲ ｷヴヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉが ﾐﾗデWゲ デｴ;デ けWWゲデWヴﾐ ﾉWｪ;ﾉ 
thought as a whole - with its rationalist tradition - whether Anglo-American or Continental - is today accepted 
as uniquely the best in human legal history, and this is even accepted in non-WWゲデWヴﾐ Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴｷWゲ ﾉｷﾆW Cｴｷﾐ;げく き 
See also Slattery and others (n 376) The authors note that the heterodox economic theories of Minsky, Keynes 
;ﾐS ﾗデｴWヴゲ ｴ;┗W HWWﾐ SｷゲIヴWSｷデWSが SWゲヮｷデW デｴWｷヴ Iﾗﾐ┗ｷﾐIｷﾐｪ WﾏヮｷヴｷI;ﾉ ｷﾐ┗;ﾉｷS;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ﾐWﾗIﾉ;ゲゲｷIｷゲﾏげゲ IﾗヴW 
tenets. 
417 HWヴHWヴデ M;ヴI┌ゲWが けFヴWWSﾗﾏ ;ﾐS FヴW┌Sげゲ TｴWﾗヴ┞ ﾗa IﾐゲデｷﾐIデゲげ ふヱΓΑヰぶ ヱΓΓ Fｷ┗W Eゲゲ;┞ゲぎ Pゲ┞Iｴﾗ;ﾐ;ﾉ┞ゲｷゲが 




rationalisation of technological domination is efficiency. Despite the existence of multiple 
technical designs and processes for achieving a goal, the principle of technical efficiency usually 
determines what becomes the dominant technology in organising social life. Ideology critiques 
of technology contest this efficiency-rationalisation, and propose that there are multiple 
factors besides efficiency, which usually play a role in design choice.418  
The rationale of efficiency therefore masks some of these interest-driven factors, while, in the 
process, borrowing the virtues of necessity and universality generally attributed to scientific 
rationality.419 For example, the use of algorithms, artificial intelligence and other technological 
innovations in High-Frequency Trading (HFT) is hailed as increasing market liquidity by 
optimising trading in financial instruments at the minimum price, supposedly making markets 
more efficient. However, critics point out that the black-boxing of these technologies, due to 
their complexities which are inaccessible to human mental processes, deters attempts at 
auditing them, and therefore renders the technologies and their creators and users 
unaccountable.420 
Technological rationalisation by financial technologies therefore contributes to the 
reproduction of neoliberal financial markets, and the restriction of possibilities for economic 
reform in the Third World by presenting technical efficiency as a necessity that must be secured 
through a trade-off with social values such as equity and morality. This efficiency-rationality 
becomes a pre-requisite for rational economic behaviour in computerized financial markets. 
6.5. Narrativization of Financial Market and Economic Development 
The ideological strategy of narrativization involves historicising particular developments 
though particular narratives that endow respectability on particular practices and institutions, 
and legitimates their perpetuation as progressive, efficient or modern. Legal narrativization is 
exhibited by the Eurocentric accounts of the international legal order, characterised by 
Eurocentric (mis)interpretations of history. These accounts of international law legitimate past 
and present institutions and practices, including imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism, 
デｴW けS┞ﾐ;ﾏｷI ﾗa SｷaaWヴWﾐIWげが WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI Iﾉ;ゲゲｷaｷI;デｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa ヮﾗゲt-colonial States, and processes of 
attaining development.  
                                                          
418 Feenberg, Transforming Technology: A Critical Theory Revisited (n 319) 21. 
419 Andrew Feenberg, Between Reason and Experience: Essays in Technology and Modernity (MIT Press 2010) 
67. 




For example, international law legitimated and in fact provided a legal framework for the 
imperial excursions of Western States in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, by narr;デｷ┗ｷ┣ｷﾐｪ ｷデ ;ゲ ; けIｷ┗ｷﾉｷゲｷﾐｪ ﾏｷゲゲｷﾗﾐげ デｴ;デ ｷゲが さthe grand project that has justified 
colonialism as a means of redeeming the backward, aberrant, violent, oppressed, undeveloped 
people of the non-European world by incorporating them into the universal civilization of 
E┌ヴﾗヮWざく421 IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ﾉ;┘ ヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷゲWS ;ﾐS ｷﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷゲWS デｴW けS┞ﾐ;ﾏｷI ﾗa SｷaaWヴWﾐIWげが デｴ;デ 
ｷゲが デｴW けa;Iデげ ﾗa I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ SｷaaWヴWﾐIW HWデ┘WWﾐ E┌ヴﾗヮW;ﾐ ゲデ;デWゲ ;ﾐS ﾐﾗﾐ-European people, 
whereby the former was elevated as rational, modern, civilised, and developed, while the latter 
was othered as irrational, backward, uncivilised and under-developed.422  
TｴW ﾐ;ヴヴ;デｷ┗ｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW ｷﾏヮWヴｷ;ﾉ ;ﾐS Iﾗﾉﾗﾐｷ;ﾉ WﾐIﾗ┌ﾐデWヴゲ ｷﾐ ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ﾉ;┘ ;ゲ デｴW けIｷ┗ｷﾉｷゲｷﾐｪ 
ﾏｷゲゲｷﾗﾐげ ｴ;ゲ IﾗﾐゲWケ┌Wﾐデﾉ┞ ヴWヮヴﾗS┌IWS デｴWゲW I┌ﾉデ┌ral dichotomies in the membership and 
participation of States in the decision-making organs of the transnational financial regulatory 
institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank.423 In addition, this narrativization also 
informed the conceptualisation of the notion of, and the paths and processes for attaining, 
development.  
For post-colonial Third World countries, the narrative of development entails economic, legal, 
political, cultural and other institutional reforms towards realising a Western form of capitalist 
society. This particular narrativization of international legal history, modernity, and the 
structuring of contemporary transnational financial regulatory institutions ideologically 
conditions not only the legislators, policy makers and regulators, but also the citizens in Third 
World countries to strive towards a particular neoliberal conception and narrativization of 
modernity, development, civilization, and capitalist society.  
Neoclassical economics as ideology, also legitimates and contributes to the reproduction of 
neoliberal financial markets through narrativization. Economists, like other social scientists, 
ヴWﾉ┞ ﾗﾐ ; ┘ｴﾗﾉW ヴ;ﾐｪW ﾗa けヴｴWデﾗヴｷI;ﾉ デWデヴ;Sげぎ a;Iデが ﾉﾗｪｷIが ﾏWデ;ヮｴﾗヴゲが ;ﾐS ゲデﾗヴｷWゲが デﾗ W┝ヮﾉ;ｷﾐ 
development, progress, change, and the emergence and sustenance of capitalist and other 
economic phenomena.424 Within its power of narrativization lies the answer to neoclassical 
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ｴWｪWﾏﾗﾐ┞が SWゲヮｷデW デｴW ┘Wﾉﾉ SﾗI┌ﾏWﾐデWS ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ a;ｷﾉ┌ヴWゲぎ さﾐWﾗIﾉ;ゲゲｷI;ﾉ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIゲ ヮヴﾗ┗ｷSWゲ ; 
heuristic narrative of explanation that can cross temporal, geographic and political 
Hﾗ┌ﾐS;ヴｷWゲくざく425 It exercises power by describing, explaining and legitimating conditions and 
institutions of social life experienced by individuals, thereby legitimating inequality, 
domination and exploitation in neoliberal market society.426 
Ideological narrativization by neoclassical economics is evident in the descriptions and 
explanations for, among other concepts, modernity, economic development, increasing 
poverty in neoliberal capitalist society, and the prevalence of economic crises. For example, 
the rise of mathematical modelling of everything, including social life, is accounted for in the 
ﾐ;ヴヴ;デｷ┗W ﾗa WWゲデWヴﾐ ﾏﾗSWヴﾐｷデ┞く KﾉｷﾐW ﾐﾗデWゲ デｴ;デ さ;ﾐ ;IIWヮデ;ﾐIW ﾗa デｴW ｷSW; デｴ;デ ﾏ;デｴWﾏ;デｷIゲ 
is essential to grounded knowledge has been a factor in sections of popular culture for rather 
longer than even the post-WﾐﾉｷｪｴデWﾐﾏWﾐデ ヮWヴｷﾗSざく427  
Capitalist economic development in Western countries is narrativized as the product of 
enlightenment, and the embrace of neoliberal capitalist legal and economic postulates, while 
the under-SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ ﾗa デｴW TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS ｷゲ デｷWS デﾗ デｴW ヮヴW┗;ﾉWﾐIW ﾗa けヮヴW-ﾏﾗSWヴﾐげ ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ 
relationships entailing a reluctance to embrace radically neoliberal capitalist economic models. 
This narrative ideologically masks critical aspects of the development of capitalism, including 
the imperial, colonial and post-colonial encounters between developed and developing 
countries. Neoclassical economic narratives set development goals and objectives, and 
structure the processes for attaining those goals, in narrow hegemonic neoliberal capitalist 
paradigms that disqualify alternative social orderings. 
The ideological narrativization of financial technologies is exhibited in its embedding in 
historical tales of modernity and related discourses, including the Other pre-modern, civilised 
versus uncivilised societies, developed/first world versus developing/Third World countries, 
the dynamic of difference, and the technological divide. These discourses create and set certain 
normative goals for the Third World, such as economic development, liberal democratic 
traditions, etc., which are presented as a cultural ideal anchored on the promise of technology. 
If the digital divide can be closed, then the Third World can achieve a cultural utopia of 
globalisation, democratic expression, increased individual and communal agency, 
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transparency, and economic development. The universalisation of these normative 
benchmarks entails an abstraction of economic, legal, political, cultural, moral, spatial and 
other particularities, while elevating a singular particular as universal. This universalisation of 
technological progress to the Third World is predicated on ostensibly neutral technology 
transfer from the global north, resulting in the transfer of neoliberal ideologies, discourses, and 
technical practices imbedded in the technical design, and concealed and legitimated as bridging 
the digital divide. Yet this results in technological domination. 
Feenberg, for example, notes the enrolment of the claims of technological determinism in the 
narrativization of the role of technology in modernity and economic development: 
さTｴW デ┘ﾗ デｴWゲWゲ ﾗa デWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ SWデWヴﾏｷﾐｷゲﾏ ヮヴWゲWﾐデ SWIﾗﾐデW┝デ┌;ﾉｷ┣WSが ゲWﾉa-
generating technology as the unique foundation of modern society. Determinism thus 
implies that our technology and its corresponding institutional structures are universal, 
indeed planetary in scope. There may be many forms of tribal society, many feudalisms, 
and even many forms of early capitalism, but there is only one modernity, and it is 
exemplified in our society, for good or ill. Developing countries should take note: as 
Marx once said, calling the attention of his backward German compatriots to British 
;S┗;ﾐIWゲぎ けSW デW a;H┌ﾉ; ﾐ;ヴヴ;デﾗヴけ に oa ┞ﾗ┌ デｴW デ;ﾉW ｷゲ デﾗﾉSくざ428 
The digitisation of finance, for example, is heralded as a technological innovation that 
universalises and liberalises the financial markets, fosters financial inclusion especially in Third 
World countries, and increases the efficiency and liquidity of the markets. Financial 
technologies that have digitised finance include dematerialisation of legal tender into 
electronic ledgers in banks, online banking, digital and other cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin 
and blockchain. While cryptocurrencies are narrativized as emancipating finance from State 
power, they however elicit concerns regarding their elitisms, opacity, black-boxing, and non-
participatory nature, especially in the Third World which lacks adequate technological 
infrastructure.429  
In addition, monopoly infrastructures such as the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunications (SWIFT) network, while enabling global financial connectivity, are 
discursively scripted in response to specific regulatory norms that they have been subjected 
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to.430 For example, state regulators such as the US Treasury have also used their licensing power 
to compel SWIFT to include in its membership criteria Anti-Money Laundering and Financing of 
Terrorism (AML-FT) regulatory guidelines.431 Consequently, SWIFT has concentrated regulatory 
power in the hands of the US, and enhanced its ability to wage economic warfare against 
geopolitical rivals, and related financial institutions and individuals, in the form of economic 
sanctions.432 Technological narratives of bridging the digital divide therefore conceal critical 
aspects of these hegemonic financial technologies. 
7. Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the second research sub-question: to what extent can 
interdisciplinary ideology-critique and performativity theory form theoretical assemblages 
within TWAIL praxis of resetting the international financial regulatory order to speak for Third 
World concerns? 
This chapter has proposed an eclectic theoretical approach to the exploration of the role of 
ideas and technical practices in reproducing regulatory neoliberalism in Third World and global 
aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲぎ ;ﾐ ;ゲゲWﾏHﾉ;ｪW ﾗa CヴｷデｷI;ﾉ TｴWﾗヴ┞げゲ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ Iヴｷデｷケ┌Wが ;ﾐS AIデﾗヴ-Network 
Theory, and Performativity Theory. The eclectic approach is essential for two reasons. First, the 
ideational infrastructure of contemporary neoliberal financial markets and their regulatory 
practices is constituted by various ideas and practices, including formal legal doctrines, 
neoclassical economics, and technologies, and yet their respective analyses have been pigeon-
holed into distinct theoretical programmes. Second, legal, economic and technological 
ideologies constitute and are constituted by other ideologies and practices, a relationship 
characterized by inclusivity, co-constitution and reflexivity, which relationship is concealed 
when they are housed in separate conceptual silos. 
The discussion has explored the ideological role of the ideational infrastructure in sustaining 
and reproducing regulatory neoliberalism within financial global markets. Ideas project power 
through their constitution of meaning about social life. LWｪ;ﾉ aﾗヴﾏ;ﾉｷゲﾏげゲ Iﾉ;ｷﾏ デﾗ autonomy, 
ヮ┌ヴｷデ┞が SWデWヴﾏｷﾐ;I┞が ;ﾐS ﾗHﾃWIデｷ┗ｷデ┞が ｷゲ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ デﾗ デｴW W┝デWﾐデ デｴ;デ ｷデ IﾗﾐIW;ﾉゲ ﾉ;┘げゲ ｴｷゲデﾗヴｷI;ﾉが 
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social, political, and contingent aspects, and thereby ideologically legitimates the relations of 
domination, and a neoliberal bias. Neoclassical economics is ideological to the extent that it 
makes claims to universality, rationality, transcendence and naturality. It appropriates the 
けIﾉﾗゲWS-ゲ┞ゲデWﾏげ ;ゲゲ┌ﾏヮデｷﾗﾐゲ ;ﾐS ﾏWデｴﾗSﾗﾉﾗｪｷWゲ ﾗa ﾐ;デ┌ヴ;ﾉ ゲIｷWﾐIWが ｷﾐ ; HｷS デﾗ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ 
legitimate neoliberal capitalism, and naturalize its excesses (including poverty and inequality) 
as inevitable and acceptable. In addition, some ideas and practices underpinning technological 
ゲﾗIｷWデ┞が ｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ けデWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ SWデWヴﾏｷﾐｷゲﾏげが ;ﾐS けデWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ ;┌デﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞げが ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ 
legitimate technology as neutral, apolitical and universal, thereby concealing its social origins 
and embedded relations of neoliberal, capitalist domination. 
The Chapter has also explored the performative power of the ideational infrastructure of 
financial markets, which extends beyond its ideological impact, to actual constitution of social 
reality. Drawing from Performativity Theory, the discussion has demonstrated how neoclassical 
economics, legal formalism, and technological ideas and concepts do not merely describe 
economy, society and technology, but actively intervene by bringing up or raising economies, 
markets, technological organizations, and societies in their theoretical and ideological images. 
For example, Neoclassical economics performs the neoliberal financial markets by shaping, 
formatting and constituting the individual in the image of homo economicus に an atomistic, 
rational, selfish, utility-ﾏ;┝ｷﾏｷゲWヴく Oﾐ デｴW ﾗデｴWヴ ｴ;ﾐSが ﾉWｪ;ﾉ aﾗヴﾏ;ﾉｷゲﾏが ;ゲ ; けゲW;ﾉWSが ゲIヴｷヮデWS 
ﾃ┌ヴｷSｷI;ﾉ ﾉﾗｪｷI ;ﾐS ゲﾗ┗WヴWｷｪﾐ ヮWヴaﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗Wげが ヮWヴaﾗヴﾏゲ デｴW ﾐWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲ H┞ 
installing them as an abstract model for all social relationships, and produces the homo 
economicus, in the form of an autonomous, unmediated legal subject capable of contracting 
and willing into the future.  
Technological ideas, devices and practices also perform neoliberal financial markets in two 
ways. First, they affect, alter, or reinforce particular narratives and arrangements of 
technological reality (despite the possibility of multiple technological realities) that constitute 
neoliberal markets. Second, they perform the other ideologies with which they are politically-
encoded, including formal-liberal legal ideologies and neoclassical economic ideologies. Since 
technological ideologies and practices constitute and are constituted by other ideologies and 
related practices, they are also enrolled in the processes of economic performativity, and legal 
performativity or constitution of social and economic reality. 
The discussion has also examined the strategies through which the ideological and 




reproduces regulatory neoliberalism within financial markets. This includes the strategies of 
universalization, reification, naturalization, rationalization, and narrativization. The chapter 
therefore argues that TWAIL theoretical work should form inter-disciplinary assemblages with 
Critical Theory of Economics and Critical Theory of Technology, among other relevant 
programs. It is also argued that, while ideology critique ably deconstructs the various 
ideologically-legitimated ideas that undergird the globalised version of neoliberal financial 
markets, it tends to under-estimate the ability of ideas and practices to construct, constitute 
or shape the world they describe. Thus, performativity theory further articulates how ideas, 
ideologies, and their related practices and material manifestations can shape a particular 
economic world, allocate interests, identities, and capacities, and in the process, define 
problems and the possible range of solutions. Insights from both ideology critique and 
performativity theory are critical to the Third World project of resetting the international legal 




















Ideational and Technological Regulation of Third World Economies by the Bretton Woods 
Institutions 
1. Introduction 
Chapter 2 has examined the ideological and performative role of economic, legal and 
technological ideas and practices in reproducing regulatory neoliberalism within transnational 
and national financial markets. It has also argued for the adoption an interdisciplinary 
assemblage of Critical Theory and Performativity Theory within TWAIL. This chapter employs 
the proposed theoretical framework in exploring the third research sub-question: how has the 
ideological and performative power of economic, legal and technological ideas and related 
practices reproduced regulatory neoliberalism within the IMF and World Bank? 
The discussion thus examines the ideological and performative role of economic, legal and 
technological ideas and praIデｷIWゲ ｷﾐ ゲｴ;ヮｷﾐｪ デｴW IMF ;ﾐS WﾗヴﾉS B;ﾐﾆげゲ ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ ヴﾗﾉW ｷﾐ 
transnational finance, and their relationship with Third World countries. It focuses on the role 
of ideas in producing and fixing meanings of social reality, producing identities and respective 
capacities that consequently enable and constrain the action of individuals, institutions, States 
and other Actants within the global financial markets. Departing from, but not disregarding the 
Iﾗﾐ┗Wﾐデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴ;ﾉｷゲデ W┝ヮﾉ;ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW BWIゲげ ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲｴip with the Third World as 
determined by US structural power (the Treasury-Wall Street Complex), the chapter argues for 
the conceptualization of these transnational financial institutions as sites of active ideational, 
ideological and technological contestation, legitimation, performation, and diffusion to Third 
World States and markets.  
Sections 2 and 3 explore the governance, decision making, membership and representation 
structures within the IMF and World Bank, respectively, framing the institutional context of 
TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴｷWゲげ under-representation, and historical contestation of the transnational 
financial regulatory order. Section 4 examines the different types of power deployed in various 
aspects of BWIs, including their establishment, State governance, bureaucratic operations and 
relationship with the Third World. It argues that the discourses of security, freedom, 
development and human rights have played a key role in the institutional design of the BWIs 
and the distribution of power between developed and Third World countries, and also between 




power in the form of economic, legal and technological rationalities endowed with ideological 
and performative power. Section 5 outlines the main conclusions, urging TWAIL practitioners 
to conceptualize transnational financial institutions as sites of active ideational, ideological and 
technological contestation, legitimation, performation, and diffusion. 
2. The International Monetary Fund: Institutional Architecture 
2.1. The Establishment and Regulatory Role of the IMF 
The IMF was established under the 1945 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary 
Fund, a treaty initially ratified by 29 of the 44 Allied nations present at the Bretton Woods 
Conference.433 Before its establishment, the global economic order at that time was 
characterized by restricted national capital flows, and a fixed exchange-rate system, where 
national currencies were pegged at par value to the US dollar, which was also pegged to gold. 
Within this order, the IMF was therefore mandated to promote international monetary 
cooperation and international trade (through balance-of-payment liquidity support), promote 
and maintain exchange stability and orderly exchange arrangements, and a multilateral system 
of payments. This was to be undertaken mainly by providing the members with a fund from 
which they could draw from, to correct maladjustments in the balance of payments of their 
respective current accounts.  
The original Articles of Agreement did not envisage a non-monetary role for the IMF. However, 
various factors, including international liquidity problems, increased international capital flows, 
globalization, the 1973 oil crisis, adoption of floating exchange rates, and the resultant 
sovereign debt crises and financial institutional collapses, gradually altered the role of the IMF 
within the global financial order.434 For example, in 1973, after the abolishment of the fixed 
exchange rate system, and the adoption of the floating exchange rates, the IMF lost its main 
role of maintaining exchange arrangements.  
However, the ensuing international financial instability as a result of the floating exchange rates 
gave the IMF a new role in global economic stabilization by way of loans to national economies 
                                                          
433 International Monetary Fund, Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (International 
Monetary Fund 2011). 
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Institutions and the EﾏWヴｪWﾐIW ﾗa デｴW さNW┘ざ DW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ AｪWﾐS;げ ふﾐ ヱヱΒぶ Γヵ. As discussed in Chapter 1, 




experiencing currency upheavals and other economic crises.435 For example, in the Mexican 
and Asian crises of 1995 and 1997, IMF loan facilities of up to $18 billion and $36 billion 
respectively to the affected countries, were instrumental in stabilizing their economies. The 
IMF then acquired a further role in international financial regulation, since it advanced these 
ﾉﾗ;ﾐゲ ﾗﾐ デｴW H;ゲｷゲ ﾗa ﾉﾗ;ﾐ さIﾗﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデｷWゲざが ┘ｴｷIｴ ｷﾐIﾉ┌SWS “デ;デWゲげ ┌ﾐSWヴデ;ﾆｷﾐｪゲ デﾗ ;Sﾃ┌ゲデ ｷデゲ 
economic policies to remedy the cause of the economic problems, and also to ensure that the 
country will be able to repay the Fund. These conditionalities have therefore become the main 
regulatory tool through which the IMF ensures adoption of economic policies deemed global 
standards; it is therefore also a standard-setter. 
The IMF also gained a surveillance or supervisory role in international financial regulation, by 
way of amendments to Article IV of the Articles of Agreement, to provide the mandate and 
powers to oversee the compliance of each member with its obligations under the Agreement. 
To this extent, under its Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP) and the Report on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) programmes, undertaken jointly with the World 
B;ﾐﾆが デｴW IMF ;ゲゲWゲゲWゲ デｴW ヴWゲｷﾉｷWﾐIW ﾗa ; ﾏWﾏHWヴ Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴ┞げゲ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ゲWIデﾗヴく Tｴｷゲ ;ゲゲWゲゲﾏWﾐデ 
includes financial regulatory areas such as financial stability and systemic risk. 
The international financial regulatory reform measures mandated by the G20 after the 2008 
GFC have further entrenched the role of the IMF, and increased synergies between it and other 
international financial regulators. Presently, the IMF is a non-voting member of the G20 and a 
full member of the FSB. It therefore works closely with the FSB and the World Bank in 
formulation of global financial regulatory standards, and the surveillance and supervision of 
デｴWｷヴ ﾏWﾏHWヴゲげ Iﾗﾏヮﾉｷ;ﾐIW ┘ｷデｴ デｴW ゲデ;ﾐS;ヴSゲ ;ﾐS IMF IﾗﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデies.436 In addition, the IMF 
leverages its Lender of Last Resort role to enforce global financial standards within its 
members. 
2.2. Governance, Decision Making, Membership and Representation at the IMF 
Institutionally, there are four primary organs that run the IMF: the Board of Governors, the 
International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC), and the Board of Executive 
Directors.437 The Board of Governors is the highest and primary policy making authority. It is 
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constituted by either a Central Bank Governor or Finance Minister from each of the 188-
member countries.438 The Board of Governors meets annually. It has a smaller committee に the 
IMFC に IﾗﾏヮﾗゲWS ﾗa ヲヴ ﾏWﾏHWヴゲげ ヴWヮヴWゲWﾐデ;デｷ┗Wゲ Sヴ;┘ﾐ aヴﾗﾏ デｴW Bﾗ;ヴS ﾗa Gﾗ┗Wヴﾐﾗヴゲく Iデ 
meets twice annually to consider and recommend relevant policy issues to the Board of 
Governors. There is also incorporated into the institutional framework a joint IMF-World Bank 
committee of Governors に the Development Committee に which also meets concurrently with 
the IMFC and considers and advises the Board of Governors on development policy issues and 
other issues affecting developing countries.  
The IMF is run or administered by a Board of Executive Directors, who are seized of the 
operational, policy, lending and other day-to-day administrative matters of the Fund. The 
Bﾗ;ヴS ﾗa DｷヴWIデﾗヴゲ ｷゲ IﾗﾏヮﾗゲWS ﾗa ヲヴ ﾏWﾏHWヴゲ デｴ;デ ﾏｷヴヴﾗヴ デｴW IMFCげゲ ﾏWﾏHWヴゲｴｷヮが ;ﾐS ┘ｴﾗ 
are representatives of, and are appointed by way of two criteria. First, the five largest 
shareholders に United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany and Japan に are each entitled 
to appoint their own executive director to the Board. China, by virtue of its weight as a large 
economy, also has a seat at the table. The other members are elected by groups or 
constituencies representing between 4 and 24 countries. By virtue of these groupings, 
countries such as Russia and Saudi Arabia have traditionally secured enough votes to appoint 
their own Executive Directors to the Board.  
Decision-making of the Board is based on consensus and formal voting. The Board of Directors 
selects and appoints a Managing Director, who serves as the chairman and the chief executive 
officer. A Bretton Woods tradition has emerged whereby the IMF Managing Director is 
nominated by European countries, while the World Bank Director is nominated by the US. 
Emerging markets have increasingly clamoured for the appointment of a non-European 
Managing Director, leading to the appointment of a Chinese national as Deputy Managing 
Director in 2011. 
While the day-to-day running of the Fund has been delegated to the Executive Board of 
Directors, the Board of Governors retains the mandate to approve quota increases, special 
drawing right (SDR) allocations, admission and expulsion of members, and amendments to the 
Articles of Agreements and Fund by-laws. It also acts as the final determiner on issues relating 
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to interpretation of the IMF Articles of Agreement. Decision-making by the Board of Governors 
is undertaken by way of voting.  
Membership and representation of countries in the IMF, including within the governance 
bodies, is determined by quotas. Each member country, upon accession to the Articles of 
Agreement, is assigned a quota based on its relative weight in the global economy, determined 
H┞ デｴW ﾏWﾏHWヴげゲ ;ﾐﾐ┌;ﾉ Gヴﾗゲゲ DﾗﾏWゲデｷI PヴﾗS┌Iデ ふGDPぶが ﾉW┗Wﾉ ﾗa デヴ;SW ﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐが ┗ﾗﾉ┌ﾏW ﾗa 
I┌ヴヴWﾐデ ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデ デヴ;ﾐゲ;Iデｷﾗﾐゲが ;ﾐS ﾗaaｷIｷ;ﾉ ヴWゲWヴ┗Wゲく “┌HゲWケ┌Wﾐデﾉ┞が デｴW ﾏWﾏHWヴげゲ ケ┌ﾗデ; 
determines its contribution to the Fund, the amount of financing it may access from the Fund, 
and voting power, especially in the Board of Governors.  
As a result, voting power at the IMF is concentrated on 10 countries, which control more than 
50% of the voting shares. These are, in order of declining voting power, the US, Japan, Germany, 
France, United Kingdom, China, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Canada and Russia. The US, with a voting 
share of 16.75%, remains the only country with unilateral veto power over major IMF decisions, 
and also informally controls the IMF by virtue of its geographical location in Washington DC. 
The State-to-State contact groups, especially the G7, and, since the global financial crisis, the 
G20, continue to wield immense influence on the IMF agenda and decision-making.  
3. The World Bank: Governance and Institutional Architecture 
The 1944 Bretton Woods Conference also adopted the Articles of Association of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which has come to be known 
as the World Bank. The governance, decision-making, membership and representation 
structure of the World Bank mirrors that of the IMF, discussed above. Since much time at the 
World Bank was spent designing and negotiating the structure of the IMF, as the conference 
drew to a close, the same structure was adopted for the World Bank. For example, the 
allocation of votes among the Executive Directors of the World Bank is tied to the allocation 
within the IMF. The main difference between the governance structures of the two institutions 
ｷゲ aﾗ┌ﾐS ｷﾐ デｴW WﾗヴﾉS B;ﾐﾆげs various financing facilities, and its funding sources. 
The World Bank was conceived to provide capital for post-world War II reconstruction and 
development. Hence the Articles of Association provided for three mandates: assist in the 
reconstruction and development of war-ravaged economies, promote private foreign 
investment by providing loans and guarantees, and also increase international trade, economic 




the recoﾐゲデヴ┌Iデｷﾗﾐ Waaﾗヴデゲ ┘ｷデｴ ｷデゲ M;ヴゲｴ;ﾉﾉ Pﾉ;ﾐが デｴW B;ﾐﾆげゲ IﾗヴW ﾏ;ﾐS;デW ┘;ゲ Sｷゲヮﾉ;IWSく Wｷデｴ 
the wave of decolonization in most parts of the world, the Bank consequently found a new role 
in the financing of development projects in developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America. This role included the alleviation of poverty and promotion of social development.  
Iデ ｷゲ ;デ デｴｷゲ ヮﾗｷﾐデ デｴ;デ デｴW B;ﾐﾆげゲ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ ヴﾗﾉW ┘;ゲ SWaｷﾐW ;ﾐS WﾐデヴWﾐIｴWSく Aゲ ヮ;ヴデ ﾗa 
the loan financing and grant programmes, the Bank promoted, as part of its financing 
conditionalities, specific institutional, policy and regulatory reforms within the member 
countries in need of financing.439 While the Articles of Agreement did not provide a specific role 
aﾗヴ デｴW B;ﾐﾆ ｷﾐ ﾏWﾏHWヴゲげ aｷﾐ;ﾐIial regulatory schemes, these financing conditionalities 
entrenched its role as an international financial regulator, especially in developing countries.440  
TｴW B;ﾐﾆげゲ ヴﾗﾉW ┘;ゲ ;IIWﾐデ┌;デWS H┞ デｴW ﾗｷﾉ Iヴｷゲｷゲ ﾗa デｴW ヱΓΑヰゲが ┘ｴｷIｴ ﾉWS デﾗ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ IヴｷゲWゲが ;ﾐS 
left many developing countries grappling with high inflation and current account deficits.441 
Alongside the IMF, the Bank offered these countries various financing facilities tied to structural 
adjustment programmes (SAPs) that included macro-economic and micro-economic policy 
reforms such as market liberalization, privatization of State entities, reduction of recurrent 
expenditure on social programmes, and regulation.442 By the 1990s, the World Bank and the 
IMF attempted to coordinate their standard-setting and surveillance programmes in respect of 
predominantly emerging market and developing economies.443 TｴWゲW さﾐWﾗ-ﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉざ ヮﾗﾉｷIｷWゲ 
have been widely criticised for putting EMDEs in vulnerable positions within the global 
economy, and ultimately exposing them to the ravages of financial globalization.444  
 
 
                                                          
439 A┝Wﾉ DヴWｴWヴが けTｴW DW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ ;ﾐS IﾏヮﾉWﾏWﾐデ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa IMF ;ﾐS WﾗヴﾉS B;ﾐﾆ CﾗﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデ┞げ 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=333960> accessed 2 February 2015; Joan M Nelson, 
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440 A┗ｪﾗ┌ﾉW;ゲ ふﾐ ヱΓΒぶき ‘ﾗﾉa H WWHWヴ ;ﾐS ﾗデｴWヴゲが けASSヴWゲゲｷﾐｪ “┞ゲデWﾏｷI ‘ｷゲﾆぎ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ‘Wｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ DWゲｷｪﾐげ ふヲヰヱヴぶ 
49 Texas International Law Journal. 
441 Avgouleas (n 198). 
442 DヴWｴWヴ ふﾐ ヴンΓぶき Tｴﾗﾏ;ゲ J BｷWヴゲデWﾆWヴが け‘WS┌Iｷﾐｪ デｴW ‘ﾗﾉW ﾗa デｴW “デ;デW ｷﾐ デｴW EIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞ぎ A CﾗﾐIWヮデ┌;ﾉ 
E┝ヮﾉﾗヴ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa IMF ;ﾐS WﾗヴﾉS B;ﾐﾆ PヴWゲIヴｷヮデｷﾗﾐゲげ ぷヱΓΓヰへ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ “デ┌SｷWゲ Q┌;ヴデWヴﾉ┞ ヴΑΑき A┝Wﾉ DヴWｴWヴが けA 
Public Choice Perspective of IMF and World Bank LeﾐSｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS CﾗﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデ┞げ ふヲヰヰヴぶ ヱヱΓ P┌HﾉｷI CｴﾗｷIW ヴヴヵき 
J;ﾐW H;ヴヴｷｪ;ﾐ ;ﾐS P;┌ﾉ MﾗゲﾉW┞が けE┗;ﾉ┌;デｷﾐｪ デｴW Iﾏヮ;Iデ ﾗa WﾗヴﾉS B;ﾐﾆ “デヴ┌Iデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ASﾃ┌ゲデﾏWﾐデ LWﾐSｷﾐｪぎ ヱΓΒヰに
ΒΑげ ふヱΓΓヱぶ ヲΑ TｴW Jﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉ ﾗa DW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ “デ┌SｷWゲ ヶンく 
443 ‘ｷIｴ;ヴS E FWｷﾐHWヴｪが けTｴW Cｴ;ﾐｪｷﾐｪ ‘elationship between the World Bank and the International Monetary 
F┌ﾐSげ ふヱΓΒΒぶ ヴヲ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Oヴｪ;ﾐｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ヵヴヵく 




4. The Nature of Regulatory Power within the Bretton Woods Institutions 
This chapter questions the adequacy of the TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉSげゲ ;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴ デﾗ contestation of BWIげゲ 
neoliberal regulatory hegemony in the global financial markets, which has concentrated on the 
issue of democratic and equitable State representation and participation. This latter approach 
to contestation is State-centric, to the extent that it has concentrated on the structural aspects 
ﾗa U“ ;ﾐS ﾗデｴWヴ Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴｷWゲげ ｴWｪWﾏﾗﾐ┞が ┘ｴｷIｴ include their voting power, representation in 
decision-making organs, and material contributions to the funds. The argument proposed in 
this chapter is that other than structural and material State power, the BWI regulatory system 
is established, perpetuated, and operates on the basis of powerful economic, legal, technical 
and ideological rationalities that have the capacity to order the global financial markets, 
including States, citizens, market players and their capacities and interests, in favour of global 
capital, and against the interests of EMDEs. 
Chapter 2 outlined how the ideational infrastructure of financial markets, that is, neoclassical 
economics, doctrines of legal formalism, technological ideas and their related technologies and 
practices, exercise ideological and performative power that acts upon actants445 within the 
global financial markets, and delineates the identities, capacities, interests and possibilities for 
action. The discussion below examines the extent to which these ideas and practices have 
impacted on four phases and aspects of BWIs: the establishment of the BWI-based global 
financial system; the establishment of the BWI regulatory system; State governance of BWIs; 
and BWI bureaucratic power. 
4.1. Structural and Ideational Power in the Establishment of the Global Financial System 
The current (modified) version of the international monetary system is not a natural, pre-
existing market system, but rather was co-constituted during the establishment of the BWIs by 
the victorious Allied Powers, and has consequently undergone ideological naturalization.446 The 
State-level power dynamics are evident in the fact that the design of the BW international 
financial system was principally designed and negotiated between two countries, the US and 
                                                          
445 TｴW デWヴﾏ け;Iデ;ﾐデげ ｷゲ ; IﾗﾐIWヮデ ﾗa AIデﾗヴ-Network Theory that captures the fact that action occurs not 
necessarily as a result of singular agency, but rather within a specifically-configured assemblage of other 
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the UK, represented by Harry Dexter White, and John Maynard Keynes, respectively.447 The 
negotiated design, heavily favouring the US, was then presented to the 44 nations represented 
at the conference, and ratified by 29 of them. For example, Keynes made three proposals for 
the design of the monetary system that would have probably evolved much differently from 
デｴW I┌ヴヴWﾐデ ゲ┞ゲデWﾏぎ デｴW IヴW;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ; ﾐW┘が ﾐW┌デヴ;ﾉ ┘ﾗヴﾉS I┌ヴヴWﾐI┞ ﾗ┌デ ﾗa Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴｷWゲげ H;ﾉ;ﾐIW-of 
payment imbalances; the creation of an international bank from which countries would access 
financing without conditionalities; and the sharing of balance-of-payment deficit financing 
between surplus countries and deficit countries.448  
The US, noting its economic dominance at that particular point in time, rejected these 
proposals, and instead advocated for retaining the dollar as de facto world currency, for deficit 
countries bearing the burden of their balance-of-payment shortfalls, and also for conditional 
lending that would place borrower countries at the regulatory power of the US.449 This design 
of the international monetary system contributed to constituting US structural and ideological 
hegemony over global finance, and globalizing the trend of financialization, which hegemony 
Chimni likens to imperial continuity.450 As discussed in Chapter 1, the adoption of the dollar as 
reserve currency in global finance, the expansion of US-controlled BWI financing into Third 
World countries, and pegging it to neoliberal financial sector reforms, have opened up global 
markets, especially Third World economies, to US structural influence.   
The nature of power the US exercised over not only the UK, but the other Allied Nations, to 
accept an international monetary system that favoured it, was principally structural and 
material, rather than ideational, in nature. Since joining WWII at the tail end, the US had 
immense military and financial reserves, as compared to the UK, France, Russia and China, 
whose resources had been depleted by the war, and would be in need of US financing for post-
                                                          
447 Benn Steil, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a 
New World Order (Princeton University Press 2013) 201. 
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13 Political Geography 255, 258. 
449 ibid 259. 
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war reconstruction.451 Hence the US was entrusted with the primary responsibility for 
さﾗヴSWヴｷﾐｪ デｴW ┘ﾗヴﾉS WIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞ざく452  
4.2. Ideational Power in the Regulatory Design of BWIs 
The power dynamics at play in the design of the regulatory scheme to police the new 
international monetary system was also largely structural, save for the nature of the resources 
that were deployed in the effort. Other than the military, economic and political clout that the 
US commanded, it carefully deployed specific discourses and practices ゲ┌Iｴ ;ゲ けSW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデげ, 
けWIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ｪヴﾗ┘デｴげが けヮﾗ┗Wヴデ┞げ ;ﾐS けｴ┌ﾏ;ﾐ ヴｷｪｴデゲげが to design not only the regulatory mandate of 
the IMF and the World Bank, but also State governance of the regulatory institutions.453 These 
discourses and related practices were crucial to this exercise of power in various respects. For 
example, they produced and fixed meanings that would be lived and experienced by other 
players in the global economy, including States, corporations, international regulatory 
institutions, and individuals in respective countries globally.454 This includes concepts such as 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as the measure of economic growth, which, as a global definition 
of State power: ranks countries; determines their influence in global governance institutions; 
drives their development policies and dictates economic reform programs they adopt; and 
determines their adoption of international regulatory standards,  based on their negative effect 
on GDP growth.455  
In addition, these discourses and practices produced social identities and respective capacities 
that either enabled or constrained the actions or exercise of power among stakeholders in the 
global economy, such as, for example, developed economy/first world and developing 
economy/third world categories.456 The discursive practices would also articulate and diffuse 
                                                          
451 For example, Steil records that the US, through White and his Treasury Department associates, used the 
Lend-Lease Programme, to press the Britｷゲｴ aﾗヴ デヴ;SW IﾗﾐIWゲゲｷﾗﾐゲ デｴ;デ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS ┌ﾉデｷﾏ;デWﾉ┞ ┘;デWヴ Sﾗ┘ﾐ Bヴｷデ;ｷﾐげゲ 
imperial influence not only over international finance, but specifically the BWIs. `See Steil (n 447). 
452 Popke (n 448) 258. 
453 See the Chapter 1 discussion of the development of discourses both at the institution of the BWIs, but also 
as responses to Third World contestation of international financial law and related financial institutions such 
as the IMF and the World Bank, as captured in Rajagopal, International Law from Below (n 382). 
454 MｷIｴ;Wﾉ N B;ヴﾐWデデ ;ﾐS M;ヴデｴ; FｷﾐﾐWﾏﾗヴWが けTｴW PﾗﾉｷデｷIゲが Pﾗ┘Wヴが ;ﾐS P;デｴﾗﾉﾗｪｷWゲ ﾗa IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ 
Oヴｪ;ﾐｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐゲげ ふヱΓΓΓぶ ヵン IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ヶΓΓが ヶΓΓに712; Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, 
けPﾗ┘Wヴ ｷﾐ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ PﾗﾉｷデｷIゲげ ふヲヰヰヵぶ ヵΓ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ organization 39, 55, 56. 
455 Fior;ﾏﾗﾐデｷ ふﾐ ヲぶ ンき “WW ;ﾉゲﾗ “┌ﾐSｴ┞; P;ｴ┌ﾃ;が けGﾉﾗH;ﾉ Pﾗ┗Wヴデ┞ ;ﾐS デｴW PﾗﾉｷデｷIゲ ﾗa GﾗﾗS IﾐデWﾐデｷﾗﾐゲげ ｷﾐ ‘┌デｴ 
Buchanan and Peer Zumbansen (eds), Law in Transition: Human Rights, Development and Transitional Justice 
(Bloomsbury Publishing 2014) 35. Pahuja argues that the ostensibly scientific and universal concept of GDP 
┘;ゲ ｷﾐデヴﾗS┌IWS ;aデWヴ SWIﾗﾉﾗﾐｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐが デﾗ ﾏ;ｷﾐデ;ｷﾐ ;ﾐS IﾗﾐIW;ﾉ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘げゲ ｴｷWヴ;ヴIｴ┞ ﾗa ヴ;Iｷ;ﾉ 
difference. 




new norms, rationalities and categories of actors across the global economy.457 Some of these 
exercises of power through discourse are mentioned below. 
The Discourse of Security and Freedom 
The discursive scripting of the IMF and the World bank is evident in the US appropriation of the 
security and freedom discourse at the end of WWII, and the beginning of the Cold War, to cast 
the communist Soviet Block as an enemy of freedom and free markets, and to position the 
Bretton Woods system of international finance, and national capitalist economic systems, as 
the antithesis of this threat to freedom.458 In addition, this creation of けデｴW ﾗデｴWヴげ ┘;ゲ ;ﾉゲﾗ 
extended to the classification of States into developed/first world States, on the one hand, and 
developing/underdeveloped/third world States, on the other hand.  
The Development Discourse 
The classification of developed and developing countries was of course preceded by a discourse 
ﾗa けSW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデげ デｴ;デ ゲﾗ┌ｪｴデ デﾗ Sｷゲデｷﾐｪ┌ｷゲｴ デｴW aﾗヴﾏWヴ ｷﾏヮWヴｷ;ﾉ “デ;デWゲ aヴﾗﾏ デｴW ﾐW┘ﾉ┞-
ｷﾐSWヮWﾐSWﾐデ “デ;デWゲが デｴ;デ ┘WヴW IﾗﾐゲｷSWヴWS けデヴ;Sｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉげが けH;Iﾆ┘;ヴSげが け┌ﾐIｷ┗ｷﾉｷゲWSげが ;ﾐS ｷﾐ ﾐWWS of 
development.459 The discourse of development, and the consequent State classification, 
enabled the ideational ordering of the regulatory relationship between the US, BWIs and Third 
World countries, in at least three ways.  
First, the US was able to draw a false, conceptual line, between economic and political domains, 
and hence the extent of democratic participation, in the emerging international institutions.460 
For example, while the principle of equal democratic participation was embedded in certain 
UN organs on the basis that the sovereignty of States was an equally binding concept, this was 
not the case for BWIs. The US appropriated the discourse of development to apportion State 
influence over the governance of the BWIs on the basis of State economic strength, including 
its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The end result was that the weighted voting rights of the 
member States to the IMF favoured the US. This was a conscious effort by the US to maintain 
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unrivalled influence over the IMF and the World Bank, and consequently over Third World 
countries, which subsists to date.461 
“WIﾗﾐSが デｴW けSW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデげ SｷゲIﾗ┌ヴゲW IヴW;デWS デｴW ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ヴW;ﾉｷデ┞ ﾗa デｴW けTｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉSげが ;ﾐS 
enabled the establishment of BWIs with jurisdiction to interfere in, manage, and even control 
these economies, on the economic rationale that they required technocratic intervention to 
achieve developed country status.462 For example, the IMF and the World Bank were given 
surveillance powers over these economies, and also the power to subject borrower countries 
to economic management programmes in the form of Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(SAPs).463 These programmes amounted to democratic or political power grabs, as the IMF 
micromanaged even political aspects of economic management, such as budgetary 
allocations.464 AﾐｪｴｷW Iﾗﾏヮ;ヴWゲ デｴｷゲ けｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ ゲIヴｷヮデｷﾐｪげ ﾗa デｴW BWIゲ デﾗ デｴW Wゲデ;HﾉｷゲｴﾏWﾐデ ﾗa 
the Mandate System of the League of Nations, which was meant to bring civilization to, and 
economically develop, the colonial territories.465 
The third related exercise of power was the effect that the discourse had on the newly-
independent post-colonial States, the so called Third World States. By constituting the States 
and their citizenry, and their self-perception on its terms, the (under-)development discourse 
さIヴW;デWぷSへ デｴW TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉﾉ┞が WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI;ﾉﾉ┞が ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉﾉ┞ ;ﾐS I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉﾉ┞ざが and in the process, 
enrolled the Third World into the economic imperatives of developed countries.466 This 
included the liberalization of Third World economies, including their financial markets, for the 
entry of transnational capital, which, due to its dis-embedded, extractive and speculative 
nature, was not primed to support the real development needs of these countries, such as 
sustainability, long-term and agricultural investments. This has been evident, for example, in 
                                                          
461 ibid 23. Pahuja notes that the quota allocation formula was political rather than scientific, considering that 
its US State Department creator had been instructed on deriving a formula for an already-determined 
outcome of US voting superiority. 
462 B;ﾉ;ﾆヴｷゲｴﾐ;ﾐ ‘;ﾃ;ｪﾗヮ;ﾉが けIﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘ ;ﾐS デｴW DW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ EﾐIﾗ┌ﾐデWヴげが International law from 
below: development, social movements, and Third World resistance (Cambridge University Press 2003) 31. 
‘;ﾃ;ｪﾗヮ;ﾉ IﾗﾐデWﾐSゲ デｴ;デ デｴW SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ SｷゲIﾗ┌ヴゲW ゲWデ ; デWﾉWﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ ｷﾏヮWヴ;デｷ┗W ﾗa けI;デIｴｷﾐｪ ┌ヮげが ┘ｴｷIｴ 
ordered the political and economic aspirations of Third World countries. 
463 Popke (n 448) 263. 
464 Rajagopal, けFヴﾗﾏ ‘Wゲｷゲデ;ﾐIW デﾗ ‘WﾐW┘;ﾉぎ BヴWデデﾗﾐ WﾗﾗSゲ Iﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐゲ ;ﾐS デｴW EﾏWヴｪWﾐIW ﾗa デｴW さNW┘ざ 
DW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ AｪWﾐS;げ ふﾐ ヱヱΒぶ ヱヲΒく ‘;ﾃ;ｪﾗヮ;ﾉ ;ヴｪ┌Wゲ デｴ;デ デｴW SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ SｷゲIﾗ┌ヴゲWが ;ﾐS ヴWﾉ;デWS SｷゲIﾗ┌ヴゲWゲ 
ゲ┌Iｴ ;ゲ ｪﾗﾗS ｪﾗ┗Wヴﾐ;ﾐIWが W┝ヮ;ﾐSWS デｴW IMFげゲ ﾏ;ﾐS;デW ﾗ┗Wヴ TｴｷヴS World countries to include poverty 
alleviation, income distribution, environmental protection, anti-corruption campaigns, and reduction of 
military expenditure. 
465 See generally, Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law (n 271). 
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the critique of products of this economic development discourse - International Investment 
Law and related treaties - which protect foreign investments in the Third World, at the expense 
of State sovereignty over resources, community rights, environmental rights, and labour 
rights.467 
4.3. Power in the State Governance of the BWIs 
As discussed in Sections 2 and 3, State governance of the IMF and the World Bank is undertaken 
more directly, as the respective Articles of Agreement spell out the institutional arrangements 
for membership and weighted voting in various organs, based on quotas tied to economic 
ゲデヴWﾐｪデｴ ﾗa デｴW ﾏWﾏHWヴ Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴｷWゲげ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷWゲく Aゲ ｷﾐSｷI;デWS W;ヴﾉｷWヴ ;Hﾗ┗Wが ┗ﾗデｷﾐｪ ヮﾗ┘Wヴ ;デ Hﾗデｴ 
the IMF and World Bank is concentrated on 10 countries, which control more than 50% of the 
voting shares. These are, in order of declining voting power, the US, Japan, Germany, France, 
United Kingdom, China, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Canada and Russia.468 This means that EMDEs have 
remained side-lined in terms of effective representation. 
Due to this institutional power arrangement that reserves a prominent sphere of influence for 
the US, most theories of international organizations have historically argued that the sources 
of power shapｷﾐｪ デｴW BWIゲ ;ﾐS デｴWｷヴ ヮﾗﾉｷIｷWゲ ;ヴWが ヮヴｷﾐIｷヮ;ﾉﾉ┞が デｴW さU“ TヴW;ゲ┌ヴ┞-Wall Street 
IﾗﾏヮﾉW┝ざく469 Indeed, State governance exercised by the US and other European State powers 
has ensured that the BWIs have not only adopted neoliberal regulatory policies that favour the 
interests of these countries, but also their compatible domestic interests. In fact, governmental 
positions within the BWIs are not attributed to or explained by the institutional or regulatory 
logic of the respective BWIs, but rather the domestic preferences, ideas and interests of the 
respective countries represented in the governance boards of the transnational regulators.470  
Thus, over the years, the normative preferences of States represented in the IMF Board have 
hardly changed. For example, Clegg observes that on issues such as loan conditionality and 
default liability, directors representing materially powerful (creditor) states would predictably 
                                                          
467 See the discussion in Chapter 1 on Third World contestation of International Law, and as captured, 
ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉﾉ┞が ｷﾐ “ﾗヴﾐ;ヴ;ﾃ;ｴが け‘Wゲｷゲデ;ﾐIW ;ﾐS Cｴ;ﾐｪW ｷﾐ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Iﾐ┗WゲデﾏWﾐデ L;┘げ ふﾐ ヱンヶぶく 
468 DWﾐﾐｷゲ LWWIｴが けVﾗデｷﾐｪ Pﾗ┘Wヴ ｷﾐ デｴW Gﾗ┗Wヴﾐ;ﾐIW ﾗa デｴW IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ MﾗﾐWデ;ヴ┞ F┌ﾐSげ ふヲヰヰヲぶ ヱヰΓ Aﾐﾐ;ﾉゲ ﾗa 
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“┞ゲデWﾏげ ふヲヰヰヶぶ ヲΓ TｴW World Economy 305. 
469 L Clegg, Controlling the World Bank and IMF: Shareholders, Stakeholders, and the Politics of Concessional 
Lending (Springer 2013) 1. Clegg lists two other sources, which I discuss separately, below: transnational elite 
serving global capitalisデゲげ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデゲが ;ﾐS ;┌デﾗﾐﾗﾏﾗ┌ゲが デWIｴﾐﾗIヴ;デｷI BWI ゲデ;aaく 
470 “WW “デWa;ﾐ A “Iｴｷヴﾏが けISW;ゲ ;ﾐS IﾐデWヴWゲデゲ ｷﾐ GﾉﾗH;ﾉ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ Gﾗ┗Wヴﾐ;ﾐIWぎ Cﾗﾏヮ;ヴｷﾐｪ GWヴﾏ;ﾐ ;ﾐS U“ 




vote successfully in favour of the use of IMF resources as a form of collective insurance against 
borrower default, and of loan conditionalities, while directors from non-Creditor nations to 
take a negative stance on these issues.471 
There is, however, an important corridor of influence in State governance of the IMF, which 
should not be under-estimated. The perpetuation of neoclassical economic theory, liberal legal 
theory, and regulatory neoliberalism at the IMF and World Bank has been sustained by an 
intricate network of academics, think tanks, foundations and the media, which promote their 
discourses and related practices, norms, ideas and theories, with respect to international 
development, and the work of the BWIs.472 Some of these institutions, which have successfully 
lobbied the US and other powerful States controlling the BWIs, include the Mont Pelerin 
Society, the American Enterprise Institute, Cato Institute, the Heritage Foundation, and the 
Hoover Institute. Over the years, revolving doors have been established between these 
institutions, the US government, and the BWIs, ensuring a closed ecology of neoliberal 
discursive, normative, and ideational influence over the transnational regulators.473 
This conveyor belt of economic, legal and technical ideology has delivered remarkable victories 
for the proponents of a neoclassical bend of regulatory policies at the BWIs. For example, in 
the 1970s, when the US banks purposed to expand their business into countries with capital 
controls and un-liberalized financial markets, they lobbied the US government to lead a 
diplomatic push at the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) forum, to first, have 
services conceptualized as tradable economic phenomena, and second, also have finance 
classified as a service に さaｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ゲWヴ┗ｷIWゲざ に and include these financial services under GATT 
negotiations for trade liberalization.474 This effort was supported by economists in the 
academia, who were also contracted to churn out publications over a period of time, 
discursively creating the previously non-W┝ｷゲデWﾐデ ゲWヴ┗ｷIW ｷﾐS┌ゲデヴ┞ ﾐﾗ┘ ﾆﾐﾗ┘ﾐ ;ゲ さaｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ 
ゲWヴ┗ｷIWゲざく475  
                                                          
471 Lｷ;ﾏ CﾉWｪｪが けGﾉﾗH;ﾉ Gﾗ┗Wヴﾐ;ﾐIW HWｴind Closed Doors: The IMF Boardroom, the Enhanced Structural 
ASﾃ┌ゲデﾏWﾐデ F;Iｷﾉｷデ┞が ;ﾐS デｴW IﾐデWヴゲWIデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa M;デWヴｷ;ﾉ Pﾗ┘Wヴ ;ﾐS Nﾗヴﾏ “デ;Hｷﾉｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ｷﾐ GﾉﾗH;ﾉ PﾗﾉｷデｷIゲげ ふヲヰヱヲぶ 
7 The Review of International Organizations 285, 304. 
472 Cｴヴｷゲデｷ;ﾐ E WWﾉﾉWヴ ;ﾐS L;┌ヴ; “ｷﾐｪﾉWデﾗﾐが けPWSSﾉｷﾐｪ ‘Waﾗヴﾏぎ TｴW ‘ﾗﾉW ﾗa Tｴｷﾐﾆ T;ﾐﾆゲ ｷﾐ “ｴ;ヮｷﾐｪ デｴW NWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉ 
Policy Agenda for the World Bank and International Monetary F┌ﾐSげ ｷﾐ DｷWデWヴ PﾉWｴ┘Wが BWヴﾐｴ;ヴS JA W;ﾉヮWﾐ 
and Gisela Neunhöffer (eds), Neoliberal hegemony: A global critique (Routledge 2007) 71. 
473 Weller and Singleton (n 472). 
474 Christophers (n 333) 190. 




The liberalization of financial services, allowing foreign capital into national economies, has 
now become one of the BWI orthodoxies and main loan conditionalities that have had mixed 
results for Third World economies, and have been blamed for exacerbating the 1990s Asian, 
Latin American and Russian financial crises.476 This network of norm entrepreneurs has 
therefore been a pivotal source of power for proponents of neoclassical economics and 
neoliberal regulatory policies within the BWIs. 
4.4. Power in the Internal Bureaucratic Governance of the BWIs 
4.4.1. BWI Bureaucratic Autonomy  
As discussed above, conventional realist theories of international regulation have held that 
ﾐﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗W Iｴ;ﾐｪW ;デ デｴW BWIゲ ﾗヴｷｪｷﾐ;デWゲ aヴﾗﾏ け;Hﾗ┗Wげが デｴ;デ ｷゲが デｴW U“ W;ﾉﾉ “デヴWWデ-Treasury 
Complex.477 State representation however, also experiences certain resistance not accounted 
for in realist theories of international regulation. In spite of their seats in the IMF and World 
Bank Executive Boards, State representatives have been known to vent that they are unable to 
ゲｴ;ヮW デｴW ﾗヮWヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ;ゲヮWIデゲ ﾗa デｴW け┌ﾐ┘ｷWﾉSﾉ┞げ BWI H┌ヴW;┌Iヴ;IｷWゲが ┘ｴｷIｴ デWﾐS デﾗ ｴ;┗W ; ﾏｷﾐS 
of their own.478 Over the course of their existence, BWI bureaucracies have emerged as 
independent, exercising power autonomously in ways unintended and unanticipated especially 
by the States that established their regulatory structures.479  
As demonstrated in the IMFげゲ ヱΓΒヰゲ ;Sﾗヮデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa I;ヮｷデ;ﾉ ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデ ﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ;ゲ ; ﾐﾗヴﾏ, 
without State advocacy (or perhaps absent State resistance), it is increasingly becoming 
apparent that norm origination, adoption, embedding and application can be internal within 
the BWIs, and independent of the preferences of the powerful States in the respective IMF and 
World Bank boards.480 This autonomy is linked デﾗ デｴW けH┌ヴW;┌Iヴ;デｷI I┌ﾉデ┌ヴWげ ヮヴevalent within 
the BWIs, which Clegg defines as さデｴW ゲWデ ﾗa H;ゲｷI ;ゲゲ┌ﾏヮデｷﾗﾐゲ デｴ;デ ;aaWIデ ｴﾗ┘ ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ 
actors interpret their environment, select and process information, and make decisions so as 
to maintain a consisteﾐデ ┗ｷW┘ ﾗa デｴW ┘ﾗヴﾉSが ;ﾐS デｴWｷヴ ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐげゲ ヴﾗﾉW ｷﾐ ｷデくざ481 Another 
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explanation of this relative autonomy of international financial institutions, found within 
TWAILが ｷゲ Cｴｷﾏﾐｷげゲ ;ヴｪ┌ﾏWﾐデ デｴ;デ ｷデ ｷゲ さa function of the fact that they [transnational financial 
regulatory institutions] do not seek to advance the interests of one or another advanced 
I;ヮｷデ;ﾉｷゲデ “デ;デWが H┌デ デｴ;デ ﾗa デｴW ｪﾉﾗH;ﾉ I;ヮｷデ;ﾉｷゲデ ゲ┞ゲデWﾏ ｷﾐ ｷデゲ SｷaaWヴWﾐデ ヮｴ;ゲWゲくざ482 
4.4.2. The Nature of BWI Bureaucratic Power 
This capacity of bureaucratic culture to shape identities, interests, and capacities has emerged 
as a significant source of power not only within the BWIs but the arena of transnational 
governance.483 In this sense, the BWI bureaucracies have become relatively autonomous and 
separate sites of authority in transnational financial governance, to the extent that they create 
their own rules, originate discursive social knowledge, and in the process, articulate and diffuse 
new norms, rationalities, principles, actors and identities.484 For example, the IMF and the 
World Bank bureaucracies have been instrumental in creating and fixing new meanings of 
ｷゲゲ┌Wゲ ゲ┌Iｴ ;ゲ けSW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデげが ;ﾐS IヴW;デｷﾐｪ ; ゲWﾐゲW デｴ;デ デｴWゲW ;ヴW ゲｴ;ヴWS ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ デ;ゲﾆゲ 
requiring State cooperation and BWI interference. They have also been instrumental in 
classifying the world, thereby creating and sustaining various categories of State and non-State 
actors such as developed and developing countries, the First and the Third World, and, in the 
process, IヴW;デｷﾐｪ ﾐW┘ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデゲ aﾗヴ ヮ;ヴデｷI┌ﾉ;ヴ ;Iデﾗヴゲが Wくｪく け;IｴｷW┗ｷﾐｪ SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデげ ﾗヴ 
けヮヴﾗﾏﾗデｷﾐｪ ｴ┌ﾏ;ﾐ ヴｷｪｴデゲげ ;ﾏﾗﾐｪ デｴW TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉSく  
These categories have given and deprived certain capacities to certain groups within 
transnational financial regulatory order. For example, the World Bank criteria for distinguishing 
HWデ┘WWﾐ ; a;ヴﾏWヴ ;ﾐS ; ヮW;ゲ;ﾐデ SWデWヴﾏｷﾐWゲ ┘ｴﾗが ┘ｷデｴｷﾐ デｴW WﾗヴﾉS B;ﾐﾆげゲ SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ 
machinery, is recognized as having knowledge relevant to solving development problems (the 
a;ヴﾏWヴぶ ;ﾐS ┘ｴﾗ SﾗWゲﾐげデ ふデｴe peasant).485 The BWI bureaucratic power to articulate and diffuse 
new norms, rationalities, principles and actors is also seen in their ability to transfer models of 
political and economic organisation, such as democracy and free markets, around the world. 
For example, Chapter 4 examines the IMFげゲ diffusion into Kenya, of the McKinnon-Shaw 
hypothesis, a neoclassical economic theory underpinning the liberalization of financial markets, 
through Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), and technical assistance programs for 
                                                          
482 Cｴｷﾏﾐｷが けIﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ Iﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐゲ ;ﾐS IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘ぎ A TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS PWヴゲヮWIデｷ┗Wげ ふﾐ ヴヵヰぶ ンヴく 
483 Clegg (n 469) 13. 
484 Barnett and Finnemore (n 454) 699. 





macroeconomic modelling and macroeconomic governance. Chapter 5 also examines the 
WﾗヴﾉS B;ﾐﾆげゲ ｷﾐデヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW Gﾗ┗Wヴﾐ;ﾐIW ;ﾐS ‘┌ﾉW ﾗa L;┘ ;ｪWﾐS; ;ゲ ; IﾗﾐIWヮデ┌;ﾉ 
framework for the liberalization of financial markets, based on New Institutional Economics 
(NIE).  
4.4.3. Sources of BWI Bureaucratic Power 
Weberian-inspired arguments about the bureaucratic power of international organizations, 
ｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ デｴW BWIゲが ヴWﾉ┞ ﾗﾐ デｴW さﾉWｪ;ﾉ-ヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ;┌デｴﾗヴｷデ┞ざ ﾗa デｴWゲW ｷﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐゲが デﾗ W┝ヮﾉ;ｷﾐ ┘ｴ┞ 
these bureaucracies can make a break from the preferences of the powerful State that created 
them.486 Tﾗ W┝ヮﾗ┌ﾐS ﾗﾐ デｴｷゲ けﾉWｪ;ﾉ-ヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ;┌デｴﾗヴｷデ┞げ ｷﾐ デｴW I;ゲW ﾗa IMF ;ﾐS WﾗヴﾉS B;ﾐﾆ 
bureaucracies, this section employs the theoretical framework of rationality as an ideological 
strategy of economic, legal and technological ideas, as articulated in Chapter 2.487  
Legal Rationality 
The IMF and World Bank bureaucracies not only make rules, but also rely on the legal 
authorities, rationales, and norms that establish and empower them to undertake their 
transnational regulatory functions and exercise bureaucratic power. They include, first, the 
respective multilateral treaties establishing them, and the underlying Public International Law 
norms and principles applicable to them as subjects of International Law (e.g. Pancta Sunt 
Servada).488 Second, the laws include private international law principles, or Lex Mercatoria, 
which apply to the BWIs as parties to international financial market transactions, e.g. property 
law, human rights, and contract law.489 As discussed in Chapters 2 and 5, these ostensibly 
rational, autonomous, objective, neutral, transcendental and universal legal norms and 
rationalities, underpinning transnational financial law, are ideological and performative in 
nature.490  
                                                          
486 Barnett and Finnemore (n 454) 699. 
487 See section 6.4 of Chapter 2. 
488 D;ﾐｷWﾉ D Bヴ;Sﾉﾗ┘が けIﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘ ;ﾐS デｴW OヮWヴ;デｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa デｴW IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ Iﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐゲげ ｷﾐ 
Daniel D Bradlow and David B Hunter (eds), International Financial Institutions and International Law (Kluwer 
Law International 2010) 1に2. 
489 ibid 1に2. Bradlow contends that the dual nature of the BWIs - as subjects of Public International Law and 
also as parties to private international financial contracts - ヴ;ｷゲWゲ ┗;ヴｷﾗ┌ゲ ｷゲゲ┌Wゲが ｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ デｴW IFIゲげ 
international obligations in policies they fund, whether they have specific international obligations they must 
comply with in undertaking their treaty functions, and whether they can be liable for the negative effects of 
their policies on contractual and third parties. 




These legal norms and discourses are not merely fleeting institutional rules that are easily 
replaceable. Rather, they shape the way an issue is seen by global policy makers, both within 
the BWIs and national institutions, and thereby control the possibilities of action or inaction in 
relation to the issue. In this sense, these legal norms are powerful. Eslava and Pahuja contend 
that legal discourses on property, trade, development, the environment, and human rights 
deployed by the BWIs are considered potent transmitters of particular modes of being.491  
For example, the conception of international human rights law universalized by the BWIs is a 
corporatized version that favours the rights of transnational corporations over natural persons, 
and also promotes individualism through the promotion of individual rights over communal 
rights.492 TｴW ｪﾉﾗH;ﾉｷ┣ｷﾐｪ SｷゲIﾗ┌ヴゲW ﾗa けデヴ;SW ｷﾐ ゲWヴ┗ｷIWゲげが ┘ｴWデｴWヴ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ﾗヴ ﾗデｴWヴ aﾗヴﾏが 
commodifies and equates services to goods, thereby obscuring and stripping services of their 
distinct social, cultural, environmental positioning in everyday life and personal 
relationships.493 The WﾗヴﾉS B;ﾐﾆげゲ ;S┗ﾗI;I┞ aﾗヴ デｴW introduction and enactment of private 
property rights, such as through land titling programs, as means of unlocking dormant capital 
for economic development, conflicts with alternative land use regimes of customary law 
systems, and inaugurates processes of inclusion and exclusion, landlessness, and new identities 
of private land owners and squatters.494     
The language of law has been recognised for its significant role in ideologically legitimising 
Sﾗﾏｷﾐ;ﾐデ ﾐWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉ ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ ｷSW;ゲが ゲｷﾐIW さｷデゲ SｷゲIﾗ┌ヴゲWゲ デWﾐS デﾗ HW ;ゲゲﾗIｷ;デWS ┘ｷデｴ 
ヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデ┞が ﾐW┌デヴ;ﾉｷデ┞が ﾗHﾃWIデｷ┗ｷデ┞ ;ﾐS ﾃ┌ゲデｷIWくざ495 In addition, it constitutes and thereby 
performs the neoliberal economic relations. As argued by Brown, in addition to securing the 
ヴｷｪｴデゲ ﾗa I;ヮｷデ;ﾉ ;ﾐS ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴｷﾐｪ IﾗﾏヮWデｷデｷﾗﾐが さﾐWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉ ﾃ┌ヴｷSｷI;ﾉ ヴW;ゲﾗﾐ ヴWI;ゲデゲ ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ ヴｷｪｴデゲが 
                                                          
491 Eslava and Pahuja (n 14) 106. 
492 “WW M┌デ┌;が けTｴW ISWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ﾗa H┌ﾏ;ﾐ ‘ｷｪｴデゲげ ふﾐ ヱヵヱぶ ヵΒΓき “WW ;ﾉゲﾗが AﾐｪｴｷWが けTｷﾏW PヴWゲWﾐデ ;ﾐS TｷﾏW P;ゲデげ ふﾐ 
149) 244. 
493 A Cﾉ;ｷヴW C┌デﾉWヴが けTﾗ┘;ヴS ; ‘;SｷI;ﾉ PﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞ Cヴｷデｷケ┌W ﾗa Tヴ;ﾐゲﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI L;┘げ ｷﾐ “┌ゲ;ﾐ 
Marks (ed), International law on the left: re-examining Marxist legacies (Cambridge University Press 2008) 
212. 
494 T;ﾐｷ; M┌ヴヴ;┞ Lｷが けFﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa C;ヮｷデ;ﾉ ;ﾐS ISWﾐデｷデ┞げが The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, 
and the Practice of Politics (Duke University Press 2007) 96, 109. For a critique of formal property rights, see 
JﾗゲWヮｴ E “デｷｪﾉｷデ┣が けTｴW EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIゲ BWｴｷﾐS L;┘ ｷﾐ ; M;ヴﾆWデ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞ぎ AﾉデWヴﾐ;デｷ┗Wゲ デﾗ デｴW NWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉ OヴデｴﾗSﾗ┝┞げ 
in David Kennedy and Joseph E Stiglitz (eds), Law and Economics with Chinese Characteristics: Institutions for 
Promoting Development in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford University Press 2013). Haldar and Stiglitz 
demonstrate how, in the context of provision of credit to the poor, the informal micro-credit approach of 
Y┌ﾐ┌ゲげ Gヴ;ﾏWWﾐ B;ﾐﾆが ｴ;ゲ ｷﾐ IWヴデ;ｷﾐ ヴWゲヮWIデゲ ヮWヴaﾗヴﾏWS HWデデWヴ デｴ;ﾐ HWヴﾐ;ﾐSﾗ SW “ﾗデﾗげゲ aﾗヴﾏ;ﾉ さヮヴﾗヮWヴデ┞ 
ヴｷｪｴデゲざ ;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴく 




citizenship and the field of democracy itself in an economic regisデWヴぐざ デｴWヴWH┞ SWヮﾗﾉｷデｷIｷゲｷﾐｪ 
these issues.496  
This legal rationality has therefore emerged as a powerful relatively autonomous ideational 
regulatory agent, which has been relied on by the BWIs in their regulation of Third World 
economies. Post-colonial and Third World studies, including TWAIL, have criticised the 
ﾗヮWヴ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ﾉ;┘ ┌ゲｷﾐｪ デｴW SｷゲIﾗ┌ヴゲW ﾗa ヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデ┞が ;ゲ けデWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪｷWゲ ﾗa WﾏヮｷヴWげが デﾗ 
extend neo-colonial management of former colonial territories (the Third World) by former 
imperial powers (developed economies) within the BWI regulatory framework.497  
As demonstrated in the examples above, the legal discourses on trade in financial services, 
human rights, and property which are deployed by the BWIs have also been criticised for 
promoting the interests of global capital, to the detriment of the welfare of the global South.498 
The short-term, speculative nature of transnational capital destabilizes the hurriedly-liberalised 
Third World financial markets, causing volatility and financial crises. In addition, as discussed in 
Chapter 4, foreign direct investment is prioritized by domestic financial markets policy makers 
over local capital, thereby maintaining an interest rate differential that attracts international 
capital while raising domestic lending rates, thereby constraining domestic access to affordable 
credit. 
Economic Rationality 
The BWIs were established, generally, to undertake the task of economic regulation of the 
global markets. Aゲ SｷゲI┌ゲゲWS ﾏﾗヴW Wﾉ;Hﾗヴ;デWﾉ┞ ｷﾐ Cｴ;ヮデWヴ ヲげゲ デｴWﾗヴWデｷcal framework, the 
dominant discourse of neoclassical economics has over time succeeded in the process of 
economization, that is, the qualification of the domain of the social relationships of production 
;ﾐS W┝Iｴ;ﾐｪW ;ゲ けWIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIげ ;ﾐSが ｷﾐ デｴW ヮヴﾗIWゲゲが デﾗ ヮrivilege the deployment of analytical 
apparatuses, language rationalities, institutions and descriptions based on or emanating from 
the (mainstream) economics discipline, above other analytical paradigms.499  
The implications of this process of economization is that, within the BWIs, economic rationality 
is ideologically legitimated and privileged as the dominant paradigm within which IMF and 
                                                          
496 Wendy Brown, UﾐSﾗｷﾐｪ デｴW DWﾏﾗゲぎ NWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉｷゲﾏげゲ SデW;ﾉデｴ ‘W┗ﾗﾉ┌デｷﾗﾐ (MIT Press 2015) 151に152. 
497 See generally, Pahuja, Decolonising International Law (n 271); Eslava and Pahuja (n 14); Anghie, 
Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law ふﾐ ヲΑヱぶき Cｴｷﾏﾐｷが けIﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ 
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World Bank bureaucrats view and interpret global regulatory issues, select and process 
information related to these issues, and generate regulatory choices for responding to these 
issues. Economic rationality is defined by Umar as さぐH;ゲWS ﾗﾐ ヴW;ゲﾗﾐWS IｴﾗｷIes that involve 
the comparison of alternatives according to their capacity to promote efficient solution for 
public problems. Choices involve comparison of alternatives in terms of their total costs and 
HWﾐWaｷデゲ デﾗ デｴW ゲﾗIｷWデ┞くざ500 
The effect of economisation on the BWI bureaucracies is that, in the IMF, for example, most of 
the staff recruited are economists or have economic training, from specific institutions with a 
bias towards neoclassical rather than heterodox approaches to economics.501 Extensive 
research has shed light on the powerful role of professional training in economics as a 
ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ﾏWIｴ;ﾐｷゲﾏが ;ﾐS ; IヴｷデｷI;ﾉ ゲﾗ┌ヴIW aﾗヴ ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉゲげ ｷSW;ゲ about social life.502 More 
recently, C;ﾉﾉﾗﾐげゲ PWヴaﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗ｷデ┞ TｴWﾗヴ┞ has also articulated the performativity of economics, 
that is, the ability of economic doctrines to perform, shape and format the economy, rather 
than merely describe it.503 These research programmes point to the ideological and 
performative power of economic theories, doctrines, ideas, discursive practices and norms, to 
act on individuals, and to enable or constrain their cognition of possibilities for action and 
inaction.  
For example, Clegg argues that the IMFげゲ ┌ゲW ﾗa ﾐWﾗIﾉ;ゲゲｷI;ﾉ economic rationalities as analytical 
or cognitive paradigms results in the interpretation of balance-of-payment shortfalls as 
macroeconomic anomalies requiring remedial action in the form of tighter credit supply, and 
reduced government expenditure.504 This paradigm is contrasted to Keynesian economics that 
would, for example, advocate for more government spending.   
The prevalence of economists and economic rationalization within the BWI bureaucracies, is 
therefore one of the reasons not only for BWI relative autonomy from State interests in certain 
instances, but also the prevalence of neoclassical economic rationalities underpinning BWI 
regulatory standards, policies and loan conditionalities. Rather than always emanating from 
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デｴW けU“ W;ﾉﾉ “デヴWWデ-TヴW;ゲ┌ヴ┞ IﾗﾏヮﾉW┝げが ゲヮWIｷaｷI WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ﾐﾗヴﾏゲ ;ﾐS ヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデｷWゲ ｴ;┗W 
originated within the internal けrationalげ decision making processes, and have been embedded 
in, and in certain instances ousted from, the BWI bureaucratic machinery.  
For example, capital account liberalization, and the use of capital controls as an IMF policy has 
undergone a number of flips since 1944. The IMF Articles of Agreement have provided since 
1944 that member States have a right to use capital controls. However, in the 1980s and 1990s, 
internal debates among the IMF staff turned capital controls as a regulatory policy option, into 
economic heresy. This was due to new, contested research that supported capital account 
liberalization.505 It was during this period that the BWIs pressured Third World economies, 
including Kenya, to liberalize their financial markets (discussed in Chapter 4).506 Even so, other 
research, and empirical evidence from the 1990s emerging markets crisis, pointed to the need 
for EMDEs to use capital controls to protect their economies from the volatility of the global 
markets.507 After the 2008 financial crisis, the IMF once again rethought its stance on this policy, 
and seems to be open to EMDEs enacting capital controls, but only with the guidance and 
advice of the IMF.508 
As seen with the issue of capital controls, empirical evidence does not always give economic 
rationality the upper hand within the BWI policy making bureaucracy. Policy is sometimes 
made on the basis of economic ideology or dogma, rather than empirical evidence, as 
demonstrated in the IMF advocacy for financial market liberalization.509 While earlier economic 
research in the 1970s (specifically the Mckinnon-Shaw theses) had claimed that interest rate 
liberalization, and financial market liberalization, would lead to reduction of market lending 
rates, empirical evidence discounted these arguments, especially in EMDEs.510 However, the 
IMF ヴWa┌ゲWS デﾗ ;H;ﾐSﾗﾐ デｴｷゲ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞く “デｷｪﾉｷデ┣ ｴ;ゲ ;ヴｪ┌WS デｴ;デ ｷﾐ デｴｷゲ I;ゲWが さデｴW IMF SｷS ﾐﾗデ HWﾉｷW┗W 
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(Palgrave Macmillan UK 1981); Edward Stone Shaw, Financial Deepening in Economic Development (Oxford 




that policy should be based on theory or evidence. Either it had an agenda that was different に 
perhaps promoting the interests of the financial markets に and/or the policies were based more 
ﾗﾐ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞が ﾐﾗデ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ゲIｷWﾐIWぐざく511  
Another example of autonomous, bureaucratic norm changes within the IMF was the shift from 
Keynesianism to Monetarism, which was precipitated not by a direct preference of Monetarist 
economic policies over Keynesian economic policies, but rather the adoption of rule-based 
rather than discretionary approaches to macro-economic policy making within the 
concessional lending programmes. That is, the shift towards Monetarism was precipitated by 
the fact that it was more rules based, while Keynesianism was discretion-based.512  
The mainstreaming of economic rationality in the BWI bureaucratic machinery had another 
WaaWIデぎ デｴW SｷゲI┌ヴゲｷ┗W Iﾗﾐゲデヴ┌Iデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW BWIゲ ;ゲ さデWIｴﾐﾗIヴ;デｷI W┝ヮWヴデゲざ ｷﾐ デｴW WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI 
ﾏ;ﾐ;ｪWﾏWﾐデ ;ﾐS SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ ﾗa EMDEゲが ;ﾐS デｴW ﾗデｴWヴｷﾐｪ ﾗaが ﾗヴ さIﾉﾗゲｷﾐｪ ﾗaa SｷゲI┌ヴゲｷ┗W ゲヮ;IW 
デﾗ デヴ;Sｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ;ﾐS ﾉﾗI;ﾉ ﾆﾐﾗ┘ﾉWSｪWゲざ ｷﾐｴWヴWﾐデ ┘ｷデｴｷﾐ デｴW EMDE Iｷデｷzens and policy makers and 
regulators.513 This not only justified BWI interventions in the politics and economic policy 
making of EMDEs, but also created within EMDE citizens and policy makers subjectivities of 
capacity inadequacy and dependence on BWI technical advice. Consequently, economic 
ヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデ┞ ｷﾐ デｴW aﾗヴﾏ ﾗa けデWIｴﾐﾗIヴ;デｷI ;S┗ｷIWげが ﾗヴ けデWIｴﾐｷI;ﾉ ;ゲゲｷゲデ;ﾐIWげ ┘;ゲ ｷﾏヮﾗゲWS ﾗﾐデﾗ 
economic, social and cultural systems of EMDEs, far removed from the neoliberal capitalist 
economies of the West, thereby entrenching and globalising the system of neoliberal 
capitalism. 
Technical Rationality 
As discussed in Chapter 2, technological ideas, practices and artefacts are both ideological and 
performative. Through the ideologies of technological determinism and autonomy, the 
rationality of technical systems not only conceals the social origins and interests of 
technological design, but also creates subjectivities, whereby social values and interests are 
subjugated to the imperatives of the ostensibly autonomous technology.514 Technological 
designs and practices also are capable of enacting and thereby performing the ideologically 
                                                          
511 “デｷｪﾉｷデ┣が けC;ヮｷデ;ﾉ M;ヴﾆWデ LｷHWヴ;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐが EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI Gヴﾗ┘デｴが ;ﾐS Iﾐゲデ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞げ ふﾐ ヴΑヶぶ ヵΒく 
512 BWﾐ Cﾉｷaデ ;ﾐS Jｷﾏ Tﾗﾏﾉｷﾐゲﾗﾐが けWｴWﾐ ‘┌ﾉWゲ “デ;ヴデWS デﾗ ‘┌ﾉWぎ TｴW IMFが NWﾗ-Liberal Economic Ideas and 
EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI PﾗﾉｷI┞ Cｴ;ﾐｪW ｷﾐ Bヴｷデ;ｷﾐげ ふヲヰヱヲぶ ヱΓ ‘W┗ｷW┘ ﾗa IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ PﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞ 477, 481に484. 
513 Popke (n 448) 264. 
514 This is discussed in section 4.4 of chapter 2. On technology as ideology, see Feenberg, Transforming 




legitimated ideas about particular technological organisation.515 In addition, as Socio-Technical 
Agencements (STAs) or hybrid assemblages of human and non-human actants, technologies 
perform and bring into reality the economic and legal ideologies embedded within them.516  
Thus, within the global financial markets, increased leveraging of various computing 
technologies by various market players, and policy makers and regulators, has also provided 
another source of technical rationality that acts upon global market players, including EMDEs, 
to adopt particular modes of economic organization.  
Technical standards embedded in various aspects of the architecture of financial technologies, 
are discursive, to the extent that they act as purveyors of particular economic discourses on 
the nature of financial markets and social life. These technical standards are embedded in 
representational screen interfaces through which users see the markets, deductive algorithms 
forming part of the software that powers the logic of the computers, and even the plastic-and-
metal aspects of the computing hardware that determine the limits of certain human 
intentionality.517 Aside from the deliberate embedding of particular discourses in these 
systems, the autonomous agency of financial technologies is embodied in their ability to 
distance the users from, for example, the real markets that the technological interfaces 
represent.518 In addition, the computing technologies are also scoping systems, to the extent 
デｴ;デ デｴW┞ ゲｷW┗W ;ﾐS ヮヴﾗﾃWIデ ; ┌ﾐｷaﾗヴﾏ ┗ｷW┘ ﾗa ｪﾉﾗH;ﾉ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲ デｴ;デ ;ヴW ｷﾐ ヴW;ﾉｷデ┞が さヮ;ヴデｷ;ﾉが 
IﾗﾐデWゲデWS ;ﾐS aヴ;ｪﾏWﾐデWSざく519 TｴW デWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪｷWゲ デｴWヴWaﾗヴW さH┞ヮ;ゲゲ デｴW ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ ;ﾐd social 
ｪWﾗｪヴ;ヮｴｷWゲ ﾗa デｴW ┘ﾗヴﾉSざ ;ﾐS ;ゲゲｷﾏｷﾉ;デW ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ;ﾐS ﾉﾗI;ﾉ SｷaaWヴWﾐIWゲ ｷﾐ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI 
organisation.520 
The regulatory agency or power of technical rationality has been noted in the deployment of 
the Debt Management and Financial Analysis System (DMFAS), a computing system initiated 
                                                          
515 Law and Singleton (n 48) 766. 
516 Ç;ﾉﾀズﾆ;ﾐ ;ﾐS C;ﾉﾉﾗﾐ ふﾐ ンンヰぶ Γく 
517 Preda (n 55) 755. Preda argues that five features constitute agential aspects of financial technologies, in 
which these technologies constitute the markets: temporal structures, visualization modes, representational 
and interpretive languages, cognitive tools and categories, and group boundaries. 
518 See generally, Mark Coeckelbergh, Money Machines: Electronic Financial Technologies, Distancing, and 
Responsibility in Global Finance (Routledge 2016) Coeckelbergh contends that financial technologies 
さIﾗﾐデヴｷH┌デW デﾗ ｷﾏヮWヴゲﾗﾐ;ﾉが SｷゲWﾐｪ;ｪWSが ヮﾉ;IWﾉWゲゲが ;ﾐS ﾗHﾃWIデｷa┞ｷﾐｪ ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲざが ┘ｴｷIｴが ｷﾐ デｴW IﾗﾐデW┝デ ﾗa 
globalized financial markets, makes it difficult to exercise and ascribe responsibility. He also examines how 
financial technologies can be contested and morally and socially re-oriented through technological ideas and 
practices. 
519 K;ヴｷﾐ Kﾐﾗヴヴ CWデｷﾐ; ;ﾐS B;ヴH;ヴ; GヴｷﾏヮWが けGﾉﾗH;ﾉ Fｷnancial Technologies: Scoping Systems That Raise the 
WﾗヴﾉSげ ｷﾐ TJ PｷﾐIｴ ;ﾐS ‘ｷIｴ;ヴS “┘WSHWヴｪ ふWSゲぶが Living in a material world: economic sociology meets science 





by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), BWIs, and more than 
66 Creditor and Debtor institutions and States at the global level, to manage sovereign debt 
among EMDEs.521 The DMFAS is discursively programmed to undertake surveillance of debtor 
States by requiring them to input into the system, specific formats of microeconomic and 
macroeconomic information into the system, whose programming logic then beams a 
particularly scripted interpretation of this information to Creditor States and institutions.522 The 
DMFAS is discursively scripted to the extent that it provides or advances specific or particular 
ｷﾐデWヴヮヴWデ;デｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa SWHデﾗヴ Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴｷWゲげ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ┘Wﾉﾉ-being and vulnerabilities, based on 
ostensibly neutral and technocratic, but really, inherently biased and political, interpretive 
lenses.523 
These three types of rationality discussed above に legal, economic and technical rationality に 
do not act in isolation, but rather in negotiation, many times mediated by the particular 
interests that the BWI bureaucrats are ideologically biased towards. 
4.4.4. External Influences on Bureaucratic Power 
In the same context in which State representation and interests in the IMF and World Bank 
executive boards are influenced by norm entrepreneurs and other parties, so are their 
bureaucracies. For example, the internal economic debates within the IMF leading to certain 
regulatory policy shifts, such as capital controls versus capital account liberalization, interest 
rate regulation versus financial markets liberalization, and austerity programmes versus 
stimulus package policies, have mirrored economic debates in the academies, research centres 
and think tanks, and the media.524  
The post-2008 ideational shift within the BWIs to macroprudential regulation, for example was 
a fundamental normative change that was not simply necessitated by the crisis, or taken 
advantage of by the EMDE States, but rather was foregrounded by comprehensive investments 
in economic, legal and technical rationalities within and without the BWI bureaucracies. Baker 
;ヴｪ┌Wゲ デｴ;デ デｴW ﾏ;Iヴﾗヮヴ┌SWﾐデｷ;ﾉ ｷSW;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ゲｴｷaデ ﾗII┌ヴヴWS ┌ﾐSWヴ aﾗ┌ヴ けゲIﾗヮｷﾐｪげ IﾗﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐゲ. First 
was prior intellectual and institutional presence of ideas favourable to macroprudential policy. 
                                                          
521 For a historical account of the initiation of DMFAS, see United Nations Conference on Trade and 
DW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデが けDWHデ M;ﾐ;ｪWﾏWﾐデ ;ﾐS Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ Aﾐ;ﾉ┞ゲｷゲ “┞ゲデWﾏげ ふUﾐｷデWS N;デｷﾗﾐゲ CﾗﾐaWヴWﾐIW ﾗﾐ Tヴ;SW ;ﾐS 
Development 1992) DMFAS Newsletter 1. 
522 Cetina and Grimpe (n 519) 162に163. 
523 ibid. 




Second was the advantageous positioning of ideational advocates in professional policy 
networks and related environments. Third was active networking, promotion of the ideational 
shift, and persuasion of professional peers by norm entrepreneurs. The fourth condition was 
the existence of explanatory capacity and a feasible programme of action, alongside 
professional esteem, status, standing or prior intellectual performance of the norm 
entrepreneurs.525  
These examples underscore the pivotal role and influence of normative ideational networks of 
the academy, research centres, think tanks, policy circles and other fora through which 
ideational shifts originate and gain authoritative traction that makes its way into the BWI 
bureaucracies.    
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the third research sub-question: how has the ideological and 
performative power of economic, legal and technological ideas and related practices 
reproduced regulatory neoliberalism within the IMF and World Bank? The chapter has explored 
デｴW ｷﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ IﾗﾐデW┝デ ﾗa TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS “デ;デWゲげ ｴｷゲデﾗヴｷI;ﾉ IﾗﾐデWゲデ;デｷﾗﾐ ;ｪ;ｷﾐゲデ BWIゲが H┞ 
discussing the governance, decision making and representation rules that have historically 
under-represented Third World countries, and propped up the structural power of the US and 
other developed countries in transnational financial regulation. While acknowledging the 
materiality and significance of the US and other developed countries structural and material 
power, and the influence of the US Treasury-Wall Street complex within these institutional 
arrangements, the discussion suggested that there has emerged an additional source of 
regulatory power within the BWIs に the influence of relatively autonomous, ideological and 
performative ideas and bureaucratic practices. The discussion has examined the role played by 
specific ideas in three aspects of the BWIs: establishment and of the BWIs; State governance 
of the BWIs; and デｴW BWIゲげ ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷWゲ.  
For example, during the establishment and structuring of the BWIs, other than the military, 
economic and political clout that it commanded, the US carefully deployed specific discourses 
;ﾐS ヮヴ;IデｷIWゲ ゲ┌Iｴ ;ゲ けSW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデげが けWIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ｪヴﾗ┘デｴげが デﾗ SWゲｷｪﾐ ﾐﾗデ ﾗﾐﾉ┞ デｴW ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ 
mandate of the IMF and the World Bank, but also State governance of the regulatory 
                                                          
525 AﾐSヴW┘ B;ﾆWヴが けTｴW NW┘ PﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞ ﾗa デｴW M;Iヴﾗヮヴ┌SWﾐデｷ;ﾉ ISW;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ “ｴｷaデげ ふヲヰヱンぶ ヱΒ NW┘ PﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ 




institutions. Concepts such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as the measure of economic 
growth were created as global definitions of State power, ranking countries into developed and 
developing economies, and determining their influence within the BWIs. State governance of 
the BWIs has also been impacted by external ideational power, through lobbying. Regulatory 
neoliberalism at the IMF and World Bank has been sustained by an intricate network of 
academics, think tanks, foundations and the media, which promote their discourses and 
related practices, norms, ideas and theories, with respect to international development, and 
the work of the BWIs. This conveyor belt of economic, legal and technical ideology has 
delivered remarkable victories for the proponents of a neoclassical bend of regulatory policies 
at the BWIs, including the classification of finance as a service, and the subsequent 
liberalization of financial markets. 
Ideas in the form of economic, legal and technological rationalities have also impacted on the 
bureaucratic culture of the BWIs, making them relatively autonomous and separate sites of 
authority in transnational financial governance, to the extent that they create their own rules, 
originate discursive social knowledge, and in the process, articulate and diffuse new norms, 
rationalities, principles, actors and identities. This includes the conceptualization of economic 
ヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデｷWゲ ;ﾐS ｷSW;ゲ ゲ┌Iｴ ;ゲ けSW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデげが ;ﾐd creating a sense that these are shared 
international tasks requiring State cooperation and BWI interference. In addition, legal 
discourses on property, trade, development, the environment, and human rights deployed by 
the BWIs are considered powerful sources of particular modes of being. Lastly, technological 
infrastructure for regulating (by monitoring) Third World economies, such as the Debt 
Management and Financial Analysis System has also embedded and diffused, globally, certain 
BWI economic and legal discourses of financial markets, with ideological and performative 
power.    
The ideological and performative ideas, including legal formalism, neoclassical economics, and 
technological rationality, that constitute these institutions, and the global monetary order, are 
significant influences that determine the regulatory policies that the BWIs favour, and how they 
exercise their regulatory power over Third World economies. The discussion has demonstrated 
how, over time, the expert neoclassical economic and rule of law theories on economic growth, 
SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデが ;ﾐS aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデ SWWヮWﾐｷﾐｪが ｴ;┗W SWIﾗ┌ヮﾉWS aヴﾗﾏ デｴWｷヴ ﾗヴｷｪｷﾐ;デﾗヴゲげ 
interests, and exercised a けヴWﾉ;デｷ┗Wﾉ┞ ;┌デﾗﾐﾗﾏﾗ┌ゲげ ideological and performative power upon 




demonstrated how these neoliberal economic and legal rationalities have been embedded and 
made durable in various technologies circulated by BWIs, including algorithmic-driven macro-
econometric models and the DMFAS.  
Implications of these findings are that the Third World should conceptualize BWIs as neither 
benevolent development institutions nor inescapably exploitative mechanisms for global 
capitalism, but rather as sites for active and continuous ideological and technological 





















Economization: The Ideological and Performative Effect of Neoclassical Economics in the 
LｷHWヴ;ﾉｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa KWﾐ┞;げゲ IﾐデWヴWゲデ R;デWゲ M;ヴﾆWデ 
1. Introduction 
Chapter 3 has examined the regulatory role of the ideological and performative nature of ideas 
within the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs). This chapter explores the first aspect of the 
fourth research question: how has the ideological and performative power of economic ideas 
;ﾐS ヴWﾉ;デWS ヮヴ;IデｷIWゲ ヴWヮヴﾗS┌IWS ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ ﾐWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉｷゲﾏ ｷﾐ KWﾐ┞;げゲ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デW ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲい Iデ 
is the first of three related aspects of the Kenya case study that explores the role which 
economic, legal and technological ideas, practices and related institutions play in the 
reproduction and sustenance of regulatory neoliberalism in Third World financial markets. The 
discussion explores the role of neoclassical economics in framing, delineating and limiting the 
actions of Kenyan financial markets regulators and policy makers in addressing the problem of 
high interest rates and high consumer indebtedness in the domestic market, and in contesting 
neoliberal transnational financial regulatory standards.   
“ｷﾐIW デｴW ﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲ ;ゲ ; ヴWゲ┌ﾉデ ﾗa BWIゲげ ﾉﾗ;ﾐ IﾗﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデｷWゲが KWﾐ┞;が ﾉｷﾆW 
other financial markets, has experienced mixed results, including increased market lending 
rates. Nevertheless, despite the criticisms and discrediting of neoclassical economic orthodoxy 
and financial market liberalisation, this neoliberal regulatory paradigm remains the main policy 
aヴ;ﾏW aﾗヴ SW┗ｷゲｷﾐｪ ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ ゲﾗﾉ┌デｷﾗﾐゲ デﾗ Hヴｷﾐｪ Sﾗ┘ﾐ ﾉWﾐSｷﾐｪ ヴ;デWゲく Tｴｷゲ ｷﾐIﾉ┌SWゲ デｴW CBKげゲ use 
of macro-econometric models as part of its liberalised, market-centred monetary policy 
mechanism, to influence lending rates downwards. Employing ideology critique and economic 
performativity theory, the discussion explores the ideological and performative role of 
neoclassical economic theories including the Mckinnon-Shaw hypothesis, Efficient Markets 
Hypothesis, General Equilibrium Theory, and related practices such as macro-econometric 
modelling. The chapter argues that the adoption of neoclassical economic theories, and related 
policy and technical practices by Kenyan policy makers and regulators reproduces and sustains 
regulatory neoliberalism, liberalised financial markets, high interest rates and high 





The chapter is organised into 7 further sections, to capture the chronology of the regulatory 
debate. Section 2 briefly outlines the theoretical framework for exploring the ideological and 
performative power of neoclassical economics and related practices. It argues that the 
neoclassical economic theories and practices adopted by Kenyan regulators, including the 
Mckinnon-Shaw hypothesis, Efficient Markets Hypothesis, General Equilibrium Theory, and 
macro-econometric modelling, ideologically legitimate and perform neoliberal financial 
markets, and regulatory neoliberalism. Section 3 lays the framework for the case study by 
recounting the IMF-driven financial sector liberalization process in Kenya and the context of 
high interest rates, and contestation of the neoliberal regulatory paradigm. Section 4 examines 
implementation of IMF structural adjustment programs through the construction and 
embedding of neoclassical macro-econometric models. It argues that this established macro-
econometric governability of the domestic financial markets, thereby ideologically legitimating 
and performing liberalized financial markets.  
Section 5 exヮﾉﾗヴWゲ デｴW Waaﾗヴデゲ H┞ KWﾐ┞;げゲ P;ヴﾉｷ;ﾏWﾐデ デﾗ re-politicize the domestic financial 
markets and their regulation. It demonstrates the ideological nature of the various neoclassical 
economic theories underpinning interest rate liberalization. Section 6 analyses デｴW ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴゲげ, 
ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ﾏ;ﾆWヴゲげ, ;ﾐS H;ﾐﾆWヴゲげ ┌ゲW ﾗa ﾐWﾗIﾉ;ゲゲｷI;l economic rationalities and policies to 
depoliticize the issue of high interest rates, and demonstrates the contradictions inherent in 
regulatory neoliberalism. Section 7 contains the conclusions and recommendations for further 
research. It argues that the political project of constituting sustainably fairer interest rates 
markets in Kenya requires the levying of both the ideological and performative power of legal, 
economic, and technological ideas and practices. 
2. Ideological, Constitutive and Performative Power of Neoclassical Economics 
Chapter 2 outlined the theoretical framework for examining the role of neoclassical economics 
and related practices, techniques and technologies in reproducing neoliberal markets and 
related regulatory practices, and also in restricting or limiting the options or possibilities for 
regulatory reform in Third World countries. Through the deployment of an assemblage of 
ideology critique and economic performativity theory, the discussion demonstrated the 
cognitive and normative agential power of economic ideas, practices and related institutions 
in constituting market relations, shaping identities and respective capacities that either enable 




theoretical framework is used to examine the role of neoclassical and other economic theories 
in embedding a neoliberal market paradigm within the Central Bank of Kenya, the National 
Treasury, and other financial sector policy makers and regulators, and in sustaining the 
liberalised financial markets, and concomitant high interest rates and high indebtedness.     
The neoclassical economic theories such as the Mckinnon-Shaw Hypothesis, and policy and 
regulatory practices such as macro-econometric modelling, and monetary policy interventions, 
are conceptualised as ideologies, for three related reasons. First, they are ideological to the 
extent that they have developed into the dominant, albeit subjective ideational apparatus for 
interpreting and interacting with the Kenyan economy and society, not only within regulatory 
bureaucracies, but also in the academia, government and non-government economic think 
tanks, and the private financial sector. This is despite their partial and at times outright 
inaccurate perspectives on the nature and workings of the Kenyan economy and financial 
markets, as exhibited by their well-documented policy failures, including persistence of high 
interest rates. Within Economic Performativity and the related Actor-Network Theory rubric, 
デｴｷゲ ヮヴﾗIWゲゲ ｷゲ ヴWaWヴヴWS デﾗ ;ゲ けWIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐげが デｴ;デ ｷゲが デｴW ┌ﾐIヴｷデｷI;ﾉ ;ﾐS Iﾗﾐデヴﾗ┗Wヴゲｷ;ﾉ 
ケ┌;ﾉｷaｷI;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ;Iデｷ┗ｷデｷWゲが HWｴ;┗ｷﾗ┌ヴゲが ゲヮｴWヴWゲ ﾗヴ aｷWﾉSゲ ;ゲ けWIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIげく526 The consequence of 
economization is the privileging of analytical apparatuses, rationalities, concepts and language 
of neoclassical economics.527 
Second, the economic theories and related practices are ideological to the extent that they 
offer a partial view of the nature and workings of the economy, as a singular, totalising view. 
Tｴｷゲ ｷゲ ;ゲ ; ヴWゲ┌ﾉデ ﾗa デｴW ;Sﾗヮデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa けIﾉﾗゲWS-ゲ┞ゲデWﾏゲげ ﾐ;デ┌ヴ;ﾉ ﾉ;┘ ;ﾐS ﾐ;デ┌ヴ;ﾉ ゲIｷWﾐIW 
assumptions and methodologies such as mathematical modelling which, in a bid to simplify the 
complexities of the real world, adopt simplifying and inaccurate assumptions. The implications 
ﾗa デｴｷゲ けゲIｷWﾐデｷaｷI;デｷﾗﾐげ ﾗa CBK ;ﾐS N;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ TヴW;ゲ┌ヴ┞ ﾏ;Iヴﾗ-econometric modelling of the 
monetary and financial sector, is that neoclassical theories and practices of financial sector 
liberalization are presumed to be superior to other heterodox approaches to interest rates 
regulation, and thus side-line them, while branding any critiques as irrational. Third, the 
theories and practices underpinning financial liberalization in Kenya are ideological to the 
extent that they conceal, and, at worst, legitimate and sustain socially-constructed and 
systematised relations of domination exemplified by exploitative interest rates. The market 
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aspects concealed by neoclassｷIｷゲﾏげゲ Iﾉ;ｷﾏゲ デﾗ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデ ;┌デﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞ ;ﾐS デｴWﾗヴWデｷI;ﾉ ﾐW┌デヴ;ﾉｷデ┞ 
ｷﾐIﾉ┌SW デｴW ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ;ﾐS ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ ;ゲヮWIデゲ ﾗa デｴW けﾏ;ヴﾆWデ-ヮヴｷIWSげ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デWゲが ｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデ 
manipulation through the CBK monetary policy mechanism, banking cartel rate-fixing, and 
power asymmetries between lenders and borrowers.  
The power of neoclassical economic theories and practices deployed by the CBK, National 
Treasury and the financial sector is, however, not restricted to its effect on the cognitive 
paradigms of the regulatory bureaucrats and policy makers. As articulated by the interlocutors 
of economic performativity theory, neoclassical economics does not merely describe the 
economy or seek to understand how it works; neoclassical economics actually performs, shapes 
and formats the economy. To this extent, it is argued that the Kenyan financial markets are 
constituted and re-constituted on the basis of neoclassical macro-econometric models, and 
therefore mimic, albeit with failure, the partial or inaccurate assumptions of the closed 
economic system. Due to the ideological legitimation and embedding of neoclassical economics 
and related practices within the CBK, the National Treasury, and the banking sector (which is 
equated to generic performativity)528, the uses of these theories and practices by all market 
players in the financial sector delivers a self-validating feedback loop. This validation of the 
neoclassical economic theories and related macro-economic models is used as further evidence 
for sustaining the market liberalisation policies, despite the problem of high interest rates and 
high indebtedness in Kenya.  
TｴW Iｴ;ヮデWヴ ;ヴｪ┌Wゲ デｴ;デ デｴW CBKげゲ ﾏ;Iヴﾗ-econometric model deployed in monetary policy 
transmission have enabled generic and effective performativity of the interest rate market. 
Generic economic performativity is established by demonstrating that the neoclassical 
economic theories and models are used by not only academics but also Kenyan financial 
markets participants, regulators and policy makers. Effective performativity is established by 
demonstrating the effect of the economic practices, which in this case, is the establishment of 
macroeconomic governability using the macro models. The reflexive character of 
macroeconomic modelling, and its subsequent deployment in evaluation, forecasting, analysis 
;ﾐS ｷﾐデWヴ┗Wﾐデｷﾗﾐが ｷゲ ┘ｴ;デ ｴ;ゲ ;ﾐ WaaWIデ デｴW WIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞く EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ;ｪWﾐデゲげ ﾆﾐﾗ┘ﾉWSｪW ﾗa デｴW I;┌ゲ;ﾉ 
                                                          
528 Generic performativity is achieved where the economic theories and practices are used, not just by 
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relationships between various economic variables feeds back into their economic behaviour, 
while that of regulators and policy makers feeds into economic policy advise and interventions. 
3. Liberalization of Interest Rates Market in Kenya, and Political Contestation 
Since the commencement of the IMF stabilisation programmes in EMDEs, in the 1970s, one of 
their most criticised reform proposals, fashioned as loan conditionalities, has been the 
ﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa SW┗Wﾉﾗヮｷﾐｪ Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴｷWゲげ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲが ;ﾐS WゲヮWIｷ;ﾉﾉ┞ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デWゲ 
markets.529 Relying on the Keynesian Liquidity Theory, Kenya, like many other developing 
economies at the time, implemented a policy of maintaining low interest rates (adjusted for 
inflation, so as to maintain positive real interest rates), as a strategy for maintaining a low cost 
of credit, which, the Government believed, would increase investment activity and economic 
development.530 This was undertaken through interest rate controls that included lending rate 
caps for commercial banks, non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) and building societies, and 
minimum savings rates for all deposit-taking institutions. In addition, banking regulation 
banned non-interest rate charges, and stipulated that the calculation of interest rates was to 
be on a reducing balance basis.531 
The 1973 oil crisis brought inflationary pressure to bear on capped interest rates, turning them 
into negative real interest rates. This prompted the Kenya government, in 1974, to start the 
first of a series of upward revisions of the lending rate caps, so as to maintain positive real 
interest rates, and give lenders room to price their loans and deposits profitably.532 In 1979, 
デｴW ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげゲ ヴWケ┌Wゲt for financial assistance from the IMF, to deal with the external shocks 
occasioned by exchange rate volatility, opened the door to the introduction of structural 
adjustment programmes (SAPs) and other IMF-recommended macro-economic policy 
prescriptions tｴ;デ Iﾗﾐデｷﾐ┌W デﾗ ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴW KWﾐ┞;げゲ I┌ヴヴWﾐデ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ヮﾗﾉｷIｷWゲく TｴW ヱΓΒヰゲ ┘WヴW 
marked by several SAP reforms to the financial sector, including further upward adjustments 
to the lending rate ceilings. The IMF advocated for interest rate liberalization as a necessity for 
maintaining positive real interest rates, so as to encourage the mobilisation of savings. This 
                                                          
529 “WW ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉﾉ┞が Mﾆ;ﾐS;┘ｷヴW ふﾐ ヱンぶき GﾗS┘ｷﾐ ‘ M┌ヴ┌ﾐｪ;が けGﾗ┗Wヴﾐ;ﾐIW ;ﾐS デｴW PﾗﾉｷデｷIゲ ﾗa “デヴ┌Iデ┌ヴ;ﾉ 
ASﾃ┌ゲデﾏWﾐデ ｷﾐ KWﾐ┞;げ ｷﾐ GﾗS┘ｷﾐ ‘ M┌ヴ┌ﾐｪ; ;ﾐS “ｴ;Sヴ;Iﾆ W N;ゲﾗﾐｪげﾗ ふWSゲぶが Kenya: The struggle for 
democracy (Zed Books 2007). 
530 Keynes, in his liquidity theory of interest, argues for low interest rates to speed up the accumulation of 
capital. See Ngugi and Kabubo (n 506) 13. See generally, Keynes (n 376). 
531 け‘WS┌Iｷﾐｪ H;ﾉ;ﾐIW H;ゲｷゲげ ﾏW;ﾐデ デｴ;デ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ┘;ゲ Iｴ;ヴｪWS ﾗﾐ デｴW ﾗ┌デゲデ;ﾐSｷﾐｪ ﾉﾗ;ﾐ ;ﾏﾗ┌ﾐデが ヴ;デｴWヴ デｴ;ﾐ 





would supposedly trigger the deepening of the banking sector, entrance of new lenders into 
the market, increased competition, and the lowering of the interest rate spread, which would 
;ﾉゲﾗ Wﾐゲ┌ヴW IﾗﾏヮWデｷデｷ┗Wﾉ┞ ﾉﾗ┘ Iﾗゲデゲ ﾗa IヴWSｷデが ;ゲ ヮWヴ デｴW ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげゲ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ デ;ヴｪWデく533 
B┞ ヱΓΓヱが KWﾐ┞;げゲ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デW ﾏ;ヴﾆWデ ｴ;S HWWﾐ a┌ﾉﾉ┞ ﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉｷ┣WSく TｴW ﾉWﾐSｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS deposit rate 
caps were abolished, while banks were allowed to include all kinds of charges and fees to the 
lending rates. In addition, banks were given the liberty to contractually set the interest rate 
calculation method. The impact of interest rate liberalization on the cost of credit has, however, 
not been positive. Between 1991 and 2016, despite the deepening and development ﾗa KWﾐ┞;げゲ 
financial sector into a regional powerhouse, and the entrance into the market of both local and 
foreign financial institutions, the lending rates have remained excessively high, while the 
deposit rate has remained very low, resulting into a high interest rate spread. This has resulted 
into high levels of borrower indebtedness and non-performing loan portfolio, and constrained 
access to credit for investment and economic development.534  
During this period of interest rate liberalization, specific market practices of lenders have 
prompted calls for the re-regulation of interest rates. First, lenders have maintained excessively 
high interest rates (at some point in the 1990s, reaching 70%) that exceed the rate of return of 
any average investment in Kenya, thereby locking borrowers in a cycle of indebtedness and 
poverty. Second, with no constraints placed on contractual provisions related to interest rates, 
lenders fashioned standard clauses in loan instruments, which gave them unfettered discretion 
to raise the contractually agreed lending rates by any margin, and without consulting the 
Hﾗヴヴﾗ┘Wヴゲく Tｴｷゲ ﾉWｪｷデｷﾏｷ┣WS デｴW H;ﾐﾆゲげ ヮヴ;IデｷIW ﾗa ;ﾏH┌ゲｴｷﾐｪ credit-compliant borrowers with 
excessive and unexplained new interest rates, repayment amounts, and penalties that they 
were unable to meet, resulting in loan defaults and loss of collateral. Third, the legal framework 
for the enforcement of collateral has favoured the lenders, privileging their right to auction 
collateral that has often been in the form of family property, often in sham sales, even before 
the loan repayment dispute has been determined by the courts. 
With these general trends in the domestic lending market, it is no surprise that since 2000, 
there have been at least four legislative initiatives to re-introduce lending rate ceilings and 
                                                          
533 See generally, Thorvaldur Gylfason, Credit Policy and Economic Activity in Developing Countries with IMF 
Stabilization Programs (International Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University 1987). 
534 See the 2013 World Bank report on the perennial problem of high interest rates: Smita Wagh and others, 





deposit rate floors, and also the legislation of other statutory protections for borrowers in 
credit contracts. This culminated in the August 2016 enactment of the Banking (Amendment) 
Act535, which introduced new lending rate ceilings and deposit rate floors, among other earlier 
consumer protection provisions.536 This regulatory debate that has unfolded since the initial 
liberalization of the interest rate market in 1991, provides an interesting case study on the local 
contestation of neoliberal regulatory paradigms in the Kenyan banking sector. 
Figure 1: Trends in Principal Rates in Kenya 
 
Source: Central Bank of Kenya (2015) 
 
 
                                                          
535 No. 25 of 2016, Laws of Kenya. The amendment introduced a section 33B(1) to the Banking Act (Cap. 488, 
L;┘ゲ ﾗa KWﾐ┞;ぶが ┘ｴｷIｴ ヮヴﾗ┗ｷSWS デｴ;デぎ さA bank or a financial institution shall set - (a) the maximum interest 
rate chargeable for a credit facility in Kenya at no more than four per cent, the base rate set and published 
by the Central Bank of Kenya; and (b) the minimum interest rate granted on a deposit held in interest earning 
ｷﾐ KWﾐ┞; デﾗ ;デ ﾉW;ゲデ ゲW┗Wﾐデ┞ ヮWヴ IWﾐデが デｴW H;ゲW ヴ;デW ゲWデ ;ﾐS ヮ┌HﾉｷゲｴWS H┞ デｴW CWﾐデヴ;ﾉ B;ﾐﾆ ﾗa KWﾐ┞;くざ  
536 Other interest rate regulations introduced between 2000 and 2016 include: Section 44A of the Banking 
Act, which entrenched the In Duplum rule in statute, providing that the interest payable on non-performing 
loans should not exceed the amount of the principal loan; Sections 53-71 of the Consumer Protection Act 
ふNﾗく ヴヶ ﾗa ヲヰヱヲぶが ┘ｴｷIｴ ヴWﾉ;デW デﾗ IヴWSｷデ ;ｪヴWWﾏWﾐデゲが ;ﾐS ヲヰヱヲ CBK Pヴ┌SWﾐデｷ;ﾉ ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲ ヴWﾉ;デｷﾐｪ デﾗ H;ﾐﾆゲげ 
increases of interest rates. The legal provisions relating to interest rate regulation are discussed in detail in 




4. Economizing and Performing the Interest Rates Market in Kenya 
The economization of the Kenyan interest rate market relates to how specific economic 
theories and paradigms were deployed to justify and implement interest rate liberalization 
(alongside other financial market reforms), and to discourage the re-introduction of interest 
rate caps. This process of economization is significant because it depoliticised the interest rate 
market, and side-lined non-economic paradigms such as usury, and concerns about power 
asymmetries between lender and borrower, in the debate. For example, the IMF-led interest 
rate liberalization project in Kenya and other countries was grounded on the McKinnon-Shaw 
theory of financial repression. The authors separately argued that interest rate controls distort 
financial markets by preventing market intermediaries such as banks from efficiently pricing 
and allocating loans, resulting in negative real interest rates on deposits and loans. 
Consequently, this results in low rates of mobilising savings, which discourages the 
accumulation of financial wealth, and hence, prevents financial deepening.537  
It was therefore recommended under the IMF SALs and SAPs that Kenya, a financially repressed 
economy, abolish interest rate controls, allow market regulation and provide for indirect 
monetary policy interventions by the CBK.538 The interest rate liberalization reforms were not 
undertaken in isolation, but rather as part of comprehensive economic reforms that included 
trade liberalization, capital account liberalization and removal of foreign exchange and credit 
controls, as globalization took root around the world. The introduction of indirect monetary 
policy interventions by the CBK, in place of the interest rate controls, in a globalized domestic 
economy, meant that the CBK and National Treasury policy makers had to embrace and employ 
any particular relevant stream of economic theory that explained the causal relationships 
between the key macro-economic variables, such as inflation, exchange rates, interest rates 
and economic growth, and also forecast the behaviour of economic agents. This not only made 
デｴW WIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞ け┗ｷゲｷHﾉWげ H┌デ ;┗;ｷﾉ;HﾉW aﾗヴ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ゲデWWヴｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS ﾗデｴWヴ ｷﾐデWヴ┗Wﾐデｷﾗﾐゲく TｴW 
adoption of specific macroeconomic theories by the CBK and National Treasury therefore 
established macro-economic governability, that is, the extent to which the Kenyan economy 
                                                          
537 See Ronald I McKinnon, Money and Capital in Economic Development (Brookings Institution Press 2010); 
See also Shaw (n 510). 
538 ‘ﾗゲW W Nｪ┌ｪｷが けFｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ‘Waﾗヴﾏ PヴﾗIWゲゲ ｷﾐ KWﾐ┞;ぎ ヱΓΒΓにΓヶげ ふヲヰヰヰぶ ヱヲ AaヴｷI;ﾐ DW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ ‘W┗ｷW┘ ヵヲが 




could be perceived as amenable to targeted interventions by the financial regulators and policy 
makers.539 
The successful establishment of this macro-economic governability, however, depended on the 
establishment of a common policy paradigm among the regulators, policy makers, and market 
ヮﾉ;┞Wヴゲ ｷﾐ デｴW aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲが ;ﾐS WIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞ ;ゲ ; ┘ｴﾗﾉWく A ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ヮ;ヴ;Sｷｪﾏ ヴWaWヴゲ デﾗ さ; 
coherent set of cognitively held に and inter-subjectively agreed upon に causal assumptions or 
accounts ﾗa ｴﾗ┘ ;ﾐ ﾗHﾃWIデ ﾗa ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ HWｴ;┗Wゲざく540 It is this embedding of a particular (in this 
IﾗﾐデW┝デが ﾐWﾗIﾉ;ゲゲｷI;ﾉぶ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ヮ;ヴ;Sｷｪﾏ ┘ｷデｴｷﾐ KWﾐ┞;げゲ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ;ﾐS ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ 
institutions, and interest rate market players, and the subsequent practice of macro-economic 
governability in the interest rates market, that has enabled the process of economization, and 
ultimately, the performativity of economic theory in the interest rate market. 
Under its SAPs and successive lending conditionalities with the Kenyan government, the IMF 
has been instrumental in embedding specific neoliberal macro-economic policies and practices 
within KWﾐ┞;げゲ policy making and regulatory institutions, including the National Treasury and 
the CBK. Indeed, formulation of successive macro-economic models by the CBK and National 
Treasury has usually been undertaken upon consultation of, and with the technical assistance 
from, the IMF.541 TｴWゲW けﾏ;Iヴﾗ ﾏﾗSWﾉゲげ ;ヴW さヴWヮヴWゲWﾐデ;デｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa ケ┌;ﾐデｷデ;デｷ┗W ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲｴｷヮゲ 
among macroeconomic variables such as employment, output, prices, government 
W┝ヮWﾐSｷデ┌ヴWゲが デ;┝Wゲが ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デWゲが ;ﾐS W┝Iｴ;ﾐｪW ヴ;デWゲくざ542 They are used by the CBK and 
National Treasury to forecast the behaviour of various economic variables and economic agents 
in, for example, the interest rate markets, and also to undertake policy analysis and 
evaluation.543  
To date, there have been four main macroeconomic models formulated by the Kenya 
government to assist in macroeconomic governability in the interest rate liberalization era.544 
                                                          
539 On macroeconomic governability, see Braun (n 305) 51. 
540 L;ゲゲW F HWﾐヴｷﾆゲWﾐが けEIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI MﾗSWﾉゲ ;ゲ DW┗ｷIWゲ ﾗa PﾗﾉｷI┞ Cｴ;ﾐｪWぎ PﾗﾉｷI┞ P;ヴ;Sｷｪﾏゲが P;radigm Shift, and 
PWヴaﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗ｷデ┞げ ふヲヰヱンぶ Α ‘egulation & Governance 481, 482. “WW ;ﾉゲﾗが PA H;ﾉﾉが けPﾗﾉｷI┞ P;ヴ;Sｷｪﾏゲが “ﾗIｷ;ﾉ 
LW;ヴﾐｷﾐｪが ;ﾐS デｴW “デ;デWぎ TｴW C;ゲW ﾗa EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI PﾗﾉｷI┞ﾏ;ﾆｷﾐｪ ｷﾐ Bヴｷデ;ｷﾐげ ふヱΓΓンぶ ヲヵ Cﾗﾏヮ;ヴ;デｷ┗W PﾗﾉｷデｷIゲ ヲΑヵ 
The author popularized the notion of policy paradigms in economic policy making. 
541 Centre for Economic Governance and Aids in Africa (n 122). 
542 “デWヮｴWﾐ N K;ヴｷﾐｪｷ ;ﾐS Nﾃ┌ｪ┌ﾐ; NS┌ﾐｪげ┌が Macro Models of the Kenyan Economy: A Review (Kenya Institute 
for Public Policy Research and Analysis 2000) 6. 
543 ibid. 
544 Other non-government individuals and agencies have, as far back as 1965, constructed macro models of 
the Kenyan economy. These include Howe and Karani (1965), UNCTAD (1968) and Elliot et al. (1996). See also 




The first model was known as the Macroeconomic Policy Model (MEPM), which was 
formulated and used as a basis for short-term planning in Kenya.  However, since it modelled 
a controlled economy, it was discontinued after the economic liberalization reforms. The 
second model, the Medium to Long-Term Model (MELT3), was formulated but never used.545 
Both the MEPM and MELT3 did not model the role of interest rates, and therefore are not 
relevant for the present discussion.  
In the year 2000, the Kenya Institute of Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA), a semi-
autonomous government think tank, in collaboration with the National Treasury, sought to 
formulate a new macro model of the Kenyan economy. This model was to account for the 
theoretical shortcomings of not only デｴW MEPM ;ﾐS MELTンが H┌デ ;ﾉゲﾗ デｴW IMFげゲ Pﾗﾉ;ﾆ ﾏﾗSWﾉが 
used in its stabilization programme in Kenya and other developing countries, and also the 
WﾗヴﾉS B;ﾐﾆげゲ ‘W┗ｷゲWS Mｷﾐｷﾏ┌ﾏ “デ;ﾐS;ヴS MﾗSWﾉ ふ‘M“Mぶく546 For example, while KIPPRA 
economists criticised the MEPM and MELT3 for lacking sound theoretical foundations, they also 
ヮﾗｷﾐデWS ﾗ┌デ デｴW IMFげゲ Pﾗﾉ;ﾆ ﾏﾗSWﾉげゲ WヴヴﾗﾐWﾗ┌ゲ I;┌ゲ;ﾉ ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲｴｷヮゲ HWデ┘WWﾐ SﾗﾏWゲデｷI IヴWSｷデ 
;ﾐS SﾗﾏWゲデｷI ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デWゲが ;ﾐS ;ﾉゲﾗ デｴW WﾗヴﾉS B;ﾐﾆ ‘M“Mげゲ ヴ┌SｷﾏWﾐデ;ヴ┞ ﾐ;デ┌ヴW ﾗa デｴW 
financial programming model, and the failure to include many important variables.547  
These critique of the BWI models are significant. Other than questioning the ontology, 
methodology and practice of macro-economic modelling, they also reveal the shortcomings of 
the reputed and irreproachable economic rationality of the BWIsげ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ヮヴWゲIヴｷヮデｷﾗﾐゲ デﾗ Third 
World regulators. The practice of macroeconomic modelling, however, suffers certain 
significant limitations. For example, some models abstract important details, making it difficult 
to study interactions between individual agents. Second, they rely on strong assumptions, such 
as the presence of complete markets, and therefore are misleading and unable to describe 
highly non-linear economic dynamics. Third, the models may also overstate individual 
rationality and foresight, and the degree of homogeneity.548 
                                                          
Economic Modelling 801, 801; See, for example, J;ﾏWゲ Eﾉﾉｷﾗデデが “┌ﾐｪ Y K┘;Iﾆ ;ﾐS GWﾗヴｪW “ T;┗ﾉ;ゲが けAﾐ 
EIﾗﾐﾗﾏWデヴｷI MﾗSWﾉ ﾗa デｴW KWﾐ┞;ﾐ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞げ ふヱΓΒヶぶ ン EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI MﾗSWﾉﾉｷﾐｪ ヲく 
545 K;ヴｷﾐｪｷ ;ﾐS NS┌ﾐｪげ┌ ふﾐ ヵヴヲぶ ヶく 
546 ibid 25. 
547 ibid 7, 8. 
548 M;┌ヴWWﾐ WWヴW ;ﾐS ﾗデｴWヴゲが けA TｴWﾗヴWデｷI;ﾉ Fヴ;ﾏW┘ﾗヴﾆ aﾗヴ KWﾐ┞;げゲ CWﾐデヴ;ﾉ B;ﾐﾆ M;IヴﾗWIﾗﾐﾗﾏWデヴｷI MﾗSWﾉげ 
(Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings 2013) Working Paper 10 3. These critiques are especially relevant for 




This KIPPRA-Treasury project resulted in the formulation of the KIPPRA-Treasury Macro Model 
(KTMM), which was used by the National Treasury and CBK for macroeconomic governability に 
that is, planning, forecasting, market intervention, and analysis に for the next decade. The 
KTMM recognised the growing relevance of interest rates in a macro model for the Kenyan 
economy, especially how they affect investment. However, interest rates were merely 
variables to be manipulated to reach other major macroeconomic policy goals, such as inflation 
targeting.549  
Despite its robustness as compared to previous macro models, the KTMM was formulated with 
a more detailed けgovernmentげ sector than monetary sector, as an aide in the national 
ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげゲ H┌SｪWデ;ヴ┞ ;ﾐS ヮﾉ;ﾐﾐｷﾐｪ ヮヴﾗIWゲゲWゲく TｴW ﾏﾗSWﾉ ｴ;S ; ┘W;ﾆ aﾗヴﾏ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW 
monetary sector, and had insufficient linkages between monetary policy and the rest of the 
economy. Therefore, it was not sufficiently detailed to cater for the needs of the monetary 
policy processes. Consequently, in 2011, the CBK developed its own macro-econometric model 
さデﾗ ;ｷS ｷﾐ デｴW ;ﾐ;ﾉ┞ゲｷゲ ﾗa ﾏﾗﾐWデ;ヴ┞ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ｷﾐ ;SSｷデｷﾗﾐ デﾗ ヮヴﾗ┗ｷSｷﾐｪ ゲｴﾗヴデ デWヴﾏ ﾏ;IヴﾗWIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI 
aﾗヴWI;ゲデゲざく550  
The CBK Macro-Econometric Model, was specifically formulated to undertake three functions. 
First, it was to ゲ┌ヮヮﾗヴデ デｴW MﾗﾐWデ;ヴ┞ PﾗﾉｷI┞ CﾗﾏﾏｷデデWW ふMPCぶ ;ﾐS デｴW B;ﾐﾆげゲ ヴWゲW;ヴIｴ 
SWヮ;ヴデﾏWﾐデ ｷﾐ さa┌ヴデｴWヴ ┌ﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐSｷﾐｪ ｴﾗ┘ デｴW WIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞ ┘ﾗヴﾆゲ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪh the complex 
ｷﾐデWヴ;Iデｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa ┗;ヴｷﾗ┌ゲ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ;ｪWﾐデゲざが ;ﾐS in their monetary policy-making functions. 
Second, it was meant to aid in evaluating the impact of various shocks and policies on the 
economy. Third, and quite significant, the macro model would structure the communication 
between the CBK and the public, on the economic rationale of its decisions551 As is discussed 
below, the MPC has the statutory role of deciding on the relevant indirect monetary policy 
ｷﾐデWヴ┗Wﾐデｷﾗﾐゲ ｷﾐ KWﾐ┞;げゲ デｴWﾐ-liberalised interest rate markets. 
A review of the 2000 KTMM and the 2011 CBK Macro-Econometric Model shows four related 
economic doctrines and assumptions that shaped the dominant macroeconomic policy 
paradigm embedded in the CBK and National Treasury macroeconomic models, and which 
ゲｴ;ヮWS デｴW ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴゲげ ;ﾐS ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ﾏ;ﾆWヴゲげ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲW デﾗ デｴW ヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏ ﾗa W┝IWゲゲｷ┗Wﾉ┞ ｴｷｪｴ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ 
rates in Kenya. First is the McKinnon-Shaw Hypothesis that liberalization of the interest rates 
                                                          
549 K;ヴｷﾐｪｷ ;ﾐS NS┌ﾐｪげ┌ ふﾐ ヵヴヲぶ ンヴく 
550 M;┌ヴWWﾐ WWヴW ;ﾐS ﾗデｴWヴゲが けAゲゲessing the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy in Kenya: Evidence from a 
M;IヴﾗWIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI MﾗSWﾉげ ふヲヰヱヴぶ ンΑ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI MﾗSWﾉﾉｷﾐｪ ヱΓンが ヱΓヴく 




market would lead to competitively low interest rates for borrowers. Interest rate liberalization 
reforms were built on this hypothesis, and therefore the KTMM and CBK models assume an 
efficient liberalized interest rate market.552 Second, and related to the Mackinnon-Shaw 
Hypothesis, is the assumption that prevailing interest rates in Kenya at any one time are 
determined by the supply and demand forces of the market.553 This assumption is based on the 
General Equilibrium Theory and Efficient Markets Hypothesis. 
The third policy paradigm is that in the liberalisWS ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デWゲ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデが CBKげゲ ｷﾐSｷヴWIデ 
monetary policy interventions, through the Monetary Policy Transmission mechanisms, can be 
effectively used to influence the market lending rates upwards or downwards. Hence the 
monetary policy transmission instruments, such as the CBK policy rate,554 the Cash Reserve 
Ratio,555 and Open Market Operations (OMOs)556 are deemed effective replacements of 
interest rate controls.557 This policy paradigm is premised on the theoretical assumption of the 
economy as a closed system, aﾐS デｴW IﾗﾐゲWケ┌Wﾐデ ;Sﾗヮデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa けIﾉﾗゲWS-ゲ┞ゲデWﾏゲげ ﾐ;デ┌ヴ;ﾉ ﾉ;┘ ;ﾐS 
natural science assumptions and methodologies such as mathematical modelling which, in a 
bid to simplify the complexities of the real world, adopt simplifying and inaccurate 
assumptions. 
The forth policy paradigm is inflation targeting, which subordinates other legitimate macro-
economic policy targets such as the maintenance of low domestic lending rates, for low 
inflation numbers.558 Hｷｪｴ SﾗﾏWゲデｷI ﾉWﾐSｷﾐｪ ヴ;デWゲ ｴ;┗W デｴWヴWaﾗヴW HWIﾗﾏW CBKげゲ ｷﾐゲデヴ┌ﾏent for 
meeting its inflation targets, despite the collateral damage to economic recovery and new 
domestic investments.559 This paradigm captures the contradictions inherent in economic 
                                                          
552 Ngugi and Kabubo (n 506); McKinnon (n 537); Shaw (n 510). 
553 For the KTMM assumptions, see Maureen Were and Stephen N Karingi, Better Understanding of the 
Kenyan Economy: Simulations from the KIPPRA-Treasury Macro Model (Kenya Institute for Public Policy 
Research and Analysis 2002). For the CBK Macroeconometric model, see, for example, Were and others (n 
548) 2. 
554 TｴW けCWﾐデヴ;ﾉ B;ﾐﾆ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ヴ;デWげ ｷゲ SWaｷﾐWS ;ﾐS Wゲデ;HﾉｷゲｴWS ┌ﾐSWヴ “WIデｷﾗﾐ ンヶふヴぶ ﾗa デｴW CBK AIデ ;ゲ さデｴW ﾉﾗ┘Wゲデ 
rate of interest that the CBK charges banks and micro-aｷﾐ;ﾐIW ｷﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐゲざが ;ﾐS a┌ﾐIデｷﾗﾐゲ ;ゲ デｴW さｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デW 
Iｴ;ﾐﾐWﾉざ aﾗヴ CBK ﾏﾗﾐWデ;ヴ┞ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ デヴ;ﾐゲﾏｷゲゲｷﾗﾐが デｴ;デ ｷゲが ゲｷｪﾐ;ﾉﾉｷﾐｪ デｴW CBKげゲ ﾏﾗﾐWデ;ヴ┞ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ゲデ;ﾐIWく 
555 TｴW けC;ゲｴ ‘WゲWヴ┗W ‘;デｷﾗげ ｷゲ ヮヴﾗ┗ｷSWS ┌ﾐSWヴ “WIデｷﾗﾐ ンΒ ﾗa デｴW CBK AIデ ;ゲ けデｴW ﾏｷﾐｷﾏ┌ﾏ I;ゲｴ balances on 
SWヮﾗゲｷデ ┘ｷデｴ デｴW B;ﾐﾆ ;ゲ ヴWゲWヴ┗Wゲ ;ｪ;ｷﾐゲデ デｴWｷヴ SWヮﾗゲｷデ ;ﾐS ﾗデｴWヴ ﾉｷ;HｷﾉｷデｷWゲげが ;ﾐS ゲWヴ┗Wゲ ;ゲ デｴW けH;ﾐﾆ ﾉWﾐSｷﾐｪ 
Iｴ;ﾐﾐWﾉげ aﾗヴ CBK ﾏﾗﾐWデ;ヴ┞ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ デヴ;ﾐゲﾏｷゲゲｷﾗﾐが H┞ ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾐｪ デｴW ;ﾏﾗ┌ﾐデ ﾗa H;ﾐﾆ ヴWゲWヴ┗Wゲ ;┗;ｷﾉ;HﾉW aﾗヴ 
lending to the public. 
556 けOヮWﾐ M;ヴﾆWデ OヮWヴ;デｷﾗﾐゲげ ;ヴW ヮヴﾗ┗ｷSWS aﾗヴ ┌ﾐSWヴ “WIデｷﾗﾐ ヴΑ ﾗa デｴW CBK AIデが ;ﾐS ヴWaWヴ デﾗ デｴW CBKげゲ H┌┞ｷﾐｪ 
and selling of negotiable securities, as a means of affecting monetary supply.  
557 For the CBK Model, see Were and others (n 548) 7に10; See also Were and others (n 550) 194. 
558 Centre for Economic Governance and Aids in Africa (n 122). 
559 Nﾃ┌ｪ┌ﾐ; NS┌ﾐｪげ┌が The Exchange Rate and the Interest Rate Differential in Kenya: A Monetary and Fiscal 




thinking that harms the economically vulnerable, but expresses optimism in economic growth 
beneficial to them. 
This macro-economic policy paradigm, embedded in the macro-economic models, has taken 
root among regulators, policy makers, and other market stakeholders in the interest rate 
market in Kenya. This embedding has ideologically legitimated and performed regulatory 
neoliberalism, liberalised financial markets, high interest rates and high indebtedness in 
KWﾐ┞;げゲ H;ﾐﾆｷﾐｪ ゲWIデﾗヴく Iﾐ ;SSｷデｷﾗﾐが ｷデ ｴ;ゲ ﾉｷﾏｷデWS ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ IｴﾗｷIWゲ ;┗;ｷﾉ;HﾉW aﾗヴ ヴWSヴWゲゲｷﾐｪ デｴW 
high interest rate problem, as demonstrated by the discussions below on the legislative efforts 
to re-regulate the interest rate market, and opposition to these efforts by market participants 
and regulators, on the basis of neoclassical economic theory. 
5. Political Contestation of Neoclassical Financial Liberalization Paradigms  
Despite market liberalization reforms, domestic lending rates remained high in Kenya (See 
figure 1 above). This led to high indebtedness, the increase in non-performing loans, and the 
reduction in access to much needed credit. Consequently, in 2000, Hon. Joe Donde, an 
Opposition Member of Parliament (MP), introduced a Bill (also known as the Donde Bill) 
seeking to cap lending rates at 4% above the CBK Treasury Bill rate, provided that the interest 
payable could not exceed the principal debt, and also establishing a deposit rate floor of 70% 
of the Treasury Bill Rate. The Bill garnered rare support from both sides of the House, and the 
public, but was vehemently opposed by the Executive, including the National Treasury, the CBK, 
the bankers (represented by the KBA), and BWIs, who had commenced talks with President 
Mﾗｷげゲ ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデ ﾗﾐ ヴWゲ┌ﾏヮデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ;ｷS デｴ;デ ｴ;S HWWﾐ ゲ┌ゲヮWﾐSWS ゲｷﾐIW デｴW W;ヴﾉ┞ ヱΓΓヰゲく560  
Though it was passed by Parliament on 29th November 2000, President Moi refused to assent 
to the Donde Bill, and returned it to the House for amendment, with a Memorandum ostensibly 
stating that "One clause of that bill contradicts the Central Bank Act. For this reason, I will not 
give assent for the passage of the bill into law until the anomaly is rectified by parliament,". He 
did not clarify which clause it was. It was widely thought that President Moi succumbed to the 
ヮヴWゲゲ┌ヴW aヴﾗﾏ デｴW BWIゲが ┘ｴﾗ ┘WヴW ;ヮヮ;ﾉﾉWS ;デ KWﾐ┞;げゲ ヴWデ┌ヴﾐ デﾗ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デW Iﾗﾐデヴﾗﾉゲく561  
                                                          
560 Murunga (n 529) 263に300. 




Parliament amended and returned the Donde Bill for assent, essentially preserving the interest 
rate capping provisions. The President signed the Bill into the law that came to be informally 
known as the Donde Act.562 Immediately after the enactment, the Kenya Bankers Association 
(KBA), on behalf of the banking sector, rushed to the Constitutional Court, and filed a suit 
seeking to have the Donde Act declared null and void, on the basis of the retrospective 
application of a section of the law creating penal offences.563 On January 24, 2002, the High 
Court issued its judgment, declaring that the Act was void in so far as it was penal and 
retroactive.564 Parliament repealed the Donde Act in 2004.  
In 2005, Parliament enacted the In Duplum Rule, which entrenched in the Banking Act the 
Common Law rule that the interest charged on loans should not exceed the principal.565 In 
addition, in 2010, the Kenyan people enacted a new constitution which for the first time 
provided, under Article 46, for the rights of consumers.566 Consequently, in 2012, Parliament 
passed the Consumer Protection Act567 which laid out a comprehensive list of legislative 
protections of the consumer in an unsecured credit agreement.568 However, the In Duplum Rule 
and consumer rights did not result in the reduction of interest rates.  
Consequently, in the 2011 and 2012 legislative sessions, two MPs from the Orange Democratic 
Movement wing of the Grand Coalition Government に Hon. Jakoyo Midiwo and Hon. Ogindo に 
attempted to introduce the Donde Act provisions as amendments to the Finance Bills 2011 and 
2012. Once again, this motion pitted the House against the Executive, National Treasury, CBK 
                                                          
562 Central Bank of Kenya (Amendment) Act No. 4 of 2001, Laws of Kenya. The amendment introduced a 
ゲWIデｷﾗﾐ ンΓふヱぶ デﾗ デｴW CWﾐデヴ;ﾉ B;ﾐﾆ ﾗa KWﾐ┞; AIデが ┘ｴｷIｴ ヮヴﾗ┗ｷSWS デｴ;デぎ さふヱぶ デｴW ﾏ;┝ｷﾏ┌ﾏ ヴ;デW ﾗa ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ┘ｴｷIｴ 
specified banks, or specified financial institutions may charge on loans or advances shall be the 91-day 
Treasury Bill rate published by the Bank on the last Friday of each month, or the latest 91-day Treasury Bill 
rate, plus four per-IWﾐデ┌ﾏぐ ふヲぶ デｴW ﾏｷﾐｷﾏ┌ﾏ ヴ;デW ﾗa ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ┘ｴｷIｴ ゲヮWIｷaｷWS H;ﾐﾆゲが ﾗヴ ゲヮWIｷfied financial 
institutions may pay on deposits held in interest-earning accounts shall be seventy per-centum of the 91-day 
Treasury Bill rate published by the Bank on the last Friday of each month, or the latest 91-day Treasury Bill 
ヴ;デWぐざ 
563 While the Act ┘;ゲ ;ゲゲWﾐデWS デﾗ ﾗﾐ A┌ｪ┌ゲデ ヶが ヲヰヰヱが ｷデげゲ IﾗﾏﾏWﾐIWﾏWﾐデ S;デW ┘;ゲ ゲデｷヮ┌ﾉ;デWS ;ゲ J;ﾐ┌;ヴ┞ ヱが 
2001. Since Section 39(4) provided that contravention of the interest rate caps was a punishable offense 
under the Banking Act, this contravened Section 77(4) of the Constitution of Kenya, which provided that 
criminalisation of formerly lawful and innocent acts or omissions was not permitted.  
564 Albert Ruturi , JK Wanywela & Kenya Bankers Association V The Minister of Finance & Attorney General 
and Central Bank of Kenya (2002) 1 Kenya Law Rep 61 (High Court at Nairobi). 
565 Section 44A of the Banking Act, Cap. 48, Laws of Kenya. 
566 Constitution of Kenya 2010, Laws of Kenya. 
567 No. 46 of 2012, Laws of Kenya. 





and the Bankers.569 In a bid to defeat Midiwo and Ogindo legislative motions, the government 
delayed the debate of the Finance Bill 2012, risking the contravention of a constitutional 
deadline that could have defunded government activities for the next financial year.570 In fact, 
after the 31st December 2011 deadline, the government illegally collected taxes for four 
months, until the Finance Bill was passed in April 2012.571 Ultimately, the motions to introduce 
the interest rates caps through the Finance Bill were defeated on a vote.  
The last attempt to re-regulate the Kenyan interest rate market was undertaken by Hon. Jude 
Njomo, a Member of Parliament from the ruling Jubilee Coalition government, and also 
ヴWヮヴWゲWﾐデｷﾐｪ ; Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌WﾐI┞ aヴﾗﾏ PヴWゲｷSWﾐデ Uｴ┌ヴ┌ KWﾐ┞;デデ;げゲ ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ H;Iﾆ┞;ヴSく TｴW CWﾐデヴ;ﾉ 
Bank of Kenya (Amendment) Bill was a replica of the Donde Bill, save for the fact that it sought 
to cap lending rates at 4% above the CBK policy rate, rather than the Treasury Bill rate. On 
August 24, 2016, against the spirited remonstrations of the CBK, the National Treasury, the 
Kenya Bankers Association, and the BWIs, the President signed the Bill into law, ending the 25-
year-old era of interest rate liberalization.572 
The politicization of the high interest rates in Kenya was undertaken mainly through the 
parliamentary debates relating to interest rate regulation, and in newspaper editorials, where 
various stakeholders listed earlier above prosecuted their respective cases for and against 
interest rate regulation. At least five key issues emerge from an analysis of these debates: (1) 
the feasibility of self-regulation of liberalized interest rate markets; (2) the accountability and 
democratisation of CBK monetary policy making; (3) the social role and responsibility of banks 
in the Kenyan economy; (4) regulatory bias towards transnational against local capital; and (5) 
the politics of BWI economic policy prescriptions for Kenya. 
5.1. The Feasibility of Self-Regulation of Liberalized Interest Rate Markets 
As discussed above, the Mckinnon-Shaw Hypothesis argued that liberalized credit markets 
would efficiently mobilise and allocate domestic financial resources, lower the cost of 
                                                          
569 GWﾗヴｪW Nｪｷｪｷが けB;ﾐﾆゲ F;IW M;ﾃﾗヴ “ｴ;ﾆW-┌ヮ Ia MPゲ P;ゲゲ MｷSｷ┘ﾗ Bｷﾉﾉげ Business Daily (Nairobi, 3 October 2012) 
<http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Banks-face-major-shake-up-if-MPs-pass-Midiwo-Bill/539552-
1524316-1n05rz/index.html> accessed 21 September 2016. 
570 GWﾗヴｪW Nｪｷｪｷが けGｷデｴ;W D┌Iﾆゲ B;ヴW-Knuckle InteヴWゲデ ‘;デWゲ W;ヴ ┘ｷデｴ MPゲげ Business Daily (Nairobi, 15 March 
2012) <http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Githae-ducks-bare-knuckle-interest-rates-war-with-MPs-
/539546-1367240-fw3071z/index.html> accessed 27 October 2016. 
571 ES┘ｷﾐ M┌デ;ｷが けMPゲ LﾗゲW ヱヲ-Yeaヴ B;デデﾉW ﾗ┗Wヴ IﾐデWヴWゲデ ‘;デW C;ヮゲげ Business Daily (Nairobi, 22 April 2012) 
<http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/MPs-lose-12-year-battle-over-interest-rate-caps-/539546-1391644-
format-xhtml-b67v5bz/index.html> accessed 27 October 2016. 




intermediation, and consequently lower market lending rates. However, this self-regulatory 
capacity of efficient, liberalized markets, and its theoretical cornerstone, have been 
interrogated amid concerns over asymmetrical power relationships, and the manipulation of 
the local and global markets, in favour of financiers, and to the disadvantage of borrowers.  
For example, proponents of interest rate caps, including Hon. Otieno Kajwangげが underscored 
the vulnerability of the Kenyan economy within globalised markets, and argued that global 
financial markets were controlled or manipulated by BWIs and major currency speculators.573 
On the local front, the legislators, including Hon. Donde, argued that the Kenyan banking sector 
was an imperfect, oligopolistic, and cartel-like market, with many market entry barriers, and 
could therefore not qualify as a perfect market in which the forces of demand and supply could 
efficiently price the cost of lending.574 In addition, despite the consistent increase in the 
number of financial institutions in the lending sector, and consequently, competition, 
bargaining power remained asymmetrically steeped against borrowers, who acquiesced to 
draconian contractual terms.  
These sentiments were in response to デｴW ｪﾗ┗Wヴﾐｷﾐｪ P;ヴデ┞げゲ ﾗヮヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐ to the re-introduction 
of interest rate controls, considering that Kenya had already adopted market liberalization. 
There was remarkably no concerted effort to extoll the positive economic developments 
attributed to the liberalization of the financial markets. During the 2011 legislative debate, 
however, the Finance Minister Robinson Githae was quick to pin the fresh spike of interest 
rates on the Euro crisis, rather than market manipulation. This was despite prevalent opinion 
among the economic experts, including the IMF, that Kenya had not been affected by the Euro 
Crisis.575 Indeed, this is an example of the scape-goating of global crises to conceal the hand of 
local financial markets players in the collusive manipulation of the currency market.576  
 
                                                          
573 H;ﾐゲ;ヴS ESｷデﾗヴが けPヴﾗIWWSｷﾐｪゲ ﾗa デｴW P;ヴﾉｷ;ﾏWﾐデ;ヴ┞ DWH;デW ﾗﾐ デｴW “WIﾗﾐS ‘W;Sｷﾐｪ ﾗa デｴW CWﾐデヴ;ﾉ B;ﾐﾆ ﾗa 
KWﾐ┞; ふAﾏWﾐSﾏWﾐデぶ Bｷﾉﾉが S┌ヴｷﾐｪ デｴW “Wゲゲｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW Βデｴ P;ヴﾉｷ;ﾏWﾐデげ ふKWﾐ┞; N;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ AゲゲWﾏHﾉ┞ ヲヰヰヰぶ OaaｷIｷ;ﾉ 
Hansard Report 3005. 
574 ibid 2999. 
575 H;ﾐゲ;ヴS ESｷデﾗヴが けPヴﾗIWWSｷﾐｪゲ ﾗa デｴW P;ヴﾉｷ;ﾏWﾐデ;ヴ┞ DWH;デW ﾗﾐ デｴW Mﾗデｷﾗﾐ aﾗヴ ASﾗヮデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW ‘Wヮﾗヴデ ﾗﾐ 
the Decline of the Kenya Shｷﾉﾉｷﾐｪが S┌ヴｷﾐｪ デｴW ヱヰデｴ P;ヴﾉｷ;ﾏWﾐデげ ふKWﾐ┞; N;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ AゲゲWﾏHﾉ┞ ヲヰヱヲぶ OaaｷIｷ;ﾉ H;ﾐゲ;ヴS 
Report 45. 
576 See Kenya National Assembly, Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee on the Decline of the Kenya 
Shilling Against Foreign Currencies (10th Parliament-Fourth Session, Kenya National Assembly 2012). The 




5.2. Democratisation versus Technocratization of Monetary Policy Making 
Theoretical assumptions underpinning neoclassical economics, especially the view of the 
ﾏﾗﾐWデ;ヴ┞ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞が ;ﾐS aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲが ;ゲ けIﾉﾗゲWS ゲ┞ゲデWﾏゲげ ;ﾏWﾐ;HﾉW ﾗﾐﾉ┞ デﾗ デｴW 
mathematical modelling methodologies of economic technocrats, have also been confronted 
by the calls for ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ ;ﾐS SWﾏﾗIヴ;デｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa CBKげゲ ﾏﾗﾐWデ;ヴ┞ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ﾏ;ﾆｷﾐｪ. These calls 
for democratization have arisen amid legislative efforts to embed practices of regulatory 
ﾐWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉｷゲﾏが デｴ;デ ｷゲが けde-politiciゲｷﾐｪげ monetary policy, by making central banks independent 
from political oversight. The legislative efforts have been precipitated by BCBS 
recommendations on regulatory designが ;ﾐS デｴW ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉ Sﾗﾐﾗヴ ;デデｷデ┌SW ﾗa け“ｷﾉWﾐIWが 
Development ｷﾐ PヴﾗｪヴWゲゲげく577  
The latter trend reflects the replacement of democracy with technocracy, and is one of the 
reasons why critics of interest rate controls label them けヮﾗヮ┌ﾉｷゲデ ヮﾗﾉｷデｷIゲげく578 For example, during 
the 2012 debates on Hon. MｷSｷ┘ﾗげゲ ﾉWｪｷゲﾉ;デｷ┗W ﾏﾗデｷﾗﾐが Tヴ;ﾐゲヮﾗヴデ MｷﾐｷゲデWヴ Amos Kimunya 
cautioned the House against さヮﾉ;┞ｷﾐｪ ヮﾗヮ┌ﾉｷゲデ ;ﾐS Iﾗﾏﾏ┌ﾐｷゲデ ヮﾗﾉｷデｷIゲ ┘ｷデｴ ﾗ┌ヴ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞ざく579 
Such sentiments have persuaded self-respecting economists advocating for interest rate caps 
デﾗ Sｷゲデｷﾐｪ┌ｷゲｴ デｴWﾏゲWﾉ┗Wゲ aヴﾗﾏ デｴW けヮﾗヮ┌ﾉｷゲデげ ;ﾐS けIﾗﾏﾏ┌ﾐｷゲデげ デ;ｪく  
For example, in November 2000, when Hon Donde stood before the House to introduce the 
Donde Bill for the third reading, he was compelled to remind his colleagues that he was an 
accomplished economist who had in fact worked with Prof. Hopkins, the Chief Economic 
Advisor to the former Prime Minister of Britain, and the political doyen of neoliberalism, 
Margaret Thatcher.580 In addition, during the same period, the then Opposition Leader, Hon. 
Mwai Kibaki, honoured an invite by the World Bank to their Nairobi offices, where they hoped 
to dissuade him from supporting the pending Donde Bill. He reportedly pre-empted the 
SｷゲI┌ゲゲｷﾗﾐ H┞ ┘;ヴﾐｷﾐｪ デｴWﾏ デｴ;デ さ┘W SｷS ﾐﾗデ IﾗﾏW ｴWヴW デﾗ ｴ;┗W デW;く I ;ﾏ ;ﾐ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷゲデ ;ﾐS I 
want you to know that we will not sit back and wait to sWW ﾗ┌ヴ ヮWﾗヮﾉW ゲ┌aaWヴざく581 This is because 
                                                          
577 Murunga (n 529) 288. The phrase is traced to Joseph Ki-Zerbo, a Burkinabé politician, who remarked that 
when he visited state houses to see friends he had fought with for independence, he would be welcomed 
ゲ┞ﾏHﾗﾉｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ H┞ Hｷｪ ゲｷｪﾐゲ ヮヴﾗIﾉ;ｷﾏｷﾐｪぎ け“ｷﾉWﾐIWぁ DW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ ｷﾐ PヴﾗｪヴWゲゲげが デﾗ ゲ┞ﾏHﾗﾉｷゲW デｴW デヴ;SW-off between 
economic development and democratic participation. 
578 “WWが aﾗヴ W┝;ﾏヮﾉWが HﾗヴﾐゲH┞げゲ SWゲIヴｷヮデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW DﾗﾐSW Bｷﾉﾉ ;ゲ ; けヮﾗヮ┌ﾉ;ヴ ;ﾐS ヮﾗヮ┌ﾉｷゲデ ﾏW;ゲ┌ヴWげが ｷﾐ HﾗヴﾐゲH┞ 
(n 561) 648. 
579 Mutai (n 571). 
580 H;ﾐゲ;ヴS ESｷデﾗヴが け“WIﾗﾐS ‘W;Sｷﾐｪ ﾗa デｴW DﾗﾐSW Bｷﾉﾉげ ふﾐ ヵΑンぶ ンヰヰンく 
581 Health Minister Charity Ngilu recounted how in 2000, she accompanied President Kibaki, who was then 




of the entrenched view that non-economists lack epistemic authority to question economic 
rationales of policy choices, or that economists supporting market regulation are not well-
heeled in their discipline. 
Calls for the democratic accountability and oversight of the CBK by a Parliamentary committee 
(including the fixing of the CBK policy rate) emanated from the increasing irrational and 
controversial monetary policy decisions that the CBK made, behind the cloak of technocratic 
and epistemic authority. These included the high pricing of Treasury Bills to create profit 
avenues for banks, leading to high market lending rates,582 and the 2011 connivance between 
the CBK and banks to set a CBK policy rate below the interbank lending rate, thereby giving 
some banks cheap money to engage in manipulation of the currency market.583 These events 
reinforced the long-held view of market capture of the CBK and National Treasury monetary 
policy making.584  
Calls for the democratization of CBK monetary policy making have therefore critiqued and 
deconstructed the economic ideology of economic policy making in Kenya as a purely 
technocratic, apolitical, asocial and objective endeavour.  
5.3. The Social Role and Responsibility of Banks in the Kenyan Economy 
Both General Equilibrium Theory and the Efficient Markets Hypothesis are invoked by 
proponents of regulatory neoliberalism to make at least three arguments. First, the market 
lending rates are products of the efficient interaction of demand and supply forces in the credit 
market. Second, these lending rates, no matter how high, reflect the optimal outcome for both 
creditors and debtors. Third, any regulatory intervention by the government will leave either 
or both parties worse off. Consequently, this legitimates the increasing financialization of the 
Kenyan economy, characterized by the increasing power and profits of institutional lenders, to 
                                                          
DWH;デW ﾗﾐ デｴW Mﾗデｷﾗﾐ aﾗヴ ASﾃﾗ┌ヴﾐﾏWﾐデ ﾗa デｴW Hﾗ┌ゲWが “ｷﾐW DｷWが S┌ヴｷﾐｪ デｴW ヱヰデｴ P;ヴﾉｷ;ﾏWﾐデげ ふKWﾐ┞; N;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ 
Assembly 2012) Official Hansard Report 43. 
582 “WW Hﾗﾐく DﾗﾐSWげゲ IﾗﾐデヴｷH┌デｷﾗﾐ ﾗﾐ ｴｷゲ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ SｷゲI┌ゲゲｷﾗﾐゲ ┘ｷデｴ デｴW CBK ｪﾗ┗Wヴﾐﾗヴぎ H;ﾐゲ;ヴS ESｷデﾗヴが け“WIﾗﾐS 
Reading ﾗa デｴW DﾗﾐSW Bｷﾉﾉげ ふﾐ ヵΑンぶ ンヰヰヱく See also, the contributions of Hon. Kibaki and Hon. Twaha, who were 
concerned that the high Treasury Bill rates were enriching banks and driving up market lending rates in 
H;ﾐゲ;ヴS ESｷデﾗヴが けPヴﾗIWWSｷﾐｪゲ ﾗa デｴW CﾗﾏﾏｷデデWW ﾗa デｴW WｴﾗﾉW Hﾗ┌ゲWが DWH;デW ﾗﾐ デｴW CWﾐデヴ;ﾉ B;ﾐﾆ ﾗa KWﾐ┞; 
ふAﾏWﾐSﾏWﾐデぶ Bｷﾉﾉが S┌ヴｷﾐｪ デｴW “Wゲゲｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW Βデｴ P;ヴﾉｷ;ﾏWﾐデげ ふKWﾐ┞; N;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ AゲゲWﾏHﾉ┞ ヲヰヰヰぶ OaaｷIｷ;ﾉ H;ﾐゲ;ヴS 
Report 3063. 
583 Kenya National Assembly (n 576). 
584 See, generally, Martin Brownbridge, Government Policies and the Development of Banking in Kenya 
(Institute of Development Studies 1996). “WW ;ﾉゲﾗが M;ヴデｷﾐ Bヴﾗ┘ﾐHヴｷSｪWが けFｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ DｷゲデヴWゲゲ ｷﾐ LﾗI;ﾉ B;ﾐﾆゲ ｷﾐ 
KWﾐ┞;が NｷｪWヴｷ;が Uｪ;ﾐS; ;ﾐS );ﾏHｷ;ぎ C;┌ゲWゲ ;ﾐS IﾏヮﾉｷI;デｷﾗﾐゲ aﾗヴ ‘Wｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ PﾗﾉｷI┞げ ふヱΓΓΒぶ ヱヶ DW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ 




the disadvantage of borrowers, and other sectors of the real economy. In addition, it absolves 
banks of any social role in market society, as the objectives of the market are purely the 
realization of shareholder profit. 
The social role and responsibility of Kenyan banks has thus come up amid the increasing 
financialization of the Kenyan economy. The National Treasury, CBK, Parliamentarians and 
other commentators have voiced concerns that Kenyan banks were posting record profits, 
while most sectors of the real economy, including agriculture and manufacturing, were 
performing poorly.585 While acknowledging that the Kenyan economy was indeed capitalist, 
Parliamentarians, including Finance Minister David Mwiraria, noted that a significant portion 
of bank profits were made from trading CBK treasury Bills, and thus, taxpayers monies, rather 
than interest on lending to the public.586  
In addition, the essential position of the banking sector as the main financial intermediator, the 
ﾉWｪ;ﾉ ヮヴｷ┗ｷﾉWｪWゲ Wﾐﾃﾗ┞WS H┞ H;ﾐﾆゲ ┌ﾐSWヴ KWﾐ┞;げゲ ﾏﾗﾐWデ;ヴ┞ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞が ゲ┌Iｴ ;ゲ W┝Iﾉ┌ゲｷ┗W HﾗﾐS 
trading privileges, and even membership in the National Payment System (essentially a public 
infrastructure), elicited calls for a more conscionable approach by banks, to lending to the 
public. Despite the capitalist ﾐ;デ┌ヴW ﾗa KWﾐ┞;げゲ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞が デｴWヴW ┘;ゲ ; ゲデヴﾗﾐｪ ゲWﾐデｷﾏWﾐデ デｴ;デ 
banks should have a sense of duty aﾗヴ デｴW Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴ┞げゲ SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデが ;ﾉﾗﾐｪゲｷSW shareholder 
profits. In 2016, after Parliament passed the Njomo Bill, and sent it to the President for assent, 
the Kenya Bankers Association entered into a non-binding Memorandum of Understanding 
with the CBK, pledging to reduce interest rates by 150 basis points, create a Kshs. 30 Billion 
fund for exclusive concessionary lending to small and medium enterprises (SMEs), set up a 
Kshs. 100 million technical assistance programme for SMEs, and enhance ethical banking 
                                                          
585 MﾗゲWゲ MｷIｴｷヴ;が けB;ﾐﾆゲ M;ﾆｷﾐｪ Tﾗﾗ M┌Iｴ MﾗﾐW┞が “;┞ゲ C“ ‘ﾗデｷIｴげ Standard Digital News (Nairobi, 20 August 
2016) <http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000212657/banks-making-too-much-money-says-cs-
ヴﾗデｷIｴб ;IIWゲゲWS ヲヱ “WヮデWﾏHWヴ ヲヰヱヶき GWﾗヴｪW Nｪｷｪｷが けB;ﾐﾆゲ DWa┞ NW┘ Lﾗ;ﾐ PヴｷIｷﾐｪ Tﾗﾗﾉ デﾗ ‘;ﾆW ｷﾐ “ｴヱヴヱHﾐげ 
Business Daily (Nairobi, 3 February 2015) <http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Banks-defy-new-loan-
pricing-tool-to-rake-in-Sh141bn/539552-2610950-u5meilz/index.html> accessed 26 October 2016. 
586 Hon. Muiruri argued, for example, that banks made a lot of profit from trading Treasury Bills, and therefore 
it was fair to regulate the profits from lending. See H;ﾐゲ;ヴS ESｷデﾗヴが けPヴﾗIWWSｷﾐｪゲ ﾗa デｴW CﾗﾏﾏｷデデWW ﾗa デｴW 
Whole House, Debate on the Central Bank of Kenya (Amendment) Bill, during the Session of the 8th 
P;ヴﾉｷ;ﾏWﾐデげ ふﾐ ヵΒヲぶ ヲヰヰヲく Hon. Mwiraria, then Shadow Finance Minister, decried the fact that foreign owned 
banks such as Barclays Bank made up to Kshs. 7 billion from trading CBK Treasury Bills, but did not give much 
regard to lending to the public to stimulate economic development. See H;ﾐゲ;ヴS ESｷデﾗヴが けPヴﾗIWWSｷﾐｪゲ ﾗa デｴW 
P;ヴﾉｷ;ﾏWﾐデ;ヴ┞ DWH;デW ﾗﾐ デｴW ヲヰヰヲ B┌SｪWデ “ヮWWIｴ ﾗa デｴW MｷﾐｷゲデWヴ ﾗa Fｷﾐ;ﾐIWが S┌ヴｷﾐｪ デｴW Βデｴ P;ヴﾉｷ;ﾏWﾐデげ 




practices.587 Nevertheless, noting that banks had reneged on their earlier promises to effect 
similar measures, President Uhuru Kenyatta assented to the interest rate capping Bill.  
The debate on the social role and responsibility of banks has therefore been an ideology-
critique of the General Equilibrium Theory and Efficient Markets Hypothesis, which 
ideologically reify markets and institutional lenders from society, and promote financialization 
of the Kenyan economy. 
5.4. Transnational Versus Local Capital: Implications of Regulatory Bias 
Another issue that has arisen within the regulatory debates is the bias that CBK and National 
Treasury macroeconomic policies exhibited toward foreign or transnational capital, to the 
disadvantage of local capital. One of the concerns underscored by both local and international 
financial regulators over interest rate caps has been capital flight, due to the narrowing of the 
ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デW SｷaaWヴWﾐデｷ;ﾉく TｴWヴWaﾗヴWが ﾗﾐW ﾗa デｴW ヴW;ゲﾗﾐゲ aﾗヴ デｴW CBKげゲ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ to maintain interest 
rate deregulation, and a positive interest rate differential, is to attract the flow of foreign 
capital into Kenya.588 However, the downside of these foreign capital inflows is that they are 
けｴﾗデ ﾏﾗﾐW┞げ - essentially speculative and short-term, and take flight at the first sign of lowering 
interest rates.589 CﾗﾐゲWケ┌Wﾐデﾉ┞が CBKげゲ ﾏﾗﾐWデ;ヴ┞ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ｴ;ゲ HWWﾐ IヴｷデｷIｷゲWS aﾗヴ I;デWヴｷﾐｪ デﾗ 
speculative foreign capital that does not stay long enough to stimulate local economic 
development, while undermining local savings capacity due to the low market deposit rate.590  
AﾐﾗデｴWヴ ヴWﾉ;デWS IﾗﾐIWヴﾐ ｴ;ゲ HWWﾐ デｴW Sﾗﾏｷﾐ;ﾐIW デｴ;デ aﾗヴWｷｪﾐ H;ﾐﾆゲ W┝WヴIｷゲW ﾗ┗Wヴ KWﾐ┞;げゲ 
money supply, and market share of the banking sector (estimated at 45% as at 2013),591 and 
their influence over CBK macroeconomic policy making, equated with a loss of State 
                                                          
587 “WW MWﾏﾗヴ;ﾐS┌ﾏ ﾗa UﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐSｷﾐｪ aヴﾗﾏ KWﾐ┞; B;ﾐﾆWヴゲ AゲゲﾗIｷ;デｷﾗﾐが けMWﾏﾗヴ;ﾐS┌ﾏ Fヴﾗﾏ TｴW B;ﾐﾆ CｴｷWa 
Executive Officers Through The Kenya Bankers Association To The Central Bank Of Kenya In Response To The 
B;ﾐﾆｷﾐｪ ふAﾏWﾐSﾏWﾐデぶ Bｷﾉﾉ ヲヰヱヵげ ふヱヰ A┌ｪ┌ゲデ ヲヰヱヶぶ аwww.kba.co.ke>. “WW ;ﾉゲﾗ GWﾗヴｪW Nｪｷｪｷが けB;ﾐﾆゲ D;ﾐｪﾉW 
“ｴンヰHﾐ “ME Lﾗ;ﾐゲ デﾗ A┗Wヴデ IﾐデWヴWゲデ ‘;デWゲ C;ヮげ Business Daily (Nairobi, 11 August 2016) 
<http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Banks-dangle-Sh30bn-SME-loans-to-avert-interest-rates-cap/539552-
3340258-s1uqrl/index.html> accessed 21 September 2016. 
588 “WW NS┌ﾐｪげ┌が The Exchange Rate and the Interest Rate Differential in Kenya: A Monetary and Fiscal Policy 
Dilemma (n 559). 
589 ibid. 
590 “WW デｴW IﾗﾐデヴｷH┌デｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa Hﾗﾐゲく K;ﾃ┘;ﾐｪげ ;ﾐS ﾆｷH;ﾆｷが ﾗﾐ デｴW ﾗﾐW ｴ;ﾐSが SWIヴ┞ｷﾐｪ デｴW aocus on speculative 
aﾗヴWｷｪﾐ ｷﾐ┗WゲデﾏWﾐデ aﾉﾗ┘ゲが ヴ;デｴWヴ デｴ;ﾐ ｪヴﾗ┘ｷﾐｪ SﾗﾏWゲデｷI ゲ;┗ｷﾐｪゲく “WW ;ﾉゲﾗ VｷIW PヴWゲｷSWﾐデ GWﾗヴｪW “;ｷデﾗデｷげゲ I;ﾉﾉ 
for a middle ground, since foreign direct investments and low lending rates can co-exist: Hansard Editor, 
け“WIﾗﾐS ‘W;Sｷﾐｪ ﾗa デｴW DﾗﾐSW Bｷﾉﾉげ ふﾐ ヵΑンぶ ンヰヰΑに3016. 
591 Sarah Sanya and Matthew Gaertner, Assessing Bank Competition within the East African Community 




sovereignty.592 TｴW ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげゲ Iﾗﾏヮﾉｷ;ﾐIW ┘ｷデｴ デｴW BWIゲげ ヴWケ┌ｷヴWﾏWﾐデゲ aﾗヴ ヮヴｷ┗;デｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa 
ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデ H;ﾐﾆゲ H┞ ゲWﾉﾉｷﾐｪ デｴWﾏ デﾗ けゲデヴ;デWｪｷIげ aﾗヴWｷｪﾐ ｷﾐ┗Wゲデﾗヴゲ ┌ﾐSWヴ ﾉWﾐSｷﾐｪ IﾗﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデｷes 
have also been seen as further alienation of local capital in favour of transnational capital.  
Aｪ;ｷﾐゲデ デｴW BWIゲげ ヮヴｷ┗;デｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ヴWIﾗﾏﾏWﾐS;デｷﾗﾐゲが P;ヴﾉｷ;ﾏWﾐデ;ヴｷ;ﾐゲ ｴ;┗W ;ﾉゲﾗ I;ﾉﾉWS aﾗヴ ｪヴW;デWヴ 
participation of government banks in the lending market, so as to break the oligopolistic and 
cartel-like practices of private banks in setting high interest rates.593 Hﾗﾐく MｷSｷ┘ﾗげゲ ｷﾉﾉ-fated 
2012 legislative Motion for interest rate caps, for example, also called for government agencies 
to be mandated to withdraw their savings from private banks, and deposit them in 
government-owned banks. These funds would then be lent out at below-market rates, so as to 
force the market to lower the high interest rates. Banks warned that this measure would cause 
a liquidity crisis that would lead to bank collapses.594  
5.5. The Politics of BWIゲげ Economic Policy Prescriptions for Kenya 
TｴW ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ﾗa デWIｴﾐﾗIヴ;I┞ ┌ﾐSWヴﾉ┞ｷﾐｪ デｴW ┗ｷW┘ ﾗa BWIゲげ ﾐWﾗIﾉ;ゲゲｷI;ﾉ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ 
prescriptions as neutral, apolitical and asocial, has also been interrogated by Kenyan 
Parliamentarians. One of their concerns has been the unquestioned implementation by Kenyan 
financial regulators and policy makers of the macroeconomic policy prescriptions issued by the 
IMF and World Bank in their stabilization programmes in developing countries, despite the 
unsound theoretical bases of their models. For example, in 2000, Opposition leader Mwai 
KｷH;ﾆｷ SWIヴｷWS デｴW a;Iデ デｴ;デ さヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴゲ ｴ;┗W ゲﾗﾉS デｴWｷヴ ゲﾗ┌ﾉゲ デﾗ aﾗヴWｷｪﾐ デｴWﾗヴｷWゲぐ ぷ;ﾐSへ ﾐWWS デﾗ 
HW ヮWヴゲ┌;SWS デﾗ I;ヮ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デWゲぐぷ┞Wデへ KWﾐ┞; ｷゲ ;ﾐ ;ｪヴｷI┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴ┞ざく595  
In addition, members of the Parliamentary Finance and Planning Committee in the 10th 
Parliament noted that in their meetings with the IMF, the donor was unable to reconcile its 
opposition to interest rate regulation in Kenya, with support for the continuing regulation of 
interest rates in other developed countries. Nobel Laureate and former World Bank Chief 
                                                          
592 Hﾗﾐく M┌ｷデW ;ヴｪ┌WS デｴ;デ aﾗヴWｷｪﾐ H;ﾐﾆゲげ Iﾗﾐデヴﾗﾉ ﾗ┗Wヴ KWﾐ┞;げゲ ﾏﾗﾐW┞ ゲ┌ヮヮﾉ┞ ┘;ゲ WゲゲWﾐデｷ;ﾉﾉ┞ デｴW Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴ┞げゲ 
ﾉﾗゲゲ ﾗa ゲﾗ┗WヴWｷｪﾐデ┞く H;ﾐゲ;ヴS ESｷデﾗヴが けPヴﾗIWWSｷﾐｪゲ ﾗa デｴW P;ヴﾉｷ;ﾏWﾐデ;ヴ┞ DWH;デW ﾗﾐ デｴW “WIﾗﾐS ‘W;Sｷﾐｪ ﾗa デｴW 
B;ﾐﾆｷﾐｪ ふAﾏWﾐSﾏWﾐデぶ Bｷﾉﾉが S┌ヴｷﾐｪ デｴW “Wゲゲｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW Γデｴ P;ヴﾉｷ;ﾏWﾐデげ ふKWﾐ┞; N;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ AゲゲWﾏHﾉ┞ ヲヰヰヴぶ OaaｷIｷ;ﾉ 
Hansard Report 4552. 
593 H;ﾐゲ;ヴS ESｷデﾗヴが けPヴﾗIWWSｷﾐｪゲ ﾗa デｴW P;ヴﾉｷ;ﾏWﾐデ;ヴ┞ DWH;デW ﾗﾐ デｴW B;ﾐﾆｷﾐｪ ふAﾏWﾐSﾏWﾐデぶ Bｷﾉﾉが S┌ヴｷﾐｪ デｴW 
Session of thW Γデｴ P;ヴﾉｷ;ﾏWﾐデげ ふKWﾐ┞; N;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ AゲゲWﾏHﾉ┞ ヲヰヰヴぶ OaaｷIｷ;ﾉ H;ﾐゲ;ヴS ‘Wヮﾗヴデ ヴΒヶヶく Fｷﾐ;ﾐIW MｷﾐｷゲデWヴ 
David Mwiraria argued that the government had killed local banks, while promoting foreign banks. Noting 
that the necessary policy was to get Kenyans saving money, he proposed the establishment of regional banks 
across the country, which would take deposits from locals and lend to them regionally. 
594 Nｪｷｪｷが けB;ﾐﾆゲ F;IW M;ﾃﾗヴ “ｴ;ﾆW-┌ヮ Ia MPゲ P;ゲゲ MｷSｷ┘ﾗ Bｷﾉﾉげ ふﾐ ヵヶΓぶく 




EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷゲデ JﾗゲWヮｴ “デｷｪﾉｷデ┣ ｴ;ゲ a;ﾏﾗ┌ゲﾉ┞ SWヴｷSWS デｴW IMFげゲ SｷゲｴﾗﾐWゲデ┞ ｷﾐ ヮrescribing interest rate 
liberalization in agricultural developing countries such as Kenya, yet the developed countries 
only liberalized their interest rate markets after the 1970s, long after cementing their 
developed economy status.596  
The politicization of the Kenyan interest rates markets, as captured in these five issues, among 
others, exposed the weaknesses of the macroeconomic paradigms driving market 
liberalization, and reframed the lenses through which the problem of high interest rates in a 
liberalised financial sector were perceived, discussed and confronted. For example, the 
epistemic concerns of economic sociology, such as social foundations and duties of the banking 
system in Kenya, were articulated in a field that has been firewalled by neoclassical financial 
economics. However, as seen below, the process of economization also attempted to claw back 
and redraw the narrative. 
6. Economizing the Politics of High Interest Rates in Kenya 
Despite their opposition to the introduction of interest rate caps, the CBK, National Treasury, 
Kenya Bankers Association, BWI, and KIPPRA, among other stakeholders, agreed that the high 
interest rates were a problem. They, however, differed on what was the cause of the high 
interest rates, and what, other than legislative caps, should be done to address the situation. 
The CBK, for example, asked Parliament to drop the interest rate capping Bill, and to give the 
market time to force banks to adjust their lending rate downwards, or lose their dominance.597 
In addition, the CBK governor Patrick Njoroge (a former Senior Economist at the IMF) preferred 
デｴW CBKげゲ ┌ゲW ﾗa ゲﾗaデ ヮﾗ┘Wヴが ゲ┌Iｴ ;ゲ デｴW ヮ┌HﾉｷI;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ﾉWﾐSｷﾐｪ ヴ;デWゲ ﾗa W;Iｴ IﾗﾏﾏWヴIｷ;ﾉ H;ﾐﾆが 
and also lending infrastructural measures such as movable assets as collateral, setting up of an 
electronic collateral registry, and the ongoing digitisation of land registries.  
With regard to the proposed interest rate caps, the CBK Governor contended that capping 
interest rates ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS さﾉW;S デﾗ ｷﾐWaaｷIｷWﾐIｷWゲ ｷﾐ デｴW IヴWSｷデ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデが ヮヴﾗﾏﾗデW ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏ;ﾉ ﾉWﾐSｷﾐｪ 
Iｴ;ﾐﾐWﾉゲが ;ﾐS ┌ﾐSWヴﾏｷﾐW デｴW WaaWIデｷ┗WﾐWゲゲ ﾗa ﾏﾗﾐWデ;ヴ┞ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ デヴ;ﾐゲﾏｷゲゲｷﾗﾐくざ598 TｴW CBKげゲ 
policy recommendations on how to deal with the high interest rates have also been supported 
                                                          
596 Joseph E Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (Penguin 2003) 32, 33. 
597 Oデｷ;デﾗ G┌ｪ┌┞┌が けCWﾐデヴ;ﾉ B;ﾐﾆ OヮヮﾗゲWゲ MPゲげ BｷS デﾗ P┌デ CWｷﾉｷﾐｪ ﾗﾐ IﾐデWヴWゲデ ‘;デWゲげ Daily Nation (Nairobi, 17 
February 2016) <http://www.nation.co.ke/business/Central-Bank-opposes-MPs-bid-to-put-ceiling-on-
interest-rates/996-3080314-11p46wq/index.html> accessed 26 October 2016. 




by the National Treasury, which has also observed that Kenyan banks have been making too 
much money at the expense of borrowers.599 
Banks, on their part, have consistently echoed the warnings of the CBK and the BWIs on the 
effects of interest rate capping laws on the lending market in Kenya. They have also blamed 
the high interest rates on the insufficient lending market infrastructure, including (at various 
instances over the last 16 years) the absence of credit reference bureaus, inefficient lands 
registries, an inefficient judicial system, macro-economic instability, etc.600 Their policy 
recommendation has been to ask the government to improve the efficiency of the lending 
market, before interest rates can go down. 
The BWIs have also consistently warned against attempts by the Kenyan Parliament to re-
introduce interest rate controls, and even threatened to withhold aid in 2000. They have 
counselled that these controls will distort market pricing, and lead to a reduction of financial 
inclusion and access to credit, as banks would only lend to the low-risk borrowers with good 
collateral and credit histories.601 An interesting concern stated by the IMF, and echoed by the 
CBK Governor, has been that the interest rate caps will blunt monetary policy instruments of 
the CBK.602 This is an example of how a specific macro-economic policy paradigm of the 
IMF/CBK has prevented the regulators from seeing high interest rates as a crisis; rather, the 
inability to achieve other macroeconomic objectives such as inflation targeting is what the 
regulators deem as problematic.603  
Instead, the recommendations by the BWIs to the Kenyan and other governments legislating 
interest rate caps has been to: (1) increase competition in the banking sector; (2) reduce 
information asymmetries in the lending market, through credit reference bureaus and 
publication of interest rate comparators; (3) increase consumer literacy and consumer 
                                                          
599 Michira (n 585). 
600 DWﾉﾗｷデデW Cﾗﾐゲ┌ﾉデｷﾐｪ LｷﾏｷデWSが けAﾐ Aﾐ;ﾉ┞ゲｷゲ ﾗa EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ;ﾐS CﾗﾏヮWデｷデｷ┗W F;Iデﾗヴゲ Iﾐaﾉ┌WﾐIｷﾐｪ KWﾐ┞;ﾐ IﾐデWヴWゲデ 
‘;デWゲげ ふKWﾐ┞; B;ﾐﾆWヴゲ AゲゲﾗIｷ;デｷﾗﾐ ヲヰヱヴぶく 
601 Wﾗﾉaｪ;ﾐｪ FWﾐｪﾉWヴが けHﾗ┘ PヴｷIW Cﾗﾐデヴﾗﾉゲ C;ﾐ LW;S デﾗ HｷｪｴWヴ PヴｷIWゲげ 
<http://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/how-price-controls-can-lead-to-higher-prices> accessed 22 
“WヮデWﾏHWヴ ヲヰヱヶき D┌ﾐI;ﾐ Mｷヴｷヴｷが けKWﾐ┞;げゲ Mﾗ┗W デﾗ C;ヮ CﾗﾏﾏWヴIｷ;ﾉ ‘;デWゲ M;┞ LﾗIﾆ ﾗ┌デ Bﾗヴヴﾗ┘Wヴゲ -IMFげ 
Reuters (Nairobi, 25 August 2016) <http://www.reuters.com/article/kenya-banks-imf-idUSL8N1B639Q> 
accessed 22 September 2016. 
602 Mｷデゲ┌ｴｷヴﾗ F┌ヴ┌ゲ;┘;が けMﾗﾐWデ;ヴ┞ PﾗﾉｷI┞ ;ﾐS デｴW F┌デ┌ヴW ﾗa CWﾐデヴ;ﾉ B;ﾐﾆｷﾐｪぎ IﾏヮﾉｷI;デｷﾗﾐゲ aﾗヴ AaヴｷI;げ ふヵヰデｴ 
Anniversary of the Central Bank of Kenya, Nairobi, 13 September 2016) 
<http://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2016/09/13/sp091316-Monetary-Policy-and-the-Future-of-Central-





protection; (4) develop the micro-finance sector; (5) improve collateralization infrastructure 
efficiency.604 Since the 2002 change of guard from the Moi era to the reform-branded era of 
Presidents Kibaki and Uhuru Kenyatta, the government has undertaken some of these reforms, 
with mixed results in the interest rate market.  
While some progress has been registered in the first four recommendations, with mixed 
results, the discussion and analysis below focus on the first two: the regulation of competition 
in the banking sector, and the reduction of information asymmetries through CRBS and 
publication of interest rate comparators. This is because these two policy proposals directly 
engage economic theories related to financial markets liberalization, especially the Efficient 
Markets Hypothesis. 
6.1. Competition in the Kenyan Banking Market 
The Efficient Markets Hypothesis, the neoclassical economic theory rationale offered by BWIs 
for interest rate deregulation in Kenya, posited that market liberalization will allow more 
lenders in the market, increase competition, and consequently drive down interest rates.605 
One of the positive developments of the financial liberalization era is that more players have 
entered the lending market. For example, from 1994 to 2015, CBK-regulated lenders increased 
from 33 to 55, considering that during this period, a number of banks underwent liquidation, 
while others merged as a result of higher capital requirements.606 However, despite the 
increased number of lenders, the market has shaped up into an oligopolistic structure, 
characterised by market segmentation, according to the World Bank.607 In addition, the IMF 
also notes that less competitive foreign banks control up to 45% of the market.608  
                                                          
604 See Samuel MunzWﾉW M;ｷﾏHﾗが HWﾐヴｷケ┌W┣ G;ﾉﾉWｪﾗゲ ;ﾐS Cﾉ;┌Sｷ; AﾉWﾃ;ﾐSヴ;が けIﾐデWヴWゲデ ‘;デW C;ヮゲ Aヴﾗ┌ﾐS デｴW 
WﾗヴﾉSぎ “デｷﾉﾉ Pﾗヮ┌ﾉ;ヴが B┌デ ; Bﾉ┌ﾐデ Iﾐゲデヴ┌ﾏWﾐデげ ふ“ﾗIｷ;ﾉ “IｷWﾐIW ‘WゲW;ヴIｴ NWデ┘ﾗヴﾆ ヲヰヱヴぶ ““‘N “Iｴﾗﾉ;ヴﾉ┞ P;ヮWヴ ID 
2513126 <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2513126> accessed 30 August 2016; See also Fengler (n 601). 
605 See Ngugi and Kabubo (n 506) 11. The IMF and World Bank reform recommendations suggested that as 
the financial markets became competitive, the efficiency of intermediation would increase, the costs of 
intermediation would go down, followed by the lowering of interest rates. 
606 CWﾐデヴ;ﾉ B;ﾐﾆ ﾗa KWﾐ┞;が けB;ﾐﾆ “┌ヮWヴ┗ｷゲｷﾗﾐ Aﾐﾐ┌;ﾉ ‘Wヮﾗヴデ ヲヰヱヵげ ふCWﾐデヴ;ﾉ B;ﾐﾆ ﾗa KWﾐ┞; ヲヰヱヶぶ 
<www.centralb;ﾐﾆくｪﾗくﾆWбき “WW ;ﾉゲﾗ Fヴ;ﾐIｷゲ M┘Wｪ;が けTｴW CﾗﾏヮWデｷデｷ┗WﾐWゲゲ ;ﾐS EaaｷIｷWﾐI┞ ﾗa デｴW Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ 
“Wヴ┗ｷIWゲ “WIデﾗヴ ｷﾐ AaヴｷI;ぎ A C;ゲW “デ┌S┞ ﾗa KWﾐ┞;げ ふヲヰヱヱぶ ヲン AaヴｷI;ﾐ DW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ ‘W┗ｷW┘ ヴヴく 
607 Wagh and others (n 534) 39. 




The CBK has also frequently noted its frustration with the cartel-like practices of Kenyan banks 
in maintaining high interest rates.609 Indeed, in December 2015, the Competition Authority of 
Kenya (CAK) announced that it was commencing investigations against banks for the failure to 
cut interest rates on loans in the face of an improved fiscal environment. In its preliminary 
report released in April 2016, the CAK found that Kenyan banks, through the KBA, were 
engaging in interest rate fixing and market zoning. It also called for the disbandment of the 
KBA, since it is a price-setting cartel.610 In response to this charge, the KBA commissioned a 
report by Deloitte, which pushed back on the CAK report, and argued that the Kenyan banking 
sector was indeed very competitive.611  
The uncompetitive nature of the Kenyan banking sector is cause for concern, considering the 
CBK and BWI preference for market determination of interest rates. In addition, it 
demonstrates the failure of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, the ideological pillar of interest 
rate liberalization, and its fetishization by financial markets regulators.  
6.2. Credit Reference Bureaus 
The Efficient Markets Hypothesis holds that markets fully, accurately and instantaneously 
incorporate all publicly-available information into market prices. Thus, information symmetry 
ヮﾉ;┞ゲ ; ﾆW┞ ヴﾗﾉW ｷﾐ ﾐWﾗIﾉ;ゲゲｷI;ﾉ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI デｴWﾗヴ┞げゲ ;ヴｪ┌ﾏWﾐデゲ ﾗﾐ デｴW WaaｷIｷWﾐI┞ ﾗa ┌ﾐヴWgulated 
ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲく A ヴWﾉ;デWS デｴWﾗヴ┞が AﾆWヴﾉﾗaげゲ デｴWﾗヴ┞ ﾗa ;ゲ┞ﾏﾏWデヴｷI;ﾉ ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐが デｴ┌ゲ ;ヴｪ┌Wゲ デｴ;デ 
incomplete information between market traders leads to inefficient markets. Therefore, 
according to neoclassical theory, credit information sharing within consumer credit markets 
counters adverse selection, moral hazard, information monopoly, and over-indebtedness.612  
                                                          
609 Bヴｷ;ﾐ Nｪ┌ｪｷが けC;ヴデWﾉ-ﾉｷﾆW BWｴ;┗ｷﾗ┌ヴ Bﾉ;ﾏWS aﾗヴ Hｷｪｴ B;ﾐﾆｷﾐｪ Cｴ;ヴｪWゲげ Daily Nation (Nairobi, 9 February 
2016) <http://www.nation.co.ke/lifestyle/smartcompany/Cartel-like-behaviour-blamed-for-high-banking-
charges/1226-3068342-hrd92wz/index.html> accessed 20 September 2016. 
610 Competitｷﾗﾐ A┌デｴﾗヴｷデ┞ ﾗa KWﾐ┞;が けAﾐﾐ┌;ﾉ ‘Wヮﾗヴデ ;ﾐS Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ “デ;デWﾏWﾐデゲ ヲヰヱヴっヲヰヱヵげ ふCﾗﾏヮWデｷデｷﾗﾐ 
A┌デｴﾗヴｷデ┞ ﾗa KWﾐ┞; ヲヰヱヵぶ “デ;デ┌デﾗヴ┞ Aﾐﾐ┌;ﾉ ‘Wヮﾗヴデ ンヲが ンンき GWヴ;ﾉS AﾐS;Wが けCAK AII┌ゲWゲ B;ﾐﾆゲ ;ﾐS MｷﾉﾉWヴゲ ﾗa 
Cﾗﾉﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ デﾗ Fｷ┝ PヴﾗS┌Iデ PヴｷIWゲげ Business Daily (Nairobi, 17 April 2016) 
<http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/CAK-accuses-banks-and-millers-of-colluding-to-fix-product-
prices/539546-3163692-naybj0/index.html> accessed 19 September 2016. 
611 Deloitte Consulting Limited (n 60ヰぶき J;ヴWS Oゲﾗヴﾗが けWｴ┞ KWﾐ┞;ﾐ B;ﾐﾆゲ ‘Wﾏ;ｷﾐ CﾗﾏヮWデｷデｷ┗W ‘ｷ┗;ﾉゲげ Business 
Daily (Nairobi, 7 June 2015) <http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Opinion-and-Analysis/Why-Kenyan-
banks-remain-competitive-rivals-/539548-2743248-rlw26d/index.html> accessed 19 September 2016. 
612 “WW T┌ﾉﾉｷﾗ J;ヮヮWﾉﾉｷ ;ﾐS M;ヴIﾗ P;ｪ;ﾐﾗが けIﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ “ｴ;ヴｷng, Lending and Defaults: Cross-Cﾗ┌ﾐデヴ┞ E┗ｷSWﾐIWげ 
ふヲヰヰヲぶ ヲヶ Jﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉ ﾗa B;ﾐﾆｷﾐｪ わ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIW ヲヰヱΑき “WW ;ﾉゲﾗ A JﾗヴｪW P;Sｷﾉﾉ; ;ﾐS M;ヴIﾗ P;ｪ;ﾐﾗが け“ｴ;ヴｷﾐｪ DWa;┌ﾉデ 




TｴWゲW デｴWﾗヴWデｷI;ﾉ aヴ;ﾏW┘ﾗヴﾆゲ ｴ;┗W ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏWS KWﾐ┞;ﾐ H;ﾐﾆｷﾐｪ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ﾏ;ﾆWヴゲ ;ﾐS ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴゲげ 
turn to the statutory establishment of credit reference bureaus as mechanisms for 
strengthening the efficiency of the liberalized interest rate markets, and lowering the cost of 
credit. In fact, one of the reasons that Kenyan banks gave for high interest rates was the risk 
premium necessitated by lack of information regarding borrower credit-worthiness. 
Consequently, in July 2008, the CBK formulated and published the Banking (Credit Reference 
Bureau) Regulations, 2008, providing for the establishment and operation of Credit Reference 
Bureaus (CRBs) and for the sharing of borrower credit worthiness among lenders.613 By 
September 2016, three CRBs had entered the market, and one of them に TransUnion に had 
ﾉｷゲデｷﾐｪゲ ﾗa ﾏﾗヴW デｴ;ﾐ ヱヶ ﾏｷﾉﾉｷﾗﾐ Hﾗヴヴﾗ┘Wヴゲが ﾏ;ﾆｷﾐｪ ;Hﾗ┌デ ; デｴｷヴS ﾗa KWﾐ┞;げゲ デﾗデ;ﾉ ヮﾗヮ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐく  
The expectations that the introduction of CRBs would lead to lower interest rates have, 
ｴﾗ┘W┗Wヴが ﾐﾗデ ﾏ;デWヴｷ;ﾉｷ┣WSが ﾏ;ｷﾐﾉ┞ S┌W デﾗ デｴW H;ﾐﾆゲげ misuse of borrower information. In July 
2016, the CBK was compelled to issue a circular to banks, threatening legal sanctions, as a result 
of their misuse of the shared credit information, including blacklisting of borrowers for failure 
to pay non-credit related charges such as account closing fees, or ATM charges, submission of 
inaccurate negative borrower data to the CRBs, and failure to give these borrowers the legally 
stipulated notice of such action.614 In addition, the banks also started using the threats of 
blacklisting as a debt-collection strategy. The credit information sharing system therefore 
became a credit access constraint, rather than a risk-management tool for pricing loans 
accordingly, as blacklisted borrowers would be locked out of lending facilities, instead of being 
subjected to higher interest charges.615 Indeed, this situation was compounded by a 2016 CRB 
report indicating that more than 400,000 Kenyans were blacklisted for non-payment of as little 
as Kshs. 100 (about £0.70 GBP). In addition, the banks have also failed to use the positive credit 
info to reward compliant borrowers.616  
These negative experiences that borrowers were subjected to by the banks has elicited a 
number of legal suits by borrowers, seeking damages from banks for misuse of the credit 
information, and also a petition to Parliament for the disbanding of the CRBs, as their existence 
                                                          
613 Legal Notice No. 97 of 2008, Laws of Kenya. 
614 GWﾗヴｪW Nｪｷｪｷが けCBK P┌デゲ B;ﾐﾆゲ ﾗﾐ NﾗデｷIW aﾗヴ AH┌ゲW ﾗa CヴWSｷデ B┌ヴW;┌ゲげ Business Daily (Nairobi, 17 August 
2016) <http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Bank-executives-face-CBK-action-for-misuse-of-credit-
scoring/539552-3347638-129jg92/index.html> accessed 20 September 2016. 
615 ibid. 
616 GWﾗヴｪW Nｪｷｪｷが けP;ｷﾐ ﾗa KWﾐ┞;ﾐゲ Bﾉ;IﾆﾉｷゲデWS aﾗヴ Aﾏﾗ┌ﾐデゲ ;ゲ “ﾏ;ﾉﾉ ;ゲ “ｴヱヰヰ ｷﾐ MﾗHｷﾉW Lﾗ;ﾐゲが B;ﾐﾆ FWWゲげ 
Business Daily (Nairobi, 9 September 2016) <http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Pain-of-Kenyans-




seemed to compound the suffering of Kenyan borrowers.617 This situation prompted an 
WSｷデﾗヴｷ;ﾉ H┞ KWﾐ┞;げゲ ヮヴWﾏｷWヴ H┌ゲｷﾐWゲゲ ﾐW┘ゲヮ;ヮWヴが B┌ゲｷﾐWゲゲ D;ｷﾉ┞ AaヴｷI;が デﾗ I;ﾉﾉ aﾗヴ デｴW H;ﾐﾆｷﾐｪ 
industry to sort out the CRB mess, before populist Parliamentarians took action.618  
The challenges of credit information sharing as a mechanism for lowering market lending rates 
in Kenya counsel against placing too much faith on theoretical prescriptions of efficient 
markets, especially where there is evidence of misuse of information to create even larger 
power asymmetries in favour of the banks. This is discussed in greater detail in the Chapter 6 
case study on credit information sharing technologies.  
6.3. TｴW KWﾐ┞; B;ﾐﾆゲげ RWaWヴWﾐIW R;デW ふKBRRぶ   
As discussed above, and in Chapter 6, credit information sharing can still deepen information 
asymmetries within the lending market, especially where borrowers have little information 
;Hﾗ┌デ デｴW IヴWSｷデﾗヴゲげ ゲｷSW ﾗa デｴW H┌ゲｷﾐWゲゲが ｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デW Iﾗﾏヮ;ヴ;デﾗヴゲく IﾐSWWSが 
neoclassical economics acknowledges that strong markets are predicated on both lender and 
borrower being bilaterally informed, that is, information symmetry.619 However, the discipline 
has not built consensus on whether there should be government regulation, and if so, what 
type of regulation would be ideal. Arguments against regulation are still premised on the fact 
that these interferences will distort markets more significantly than asymmetrical 
information.620    
This conundrum dominated the debate on the adequate response to the misuse of credit 
information sharing infrastructure by banks, and absence of a downward adjustment in lending 
rates. Therefore, in 2013, the newly-elected President Kenyatta set out to implement one of 
his campaign manifesto items, which was the reduction of domestic lending rates. A Cost of 
Credit Committee was formed, constituted by two Cabinet Secretaries (who were formerly 
CEOs of two major banks), CBK and KBA representaデｷ┗Wゲく TｴW IﾗﾏﾏｷデデWWげゲ ヴWIﾗﾏﾏWﾐS;デｷﾗﾐ 
                                                          
617 ES┘ｷﾐ M┌デ;ｷが けP;ヴﾉｷ;ﾏWﾐデ UヴｪWS デﾗ DｷゲH;ﾐS CヴWSｷデ ‘WaWヴWﾐIW B┌ヴW;┌ゲげ Business Daily (Nairobi, 10 May 
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<http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Opinion-and-Analysis/Correct-credit-bureau-flaws/539548-3199370-
tgm3vgz/index.html> accessed 20 September 2016. 
619 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (University of Chicago Press 2009) 13. Friedman argues that 
けデｴW ヮﾗゲゲｷHｷﾉｷデ┞ ﾗa Iﾗ-ordination through voluntary co-operation rests on the elementary - yet frequently 
denied - proposition that both parties to an economic transaction benefit from it, provided the transaction is 
bi-ﾉ;デWヴ;ﾉﾉ┞ ┗ﾗﾉ┌ﾐデ;ヴ┞ ;ﾐS ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏWSげく く 
620 ‘ｷIｴ;ヴS A EヮゲデWｷﾐが けTｴW NWﾗIﾉ;ゲゲｷI;ﾉ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIゲ ﾗa Cﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴ Cﾗﾐデヴ;Iデゲ E┝Iｴ;ﾐｪWげ ふヲヰヰΑぶ Γヲ MｷﾐﾐWゲﾗデ; 




aﾗヴ ;SSヴWゲゲｷﾐｪ デｴW ｴｷｪｴ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デWゲ ┘;ゲ デｴW IヴW;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW KWﾐ┞; B;ﾐﾆゲげ ‘WaWヴWﾐIW ‘;デW 
(KBRR), which was supposed to be a market lending rate signal that would empower borrowers 
by increasing transparency and competition in the pricing of loans, and ultimately, bring down 
interest margins.621  
The KBRR framework came into effect in July 2014, and required banks to disclose and explain 
to their customers the effective base rate (KBRR) and any additional premium (K) above the 
base rate. This premium was to be broken down to enable clients to understand its 
components. This would also allow the Government and the Central Bank to make targeted 
policy interventions to lower the premium.622 
Banks, however, largely defied the guidance offered by the KBRR pricing, and, in 2015, 
announced an increase in sector profits from Kshs. 124 to 141 billion.623 Considering that it was 
the banks that had proposed the KBRR in an effort to appease legislators who were making 
serious attempts at enacting interest rate caps, many commentators thought the banks had 
exercised bad faith, and had themselves to blame for the ultimate passing of the interest rate 
controls.624 This was yet another government-backed market optimizing mechanism that had 
been short-circuited by the lenders. 
The cartel-like behaviour of the banks, and their sabotage of the CRB and KBRR market 
mechanisms have least inspired the economic argument that the liberalized interest rate 
market would eventually bring down the high lending rates. In fact, sharp divisions continue to 
linger among Kenyan economists on whether the financial liberalization reforms were 
undertaken properly. For example, it has been argued that the sequencing of the IMF-
prompted reforms in Kenya was against best practice, which required interest rate 
liberalization to have followed the putting in place of other financial market fundamentals, such 
as macro-economic and financial stability, and a competitive, rather than an oligopolistic 
                                                          
621 CWﾐデヴ;ﾉ B;ﾐﾆ ﾗa KWﾐ┞;が けB;ﾐﾆ “┌ヮWヴ┗ｷゲｷﾗﾐ Aﾐﾐ┌;ﾉ ‘Wヮﾗヴデ ヲヰヱヴげ ふCWﾐデヴ;ﾉ B;ﾐﾆ ﾗa KWﾐ┞; ヲヰヱヵぶ ヱヲ 
<www.centralbank.go.ke> The KBRR is computed as an average of (a) the Central Bank Rate (CBR) and (b) the 
2-month weighted moving average of the 91-day Treasury bill rate. The 91-day Treasury Bills reflect the floor 
of risk-free assets while the CBR reflects the stance of monetary policy. A customer should therefore expect 
デﾗ HW Iｴ;ヴｪWS ; ﾉWﾐSｷﾐｪ ヴ;デW ﾗa KB‘‘ Щ さKざが ;ﾐS ゲｴﾗ┌ﾉS HW ゲWWﾐ ;ゲ デｴW ﾏｷﾐｷﾏ┌ﾏ ヮヴｷIW aﾗヴ H;ﾐﾆゲ デﾗ ヮ;ヴデｷIｷヮ;デW 
in the credit market. 
622 ibid. 
623 Nｪｷｪｷが けB;ﾐﾆゲ DWa┞ NW┘ Lﾗ;ﾐ PヴｷIｷﾐｪ Tﾗﾗﾉ デﾗ ‘;ﾆW ｷﾐ “ｴヱヴヱHﾐげ ふﾐ ヵΒヵぶく 
624 ESｷデﾗヴｷ;ﾉが けB;ﾐﾆゲ H;┗W TｴWﾏゲWﾉ┗Wゲ デﾗ Bﾉ;ﾏW ﾗﾐ IﾐデWヴWゲデ ‘;デWゲ Bｷﾉﾉげ Business Daily (Nairobi, 28 July 2016) 
<http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Opinion-and-Analysis/Banks-have-themselves-to-blame-on-interest-




market.625 Otherwise the reforms risked high interest rates, bankruptcy, and loss of monetary 
control, which were the eventual results. In addition, an oligopolistic market structure has 
taken root.   
These findings have been echoed by Nobel Laureate in Economics, and former Chief Economist 
at the World Bank, George Stiglitz, in his famously harsh criticism of IMF stabilization policies 
in Kenya and other developing countries. Stiglitz critiqued the IMFげゲ ｷﾐゲｷゲデWﾐIW ﾗa ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デW 
liberalization in Ethiopia and Kenya as erroneous, since the agricultural nature of the two 
Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴｷWゲげ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷWゲが デｴWir state of economic development, and the structure of the financial 
sector, did not provide a conducive environment for interest rate liberalization. He notes that 
developed countries liberalized their interest rate markets after the 1970s, long after their 
financial markets were stable.626 
7. Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the fourth research question: how has the ideological and 
performative power of economic, legal and technological ideas and related practices 
ヴWヮヴﾗS┌IWS ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ ﾐWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉｷゲﾏ ｷﾐ KWﾐ┞;げゲ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デW ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲい In this effort, the 
discussion has examined the role of neoclassical economics in framing, delineating and limiting 
the actions of Kenyan financial markets regulators and policy makers in addressing the problem 
of high interest rates and high consumer indebtedness in the domestic market, and in 
contesting neoliberal transnational financial regulatory standards.  
TｴW IﾗﾐデWゲデ;デｷﾗﾐ W┝ｴｷHｷデWS HWデ┘WWﾐ デｴW ゲデ;ﾆWｴﾗﾉSWヴゲ ｷﾐ KWﾐ┞;げゲ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デW ﾏ;ヴﾆWデが デﾗ 
impose a particular paradigm of how the phenomenon of high interest rates should be 
perceived, framed, discussed and confronted, has demonstrated the ideological and 
performative power of neoclassical economic theory in establishing macroeconomic models 
and policy paradigms as cognitive locks. Despite the recognition by the CBK, National Treasury, 
banks, BWIs and other stakeholders, that high domestic lending rates were not only a problem, 
H┌デ ;ﾉゲﾗ ; SWデWヴヴWﾐデ デﾗ KWﾐ┞;げゲ ﾉﾗﾐｪ-term development goals, and that the liberalized interest 
                                                          
625 Nｪ┌ｪｷ ;ﾐS K;H┌Hﾗ ふﾐ ヵヰヶぶ ンヵき M;┌ヴWWﾐ WWヴWが ‘ﾗゲW Nｪ┌ｪｷ ;ﾐS Pｴ┞ﾉﾉｷゲ M;ﾆ;┌が けE┝ヮWヴｷWﾐIWゲ ┘ｷデｴ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ 
“WIデﾗヴ ‘Waﾗヴﾏゲ ;ﾐS Tヴ;SW LｷHWヴ;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ｷﾐ KWﾐ┞;げ ふKWﾐ┞; Iﾐゲデｷデ┌デW aﾗヴ P┌HﾉｷI PﾗﾉｷI┞ ‘WゲW;ヴIｴ ;ﾐS Aﾐ;ﾉ┞ゲｷゲ 
2013) Research Proposal 48. 
626 “デｷｪﾉｷデ┣が けC;ヮｷデ;ﾉ M;ヴﾆWデ LｷHWヴ;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐが EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI Gヴﾗ┘デｴが ;ﾐS Iﾐゲデ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞げ ふﾐ ヴΑヶぶき “デｷｪﾉｷデ┣が Globalization and 




rate market had failed to mediate them downwards, the macro-economic policy paradigm has 
remained tied to the neoclassical economics of financial liberalization. 
Ideological Legitimation of Regulatory Neoliberalism and Interest Rate Liberalization 
The discussion has demonstrated the ideological power of various neoclassical economic 
theories in legitimating regulatory neoliberalism, and financial markets liberalization, as the 
ﾗﾐﾉ┞ ゲIｴWﾏWゲ aﾗヴ ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷ┣ｷﾐｪ KWﾐ┞;げゲ IヴWSｷデ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲ デﾗ ;IｴｷW┗W ﾉﾗ┘Wヴ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デWゲく The 
ideological effect of the various economic theories is demonstrated through the four main 
principles underpinning the regulation of the financial markets. First, in the course of the 
regulatory debates, the CBK, National Treasury, KIPPRA and the BWIs have maintained a 
dogged faith in the Mckinnon-Shaw hypothesis on the power of the liberalized financial 
markets to tame interest rates. This is despite evidence of growing interest rate spreads 25 
years after deregulation.  
Second, the regulators and policy makers have maintained faith in the General Equilibrium 
Theory, and the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, in their continued implementation of 
macroeconomic models built on the assumption that prevailing interest rates in Kenya at any 
one time are determined by the supply and demand forces of the market.627 This is despite 
evidence that the banking sector is oligopolistic and continues to exhibit cartel-like tendencies 
in retaining high interest rates.628  
Third, the CBK has maintained ｷデゲ a;ｷデｴ ｷﾐ デｴW ┌ゲW ﾗa ヮ┌ヴヮﾗヴデWSﾉ┞ けゲIｷWﾐデｷaｷIげ ;ﾐS けﾏ;デｴWﾏ;デｷI;ﾉげ 
macro-econometric models, to undertake monetary policy interventions. The CBK has 
contended that the CBK policy rate, the Cash Reserve Ratio, and Open Market Operations 
(OMOs), are effective replacements of interest rate controls, and can be effectively used to 
bring down lending rates.629 This is despite the CBKげゲ MﾗﾐWデ;ヴ┞ PﾗﾉｷI┞ CﾗﾏﾏｷデデWWが ;ﾐS ┗;ヴｷﾗ┌ゲ 
studies, including by CBK and Treasury insiders, separately noting the weakness of the 
monetary policy transmission mechanisms, and specifically the non-response of market lending 
rates to these instruments.630  
                                                          
627 For the KTMM assumptions, see Were and Karingi (n 553); For the CBK Macroeconometric model, see, for 
example, Were and others (n 548) 2. 
628 See Competition Authority of Kenya (n 610); Wagh and others (n 534); Sanya and Gaertner (n 591). 
629 For the CBK Model, see Were and others (n 27) 7に10; See also Were aand others (n 26) 194. 
630 Were and others (n 550) The authors find that a change in the CBK policy rate is ineffective in signalling 




Fourth, the CBK continues to pursue inflation targeting as its main macroeconomic policy, 
despite its consequent effect of high market lending rates, which ultimately hurts economic 
recovery and deters new investments.631 High domestic lending rates have therefore become 
CBKげゲ ｷﾐゲデヴ┌ﾏWﾐデ aﾗヴ ﾏWWデｷﾐｪ ｷデゲ ｷﾐaﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ デ;ヴｪWデゲが SWゲヮｷデW デｴW Iﾗﾉﾉ;デWヴ;ﾉ S;ﾏ;ｪW デﾗ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI 
recovery and new domestic investments.632 This demonstrates the contradictions inherent in 
the economic theories relied on by the CBK in its task of macroeconomic governability. 
Performation of the Interest Rates Market 
In addition, this particular policy paradigm has also taken hold in the entire Kenyan banking 
sector. Aﾐ ｷﾐデWｪヴ;ﾉ ;ゲヮWIデ ﾗa デｴW CBKげゲ economic steering of the interest rate market (and the 
rest of the monetary sector) is communication of its monetary policy direction to the market, 
and the subsequent reaction by market participants to this communication. Therefore, 
macroeconomic governability is possible only where the financial markets, especially the 
lenders, share an intersubjective understanding of the causal relationships between the various 
WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ┗;ヴｷ;HﾉWゲ ;ﾐS デｴW HWｴ;┗ｷﾗ┌ヴ;ﾉ W┝ヮWIデ;デｷﾗﾐゲ ｷﾐIﾉ┌SWS ｷﾐ CBKげゲ macro-econometric 
models. It is for this reason that after the 2016 interest rate caps were enacted into law, the 
aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲ ヴW;IデWS デﾗ デｴW ;ﾐデｷIｷヮ;デWS ﾐWｪ;デｷ┗W IﾗﾐゲWケ┌WﾐIWゲ デﾗ デｴW H;ﾐﾆｷﾐｪ ゲWIデﾗヴげゲ 
ヮヴﾗaｷデ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ H┞ ゲｴWSSｷﾐｪ Kゲｴゲく ヴΑ Bｷﾉﾉｷﾗﾐ ┘ﾗヴデｴ ﾗa H;ﾐﾆゲげ ゲｴ;ヴW ┗;ﾉ┌e, at the Nairobi Securities 
E┝Iｴ;ﾐｪW ふN“Eぶが ;ﾐSが ┘ｷデｴｷﾐ デｴW ﾐW┝デ Wｷｪｴデ S;┞ゲが Kゲｴゲく ヲヴン Bｷﾉﾉｷﾗﾐ ┘ﾗヴデｴ ﾗa ﾗデｴWヴ Wケ┌ｷデｷWゲげ 
value.633 
These examples demonstrate at least the first two levels of economic performativity. Generic 
performativity of these macroeconomic paradigms is established by the fact of their 
deployment by the CBK, National Treasury and BWIs in macroeconomic governability, and their 
use by financial market participants, including banks. The equations and assumptions 
underlying the KTMM, CBK Macro-EIﾗﾐﾗﾏWデヴｷI MﾗSWﾉが デｴW IMFげゲ Pﾗﾉ;ﾆ MﾗSWﾉが ;ﾐS デｴW WﾗヴﾉS 
B;ﾐﾆげゲ ‘“M“ ;ヴW ヮヴﾗﾗa ﾗa デｴｷゲ ;ヮヮﾉｷI;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴWﾗヴ┞く  
                                                          
631 CWﾐデヴW aﾗヴ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI Gﾗ┗Wヴﾐ;ﾐIW ;ﾐS AｷSゲ ｷﾐ AaヴｷI; ふﾐ ヱヲヲぶき NS┌ﾐｪげ┌が The Exchange Rate and the Interest 
Rate Differential in Kenya: A Monetary and Fiscal Policy Dilemma (n 559) 1. 
632 NS┌ﾐｪげ┌, The Exchange Rate and the Interest Rate Differential in Kenya: A Monetary and Fiscal Policy 
Dilemma (n 559) 1. 
633 GeoffrW┞ Iヴ┌ﾐｪ┌が けN“E Iﾐ┗Wゲデﾗヴゲ LﾗゲW “ｴヲヴンHﾐ ;aデWヴ ‘;デWゲ C;ヮ Hｷデゲ B;ﾐﾆ “ｴ;ヴWゲげ Business Daily (Nairobi, 15 
September 2016) <http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/NSE-investors-lose-Sh243bn-after-rates-cap-hits-




Effective performativity is established by institutional embedding of the practice of 
macroeconomic modelling within the economic policy making structures at the CBK, National 
Treasury, KIPPRA, and the BWIs, over a long period of time. As argued by Egmond and Zeiss, 
the practice of macroeconomic modelling of the Kenyan economy has led to the entrenching 
of routines and patterns in economic research and policy making circles, thereby entrenching 
particular policy paradigms that have been hard to deconstruct during the interest rate 
regulatory debate.634 A ｪﾗﾗS W┝;ﾏヮﾉW ｷゲ デｴW CBKげゲ IﾗﾐIWヴﾐ デｴ;デ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デW I;ヮゲ ﾏ;ﾆW ｷデゲ 
present monetary policy instruments less effective. 
It can thus be argued that the mere achievement of macroeconomic governability using the 
respective macro models employed by the CBK and National Treasury reflects effective 
performativity.635 The reflexive character of macroeconomic modelling, and its subsequent 
deployment in evaluation, forecasting, analysis and intervention, is what has an effect the 
WIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞く EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ;ｪWﾐデゲげ ﾆﾐﾗ┘ﾉWSｪW ﾗa デｴW I;┌ゲ;ﾉ ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲｴｷヮゲ HWデ┘WWﾐ ┗;ヴｷﾗ┌ゲ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI 
variables feeds back into their economic behaviour, while that of regulators and policy makers 
feeds into economic policy advise and interventions.636 The macroeconomic model therefore 
achieves an intersubjective representation and visualisation of an abstract economy that is 
amenable to economic steering and other interventions.637 Consequently, the market 
participants, including regulators, policy makers, lenders, consumers and other intermediaries, 
calculate their economic actions based on the causal relationships and assumptions embedded 
in the macro model.  
To this extent, the conformity of the Kenyan economy, even marginally, to the CBK and 
Treasury macroeconomic models, establishes the effective performativity of the various 
neoclassical economic theories discussed, including the Mckinnon-Shaw Hypothesis, the 
Efficient Markets Hypothesis, and the General Equilibrium Theory. 
 
 
                                                          
634 “デ;ﾐゲ V;ﾐ EｪﾏﾗﾐS ;ﾐS ‘;ｪﾐ; )Wｷゲゲが けMﾗSWﾉｷﾐｪ aﾗヴ PﾗﾉｷI┞ぎ “IｷWﾐIW-Based Models as Performative Boundary 
OHﾃWIデゲ aﾗヴ D┌デIｴ PﾗﾉｷI┞ M;ﾆｷﾐｪげ ふヲヰヱヰぶ ヲΒ “IｷWﾐIW わ TWIｴﾐﾗlogy Studies 73. 
635 Braun (n 305) 48. 
636 M;ヴ┞ “ Mﾗヴｪ;ﾐ ;ﾐS T;ヴﾃ; Kﾐ┌┌デデｷﾉ;が けMﾗSWﾉゲ ;ﾐS MﾗSWﾉﾉｷﾐｪ ｷﾐ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIゲげ ｷﾐ Uゲﾆ;li Mäki (ed), Philosophy 
of Economics, vol 13 (Elsevier 2012) 51. 
637 JWﾐゲ M;WヂWが け“ヮWIデヴ;ﾉ PWヴaﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗ｷデ┞く Hﾗ┘ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI E┝ヮWヴデ DｷゲIﾗ┌ヴゲW Cﾗﾐゲデヴ┌Iデゲ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI WﾗヴﾉSゲげ 




Implications on Third World Contestation 
The various manifestations of economic performativity in the interest rates market in Kenya 
have two implications. First, the entrenchment of a particular neoclassical macroeconomic 
policy paradigm に that is, financial liberalization に has made it harder to intervene in the 
interest rates market, and establish a fairer and moral economy. This is because the process of 
economic performativity, as described by Callon, has entailed the enrolment of the various 
ゲデ;ﾆWｴﾗﾉSWヴゲ ｷﾐ デｴW ﾉWﾐSｷﾐｪ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデが デﾗｪWデｴWヴ ┘ｷデｴ さWIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI デｴWﾗヴｷWゲが IﾗﾐIWヮデゲ ;ﾐS ﾗデｴWヴ 
WﾏヮｷヴｷI;ﾉ ヮｴWﾐﾗﾏWﾐ;ざが ｷﾐデﾗ ; さﾐWデ┘ﾗヴﾆ デｴ;デ ｷゲ IﾗﾐﾐWIデWS H┞ ; ゲヮWIｷaｷI ﾉ;ﾐｪ┌;ｪW ;ﾐS Iﾗﾏﾏ┌ﾐ;ﾉ 
projectざく638 Therefore, the establishment of alternative markets に whether capped interest 
rates markets or other forms of regulation に within a global economy, requires the 
deconstruction of the prevailing policy paradigm and attendant network of market actors, and 
the reconstruction of a new market. 
Second, economic performativity also presents the Third World visionaries of alternative 
interest rate economies with the transformative potential of macroeconomic models, and their 
constitution as agencements for achieving policy paradigm shifts.639 Third World proponents of 
けa;ｷヴWヴげ ;ﾐS けﾏﾗヴ;ﾉげ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デWゲ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲが aﾗヴ W┝;ﾏヮﾉWが ゲｴﾗ┌ﾉS IﾗﾐゲｷSWヴ デｴW SｷゲI┌ヴゲｷ┗Wが 
normative, technical, material, social and political resources that the neoliberal project has 
expended in entrenching neoclassical economics into social life, and match the effort.640 
The re-introduction of interest rate caps in the Kenyan lending market in 2016 was the 
I┌ﾉﾏｷﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ; ﾏWヴW けゲﾆｷヴﾏｷゲｴげ HWデ┘WWﾐ デｴW ヮヴﾗIWゲゲWゲ ﾗa WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS ヮﾗﾉｷデｷIｷ┣;tion, 
with a small victory to the latter. The war, however, will be fought on whether Kenyans succeed 
in establishing an economic paradigm that combines collective action with individual 
calculation and optimization. This means that government regulatory schemes aimed at 
lowering consumer lending rates, including the market for creditor lending information, will 
only be successful through intersubjective understanding with the market. For example, both 
bankers and borrowers should have a common understanding that affordable credit leads to 
increased economic investments, and an economic boon to creditor and debtor. This 
understanding should replace the current paradigm of a zero-sum game, where lower lending 
rates results in a credit crunch, as bankers shift their credit reserves to speculative investments 
                                                          
638 Leon Wansleben, Cultures of Expertise in Global Currency Markets (Routledge 2013) 21. 
639 Henriksen (n 540) 482. 




on government treasury bills. In addition, the construction of a fairer credit market also 
depends on building a sustainable reservoir of local development capital, while weening the 
economy of dependence on transnational capital, which characteristically imports with it policy 


























Juridification: The Ideological and Constitutive Effect of the Rule of Law in the Liberalisation 
of KWﾐ┞;げゲ IﾐデWヴWゲデ R;デWゲ M;ヴﾆWデ 
1. Introduction 
This thesis examines the ideological and performative power of economic, legal, and 
technological ideas, practices and related institutions in reproducing regulatory neoliberalism 
in transnational and national financial markets. Chapter 4 has explored the ideological and 
performative role of neoclassical economics in framing high interest rates and high consumer 
indebtedness as an economic rather than political problem, and consequently restricting the 
regulatory possibilities.  
This chapter is the second instalment of the Kenya case study, exploring the second aspect of 
the fourth research sub-question: how has the ideological and performative power of legal 
ideas and related practices reproduced regulatory neolibWヴ;ﾉｷゲﾏ ｷﾐ KWﾐ┞;げゲ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デW 
markets? It W┝;ﾏｷﾐWゲ デｴW ヴﾗﾉW ﾗa デｴW け‘┌ﾉW ﾗa L;┘げ ;ゲ ﾉWｪ;ﾉ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞が ;ﾐS ┌ﾐヮ;Iﾆゲ ｷデゲ IﾗﾐIW;ﾉWS 
constitutive and performative power in the financial markets. It explores the nature of the rule 
of law as part of the ideational infrastructure of contemporary financial markets in Kenya, and 
its entrenchment of neoliberal transnational regulatory standards in the financial sector 
デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ ┗;ヴｷﾗ┌ゲ BヴWデデﾗﾐ WﾗﾗSゲ Iﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐゲげ ﾉﾗ;ﾐ IﾗﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデｷWゲ ;ﾐS ヴWaﾗヴﾏ ヮヴﾗｪヴ;ﾏゲく E┗Wﾐ 
though the Rule of Law claims to be neutral and apolitical, it undergirds neoliberal assumptions 
and concepts about nature, role and functioning of markets, and economic development. In 
addition, through its reifying and naturalising ideological strategies, this ideology obfuscates 
the role of law in constituting market relations, shaping identities and respective capacities to 
act. 
Consequently, the discussion demonstrates how the rule of law restricts the possibilities for 
constructing (through regulation) fairer and affordable interest rate markets in Kenya. The rule 
of law indeed has a positive impact in the deepening of financial markets, and the provision of 
credit. However, it also has the potential to reproduce systemic inequalities in liberalised 
financial markets, and to constrain or limit the solutions available to financial market 
regulators, policy makers and legislators, in addressing unduly high interest rates, high 




The chapter is organised into four further sections. Section 2 briefly outlines the theoretical 
argument. It argues that the rule of law doctrine is ideological, since its claims to autonomy, 
ヮ┌ヴｷデ┞が SWデWヴﾏｷﾐ;I┞が ﾗHﾃWIデｷ┗ｷデ┞が ;ﾐS デヴ;ﾐゲIWﾐSWﾐIW IﾗﾐIW;ﾉ ﾉ;┘げゲ ｴｷゲデﾗヴｷI;ﾉが ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉが ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉが 
and contingent aspects, and legitimate its relations of domination, and a neoliberal bias. 
Section 3 discusses the embedding of the rule of law discourse in Kenyan development 
discourse and the financial markets liberalization process. It argues that the ideology of the rule 
of law has constituted, and been co-constituted by, the discourse of economic development 
introduced in Kenya by various transnational actors, including the BWIs. Section 4 critically 
analyses the ideological and performative role of the rule of law doctrine underpinning interest 
rate liberalisation in Kenya. It argues that the rule of law doctrine harbours a bias for neoliberal 
capitalism and regulatory neoliberalism, which have reproduced power asymmetries between 
borrowers and lenders, and impeded the regulation of high interest rates. Section 5 contains 
the main conclusions and suggestions for directions for further research. It argues for the 
deconstruction and reconstruction of the Rule of Law into a concept that aids rather than 
impedes progressive politics of economic reconstruction. 
2. Ideological, Constitutive and Performative Power of the Rule of Law 
The discussion in Chapter 2 laid out the critical, theoretical framework for the nature, role and 
functioning of mainstream legal ideas including the rule of law in financial markets, in four 
conceptual moves.  
The first conceptual move is the shift from interests and material legal institutions to the 
ideological power of legal ideas, that is, the ability of the rule of law to exercise power through 
the construction of meaning. The rule of law and its constituent elements are ideological due 
to their tendency to obscure the complexities, contradictions and dilemmas inherent in their 
claims (about society, markets, the economy, and the law) in abstractions that imply universal 
truths.641 The ideology critique of the rule of law in this chapter and the rest of the study does 
not imply that the rule of law is undesirable or wrong. Rather, the critique asserts that the 
specific conceptualisation and usage of the rule of law to advance neoliberal politics of market 
liberalization advances a partial perspective which is treated as a total perspective, and which 
conceals or deters recognition of the domination, oppression and inequality in society.642 This 
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ideological concealing occurs through various ideological strategies discussed in chapter 2: 
universalization, reification, naturalisation, rationalization and narrativization.643  
The second conceptual move is the articulation of the relative autonomy of law. This entails 
デ┘ﾗ ゲデWヮゲぎ aｷヴゲデが デｴW SWIﾗﾐゲデヴ┌Iデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ﾉWｪ;ﾉ aﾗヴﾏ;ﾉｷゲﾏげゲ ;ゲゲWヴデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW ;┌デﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞ ﾗa ﾉ;┘ aヴﾗﾏ 
society and politics; and second, the rejection of legal instrumentalism, that is, the idea of the 
rule of law as merely the superstructure of capitalist society, or the preferences of the 
dominant classes.644 Thus, despite its social and political construction, the concept of the rule 
of law can acquire some relative autonomy from social actors, through practices of legal 
fetishism.645 Consequently, a particular, historically and socially contingent conception of the 
rule of law is ossified and reified from changes or reconfigurations of power, and with time 
makes subjects of its creators.646 Nevertheless, in capitalist society, the law is not fully 
;┌デﾗﾐﾗﾏﾗ┌ゲが ;ゲ ｷデ さ;ヴデｷI┌ﾉ;デWゲ ┘ｷデｴ ;ﾐS ﾏ┌ゲデ HW W┝ヮﾉ;ｷﾐWS H┞ デｴW ゲ┞ゲデWﾏｷI ヴWケ┌ｷヴWﾏWﾐデゲ ﾗa 
I;ヮｷデ;ﾉｷゲﾏぐざ647 The relative autonomy of law thus aids the understanding of the agential power 
ﾗa デｴW ヴ┌ﾉW ﾗa ﾉ;┘ ;ゲ ; SｷゲIﾗ┌ヴゲW ﾗa WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデが ;ﾐS ｷデゲ ゲヮWIｷaｷI ;aaｷﾐｷデ┞が ﾗヴ けWゲゲWﾐデｷ;ﾉ 
ｴﾗﾏﾗﾉﾗｪ┞げ ┘ｷデｴ ﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉ I;ヮｷデ;ﾉｷゲﾏく648 Forms and practices of the rule of law tend to become 
eﾏHWSSWS ｷﾐ けヴWﾉ;デｷ┗Wﾉ┞ ;┌デﾗﾐﾗﾏﾗ┌ゲ ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴWゲげが デヴ;ﾐゲIWﾐSｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS ｴWﾉヮｷﾐｪ デﾗ ゲｴ;ヮW デｴW 
desires, interests, and cognitive perspectives of social groups.649  
TｴW デｴｷヴS IﾗﾐIWヮデ┌;ﾉ ﾏﾗ┗W Wﾐデ;ｷﾉゲ デｴW a┌ヴデｴWヴ ;ヴデｷI┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴｷゲ けWゲゲWﾐデｷ;ﾉ ｴﾗﾏﾗﾉﾗｪ┞げ ﾗa デｴW 
rule of l;┘ ┘ｷデｴ I;ヮｷデ;ﾉｷゲﾏが ;ゲ ｷﾐｴWヴWﾐデ ｷﾐ デｴW aﾗヴﾏ ﾗa ﾉ;┘が デｴ;デ ｷゲが デｴW けIﾗﾏﾏﾗSｷデ┞-form of 
ﾉ;┘げく650 This concept compares the logic of juridical equality of legal subjects in the formalistic 
conception of the rule of law, with the commodity form in market capitalism, which creates 
the appearance that all products are equal, despite the qualitatively distinct labour-value that 
                                                          
643 Thompson (n 50ぶ ヶヰき Tｴｷゲ デｴWゲｷゲ ﾏ;ﾆWゲ ┌ゲW ﾗa M;ヴﾆゲげ ;S;ヮデ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa Tｴﾗﾏヮゲﾗﾐげゲ デ┞ヮﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ﾗa ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ 
strategies. Marks (n 38) 112. 
644 Balbus (n 7) 571に572. 
645 ibid 572に573. The author locates the emergence of legal autonomy from the fetishism of the law, and the 
perverse logic of デｴW ﾉWｪ;ﾉ aﾗヴﾏが さ┘ｴｷIｴ IヴW;デWゲ ; aWデｷゲｴｷ┣WS ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲｴｷヮ HWデ┘WWﾐ ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉゲ ;ﾐS デｴW ﾉ;┘ ｷﾐ 
┘ｴｷIｴ デｴWゲW ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉゲ ;デデヴｷH┌デW ゲ┌HﾃWIデｷ┗ｷデ┞ デﾗ デｴW ﾉ;┘ ;ﾐS IﾗﾐIWｷ┗W デｴWﾏゲWﾉ┗Wゲ ;ゲ ｷデゲ ﾗHﾃWIデゲ ﾗヴ IヴW;デｷﾗﾐゲざく 
646 ‘ﾗﾐ;ﾉS WWｷデ┣Wヴが けL;┘ ;ﾐS LWｪ;ﾉ ISWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ぎ CﾗﾐデヴｷH┌デｷﾗﾐゲ デﾗ デｴW GWﾐWゲｷゲ ;ﾐS ‘WヮヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa C;ヮｷデ;ﾉｷゲﾏげ 
(1980) 24 Berkeley journal of Sociology 137, 146に147. The author argues that relative autonomy of the law 
is solidified in two ways. First, political contestations increasingly necessitated that the legal order appear 
transcendental, and above class manipulation. Second, legal victories by the dominated potentially 
contribute to the reproduction of the illusion that the legal system is just and equitable, thereby legitimising 
the legal system, soliciting consent, and establishing hegemony. 
647 Balbus (n 7) 572. 
648 ibid 573. 
649 Gordon (n 6) 101. 




has gone into its creation.651 By embracing formal juridical equality, the formalist conception 
of the rule of law thus masks and conceals class and social inequalities, and depoliticising legal 
relations through the separation of the legal and the political spheres. In this way, the rule of 
law neutralises, depoliticises, and maintains coercive, exploitative, and inherently political legal 
relations within liberal market capitalism.652 The commodity form theory of law demonstrates 
how formal juridical equality of legal subjects as an element of the rule of law reproduces and 
sustains liberal market capitalism in Third World countries where the concept is deployed. 
The fourth conceptual move is the recognition of the rule of law and its constituent concepts 
as a historically effective force, with the power to constitute material economic relations, 
including individual liberty, property rights, contractual relations, and transactional capacities. 
The deconstruction of the ideologically reified and naturalised economic institutions such as 
property rights, for example, simultaneously reveals the role of rule of law concepts in 
constituting them. The rule of law is not simply a set of autonomous ideas or attitudes 
determined elsewhere; it is part of a complex social totality in which it constitutes as well as is 
constituted, shapes as well as is shaped.653 Law has constitutive power to the extent that its 
concepts, definitional categories, labels and ideas play a subtle and often imperceptible role in 
how economic actors come into existence, organise their activities and relationships, and 
arrange their governance. The law therefore provides cognitive possibilities and values for 
organising economies.654    
The discussion below uses this conceptual framework of the rule of law as an ideology and as 
a constitutive force with a bias for liberal market capitalism, to explore the role of law in 
creating a basis for the liberalization of interest rates market in Kenya. The conceptual 
framework also explores the foreclosing of certain policy options for dealing with the problem 




                                                          
651 ibid 573に575. 
652 C┌デﾉWヴが けGヴ;ﾏゲIｷが L;┘が ;ﾐS デｴW C┌ﾉデ┌ヴW ﾗa GﾉﾗH;ﾉ C;ヮｷデ;ﾉｷゲﾏげ ふﾐ ヲΓヴぶ ヵンヲく 
653 Harrington and Merry (n 350) 711. 




3. The Rule of Law in Financial Sector Reforms in Kenya 
3.1. Ideology of the Rule of Law or the Ideology of Development? 
The emergence of the ideology of the rule of law as a basis for the liberalisation of financial 
markets, and lending rates in Kenya, has not proceeded in an organic manner as has been 
observed in the UK and the US, for example where it forms an important aspect of popular legal 
consciousness.655 In these countries, the concept of the rule of law developed and gained an 
historically and socially contingent understanding stemming from the respective political 
struggles of various eras.656 As noted by Ghai, the predominant ideology in popular 
consciousness of Kenyan and other Africans, since their respective independence from colonial 
rule, has been the ideology of modernisation and development.657 The ideology of the rule of 
law has been midwifed into the discourse of development in Kenya and other African countries 
as a result of their engagement with the Bretton Woods institutions (BWIs).  
Even then, as discussed below, the rule of law as a legal and ideological concept, though 
significant in terms of how national economic policies and financial sector reforms are framed, 
ｷゲ ヴWゲデヴｷIデWS デﾗ ┘ｴ;デ GﾗヴSﾗﾐ I;ﾉﾉゲ けWﾉｷデW ﾉWｪ;ﾉ IﾗﾐゲIｷﾗ┌ゲﾐWゲゲげ, that is, lawyers, judges, 
bureaucrats and other practitioners.658 Ghai notes that forms of development generated 
through post-colonial authoritarianism (such as Kenya) gives rise to certain contradictions: 
where the ideology of the rule of law is largely absent in universal consciousness, but is present 
ｷﾐ さ; ヮヴﾗヮWヴデｷWS ;ﾐS ヮヴﾗaWゲゲｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ﾏｷSSﾉW Iﾉ;ゲゲ ┘ｴｷIｴ ┗;ﾉ┌Wゲ SWﾏﾗIヴ;I┞ ;ﾐS ｴ┌ﾏ;ﾐ ヴｷｪｴデゲ aﾗヴ 
Hﾗデｴ ヮヴ;ｪﾏ;デｷI ;ﾐS ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ ヴW;ゲﾗﾐゲざく659 Hence one of the questions this discussion 
illuminates is the ideological power of the concept of the rule of law, and how it captures the 
policy paradigms of Kenyan financial sector regulators and policy makers, and constrains more 
politically popular policy choices for addressing the issue of high interest rates. 
                                                          
655 Tヴ┌HWﾆ SWゲIヴｷHWゲ ﾉWｪ;ﾉ IﾗﾐゲIｷﾗ┌ゲﾐWゲゲ ;ゲ さデｴ;デ ;ゲヮWIデ ﾗa デｴW IﾗﾐゲIｷﾗ┌ゲﾐWゲゲ ﾗa ;ﾐ┞ ゲﾗIｷWデ┞ デｴ;デ W┝ヮﾉ;ｷﾐゲ ;ﾐS 
helps justify its legal institutions, the way in which society integrates understanding of legal order with other 
ideas which give meaning to the social world. It includes all the ideas about the nature, function and operation 
ﾗa ﾉ;┘ ｴWﾉS H┞ ;ﾐ┞ﾗﾐW ｷﾐ ゲﾗIｷWデ┞ ;デ ; ｪｷ┗Wﾐ デｷﾏWざく “WW Tヴ┌HWﾆが けWｴWヴW デｴW AIデｷﾗﾐ Iゲげ ふﾐ ヶヱぶ ヵΓヲく 
656 Bヴｷ;ﾐ ) T;ﾏ;ﾐ;ｴ;が けTｴW D;ヴﾆ “ｷSW ﾗa デｴW ‘Wﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲｴｷヮ HWデ┘WWﾐ デｴW ‘┌ﾉW ﾗa L;┘ ;ﾐS LｷHWヴ;ﾉｷゲﾏげ ふヲヰヰΒぶ ン 
NYUJL & Liberty 516, 542. For example, in the UK, the rule of law emerged from the concept of natural law, 
which was the argument used to defend property rights threatened by monarchs and legislatures. 
657 Y;ゲｴ Gｴ;ｷが けTｴW TｴWﾗヴ┞ ﾗa デｴW “デ;デWゲ ｷﾐ デｴW TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉS ;ﾐS デｴW PヴﾗHﾉWﾏ ﾗa Cﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷゲﾏげ ふヱΓΓヰぶ ヶ 
Connecticut Journal of International Law 411, 417. Ghai argues that Third World citizens appear to regard the 
promotion of development as the primary task of the government, which then justifies the aggregation and 
concentration of power, and dismisses human rights debates, on the imperatives of development. 
658 Gordon (n 6) 120に121. 




3.2. The Law and Development Project in Kenya 
The role of the rule of law in the development process in post-colonial Kenya can be traced to 
the first Law and Development movement of the 1960s and 1970s, when American lawyers 
were tasked with crafting legal development assistance projects in Third World countries. 
Informed by the Modernisation Theory, this legal transplantation project aimed to catalyse the 
modernisation and economic development process in the Third World using Western legal 
institutions.660 Kenyan nationalists, in the midst of negotiating independence from British 
colonial rule, benefitted, for example, from the technical-legal assistance of the American 
lawyer and jurist, Thurgood Marshall, who is credited with drafting the first Bill of Rights in the 
1963 Constitution of Kenya.661  
M;ヴゲｴ;ﾉﾉげゲ IﾗﾐデヴｷH┌デｷﾗﾐ ｴ;ゲ HWWﾐ Iヴｷデｷケ┌WS aﾗヴ デｴW Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Wﾏヮｴ;ゲｷゲ ﾗa aﾗヴﾏ;ﾉ Wケ┌;ﾉｷデ┞ 
between the economically dominant and oppressive minority settler community and the 
economically dispossessed colonial natives, and also the protection of property rights, which 
entrenched rights gained through historical injustices.662 This legal transplantation experiment 
a;ｷﾉWSが ;ﾐS ｴ;ゲ ヴWﾏ;ｷﾐWS ; Iﾗﾐデｷﾐ┌ｷﾐｪ ﾉWｪ;I┞ ﾗa KWﾐ┞;げゲ ｷﾐ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ デﾗ ;SSヴWゲゲ Iﾗﾉﾗﾐｷ;ﾉ ;ﾐS ヮﾗゲデ-
colonial historical injustices, despite their present manifestations in inequality in resource 
distribution, in a heavily agricultural economy.  
The well documented failure of the Law and Development movement in Kenya and other 
countries has been attributed to the misplaced faith in the universality of specific Western legal 
institutions, including the sanctity of private property rights, and the functional role of these 
institutions in economic development.663  
 
                                                          
660 D;┗ｷS M Tヴ┌HWﾆが けTﾗ┘;ヴS ; “ﾗIｷ;ﾉ TｴWﾗヴ┞ ﾗa L;┘ぎ Aﾐ Eゲゲ;┞ ﾗﾐ デｴW “デ┌S┞ ﾗa L;┘ ;ﾐS DW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデげ ふヱΓΑヲぶ 
82 The Yale Law Journal 1, 6. 
661 “WW ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉﾉ┞ M;ヴ┞ L D┌S┣ｷ;ﾆが けWﾗヴﾆｷﾐｪ デoward Democracy: Thurgood Marshall and the Constitution of 
KWﾐ┞;げ ふヲヰヰヶぶ ヵヶ D┌ﾆW L;┘ Jﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉ Αヲヱく 
662 ibid 776. TｴW ;┌デｴﾗヴ ケ┌Wゲデｷﾗﾐゲ ┘ｴWデｴWヴ M;ヴゲｴ;ﾉﾉげゲ Wﾏヮｴ;ゲis on formal equality was one of form over 
substance in the rule of law. See also, M┌デ┌;が けふBﾗﾗﾆ ‘W┗ｷW┘ぶ E┝ヮﾗヴデｷﾐｪ AﾏWヴｷI;ﾐ DヴW;ﾏゲげ ふﾐ ヱヵヱぶ ヱヱヵヰく 
M┌デ┌; Iヴｷデｷケ┌Wゲ Hﾗデｴ D┌S┣ｷ;ﾆげゲ ｷﾐデWヴヮヴWデ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa M;ヴゲｴ;ﾉﾉげゲ IﾗﾐデヴｷH┌デｷﾗﾐが ;ﾐS デｴW ﾉ;デデWヴげゲ Wﾏヮｴ;ゲｷゲ ﾗﾐ aﾗヴﾏ;ﾉ 
equality between the colonial settlers and the Kenyan natives. He contends that Marshall sought to secure 
for Kenyan colonial natives the same equal protections that he sought for marginalised blacks in the United 
States, while failing to appreciate that this protection would enhance racial equality in the US but freeze white 
privilege in Kenya and doom any real chance at social transformation. 
663 “WW ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉﾉ┞が D;┗ｷS M Tヴ┌HWﾆ ;ﾐS M;ヴI G;ﾉ;ﾐデWヴが け“Iｴﾗﾉ;ヴゲ ｷﾐ “Wﾉa-Estrangement: Some Reflections on 




3.3. The Rule of Law in Structural Adjustment Programs in Kenya 
The failure of this legal theorisation of the development process coincided with the rise of 
neoliberalism in the 1970s, and the prominence of neoclassical economic theories of 
development.664 Therefore, when Kenya and other developing countries experienced economic 
upheavals occasioned by the 1970s foreign exchange shocks, the IMF and the World Bank 
fashioned financial aid packages conditioned on domestic economic policy reforms, known as 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs).  
As discussed extensively in Chapter 4, some of the loan conditionalities included micro-
WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ヴWaﾗヴﾏゲ ゲ┌Iｴ ;ゲ デｴW ﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa KWﾐ┞;げゲ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲが デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ デｴW ヴWﾏﾗ┗;ﾉ 
of interest rate caps, deregulation of the lending market, reduction of reserve requirements, 
removal of credit controls and foreign exchange controls.665 These SAPs were based on the 
Mckinnon-Shaw Hypothesis, which theorised that interest rate controls distort financial 
markets by preventing market intermediaries such as banks from efficiently pricing and 
allocating loans, resulting in negative real interest rates on deposits and loans. Consequently, 
this results in low rates of mobilising savings, which discourages the accumulation of financial 
wealth, and hence, prevents financial deepening.666 In this theorisation of financial market 
development, law was reduced to a framework for facilitating private market transactions, and 
did not play the ideological, discursive and constitutive role that it would later be given in the 
development process.667     
The SAPs administered by the BWIs and implemented by Kenyan policy makers did not realise 
the economic growth or development that had been projected by neoclassical theory. In fact, 
the economic policy reforms, including the scale-back of government involvement in the 
economy, including the provision of social services such as health and education, deepened the 
negative impact of the economic problems on the poor segments of the country.668 As 
                                                          
664 Krever (n 134) 296. 
665 NｷIｴﾗﾉ;ゲ M OSｴｷ;ﾏHﾗが けIﾐデWヴWゲデ ‘;デW ‘Waﾗヴﾏゲが Financial Deepening and Economic Growth in Kenya: An 
EﾏヮｷヴｷI;ﾉ Iﾐ┗Wゲデｷｪ;デｷﾗﾐげ ふヲヰヰΓぶ ヴン TｴW Jﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉ ﾗa DW┗Wﾉﾗヮｷﾐｪ AヴW;ゲ ヲΓヵが ヲΓヶに297. 
666 See McKinnon (n 537); See also Shaw (n 510). 
667 Krever (n 134) 297. 
668 “┞ﾉ┗ｷ; W;ｷヴｷﾏ┌ K;ﾐｪげ;ヴ;が けWｴWﾐ デｴW PWﾐS┌ﾉ┌ﾏ “┘ｷﾐｪゲ Tﾗﾗ F;ヴぎ “デヴ┌Iデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ASﾃ┌ゲデﾏWﾐデ Pヴﾗｪヴ;ﾏゲ ｷﾐ KWﾐ┞;げ 
[1998] Third World Legal Stud. 109, 116. The author notes that the effects of SAPs, including the rollback of 
essential social services, was harsher on the poor and vulnerable segments of the Kenyan society, and 
excerbated by the absence of a welfare system that is common in Western liberal economies. See also Joseph 
KｷヮﾆWﾏHﾗｷ ‘ﾗﾐﾗが けTｴW Iﾏヮ;Iデ ﾗa デｴW “デヴ┌Iデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ASﾃ┌ゲデﾏWﾐデ Pヴﾗｪヴ;ﾏﾏWゲ ﾗﾐ KWﾐ┞;ﾐ “ﾗIｷWデ┞げ ふヲヰヰヲぶ ヱΑ Jﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉ 




replicated in other developing countries and transitional states in Eastern Europe, the failure 
of these neoclassical economic policy prescriptions, generated debate and opposition to the 
BWIゲげ ヮヴﾗｪヴ;ﾏゲく669  
3.4. TｴW R┌ﾉW ﾗa L;┘ ｷﾐ デｴW WﾗヴﾉS B;ﾐﾆげゲ Gﾗ┗Wヴﾐ;ﾐIW AｪWﾐS; 
It is within this context of the policy failure of the SAPs modelled on neoclassical economic 
theory, in Kenya and other countries, that the rule of law was once again reintroduced by the 
World Bank as an ideological basis for economic development policies and processes. The rise 
of New Institutional Economics (NIE) in the late 1980s provided much needed cover to the BWIs 
from the criticisms of their policy failures. Developed by Douglas North and Robert Coase, NIE 
modified the neoclassical economic theorisation of naturally-occurring markets, and theorised 
that well-functioning markets required institutｷﾗﾐゲが デｴ;デ ｷゲが さｴ┌ﾏ;ﾐﾉ┞ SW┗ｷゲWS Iﾗﾐゲデヴ;ｷﾐデゲ デｴ;デ 
ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴW ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉが WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ;ﾐS ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ｷﾐデWヴ;Iデｷﾗﾐざく670 These institutions include informal 
constraints such as sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct, and formal 
constraints such as constitutions, laws and property rights. NIE argues that institutions provide 
the incentive structure for economic growth by creating order, reducing uncertainty, defining 
choice sets, determining transaction and production costs, and the profitability and feasibility 
of engaging in economic activity.671 
In response to the criticisms of the failure of their neoliberal policy reform prescriptions in 
Kenya and other developing countries, the World Bank created a new agenda に that of 
けGﾗ┗Wヴﾐ;ﾐIWげ に and argued that the failures of the SAPs were due to the absence of proper 
governance structures, including the rule of law, in these countries.672 In its 1992 annual report, 
the World Bank set out the case for its advocacy for rule of law reforms in Third World countries 
as the basis for economic reforms. In this report, the Bank clarified that the connection of the 
rule of law with efficient use of resources and productive investment, is the aspect most 
                                                          
669 See, for exaﾏヮﾉWが ┌ﾐｷ┗Wヴゲｷデ┞ ;I;SWﾏｷIゲげ ;ﾐS ゲデ┌SWﾐデゲげ IﾗﾐデWゲデ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ヴWS┌IWS ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷﾐｪ ﾗa 
ｴｷｪｴWヴ WS┌I;デｷﾗﾐが ｷﾐ Aﾉ;ﾏｷﾐ M;┣ヴ┌ｷ ;ﾐS Wｷﾉﾉ┞ M┌デ┌ﾐｪ;が けTｴW “デ;デW VWヴゲ┌ゲ AI;SWﾏｷI Uﾐｷﾗﾐゲ ｷﾐ PﾗゲデIﾗﾉﾗﾐｷ;ﾉ 
KWﾐ┞;げ ｷﾐ “ｷﾉ┗ｷ; FWSWヴｷIｷが Cﾗﾐゲデ;ﾐデｷﾐW GWﾗヴｪW C;aaWﾐデ┣ｷゲ ;ﾐS Ousseina Alidou (eds), A Thousand Flowers: Social 
Struggles Against Structural Adjustment in African Universities (Africa World Press 2000); See also James 
NS┌ﾆﾗが け“デ┌SWﾐデゲげ ‘ｷｪｴデゲ ;ﾐS AI;SWﾏｷI FヴWWSﾗﾏ ｷﾐ KWﾐ┞;げゲ P┌HﾉｷI Uﾐｷ┗WヴゲｷデｷWゲげ ｷﾐ “ｷﾉ┗ｷ; FWSWヴｷIｷが Cﾗﾐstantine 
George Caffentzis and Ousseina Alidou (eds), A Thousand Flowers: Social Struggles Against Structural 
Adjustment in African Universities (Africa World Press 2000). 
670 North (n 130) 97. 
671 ibid. 




important to economic development, and hence to World Bank assistance.673 This was to be 
followed by subsequent elaboration of various overlapping and conflicting conceptions of the 
rule of law, and its role in the economic development process.  
3.5. TｴW WﾗヴﾉS B;ﾐﾆげゲ CﾗﾐIWヮデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW R┌ﾉW ﾗa L;┘ 
There are at least four complementary, overlapping and at the same time contradictory 
IﾗﾐIWヮデｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa デｴW ヴ┌ﾉW ﾗa ﾉ;┘ ｷﾐｴWヴWﾐデ ｷﾐ デｴW WﾗヴﾉS B;ﾐﾆげゲ SｷゲIﾗ┌ヴゲW ﾗﾐ SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ ;ﾐS ｷデゲ 
law reform projects. These include the common dichotomy of institutional/formalistic and 
substantive conceptions, and, within both, a further dichotomy of the functional role of law as 
either instrumental or intrinsic.674 The institutional or formalistic conception, identified more 
with Joseph Raz, emphasizes the efficiency of the legal system in terms of eliciting compliance, 
through characteristics internal to the legal order, such as its generality, notice or publicity, 
prospectively, clarity, stability and congruence, due process, judicial independence, and access 
to justice.675 The formalistic conception is not concerned with the normative content of the 
law. On the other hand, the substantive conception of the rule of law, expounded most notably 
by Dworkin and Bingham, is more concerned with the normative content of the law than the 
form of law, and emphasizes the protection and enforcement of moral rights and fundamental 
freedoms, including democratic rights.676 
In the instrumental conception, the rule of law is merely a mechanism, means or instrument 
for achieving certain non-legal goals within society. The institutional/formalistic aspects of the 
rule of law - specifically the rationality of the legal system - were characterised by Weber as the 
desirable legal attributes instrumental to achieving capitalist economic development.677 On the 
                                                          
673 WﾗヴﾉS B;ﾐﾆが けGﾗ┗Wヴﾐ;ﾐIW ;ﾐS DW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデげ ふﾐ ヱンヰぶ ヲΒに30. The report also acknowledged that a fairer 
legal system is, in a general sense, conducive to balanced development that facilitates growth and responds 
to needs of the poor. However, it endorsed the formalistic conception of the rule of law, which emphasizes 
the efficiency of the legal system rather than its content. 
674 Aﾉ┗;ヴﾗ “;ﾐデﾗゲが けTｴW WﾗヴﾉS B;ﾐﾆげゲ UゲWゲ ﾗa デｴW さ‘┌ﾉW ﾗa L;┘ざ PヴﾗﾏｷゲW ｷﾐ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI DW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデげ ｷﾐ D;┗ｷS 
M Trubek and Alvaro Santos (eds), The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal (Cambridge 
University Press 2006) 258. 
675 JﾗゲWヮｴ ‘;┣が けTｴW ‘┌ﾉW ﾗa L;┘ ;ﾐS Iデゲ Vｷヴデ┌Wげが The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (OUP 2009) 
214に218. 
676 Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (OUP 1985) 11にヱヲき LﾗヴS Bｷﾐｪｴ;ﾏが けTｴW ‘┌ﾉW ﾗa L;┘げ ぷヲヰヰΑへ TｴW 
Cambridge Law Journal 67, 69に82. While Bingham includes the formal aspects in his conception of the rule 
of law, he also includes substantive aspects such as protection of human rights, and the adherence to 
International Law. 
677 Tヴ┌HWﾆが けM;┝ WWHWヴ ﾗﾐ L;┘ ;ﾐS デｴW ‘ｷゲW ﾗa C;ヮｷデ;ﾉｷゲﾏげ ふﾐ ヴヱヱぶ Αヲヴく WWHWヴ ;ヴｪ┌WS デｴ;デ ﾉWｪ;ﾉ aﾗヴﾏ;ﾉｷゲﾏが 
to the extent that it claims to be autonomous (and hence has an objective internal adjudicative logic), general 
and universal, is deemed to be legally rational, or to embody legal rationality, accounts for the prevalence of 




other hand, Hayek identified the protection of individual freedom as a substantive aspect of 
the rule of law, and which was instrumental to human capability to plot and plan their future 
in liberal market capitalism.678 Thus, in these two instances, legal rationality and individual 
rights are but instruments for achieving a more important goal に establishing liberal market 
capitalism.  
In the intrinsic conception, the rule of law is not merely an instrument or means to another 
goal, but is actually a goal in itself. This means that the characteristics or content of the rule of 
law are themselves values and end-ｪﾗ;ﾉゲ デﾗ HW ;ゲヮｷヴWS デﾗく Fﾗヴ W┝;ﾏヮﾉWが AV DｷIW┞げゲ IﾗﾐIWヮデｷﾗﾐ 
of the formalistic aspects of the rule of law as one of the two fundamental principles of the UK 
unwritten constitution (alongside Parliamentary supremacy), upholds aspects such as: no 
punishment without written law; no retrospective law; no discretionary power; and equality 
before the law.679 On the other hand, Amartya Sen argues that certain substantive aspects of 
the rule of law, such as freedom, are in themselves constitutive of the development process, 
and are therefore goals in themselves, rather than mere instruments or means.680    
3.6. Ideological Power of the Rule of Law in the Governance Agenda 
The various complementary, overlapping and contradictory conceptions of the rule of law have 
been deployed by the World Bank and the IMF as powerful ideological and rhetorical tools for 
legitimising present reform programmes in Kenya, including the Financial Sector Assessment 
Programs (FSAPs) and Article IV consultations, which have significant social, political and 
economic implications.681 These policy reform prescriptions are universalised as appropriate in 
Kenya as they are in Western contexts, and are reified from politics and society, by being cast 
as merely institutional, economically efficient and neutral.682  
                                                          
678 Raz (n 675) 221. 
679 See generally Albert Venn Dicey and Emlyn Capel Stewart Wade, Introduction to the Study of the Law of 
the Constitution, vol 10 (Macmillan & Co 1939). 
680 See generally, Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (OUP 2001) 3. The author argues that development 
should also be seen as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy, rather than the narrower 
views of development that concentrate on gross national product, rise in personal incomes, industrialisation, 
technological advancement, and social modernisation. 
681 The FSAP is a joint IMF/World Bank financial sector surveillance program, launched after the 1990s 
emerging markets financial crises, to identify emerging financial sector vulnerabilities and help identify 
financial sector development needs, which would then be addressed through technical assistance programs. 
The consultations between the BWIs and respective States would also be undertaken under the Article IV 
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The indeterminacy and lack of clarity in the concept of the rule of law has muddled the use of 
this concept by policy makers and regulators, when justifying policy reforms, and undermined 
the efforts of political actors to question the underlying premises of some failed rule of law 
reforms, such as land titling, for example. In addition, policy makers and market stakeholders 
with various agenda find means of defending certain policies, as a result of the malleability of 
the rule of law concept.683 For example, the CBK, National Treasury and the Kenya Bankers 
Association (KBA) have been able to deflect the blame for high interest rates from lenders to 
the weakness or non-existence of financial markets institutions such as collateral registries, 
high collateralisation costs, credit rating agencies, and judicial institutions.684 This is despite the 
W┗ｷSWﾐIW ﾗa ﾏ;ヴﾆWデ a;ｷﾉ┌ヴWが ｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ ;ﾐ ﾗﾉｷｪﾗヮﾗﾉｷゲデｷI H;ﾐﾆｷﾐｪ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデ ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴWが ﾉWﾐSWヴゲげ I;ヴデWﾉ-
like behaviour, and regulatory capture of the CBK and the National Treasury.685  
Santos also argues that the rule of law, as an economic development project, has persisted 
despite its failures and the many criticisms levied on it, because of multiple reasons that point 
to the ideational power of the concept. First, the discourses and practices of rule of law 
projects, and the common intellectual backgrounds of the stakeholders have augmented 
professional networks and relationships, epistemic communities, and also revolving doors 
between BWI and Kenya government bureaucrats, which are integral for the maintenance of 
the projects.686 The ideational commitments to epistemic communities of lawyers and 
economists, for example, shape the policy paradigms of the Kenyan regulators and policy 
makers on the role of the government in the lending market. The current CBK governor, Dr 
Patrick Njoroge, is a former senior official at the IMF. Henry Rotich, the current Cabinet 
Secretary for the National Treasury, is also a former economist at the CBK, who has also been 
attached to the IMF Nairobi office, and has also consulted for its technical assistance arm, East 
AFRITAC. These professional and epistemic commitments make these financial sector 
ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴゲ ┌ﾐﾉｷﾆWﾉ┞ デﾗ ;Sﾗヮデ ヴ;SｷI;ﾉ ヮﾗﾉｷIｷWゲ デｴ;デ SWヮ;ヴデ aヴﾗﾏ デｴW BWIゲげ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ヮヴWゲIヴｷヮデｷﾗﾐゲく 
Second, at the domestic level, various social groups in Kenya continue to champion the rule of 
law uncritically because, in its conceptual indeterminacy and multiplicity, the concept appeals 
to their separate interests.687 D┌W デﾗ KWﾐ┞;げゲ ｴｷゲデﾗヴ┞ ﾗa Iﾗﾐゲデヴ;ｷﾐWS ;IIWゲゲ デﾗ ﾃ┌ゲデｷIWが ;ﾐS デｴW 
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684 Deloitte Consulting Limited (n 600). 
685 Sanya and Gaertner (n 591) 17; Wagh and others (n 534) 39. 
686 Santos (n 674) 298. 




abuse of State power, the formal conception of the rule of law appeals to a majority of Kenyans 
concerned with abuse of State discretion. The substantive conception of the rule of law, which 
emphasizes the protection of individual rights and freedoms, is also largely popular due to the 
history of State infringement of civil liberties. Property rights provide a shelter to the propertied 
group from redistributive State policies that have been recommended but not implemented by 
various government task forces and commissions on land. However, absolute protection of 
property rights is less popular with the un-landed, due to the economic inequality caused by 
illegal and inequitable appropriation of both public and private land by individuals and social 
groups. Various epistemic and social communities, including lawyers, judges and civil society 
organisation, also have reason to champion the rule of law for various ideological and practical 
interests.    
TｴW BWIゲげ IﾗﾐIWヮデ ﾗa デｴW ‘┌ﾉW ﾗa L;┘ ;ゲ ;ヮヮﾉｷWS ゲヮWIｷaｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ デﾗ デｴW ﾉｷHeralisation of financial 
markets in Kenya and other countries has emphasized the following aspects: first, there must 
be legal and political guarantees of civil liberties and property rights; second, there must be an 
efficient judicial system which reduces transaction costs and limits predatory behaviour; third, 
there must be legal security, that is, legal certainty, stability, predictability and prospective 
laws, which allow planning for future goals. These elements of the rule of law, the IMF argues, 
give borrowers and lenders the confidence to contract in the financial markets.688  
Consequently, these elements of the rule of law have informed the various policies that the 
IMF and World Bank have championed in Kenya through the FSAPs, Article IV consultations, 
the Financial and Legal Sector Technical Assistance Programme (FALSTAP), and the specific 
ways they have been translated into legislation, regulations and policies by the Kenya 
government. These include the following measures for reducing interest rates: the removal of 
costly banking regulations, including interest rate caps; removing hindrances to enforcement 
of collateral; encouraging bank transparency on loan charges; the privatisation of State-owned 
banks as a means of State withdrawal from the lending market; and information sharing 
between banks and regulators.689 
                                                          
688 Ralph Chami, Sunil Sharma and Connel Fullenkamp, A Framework for Financial Market Development 
(International Monetary Fund 2009) 13に14. 
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4. TｴW R┌ﾉW ﾗa L;┘げゲ RWゲデヴｷIデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa KWﾐ┞;げゲ IﾐデWヴWゲデ R;デW RWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ DWH;デW 
The ideological nature and role of the Rule of Law is through the abstraction of its partial and 
limited perspectives on equality, autonomy, and liberty, into universal, rational, transcendental 
and totalizing perspectives that are valid prerequisites in all social and economic conditions. 
This is evident in the four aspects of the Rule of Law. 
4.1. Sanctity of Property Rights in Debt Contracts 
TｴW ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ﾗa デｴW けゲ;ﾐIデｷデ┞ ﾗa ヮヴｷ┗;デW ヮヴﾗヮWヴデ┞げ ヴｷｪｴデゲ ゲWWゲ デｴW ヮヴﾗヮWヴデ┞ ヴｷｪｴデゲ ;ゲ ;ﾐデWIWSWﾐデ 
or forerunners to the State, and therefore more fundamental than any State claims.690 Within 
BWI orthodoxy, the deepening and development of financial markets in developing countries 
is predicated on legal and political guarantees of property rights, as one of the elements of the 
Rule of Law.691 This ideology has been rationalised through the Law and Finance Theory (LFT) 
research rubric developed by La Porta and others, who draw a causal linkage between legal 
systems on the one hand, and financial development, and supply of external credit and 
economic growth. LFT concludes that countries with a common law legal system have more 
developed financial systems with willing creditors, due to their comparatively stronger creditor 
rights protections, including property rights.692  
This theory has been challenged on various grounds, one being its establishment of weak 
causality between legal origins/legal traditions, and financial development. Fohlin, for example, 
argues that since the English financial system was imported into the countries under study, 
alongside the importation of the common law legal system, the causal impact of the latter on 
financial development cannot be separated from that of English financial institutions.693 A 
second challenge to the links between protection of formal property rights and financial 
development has arisen from the observation that Asian countries such as China have 
experienced periods of rapid economic growth and financial sector development, under a 
developmental State model that lacked the property rights protections under common law 
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691 Chami, Sharma and Fullenkamp (n 688) 13に14. 
692 ‘;a;Wﾉ L; Pﾗヴデ; ;ﾐS ﾗデｴWヴゲが けLWｪ;ﾉ DWデWヴﾏｷﾐ;ﾐデゲ ﾗa E┝デWヴﾐ;ﾉ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIWげ ふヱΓΓΑぶ ヵヲ The Journal of Finance 1131; 
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693 C;ヴﾗﾉｷﾐW Fﾗｴﾉｷﾐが けEIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIが PﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉが ;ﾐS LWｪ;ﾉ F;Iデﾗヴゲ ｷﾐ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ “┞ゲデWﾏ DW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデぎ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ 
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systems.694 A third challenge is that the law reform projects undertaken in developing countries 
have so far failed to yield the expected economic development.695 
The ideology of the sanctity of private property, based on the LFT rationalisation, has informed 
the reforms formulated by Kenyan financial policy makers, regulators and legislators, aimed at 
entrenching the rule of law and property rights, as a means of deepening the financial sector 
and the availability of credit. This includes protection of property rights through preserving 
certainty in, and ensuring the enforcement of financial contracts such as debt instruments.696 
Iﾐ ;SSｷデｷﾗﾐが KWﾐ┞;げゲ ﾐWｪ;デｷ┗W Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ “WIデﾗヴ AゲゲWゲゲﾏWﾐデ Pヴﾗｪヴ;ﾏ ふF“APぶ ヴWヮﾗヴデゲ ヮヴWヮ;ヴWS 
jointly by the BWIs, as part of the Article IV consultations, have also compelled amendments to 
insolvency laws aimed at presWヴ┗ｷﾐｪ IヴWSｷデﾗヴげゲ ヮヴﾗヮWヴデ┞ ヴｷｪｴデゲ ｷﾐ SWHデ Iﾗﾐデヴ;Iデゲく697 This has 
ゲｴｷaデWS KWﾐ┞;げゲ ｷﾐゲﾗﾉ┗WﾐI┞ ヴWｪｷﾏW aヴﾗﾏ ; Iﾗﾏﾏ┌ﾐｷデ;ヴｷ;ﾐ ヮｴｷﾉﾗゲﾗヮｴ┞ ;ｷﾏWS ;デ ヴWIﾗｪﾐｷゲｷﾐｪ デｴW 
┘ｷSWヴ ゲデ;ﾆWｴﾗﾉSWヴ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデゲ ｷﾐ デｴW W┗Wﾐデ ﾗa aｷヴﾏ ﾉｷケ┌ｷS;デｷﾗﾐが デﾗ ﾗﾐW ;ゲゲWヴデｷﾐｪ デｴW CヴWSｷデﾗヴゲげ 
Bargain.698 
The ideology of the sanctity of property rights therefore reifies the debt contract as a juridical 
relationship between a creditor and debtor; the creditor owns the property rights in the debt 
contract, which is a けchose in actionげ.699 The rule of law therefore takes a reductionist approach 
to the problem of high interest rates, high indebtedness and constrained access to credit, 
regarding these issues as juridical rather than political-economy issues.700 This reductionist 
;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴ ヮヴWIﾉ┌SWゲ けヴWSｷゲデヴｷH┌デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ヮヴｷ┗;デW ヮヴﾗヮWヴデ┞げ ｷﾐ デｴW aﾗヴﾏ ﾗa ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デW ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐが 
as political options for addressing high indebtedness or lack of affordable credit. Hence, despite 
the popularity of interest rate caps or other political forms of intervention to lower the cost of 
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695 Santos (n 674) 254. 
696 Nﾃ┌ｪ┌ﾐ; “ NS┌ﾐｪげ┌が けGﾗ┗Wヴﾐﾗヴげゲ ‘Wﾏ;ヴﾆゲ ;デ デｴW L;┌ﾐIｴ ﾗa デｴW “デ┌S┞ ‘Wヮﾗヴデ ﾗﾐ デｴW Cﾗゲデ ﾗa Cﾗﾉﾉ;デWヴ;ﾉ ｷﾐ 
KWﾐ┞;げ ふL;┌ﾐIｴ of the Study Report on Cost of Collateral in Kenya, Nairobi, 24 March 2010). 
697 International Monetary Fund, Kenya: 2001 Article IV Consultation-Staff Report; Staff Supplement; and 
Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion (International Monetary Fund 2002). 
698 Fﾗヴ ; SｷゲI┌ゲゲｷﾗﾐ ﾗa Iﾗﾏﾏ┌ﾐｷデ;ヴｷ;ﾐ デｴWﾗヴ┞ ﾗa H;ﾐﾆヴ┌ヮデI┞ ﾉ;┘が ゲWW K;ヴWﾐ Gヴﾗゲゲが けT;ﾆｷﾐｪ Cﾗﾏﾏ┌ﾐｷデ┞ IﾐデWヴWゲデゲ 
into Account in Bankruptcy: An Eゲゲ;┞げ ふヱΓΓヴぶ Αヲ Wash. ULQ 1031. Fﾗヴ ; SｷゲI┌ゲゲｷﾗﾐ ﾗﾐ デｴW CヴWSｷデﾗヴゲげ B;ヴｪ;ｷﾐが 
ゲWW Tｴﾗﾏ;ゲ H J;Iﾆゲﾗﾐが けB;ﾐﾆヴ┌ヮデI┞が Nﾗﾐ-B;ﾐﾆヴ┌ヮデI┞ EﾐデｷデﾉWﾏWﾐデゲが ;ﾐS デｴW CヴWSｷデﾗヴゲげ B;ヴｪ;ｷﾐげ ふヱΓΒヲぶ Γヱ TｴW 
Yale Law Journal 857. TｴW CヴWSｷデﾗヴゲげ B;ヴｪ;ｷﾐ デｴWゲｷゲ ;ヴｪ┌Wゲ デｴ;デ H;ﾐﾆヴ┌ヮデI┞ ﾉ;┘ ゲｴﾗ┌ﾉS ヴWゲヮWIデ デｴW IヴWSｷデﾗヴげゲ 
contractual and proprietary rights and expectations that motivated them to grant credit in the first place. 
699 TｴW W┝ヮヴWゲゲｷﾗﾐ ろIｴﾗゲW ｷﾐ ;Iデｷﾗﾐろ ﾏW;ﾐゲ け; デｴｷﾐｪ ヴWIﾗ┗Wヴ;HﾉW H┞ ;Iデｷﾗﾐげが ;ゲ Iﾗﾐデヴ;ゲデWS ┘ｷデｴ ; けIｴﾗゲW ｷﾐ 
ヮﾗゲゲWゲゲｷﾗﾐげが ┘ｴｷIｴ ｷs a thing of which a person may have physical possession. The meaning has expanded 
over time to include all personal rights of property which can only be claimed or enforced by action, and not 
by taking physical possession. See R v Hallam and Blackburn [1995] Crim LR 323, CA. 
700 Iﾉゲ┌ヮ Aｴﾐが けDWIﾗﾐゲデヴ┌Iデｷﾐｪ デｴW EIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞ ﾗa DWHデぎ K;ヴﾉ M;ヴ┝が J┑ヴｪWﾐ H;HWヴﾏ;ゲが ;ﾐS ;ﾐ EデｴｷIゲ ﾗa DWHデげ ヶ 




credit, the CBK, the National Treasury and other financial policy makers and regulators read 
aヴﾗﾏ デｴW ゲ;ﾏW ゲIヴｷヮデ ;ゲ デｴW IMF ;ﾐS WﾗヴﾉS B;ﾐﾆが ﾗヮヮﾗゲｷﾐｪ P;ヴﾉｷ;ﾏWﾐデげゲ ﾉWｪｷゲﾉ;デｷ┗W ;デデWﾏヮデゲく701  
The contradiction and concealment inherent in the ideology of sanctity of private property are 
two-fold. First, the rule of law naturalises property rights (including financial instruments such 
as debt contracts), concealing the fact that they are a product of the constitutive power of the 
law, which defines property rights into existence. Consequently, Kenyan judges, regulators and 
policy makers find it untenable to define other alternative kinds of property rights, duties, 
privileges and entitlements between lenders and borrowers in law. The English Common Law 
provisions of finance law continue to police the nature of the lending contract, exerting a 
restrictive constitutional form of influence on the cognitive possibilities of judges, regulators 
and policy makers, despite the Common L;┘げゲ ｷﾐaWヴｷﾗヴｷデ┞ デﾗ KWﾐ┞;ﾐ Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デional and 
legislative provisions. The rule of law ideologically obscures the fact that specific patterns of 
rights, allocation and entitlement are historically and socially contingent, and that even the 
history of the Western developed economies is one of repeated inventions and 
experimentations with different concepts of property.702 
“WIﾗﾐSが デｴW ヴWｷaｷI;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa けaｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ;ゲゲWデゲ ;ゲ ヮヴｷ┗;デW ヮヴﾗヮWヴデ┞げ aヴﾗﾏ デｴW “デ;デW ﾗHゲI┌ヴWゲ デｴW a;Iデ 
that property rights exist only as long as they are accredited, legitimated and enforceable by 
the State, against any general or specific third party.703 Money (and by extension a debt 
contract) is as much tangible as it is intangible, its value pegged on rhetoric, faith expectation, 
and the multiple assurances of the State to maintain the stability of the monetary system 
through various measures.704 First, the State creates fiat money, which, as legal tender, is the 
most common form of credit. Second, the CBK guarantees the liquidity of commercial banks 
and the financial markets by acting as a lender of last resort, having licensed the banks to create 
electronic money, and lend money they do not have, through leveraging. Third, since the 
emergence of systemic risk concerns and the frequent financial crises, banks have benefitted 
                                                          
701 Patrick NjoroｪWが けB;ﾐﾆｷﾐｪ “WIデﾗヴ ‘Waﾗヴﾏゲ Wｷﾉﾉ ‘WS┌IW Cﾗゲデ ﾗa CヴWSｷデげ Business Daily (Nairobi, 2 August 
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Law School 2009) Working Paper 3. 
703 Deakin and others (n 54) 192に193. 




from an almost guaranteed assurance of taxpayer-funded bail-outs. Within this context, the 
argument for property rights in debt contracts preceding the State, and the discounting of 
redistributive policies in interest rates markets, are untenable.  
The rule of law holds out property rights in debt contracts as distinguished from public 
property, and unproblematically conceptualises them as universal, apolitical, asocial, natural, 
and rational. Sanctity of property rights as a policy framework has thus become a self-
referencing feedback loop of policy rationale, used to adjudicate issues of inequality in 
neoliberal capitalism, which issues have been partly created by the structure of property rights. 
Aside from the high interest rates problem, the touting of sanctity of property rights as a policy 
goal in Kenya has prevented the State from confronting widely-acknowledged resource 
distribution challenges, such as illegally and fraudulently-acquired land titles. For example, 
after decades of inequitable, illegal and fraudulent alienation of public and private land by a 
minority of citizens, successive government task forces and commissions have investigated and 
offered recommendations for resolving the issue.705 One of the main reasons for the 
ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデゲげ ヴWﾉ┌Iデ;ﾐIW デﾗ ヴWvoke land titles has been its impact on the financial sector, since 
banks have collateralised these properties.706 While it is reasonable to take into account the 
concerns of the financial sector, which may lose their collateral, it is noteworthy that these 
concerns are prioritized over the adverse impact that land inequality has caused to the poor 
citizens. In fact, due to デｴW ヮヴｷﾗヴｷデ┞ ｪヴ;ﾐデWS デﾗ デｴW ゲ;ﾐIデｷデ┞ ﾗa ヮヴｷ┗;デW ﾉ;ﾐS デｷデﾉWゲが デｴW NS┌ﾐｪげ┌ 
Land Commission report documented the tactic of collateralising fraudulently alienated land 
as one of the strategies used by Kenyan lawyers in legitimising legally-void land titles.707    
This substantive notion of the rule of law adopted by the BWIs (in specific instances), and which 
emphasizes the protection of property rights (at the expense of other socio-economic rights), 
has thus been used to protect the owners of credit finance (in this instance, the lenders) from 
redistributive policies. Legislation has only been deemed to have been legitimately used to 
substantively interfere with the rights of parties to a contract, in the establishment of a credit 
information sharing system. As discussed more substantively in Chapter 6, the Kenyan 
                                                          
705 “WWが aﾗヴ W┝;ﾏヮﾉWが ‘Wヮ┌HﾉｷI ﾗa KWﾐ┞;が け‘Wヮﾗヴデ ﾗa デｴW Cﾗﾏﾏｷゲゲｷﾗﾐ ﾗa Iﾐケ┌ｷヴ┞ ｷﾐデﾗ IﾉﾉWｪ;ﾉっIヴヴWｪ┌ﾉ;ヴ AﾉﾉﾗI;デｷﾗﾐ 
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‘WIﾗﾐIｷﾉｷ;デｷﾗﾐ Cﾗﾏﾏｷゲゲｷﾗﾐげ ふGﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデ PヴｷﾐデWヴゲ ヲヰヱンぶく 
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Centre for Open Governance 2009) 24. 
707 “WW AﾏHヴWWﾐ; M;ﾐﾃｷが けTｴW Gヴ;HHWS “デ;デWぎ L;┘┞Wヴゲが PﾗﾉｷデｷIゲ ;ﾐS P┌HﾉｷI L;ﾐS ｷﾐ KWﾐ┞;げ ふヲヰヱヲぶ ヵヰ TｴW Jﾗ┌ヴﾐ;l 
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Parliament and the financial regulators have used legislation to dispossess borrowers of their 
rights to privacy, to the commercial use of their credit information, and to sue lenders in tort, 
and licensed it to credit referencing bureaus and banks, in a bid to commodify, and facilitate 
the market for, credit information.  
Aゲ ﾐﾗデWS H┞ Tゲｴ┌ﾏ;が デｴW WﾗヴﾉS B;ﾐﾆげゲ IﾗﾐIWヮデ ﾗa デｴW ヴ┌ﾉW ﾗa L;┘が ヮ;ゲゲWS Sﾗ┘ﾐ デﾗ SW┗Wﾉﾗヮｷﾐｪ 
countries such as Kenya, only legitimises State coercion of individuals and the use of law to 
usurp the will of individuals, in the establishment of markets. This is where there is need for 
the commodification of all means of production to facilitate liberal market capitalism, 
especially where commodification cannot occur naturally, since it entails traumatic 
consequences for the parties that are dispossessed in the process.708 This demonstrates the 
contradiction inherent in the ideology of the sanctity of private property, as conceptualized in 
デｴW WﾗヴﾉS B;ﾐﾆげゲ ‘┌ﾉW ﾗa L;┘ ヮヴﾗｪヴ;ﾏゲく  
4.2. Individual Liberty to Contract  
The ideology of liberty asserts freedom from interference with the person or property, and, 
similar to private property rights, is deemed to precede the establishment of the State. This 
implies that the State can only interfere with individual rights and freedoms in the course of 
protecting equal liberty for all individuals.709 The concept of individual liberty constructs the 
separate spheres of the public and the private, and, borrowing from the assertions of 
liberalism, recognises the economic benefits of free choice.710 This paradigm was recognised in 
the Thuku Kirori case, where the Kenyan High Court stated: 
さ; ﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉｷゲWS ﾏ;ヴﾆWデ Wﾐ┗ｷゲ;ｪWゲ IﾗﾏヮWデｷデｷﾗﾐ ┘ｴWヴW デｴW Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴ ｷゲ ヮヴWゲWﾐデWS ┘ｷデｴ ; 
variety of choices from which he may pick the most suitable for his needs subject only 
to his capacity to access them; this must be what the doctrine of laissez-faire is all 
about. Competition does not clog but rather oils the engine of a liberalised market 
WIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞くざ711 
This ideology has underpinned the financial market and specifically interest rate liberalisation 
ヮﾗﾉｷIｷWゲ ;S┗ﾗI;デWS H┞ デｴW BWIゲが KWﾐ┞;げゲ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ﾏ;ﾆWヴゲ ;ﾐS ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴゲが ;ﾐS デｴW 
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local banking sector. As discussed above, the BWI FSAP regulatory prescriptions, supported by 
the Legal Theory of Finance (LTF) research findings, advocate the removal of interest rate 
regulations, and the enforcement of credit contracts by the courts, as necessary preconditions 
for the availability of credit in the economy.712 The ideology of individual liberty rests on the 
assumption that all parties to a credit agreement, whether powerful banks or uneducated 
individuals, make the best decisions that result in optimal lending activity in the credit markets. 
By uncritically invoking concepts suIｴ ;ゲ けヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲｷHｷﾉｷデ┞げが けｷﾐデWﾐデｷﾗﾐげ ;ﾐS けa;┌ﾉデげ ふ┘ｴｷIｴ ;ヴW 
borrowed from a range of liberal philosophical and sociological claims), the rule of law 
presupposes the active will of the legal subject in entering debt contracts.713  
The ideological aspect of this claim is that it constructs a partial, limited conception of liberty 
as freedom of the person and property only from interference by the State and the law, while 
excluding interference from private persons. The first ideological element relates to the nature 
of debt finance in the private sphere. The construction of a private sphere where individuals 
are free to own property, such as debt contracts, for example, homogenises property rights 
(debt contracts) to consist of neutral control over objects, rather than the reality of control 
over human subjects (in this case, debtors), distorting the social and political nature of debt 
contracts.714 The private sphere is thus not necessarily a sphere of liberty. More critical 
conceptions see debt finance as the art ﾗa ﾏ;ﾐｷヮ┌ﾉ;デｷﾐｪ WﾐSゲが ; IヴWSｷデﾗヴげゲ ｪﾗ┗Wヴﾐ;ﾐIW ﾗa デｴW 
SWHデﾗヴげゲ a┌デ┌ヴWが ;ﾐS デｴW colonisation ﾗa デｴW ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉ SWHデﾗヴげゲ ヮ┌ヴヮﾗゲWく Iﾐ デｴｷゲ IﾗﾐデW┝デが デｴW 
spurious end-ｪﾗ;ﾉ ﾗa SWHデ ゲ;デｷゲa;Iデｷﾗﾐ I;ﾐ ┌ゲ┌ヴヮ ;ﾐ ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉ SWHデﾗヴげゲ ヴW;ゲﾗﾐ aﾗヴ HWｷﾐｪく715  
The ideology of individual liberty therefore conceals the illiberal power of debt, even within the 
┌ﾐヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デWS ヮヴｷ┗;デW ゲヮｴWヴWく Iデ デｴ┌ゲ ｷｪﾐﾗヴWゲ デｴW IﾗWヴIｷ┗W ヮﾗ┘Wヴ ﾗa IヴWSｷデﾗヴゲげ ヮヴﾗヮWヴデ┞ ヴｷｪｴデゲ ｷﾐ 
debt contracts, and how the uncritical elevation of these rights in liberal market capitalism 
infringes on other fundamental rights and freedoms, including socio-economic rights. BWIs 
have deliberately excluded socio-economic rights from their conception of rule of law and good 
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714 Weitzer (n 646) 145. 
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governance, arguing that these rights are in the sphere of the political, over which the BWIs 
allegedly have no jurisdiction, rather than the economic, which is their main mandate.716    
The second ideological aspect is that while liberty is defined as freedom from legal interference, 
it is the same culprit (the law) that has the power to define the boundaries of this liberty. Liberty 
thus becomes an empty concept. Hale argues that property rights are best conceptualised as 
delegations of State authority to a minority of private individuals. Consequently, since property 
rights embody the legally constituted power of the State, individuals in non-regulatory Laissez 
Faire markets are subject to coercive power similar to regulated markets. By this logic, it is 
discernible that the private sphere of unregulated credit agreements is not necessarily a sphere 
of liberty and the exercise of free choice, especially by borrowers. They are subject to the 
legally-constituted and State-maintained coercive and disciplining power of capital, especially 
in an increasingly financialised economy. With the limited conception, the Rule of Law fails to 
IﾗﾐIWヮデ┌;ﾉｷゲW ﾉｷHWヴデ┞ ﾏﾗヴW Hヴﾗ;Sﾉ┞が ;ゲ ; さｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉ ;HゲWﾐIW ﾗa Iﾗﾐゲデヴ;ｷﾐデゲ ﾗﾐ ﾉWｪｷデｷﾏ;デW ;Iデｷ┗ｷデｷWゲ 
ﾗヴ ;ゲ aヴWWSﾗﾏ aﾗヴ a┌ﾉaｷﾉﾏWﾐデざく717 Chapter 6 of this study explores, for example, how the legal 
construction of a debtor information market in Kenya through the establishment of licensed 
Credit Reference Bureaus (CRBs) touts credit scoring and reporting as a free market solution to 
the problem of information asymmetry and high interest rates, while ideologically concealing 
the legally-deepened power asymmetries in favour of banks. 
The third ideological aspect is that the Rule of Law rationale for protecting the private sphere 
from State interference or power ignores or is blind to the manifest exercise of private power 
in the private sphere, characterised by power asymmetries and other types of inequality. For 
example, formal-liberal law fails to recognise the way the identity and capacity of certain 
individual borrowers is confined to a private sphere in which they are disempowered. In 
KWﾐ┞;げゲ IﾗﾐデW┝デが デｴｷゲ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS ｷﾐIﾉ┌SW IWヴデ;ｷﾐ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉﾉ┞ ﾏ;ヴｪｷﾐ;ﾉｷゲWS ｪヴﾗ┌ヮゲ ｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ ┘ﾗﾏWﾐが 
rural folk, the uneducated, and the poor.718 Iﾐ ゲ┌Iｴ IﾗﾐデW┝デが デｴW ‘┌ﾉW ﾗa L;┘げゲ Wﾏヮｴ;ゲｷゲ ﾗﾐ 
protection of liberties in the private sphere from State interference fails to address the 
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718 Central Bank of Kenya, Kenya National Bureau of Statistics and Financial Sector Deepening (FSD) Kenya, 
けTｴW ヲヰヱヶ FｷﾐAIIWゲゲ Hﾗ┌ゲWｴﾗﾉS “┌ヴ┗W┞げ ふFｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ “WIデﾗヴ DWWヮWﾐｷﾐｪ ふF“Dぶ KWﾐ┞; ヲヰヱヶぶ ヵに8. According to the 
report, the financial marginalised and unempowered individuals in Kenya include women, rural populations, 
the less educated, the poor, the unemployed, and individuals from certain regions, including Western Kenya 




inequities and power hierarchies inherent in consumer credit agreements, rendering the 
weaker party marginal to the operation of law, by assigning their identity to the private 
sphere.719 
In Kenyaげゲ ﾉWﾐSｷﾐｪ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデが H;ﾐﾆゲ ｴ;┗W ｴｷゲデﾗヴｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ ﾏ;ｷﾐデ;ｷﾐWS ;ﾐ ｷﾐﾗヴSｷﾐ;デWﾉ┞ ヮﾗ┘Wヴa┌ﾉ ヴﾗﾉW ｷﾐ 
credit contracting, including fixing non-negotiable, high interest rates, and in most instances 
maintaining the contractual discretion to vary the rate of interest by any margin, which may 
ﾗﾐﾉ┞ W┝ ヮﾗゲデ HW SWWﾏWS ヴW;ゲﾗﾐ;HﾉW ﾗヴ ┌ﾐヴW;ゲﾗﾐ;HﾉW H;ゲWS ﾗﾐ デｴW Iﾗ┌ヴデゲげ SｷゲIヴWデｷﾗﾐく KWﾐ┞;ﾐ 
Iﾗ┌ヴデゲ ｴ;┗W ﾗa Iﾗ┌ヴゲW デ;ﾆWﾐ ; ヴWゲデヴ;ｷﾐWS ;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴ デﾗ┘;ヴSゲ Hﾗヴヴﾗ┘Wヴゲげ ヮヴ;┞Wヴゲ aﾗヴ ﾃ┌SｷIｷ;ﾉ 
variation of contractual interest rates, opining that they are reluctant to interfere with, or 
rewrite contracts, unless the borrower pleads and proves that the contract is either harsh, 
illegal, fraudulent, or unconscionable.720  
In this context, it is discernible that the partial, limited conception of liberty ideologically 
restricts the options available to Kenyan financial sector policy makers and regulators for 
addressing the problem of high interest rates and high indebtedness in Kenya, when financial 
sector reform projects are framed within, or undergirded by the rule of law.   
4.3. Minimalist State Interference in the Credit Market 
The ideology of the minimalist State asserts that the State exists to preserve, and prevent the 
interference with, the free interaction of citizens by means of contract and property, which 
ｷﾐデWヴ;Iデｷﾗﾐ ｷゲ SWWﾏWS ; けゲヮﾗﾐデ;ﾐWﾗ┌ゲげ ﾏWIｴ;ﾐｷゲﾏ ﾗa Iｷ┗ｷﾉ ゲﾗIｷWデ┞く721 This assertion, forming 
one of the direct linkages between liberalism and the Rule of Law, is one of the underlying 
premises of the World Bank and IMF financial liberalisation programs in Kenya, which have 
sought to deepen the financial markets and increase access to finance, through the roll-back of 
State involvement in the sector. At the core of this ideology is the argument that the market 
has far superior information compared to the State, whose interventions can only be sub-
optimal and distortive of the efficient, independent markets.  
TｴW ﾏﾗゲデ SWaｷﾐｷデｷ┗W ﾗa デｴW KWﾐ┞; ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげゲ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ヴWIﾗﾏﾏWﾐS;デｷﾗﾐゲ aﾗヴ ﾉﾗ┘Wヴｷﾐｪ デｴW ｴｷｪｴ 
lending rates, spelt out in the 2004 budget speech, were fundamentally shaped by the legal 
                                                          
719 C;ﾏWヴﾗﾐ “デW┘;ヴデが けTｴW ‘┌ﾉW ﾗa L;┘ ;ﾐS デｴW TｷﾐﾆWヴHWﾉﾉ EaaWIデぎ TｴWﾗヴWデｷI;ﾉ CﾗﾐゲｷSWヴ;デｷﾗﾐゲが Cヴｷデｷcisms and 
J┌ゲデｷaｷI;デｷﾗﾐゲ aﾗヴ デｴW ‘┌ﾉW ﾗa L;┘げ ふヲヰヰヴぶ ヴ M;Iケ┌;ヴｷW L;┘ Jﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉ ヱンヵが ヱヴΓく 
720 See Margaret Njeri Muiruri v Bank of Baroda (Kenya) Limited [2014] eKLR (The Court of Appeal at Nairobi). 





ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ﾗa デｴW ﾏｷﾐｷﾏ;ﾉｷゲデ “デ;デWく TｴWゲW ヮﾗﾉｷIｷWゲ ｷﾐIﾉ┌SWSぎ デｴW ヴWヮW;ﾉ ﾗa デｴW けDﾗﾐSW AIデげ 
legislative caps on interest rates; the reduction of bank regulations to reduce cost of regulatory 
compliance; the privatisation of government-owned banks; and the increased autonomy of the 
CBK monetary policy making.722   
Gヴ;ﾐデWSが デｴW KWﾐ┞; ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげゲ けSW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデal “デ;デWげ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ﾏﾗSWﾉ デｴ;デ aﾗﾉﾉﾗ┘WS デｴW 
1963 independence from British colonial rule was blighted by corruption, which derailed the 
same economic development blueprint that succeeded in East Asian countries. Nevertheless, 
it is notable that the private sector itself is dominated by political elites with direct connections 
to State officers, and in fact private banks owned by State officers act as conduits for laundering 
proceeds of State corruption. Hence the premises underpinning the roll-back of State 
intervention in the interest rate markets に that of efficient and optimal free markets - are not 
supported by the context.  
The ideology of the minimalist State also harbours certain inconsistencies, contradictions and 
complexities that have sustained a bias for neoliberal markets. The ideology reifies the financial 
markets as an economic sphere that is free of the social and the political, which distinction 
should be maintained through, for example, making the monetary policy making organs and 
processes of the CBK independent and autonomous. As has been discussed extensively in 
Cｴ;ヮデWヴ ヴが デｴW ┗ｷW┘ ﾗa KWﾐ┞;げゲ H;ﾐﾆｷﾐｪ ゲWIデﾗヴ ;ゲ ;political is untenable, considering the 
legitimate and illegitimate political patronage, and taxpayer subsidies that have historically 
;IIﾗ┌ﾐデWS aﾗヴ ヮヴｷ┗;デW H;ﾐﾆゲげ ヮヴﾗaｷデゲく  
Iﾐ ;SSｷデｷﾗﾐが けｷﾐSWヮWﾐSWﾐデげ CBK ﾏﾗﾐWデ;ヴ┞ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ﾏ;ﾆｷﾐｪ SWIｷゲｷﾗﾐゲ ;ﾐS ヮヴﾗIWゲゲWゲ ｴ;┗W 
historically been used to fund incumbent ruling parties in general elections, and also to rig 
financial markets in favour of politically-connected private banks. The rationalisation of 
ﾏﾗﾐWデ;ヴ┞ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ﾏ;ﾆｷﾐｪ ;ゲ けデWIｴﾐｷI;ﾉげが W┗Wﾐ ｷﾐ ｷﾐゲデ;ﾐIWゲ ﾗa けヴW;ﾉ ;┌デﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞げ ;ﾐS デｴW ;HゲWﾐIW ﾗa 
illegal influences, still fails the claim to technocracy and political neutrality. This is because CBK 
interventions to alter interest rates, exchange rates, liquidity, and inflation are still tied to 
political and social interests, as these interventions navigate various biases and interests: 
labour versus capital; exporters versus importers; financial capital versus industry; and local 
versus transnational capital.723     
                                                          
722 H;ﾐゲ;ヴS ESｷデﾗヴが けFｷﾐ;ﾐIW MｷﾐｷゲデWヴげゲ ヲヰヰヴ B┌SｪWデ “ヮWWIｴげ ふﾐ ヶΒΓぶ ヱΒヱヴく 
723 Dunn (n 704) 208. The author argues that money and finance are usually presented as complex, technical 




The ideology also naturalises the financial markets as phenomena pre-existing the State, and 
ゲWWﾆゲ デﾗ ﾏ;ｷﾐデ;ｷﾐ デｴｷゲ けﾐ;デ┌ヴ;ﾉげ a┌ﾐIデｷﾗﾐｷﾐｪ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ デｴW ヴWﾏﾗ┗;ﾉ ﾗa ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デW I;ヮゲ ;ﾐS ﾗデｴWヴ 
けヴWS┌ﾐS;ﾐデげ Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴ ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲが ;ﾐS ;ﾉゲﾗ デｴW ┘ｷデｴSヴ;┘;ﾉ ﾗa ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデ aヴﾗﾏ デｴW ﾏ;ヴﾆWデが 
through the privatisation of State-owned banks.724 This ideology conceals the integral role of 
the State and law in constituting financial markets. As discussed above, the State has 
historically underpinned the financial markets by legislating into existence various financial 
assets, and by guaranteeing these assets. In addition, it conceals the historical role of the State 
in spurring economic development and enterprise in some of the developed countries boasting 
a Rule of Law constitutional foundation, include State-sponsored imperial excursions and 
modern military engagements in search of new markets and free or discounted raw 
materials.725 In addition, by narrativizing financial deepening and economic development as 
predicated entirely on market liberalisation, the rule of law discourse obscures alternative 
development models such as the East-Aゲｷ;ﾐ ゲデﾗヴ┞が ｷﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ ; けSW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデal “デ;デWげ ﾏﾗSWﾉ 
achieved a commendable measure of financial and economic development without financial 
market liberalisation, and other rule of law prescriptions such as private property rights and 
protection of specific forms of property rights.726 
Thus, the ideological imperative for State withdrawal from financial markets fails to take into 
account the reason for the establishment of government owned banks immediately after 
independence; parastatal commercial banks were meant to finance local or indigenous 
businesses, which at that time were ignored by the foreign-owned banks that dominated the 
market.727 Tｴｷゲ aﾗヴWｷｪﾐ Sﾗﾏｷﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa KWﾐ┞;げゲ H;ﾐﾆｷﾐｪ ゲWIデﾗヴ ヮWヴゲｷゲデゲ デﾗ S;デWが ┘ｷデｴ ; ヴヵХ 
market share.728 In fact, the large foreign banks only concentrated on lending to large corporate 
borrowers and the government, until Equity Bank, a new entrant in the sector, demonstrated 
the profitability of the lower rung of the market by lending to small-scale traders and farmers.  
                                                          
monetary policy with distributional consequences seem inconsequential, while finance takes on the 
appearance of a transcendental power. 
724 This ideology has been passed down by the BWIs to the Kenya government. See, for example, the Finance 
MｷﾐｷゲデWヴげゲ ヲヰヰヴ ヮヴﾗヮﾗゲ;ﾉゲ ﾗﾐ ヴWS┌Iｷﾐｪ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デWゲが ｷﾐ H;ﾐゲ;ヴS ESｷデﾗヴが けFｷﾐ;ﾐIW MｷﾐｷゲデWヴげゲ ヲヰヰヴ B┌SｪWデ 
“ヮWWIｴげ ふﾐ ヶΒΓぶく 
725 Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law (n 271) 167に168. Anghie notes that 
one of the objectives of colonial administrators under the Mandate System was to convert colonial natives 
into capitalist consumers and introduce them into the market system. See also, Harvey (n 3) 15, 27, 39. Harvey 
notes the violent imposition of neoliberal economics, such as the explicit and implicit US military 
interventions in Chile, Argentina, and Iraq. 
726 See generally Rodrik (n 135). 
727 Brownbridge, Government Policies and the Development of Banking in Kenya (n 584) 4. 




The utility of maintaining government-owned bank presence in such a context of market 
domination by foreign banks is especially underscored when account is taken of the 
implications of the conceptualisation of credit worthiness and default probability using credit 
scoring technologies calibrated in foreign lending markets. Foreign banks may refrain from 
lending to lower segments of the borrower market, due to the inability to contextualise their 
credit scoring models to the Kenyan context.729 This is discussed in further detail in Chapter 6. 
The privatisation of government banks as a means of deepening the local financial markets 
therefore does not address the problem of unaffordable credit, and in fact further 
disadvantages the borrowers. 
Lｷデｷｪ;デｷﾐｪ デｴW Mｷﾐｷﾏ;ﾉｷゲデ Sデ;デWげゲ RWｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa IﾐデWヴWゲデ R;デWゲ 
The impact of this ideology on financial sector regulators and policy makers was demonstrated 
ｷﾐ デｴW CBKげゲ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲW デﾗ デｴW Albert Ruturi case730 Iﾐ ヲヰヰヱが ｷﾐ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲW デﾗ P;ヴﾉｷ;ﾏWﾐデげゲ 
Wﾐ;IデﾏWﾐデ ﾗa ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デW I;ヮゲ ふﾆﾐﾗ┘ﾐ ;ゲ けデｴW DﾗﾐSW AIデげぶ,731 the Kenya Bankers Association 
(KBA), challenged the constitutionality of the legislation at the High Court, on the basis that it 
created retrospective criminal offenses.732 The second limb of the suit is of more interest in the 
present discussion. The CBK requested to be enjoined in the suit, and iﾐ ゲ┌ヮヮﾗヴデ ﾗa デｴW KBAげゲ 
position, petitioned the Court to declare the Donde Act unconstitutional, and thus void. The 
basis ﾗa デｴW CBKげゲ ヮWデｷデｷﾗﾐ ┘;ゲ that the interest rate capping measures offended the statutory 
objectives of the CBK to けaﾗゲデWヴ デｴW ﾉｷケ┌ｷSｷデ┞が ゲﾗﾉ┗WﾐI┞が ;ﾐS ヮヴﾗヮWヴ a┌ﾐIデｷﾗﾐｷﾐｪ ﾗa ; ゲデ;HﾉW 
market-H;ゲWS aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ゲ┞ゲデWﾏげ ;ﾐS デｴW ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげゲ ﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ け┘ｴｷIｴ ｷゲ aﾗヴ 
ﾗヮデｷﾏ┌ﾏ ｪヴﾗ┘デｴ ;ﾐS SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ aヴWW aヴﾗﾏ ;Sﾏｷﾐｷゲデヴ;デｷ┗W ｷﾐデWヴaWヴWﾐIWくげ TｴW CBK ;ﾉゲﾗ ;ヴｪ┌WS 
デｴ;デ さｷデ did not make economic sense to control interest rates, and yet leave out of control 
                                                          
729 Micro-Fｷﾐ;ﾐIW ‘ｷゲﾆ M;ﾐ;ｪWﾏWﾐデ LLCが けTｴW PﾗデWﾐデｷ;ﾉ aﾗヴ CヴWSｷデ “Iﾗヴｷﾐｪ aﾗヴ “ME LWﾐSｷﾐｪ ｷﾐ KWﾐ┞;げ ふFｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ 
Sector Deepening (FSD) Kenya 2008) Report Commissioned by F“D KWﾐ┞;げゲ Gヴﾗ┘デｴFｷﾐ Pヴﾗｪヴ;ﾏﾏW ヲン. The 
authors recount the decision of CitiGroup, a US bank, to close the SME division of its Kenyan subsidiary, as its 
credit scoring model declared the sector of high credit risk, despite the patent profitability of the sector. 
730 Albert Ruturi , J.K. Wanywela & Kenya Bankers Association V The Minister of Finance & Attorney General 
and Central Bank of Kenya (n 564). 
731 Central Bank of Kenya (Amendment) Act No. 4 of 2001, Laws of Kenya. The amendment introduced a 
section 39(1) to the CWﾐデヴ;ﾉ B;ﾐﾆ ﾗa KWﾐ┞; AIデが ┘ｴｷIｴ ヮヴﾗ┗ｷSWS デｴ;デぎ さふヱぶ デｴW ﾏ;┝ｷﾏ┌ﾏ ヴ;デW ﾗa ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ┘ｴｷIｴ 
specified banks, or specified financial institutions may charge on loans or advances shall be the 91-day 
Treasury Bill rate published by the Bank on the last Friday of each month, or the latest 91-day Treasury Bill 
rate, plus four per-IWﾐデ┌ﾏぐ ふヲぶ デｴW ﾏｷﾐｷﾏ┌ﾏ ヴ;デW ﾗa ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ┘ｴｷIｴ ゲヮWIｷaｷWS H;ﾐﾆゲが ﾗヴ ゲヮWIｷaｷWS aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ 
institutions may pay on deposits held in interest-earning accounts shall be seventy per-centum of the 91-day 
Treasury Bill rate published by the Bank on the last Friday of each month, or the latest 91-day Treasury Bill 
ヴ;デWぐざ 
732 Albert Ruturi , J.K. Wanywela & Kenya Bankers Association V The Minister of Finance & Attorney General 




other forces in the economy, because this would lead to distortions and misallocation of 
ヮヴﾗS┌Iデｷ┗W ヴWゲﾗ┌ヴIWゲくざ A ﾐﾗデ;HﾉW ;ヴｪ┌ﾏWﾐデ ┘;ゲ デｴ;デ デｴW ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デW I;ヮヮｷﾐｪ ﾏW;ゲ┌ヴes would 
ｪﾗ ;ｪ;ｷﾐゲデ KWﾐ┞;げゲ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞が ;ﾐS さヮ┌デ デｴW Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴ┞ ;デ ﾗSSゲ ┘ｷデｴ ﾗデｴWヴ ﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉ 
WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷWゲ ┘ｷデｴ ┘ｴｷIｴ ┘W SW;ﾉくざ733  
TｴW CBKげゲ ;ヴｪ┌ﾏWﾐデ ┘;ゲ ﾐﾗデ ゲ┌ヮヮﾗヴデWS H┞ ;ﾐ┞ ﾉWｪ;ﾉ ヮヴﾗ┗ｷゲｷﾗﾐが ;ゲ ｷデゲ ゲデ;デ┌デﾗヴ┞ ﾗHﾃWIデｷ┗Wゲ ┌ﾐSWヴ 
the Central Bank of Kenya Act734 can be repealed by any latter statute such as the Donde Act. 
Rather, the argument was based on a liberal ideology of the minimalist role of the State in 
ﾏ;ヴﾆWデ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷWゲく ‘WﾃWIデｷﾐｪ デｴW CBKげゲ ｷﾐ┗ｷデ;デｷﾗﾐ デﾗ ;Sﾃ┌SｷI;デW ﾗﾐ デｴW ﾉWｪ;ﾉｷデ┞ ﾗa ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾐg a 
liberalised interest rate market, the Constitutional Court held as follows: 
さAデデヴ;Iデｷ┗W ;ヴｪ┌ﾏWﾐデゲ ;ゲ デｴW┞ ;ヴWが ┘W Sﾗ ﾐﾗデ IﾗﾐゲｷSWヴ ｷデ ;ヮヮヴﾗヮヴｷ;デW aﾗヴ デｴW Iﾗ┌ヴデ デﾗ 
comment on, or decide, them, because these are questions of policy. If the Government 
wishes to introduce controls, or if the government is unable to defeat motions and Bills 
initiated by the Opposition parties to introduce controls, and a section of the Kenyan 
people or some interested group does not like such control measures being introduced, 
then it is a matter which goes beyond the realms of courts. A statute reversing a given 
economic policy, or introducing a new commercial or economic regime may have 
political repercussions for the political party in power, but it does not of itself thereby 
become an unconstitutional statute. Such a statute may influence the voting at a 
national election time, but it remains a valid statute within the constitution of Kenya. 
Some people want a State controlled economy; others do not want any form of control, 
and desire a free enterprise. That is for economic policy makers. The court cannot go 
ｷﾐデﾗ デｴｷゲ ;ヴWﾐ;く Nﾗ Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ヮヴﾗ┗ｷゲｷﾗﾐ ｷゲ ┗ｷﾗﾉ;デWSくざ735 
By refusing to concretise in court jurisprudence, the liberal bias of the rule of law, the court 
opened up the arena of economic policy making to political actors in the form of Parliament. 
The court, however, voided the interest rate caps for violating the rule against retrospectivity, 
an element of the formalistic conception of the rule of law, and entrenched in section 77(4) of 
the (now repealed) Constitution of Kenya.736 
                                                          
733 ibid 68, 79, 80. 
734 Cap 491, Laws of Kenya. 
735 Albert Ruturi , J.K. Wanywela & Kenya Bankers Association V The Minister of Finance & Attorney General 
and Central Bank of Kenya (n 564) 84. 




TｴW R┌ﾉW ﾗa L;┘げゲ Restriction of Democratic Policy Making 
DWゲヮｷデW デｴW Hｷｪｴ Cﾗ┌ヴデげゲ WﾐSﾗヴゲWﾏWﾐデ ﾗa デｴW ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ ﾐ;デ┌ヴW ﾗa WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ﾏ;ﾆｷﾐｪが デｴW 
rule of law development programs continue to restrict democratic policy making, because of 
their structural linkage with BWIゲげ ﾉﾗ;ﾐ IﾗﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデｷWゲが ;ﾐS デｴW ﾉWﾐSWヴゲげ ｷﾐSWデWヴﾏｷﾐ;デW ;ﾐS 
contradictory conceptions of the rule of law. The donor community maintained a markedly 
Iﾗﾐデヴ;SｷIデﾗヴ┞ ゲデ;ﾐIW デﾗ┘;ヴSゲ KWﾐ┞;げゲ Iﾗﾏヮﾉｷ;ﾐIW ┘ｷデｴ デｴW ‘┌ﾉW ﾗa L;┘が ｷﾐ デｴWゲW IｷヴI┌ﾏゲデ;ﾐIWゲく 
Having opposed the interest rate caps, and called for the repeal of the democratically-
legitimated Donde Act as a conditionality for the resumption of Fund and World-Bank funding, 
デｴW IMF ﾉ;┌SWS デｴW Cﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Cﾗ┌ヴデげゲ SWIｷゲｷﾗﾐ in Albert Ruturi declaring the Act null and 
void.737 However, on the other hand, it also threatened to withhold external financing after the 
same Constitutional Court declared some IMF-backed statutes passed by Parliament as 
unconstitutional, and also when the democratically elected Parliament rejected of some IMF-
sponsored legislation, on grounds of non-compliance with the Rule of Law. These included the 
Kenya Anti-Corruption Act, the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Bill, and the Public 
Service Code of Ethics Bill.738 In these circumstances, the Parliamentarians expressed their 
aヴ┌ゲデヴ;デｷﾗﾐ ;デ デｴW BWIゲげ ﾐﾗﾐIｴ;ﾉ;ﾐデ ゲデ;ﾐIW ﾗﾐ デｴW ヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏ ﾗa ｴｷｪｴ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デWゲ ｷﾐ KWﾐ┞;が ;ﾐS 
their readiness to undermine democratic governance processes and the rule of law in Kenya, 
to achieve the liberalization of the Kenyan financial markets.739 
4.4. Formalism in the Rule of Law 
The fourth ideology is the procedural essence of the Rule of Law, which is the notion of general 
application of the law to legal subjects and objects, and the requirements that the law should 
be clear prospective, and stable.740 While these attributes are, on face value, desirable for any 
legal system, they also exhibit partial and limited perspectives on social and economic life. Two 
elements of the formalist conception are relevant to the discussion on interest rate regulation: 
general application of law, or formal juridical equality; and retrospective application of law.  
 
                                                          
737 International Monetary Fund, Kenya: 2001 Article IV Consultation (n 697) 15. 
738 ibid. 
739 See, for example, the contributioﾐ ﾗa Hﾗﾐく M┌ｪ;ﾉﾉ;が ｷﾐ H;ﾐゲ;ヴS ESｷデﾗヴが けPヴﾗIWWSｷﾐｪゲ ﾗa デｴW P;ヴﾉｷ;ﾏWﾐデ;ヴ┞ 
DWH;デW ﾗﾐ デｴW Fｷﾐ;ﾐIW MｷﾐｷゲデWヴげゲ ヲヰヰヱ B┌SｪWデ “ヮWWIｴが S┌ヴｷﾐｪ デｴW Βデｴ P;ヴﾉｷ;ﾏWﾐデげ ふKWﾐ┞; N;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ AゲゲWﾏHﾉ┞ 
2001) Official Hansard Report 1324. 




Formal Equality of Juridical Subjects 
Formal juridical equality is ideological due to its inability to recognise that legal equality is only 
equitable and just, when the legal subjects themselves enjoy symmetry of power and equal 
chances in the  market-place, as between themselves.741 Feminist scholarship argues, for 
example, that equality and generality as aspects of the Rule of Law perpetuate the male bias 
of law and its disregard of the oppression of women in the private sphere.742 While objectivity, 
neutrality, and acceptability are desirable aspects of the Rule of Law, there is no attention 
given, for example, to the gendered distribution of factors of production such as land and 
capital, and hence these procedural aspects can also entrench particular inequitable 
distribution of economic, social and political goods.743 
This formal equality under the law also bears an affinity for financial market liberalism. By 
relying on the rationalisation that unfettered markets, freedom of contract and individual 
choice generate optimal economic outcomes, formal equality under the law ideologically 
fashions the individual credit consumer as rational, utility-maximising, prudent, responsible, 
and trustworthy, and in no need of consumer protection regulations. While the lending market 
is composed of powerful, oligopolistic corporate lenders alongside less-powerful, individual 
Hﾗヴヴﾗ┘Wヴゲが デｴW ヴ┌ﾉW ﾗa ﾉ;┘げゲ aﾗヴﾏ;ﾉ Wケ┌;ﾉｷデ┞ デヴW;デゲ デｴWﾏ ;ゲ ヮヴWゲ┌ﾏヮデｷ┗Wﾉ┞ Wケ┌;ﾉ ﾉWｪ;ﾉ ヮWヴゲﾗﾐゲく 
In this instance, the constitutive and performative power of law is evident: the corporate lender 
is interpellated as the neoliberal subject with private property rights, individual liberties, and 
the beneficiary of juridical equality with natural persons.  
Consequently, the courts adjudicating disputes in lending contracts presume the free bargains, 
and parity of arms, which in reality do not exist in most instances. Formal equality in the rule 
of law therefore plays a significant role in sustaining the systemic economic advantages 
generated by the neoliberal capitalist economic system. By obfuscating unequal property 
relations and capacities through juridical equality, the rule of law fails to confront whether 
individuals actually have access to credit finance, which enables them to set and realise the 
economic goals, as expected of them under neoclassical economic theory.744     
                                                          
741 CﾗデデWヴヴWﾉﾉが けFW;ゲｷHﾉW ‘Wｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ aﾗヴ DWﾏﾗIヴ;I┞ ;ﾐS “ﾗIｷ;ﾉ J┌ゲデｷIWげ ふﾐ ンΓΑぶ ヱヲく 
742 Stewart (n 719) 136. 
743 Hｷﾉ;ヴ┞ Cｴ;ヴﾉWゲ┘ﾗヴデｴが けTｴW J;ﾏWゲ Cヴ;┘aﾗヴS BｷWﾐﾐｷ;ﾉ LWIデ┌ヴW “WヴｷWゲ ﾗﾐ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘ぎ CﾗﾏﾏWﾐデげ ふヲヰヰンぶ 
24 Adelaide Law Review 13, 14. 




Retrospective Legislation: Financialization of the Rule of Law?  
DWゲヮｷデW KWﾐ┞;ﾐ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ゲWIデﾗヴ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ﾏ;ﾆWヴゲげ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ ;デデ;IｴﾏWﾐデ デﾗ デｴW ﾐWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉﾉ┞-
biased conception of the rule of law, they have in specific instances endorsed the violation of 
the legal concept where it has been in opposition to the interest of creditors. Prior to the 1989 
liberalization of interest rates, the Banking Act provided under section 44 of the Banking Act 
デｴ;デ さNﾗ ｷﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ ゲｴ;ﾉﾉ ｷﾐIヴW;ゲW ｷデゲ ヴ;デW ﾗa H;ﾐﾆｷﾐｪ ﾗヴ ﾗデｴWヴ Iｴ;ヴｪWゲ W┝IWヮデ ┘ｷデｴ デｴW ヮヴｷﾗヴ 
approval ﾗa デｴW ぷFｷﾐ;ﾐIWへ MｷﾐｷゲデWヴざく745 However, between 1992 and 2006, the CBK did not 
WﾐaﾗヴIW デｴW H;ﾐﾆゲげ Iﾗﾏヮﾉｷ;ﾐIW ┘ｷデｴ デｴｷゲ ヮヴﾗ┗ｷゲｷﾗﾐが ;ﾐS デｴW ﾉWﾐSWヴゲ デﾗﾗﾆ ;S┗;ﾐデ;ｪW ﾗa デｴW 
ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴげゲ ;Iケ┌ｷWゲIWﾐIWく  
Subsequently, banks institutionalised the practice of retaining, in the credit instruments, a 
contractual provision granting them a unilateral right to vary interest rates by any margin, 
without consulting the borrowers, which provision was abused in excessively unreasonable 
rate hikes. However, the legal implicationゲ ﾗa デｴW H;ﾐﾆゲげ ｷﾐIヴW;ゲW ﾗa ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デWゲ ┘ｷデｴﾗ┌デ デｴW 
Fｷﾐ;ﾐIW MｷﾐｷゲデWヴげゲ ;ヮヮヴﾗ┗;ﾉ ┘;ゲ デｴ;デ ;ﾐ┞ ヴ;デW ｷﾐIヴW;ゲWゲ ゲｷﾐIW ヱΓΓヲ ┘WヴW デｴWヴWaﾗヴW ｷﾉﾉWｪ;ﾉ ;ﾐS 
the courts could compel the banks to refund the lenders. Indeed, in 2004, Rose Florence 
Wanjiru, a borrower, filed a class action suit asking the court to declare all interest rate 
ｷﾐIヴW;ゲWゲ ゲｷﾐIW ヱΓΓヲ ┘ｷデｴﾗ┌デ デｴW Fｷﾐ;ﾐIW MｷﾐｷゲデWヴげゲ ;ヮヮヴﾗ┗;ﾉが ｷﾉﾉWｪ;ﾉが ;ﾐS aﾗヴ ;ﾐ ﾗヴSWヴ ヴWケ┌ｷヴｷﾐｪ 
all Kenyan banks to compensate their borrowers for illegal charges levied for the last 13 years, 
since 1991. 
In response to this suit, the government introduced, within its Finance Bill before Parliament, 
a provision to repeal Section 44 of the Banking Act.746 The amendment also sought to 
retrospectively regularize/legalize all the charges and interest rates levied by the banks without 
デｴW Fｷﾐ;ﾐIW MｷﾐｷゲデWヴげゲ ヮヴｷﾗヴ ;ヮヮヴﾗ┗;ﾉ ゲｷﾐIW ヱΓΓヱが H┞ SWﾉWデｷﾐｪ ゲWIデｷﾗﾐ ヴヴ ;ﾐS ｷﾐゲWヴデｷﾐｪ ; Iﾉ;┌ゲW 
that deemed all the interest rate increases and charges to have been approved by the Minister, 
and therefore legal. Despite the clause being rejected by Parliament and removed from the 
Final Bill sent to President Mwai Kibaki for assent, he vetoed the Finance Bill and sent it back 
to Parliament with a memorandum. The President argued for the retrospective measure on the 
basis that an order requiring banks to refund their customers the illegal interest rate charges 
                                                          
745 See section 44 of the Central Bank of Kenya Act, Cap. 499 of the Laws of Kenya. 
746 This proposed repeal was based on the argument that section 44 was obsolete in so far as it had not been 
enforced since 1991, and that the newly proposed measures (including increased external financing, reduced 
ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげゲ SﾗﾏWゲデｷI Hﾗヴヴﾗ┘ｷﾐｪが ;ﾐS ヴWS┌IWS CBK I;ゲｴ ヴ;デｷﾗぶ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS ﾏﾗヴW WaaWIデｷ┗Wﾉ┞ result in market-led 




would occasion a huge compensation crisis that would threaten the financial stability of the 
banking sector. This was apparently because such an order would affect the financial results 
that the banks have declared for 13 years, and consequently, the taxes charged on the profits, 
which taxes the government would have to refund the banks.747 Parliament, however, refused 
to enact the provision. 
TｴW ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげゲ Iontradictory stance towards retrospectivity of interest rates legislation was 
called out by Parliamentarians, who pointed out that in the same Memorandum to Parliament, 
the President had objected to the retrospective application of a statutory In Duplum Rule, 
which would have limited the amount of interest charged on a loan to the principal amount.748 
Yet in the instance of section 44, the Executive was willing to legislatively expropriate 
borrowers of their rights to sue lenders for compensation for unlawfully-charged interest rates.  
TｴW ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげゲ ヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW ヴWデヴﾗゲヮWIデｷ┗W ﾏW;ゲ┌ヴW ｷﾐ デｴｷゲ ｷﾐゲデ;ﾐIW SWﾏﾗﾐゲデヴ;デWゲ 
the financialization of the rule of law, to the extent that the application of the concept is not 
based on its intrinsic value, but rather on its utility in sustaining and protecting the profits of 
creditors.749 B;ﾐﾆゲげ ゲｴ;ヴWｴﾗﾉSWヴ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデゲ ;ヴW ヮヴｷ┗ｷﾉWｪWS ﾗ┗Wヴ ;ﾐS ;Hﾗ┗W デｴW ﾉWｪ;ﾉ Iﾉ;ｷﾏゲ ;ﾐS 
economic interests of aggrieved borrowers, under the guise of safeguarding the financial 
stability ﾗa デｴW H;ﾐﾆｷﾐｪ ゲWIデﾗヴく TｴW WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI IﾗﾐIWヮデ ﾗa さaｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ゲデ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ざが ｷデゲWﾉa ; IﾗﾐデWゲデWS 
concept, has therefore been enrolled in legal rationalizations by Kenyan policy makers and 
regulators, in using retrospective law to defeat attempts to secure justice for borrowers that 
have been exploited by Kenyan banks in the levying of unconscionable and oppressive interest 
rates. 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the fourth research sub-question: how has the ideological and 
performative power of legal ideas and related practices reproduced regulatory neoliberalism 
ｷﾐ KWﾐ┞;げゲ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デW ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲい Iデ ｴ;ゲ W┝;ﾏｷﾐWS デｴW ヴﾗﾉW ﾗa デｴW け‘┌ﾉW ﾗa L;┘げ ;ゲ ﾉWｪ;ﾉ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞が 
and unpacked its concealed constitutive and performative power in the liberalization of 
                                                          
747 H;ﾐゲ;ヴS ESｷデﾗヴが けPヴﾗIWWSｷﾐｪゲ ﾗa デｴW P;ヴﾉｷ;ﾏWﾐデ;ヴ┞ DWH;デW ﾗﾐ デｴW B;ﾐﾆｷﾐｪ ふAﾏWﾐSﾏWﾐデぶ Bｷﾉﾉが S┌ring the 
“Wゲゲｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW Γデｴ P;ヴﾉｷ;ﾏWﾐデげ ふKWﾐ┞; N;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ AゲゲWﾏHﾉ┞ ヲヰヰヵぶ OaaｷIｷ;ﾉ H;ﾐゲ;ヴS ‘Wヮﾗヴデ ンΓヵく 
748 See contribution by Hon. Paul Muite in ibid. 
749 Tｴﾗﾏ;ゲ I P;ﾉﾉW┞が けFｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐぎ Wｴ;デ Iデ Iゲ ;ﾐS Wｴ┞ Iデ M;デデWヴゲげが Financialization (Palgrave Macmillan UK 
2013) 17. The concept of financialization here refers to the privileging of shareholder value above other non-
financial aspects of the economy, e.g. the real economy. It also transfers income from the real sector to the 




financial markets in Kenya. It has also explored the nature of the rule of law as part of the 
ideational infrastructure of contemporary financial markets in Kenya, and its entrenchment of 
neoliberal transnational regulatory standards in the financial sector through various Bretton 
WﾗﾗSゲ Iﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐゲげ ﾉﾗ;ﾐ IﾗﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデｷWゲ ;ﾐS ヴWaﾗヴﾏ ヮヴﾗｪヴ;ﾏゲく 
The discussion has demonstrated the ideological and constitutive power of the rule of law, as 
it underpins the actions of Kenyan policy makers and regulators, and financial markets actors, 
in the debate regarding making credit affordable. While it plays a useful, though dispensable, 
role in financial market deepening and economic growth, the partial perspectives of the rule of 
law also open it up to useful critique of its role. The discussion has explored and critiqued two 
roles played by the rule of law, embodying ideological, constitutive and performative power, 
ｷﾐ KWﾐ┞;げゲ ;ﾐS ﾗデｴWヴ SW┗Wﾉﾗヮｷﾐｪ Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴｷWゲげ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲく  
First, the Rule of Law reproduces neoliberal financial market capitalism and the attendant 
inequalities and power asymmetries that sustain high interest rates and high indebtedness, 
through its conceptual linkages with neoliberalism. These linkages include the formalistic 
IﾗﾐIWヮデｷﾗﾐげゲ Wﾏヮｴ;ゲｷゲ ﾗﾐ aﾗヴﾏ;ﾉ ﾃ┌ヴｷSｷI;ﾉ Wケ┌;ﾉｷデ┞ ﾗa ﾉWﾐSWヴゲ ;ﾐS Hﾗヴヴﾗ┘Wヴゲが ;ﾐS デｴW 
ゲ┌Hゲデ;ﾐデｷ┗W IﾗﾐIWヮデｷﾗﾐげゲ ｷﾐゲデヴ┌ﾏWﾐデ;ﾉｷ┣ation of liberty and property as a means to optimal 
markets.750 In addition, neoliberal philosophical and sociological claims about responsibility, 
intention, and fault, and neoclassical economic assumptions about efficiency, individual 
entrepreneurial activity, sanctity of property and contractarian principles as drivers of 
economic growth, undergird the ideology of the rule of law.751 These liberal conceptions have 
cast regulatory interventions in the interest rates market as against the rule of law. 
Second, the ideological rendering of the rule of law in financial market development limits the 
options and possibilities available for Kenyan and other Third World States to realise fairer and 
affordable credit markets. The rule of law weakens their ability to articulate and advocate for 
transnational regulatory policies that benefit their citizens in various ways. Formal juridical 
equality conceals the power asymmetries between lenders and borrowers, and the inequitable 
デWヴﾏゲ ┘ｷデｴｷﾐ ﾉWﾐSｷﾐｪ Iﾗﾐデヴ;Iデゲが ;ゲ W┗ｷSWﾐIWS H┞ デｴW KWﾐ┞;ﾐ Iﾗ┌ヴデゲげ ヴWﾉ┌Iデ;ﾐIW デﾗ ｷﾐデWヴaWヴW ｷn 
contractual arrangements.752  
                                                          
750 Raz (n 675); Tshuma (n 708) 75, 86. 
751 CﾗデデWヴヴWﾉﾉが けFW;ゲｷHﾉW ‘Wｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ aﾗヴ DWﾏﾗIヴ;I┞ ;ﾐS “ﾗIｷ;ﾉ J┌ゲデｷIWげ ふﾐ ンΓΑぶ ヱヴき Gヴ;ｴ;ﾏ H;ヴヴｷゲﾗﾐが The World 
Bank and Africa: The Construction of Governance States (Routledge 2004); Krever (n 134) 288, 317. 




In addition, the rule of law dichotomies of public/private, political/economic, and 
State/market, has depoliticised inherently political issues such as high interest rates, and 
removed them from the domain of political action to that of technocratic action, thus 
precluding certain policy choices.753 TｴW BWIゲげ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ ヴWﾐSWヴｷﾐｪ ﾗa デｴW ヴ┌ﾉW ﾗa ﾉ;┘ ;ゲ 
autonomous, technical, apolitical, neutral and rational, and its deployment as a framework for 
financial markets and general economic development, has also limited political options.754 
When concepts, such as sanctity of property tights, are used to address inequitable resource 
distribution problems they helped create, the regulatory process gets stuck in a vicious 
feedback loop, as evidenced by the land reforms impasse in Kenya. The rule of law ideology 
limits the use of legislation to shape individual choices, except where it involves facilitating 
market exchange, e.g. in the establishment of credit information sharing.755 
The inevitable conceptual indeterminacy, inconsistency and contradiction inherent in the 
ideology of the rule of law also limits the market reform process by making it difficult to criticise 
the resulting BWI-backed policies, despite their harsh consequences on the poor and 
vulnerable in Kenyan society.756 Another consequence of this indeterminacy is that it appeals 
to the distinct and related interests of various social and economic groups, thus rendering it 
indispensable, even to the groups that fall victim to the rule ﾗa ﾉ;┘げゲ ヮ;ヴデｷ;ﾉ ヮWヴゲヮWIデｷ┗Wゲく757 
Thus, a deconstruction of the sanctity of property rights for equitable redistributive goals 
equally signals the potential deconstruction of civil and political rights. The ideational power of 
the rule of law has also enrolled Kenyan regulators and policy makers into epistemic 
communities that shape their development policy paradigms on the nature of social and 
economic life, and the options and possibilities for regulation.758 
The ideology of the rule of law has thus sought to swing the regulatory paradigm from that of 
an overly regulated and State-steered local financial market, suffering the malaise of poor 
governance and corruption, to that of an unregulated market with high interest rates, high 
indebtedness and constrained access to credit, with negative distributional consequences to 
the poor segments of society.759 In this liberalised financial sector, capital increasingly takes on 
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a transcendental power, decoupling itself from the real economy of production, and standing 
on its own as a singular status, or absolute power.760 This trend of financialization of the Kenyan 
economy, whereby the banking sector continues to make record profits while the rest of the 
largely agricultural economy performs poorly, in the context of high interest rates and high 
indebtedness, therefore problematises the ideological basis for interest rates and financial 
markets liberalisation.  
The uncritical advocates for the Rule of Law in this regard have been charged with peddling 
outdated abstractions rather than engage in contextualised analysis. Critics contend that the 
Rule of Law is politically and socially outdated, since it is a creature of the 19th century laisses 
faire economy that has since disappeared, and with it, the descriptive and prescriptive force of 
the Rule of Law.761  
Without a doubt, the rule of law makes a significant contribution to the realisation of equitable, 
and fairer capitalist economies in Kenya and other developing countries. This, however, is 
limited by the ideological and partial perspectives on social and economic life that deter certain 
policy and regulatory actions. Ideology critique and the deconstruction of the ideological 
elements of the rule of law is therefore necessary to make visible the concealed inequalities, 
domination and power asymmetries in liberal market economies, and to take progressive steps 
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Technification: The Ideological and Performative Effect of Credit Information Sharing 
TWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪｷWゲ ｷﾐ デｴW LｷHWヴ;ﾉｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa KWﾐ┞;げゲ IﾐデWヴWゲデ R;デWゲ M;ヴﾆWデ 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapters have examined the ideological and performative power of economic, 
legal, and technological ideas, practices and related institutions in constituting market 
relations, shaping identities and respective capacities that either enable or constrain the 
actions of financial market stakeholders in the global economy. Chapter 3 examined the 
regulatory role of these ideas within the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs). The case studies 
under chapters 4 and 5 have also examined the ideological and performative roles of 
neoclassical economics and formal-liberal Rule of Law doctrines, respectively, in framing the 
debate on high interest rates and high consumer indebtedness as economic-legal rather than 
political problems, and consequently restricting regulatory options for realizing fairer interest 
rate markets in Kenya. This chapter is the third instalment of the Kenya case study, and explores 
the third aspect of the fourth research sub-question: how has the ideological and performative 
power of technological ideas, artefacts and related practices, reproduced regulatory 
ﾐWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉｷゲﾏ ｷﾐ KWﾐ┞;げゲ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デW ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲい 
The chapter examines the technification of the interest rates market, that is, the enrolment, 
adoption or imposition of technical methods into the overarching process of economisation 
and juridification of the lending market.762 Technification has occurred in the adoption and 
operationalisation of credit scoring and credit reporting technologies and practices as a policy 
and regulatory response by Kenyan banking regulators and policy makers, and the banking 
sector, in addressing the problem of high interest rates and high consumer indebtedness. The 
discussion demonstrates the nature of credit scoring and reporting (or Credit Information 
Sharing) technologies as Socio-Technical Assemblages or Agencements (STAs) of regulatory 
neoliberalism, neoclassical economic theories, formal-liberal legal norms, and technological 
                                                          
762 Ç;ﾉﾀズﾆ;ﾐ ;ﾐS C;ﾉﾉﾗﾐ ふﾐ ンンヰぶ ヲ. The authors point out that one of the key agents in the economization 
process is the technical arrangements that enhance the capacities of human agents for action and cognition. 
“WW ;ﾉゲﾗが M;ﾐ┌Wﾉ Tｷヴﾗﾐｷが けMﾗSWゲ ﾗa TWIｴﾐｷaｷI;デｷﾗﾐぎ E┝ヮWヴデｷゲWが UヴH;ﾐ Cﾗﾐデヴﾗ┗WヴゲｷWゲ ;ﾐS デｴW ‘;SｷI;ﾉﾐWゲゲ ﾗa 




rationalities and related practices.763 As STAs, these CIS technologies are material and 
discursive assemblages that have an agential power to intervene in the constitution and 
performance of the lending market, through their enrolment of human and non-human market 
actors (including lenders, borrowers, Credit Reference Bureaus, and local and transnational 
banking regulators and policy makers) in their ideational infrastructure.  
The discussion demonstrates the neoliberal ideological scripting of CIS technologies in 
IﾗﾐIWヮデ┌;ﾉｷゲｷﾐｪ けIヴWSｷデ SWa;┌ﾉデ ヴｷゲﾆげが ;ﾐS ﾉWｪｷデｷﾏ;デｷﾐｪ ┌ﾐS┌ﾉ┞ ｴｷｪｴ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デWゲ ;ﾐS ｴｷｪｴ 
indebtedness as a private problem of financially imprudent, untrustworthy and unethical debt 
consumers, while prescribing interest rate deregulation and consumer credit information 
sharing as the best regulatory solutions. As an ideological discourse, technology and practice, 
CIS conceals its deepening of power asymmetries between lenders and borrowers, and 
reproduction of high interest rates and inequalities in access to affordable credit in Kenya. The 
discussion covers the CIS developments up to the legislation of interest rate caps in September 
2016. Since the impact of interest rate caps is still not clear, their effect on CIS and the banking 
sector, generally, are not covered. 
The Chapter is organised into four further sections. Section 2 explores CIS as a methodologically 
problematic mathematical and computational method for rendering uncertainty of credit 
default calculable and knowable. It argues that Kenyan bankers and regulators have deployed 
CIS as a means of privatizing the issue of high interest rates as an individual, trustworthiness 
issue, rather than a public issue amenable to regulatory measures. Section 3 examines CIS as a 
socio-technical assemblage of legal, neoclassical economic, and technological Ideas and 
practices. It argues that the embedding of these ideas and practices within CIS has given it 
ideological and performative power that has constructed and sustained the liberalized interest 
rates market, and also deepened the power asymmetries between lenders and borrowers. 
Section 4 explores the progressive potentialities of re-constituting the interest rate markets. It 
argues that the contradictions and indeterminacies inherent in the legal, economic and 
technological ideas within CIS can be exploited towards deconstructing regulatory 
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Technological Studies (STS), and more specifically Actor-Network Theory, and refers to the hybrid collectives 
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neoliberalism, and constituting equitable, accessible and affordable lending markets. Section 5 
contains the main conclusions and suggestions for further research.      
2. Credit Information Sharing as a Policy Response to High Interest Rates 
2.1. The Mechanics and Methodology of Credit Information Sharing 
Credit Information Sharing (CIS) or けcredit scoring and reportingげ ｷﾐ KWﾐ┞; refer to a three-
pronged process. The first aspect is the sharing of both positive and negative consumer credit 
data by credit providers among themselves and/or with Credit Reference Bureaus (CRBs). The 
second aspect is the weighting (by CRBs) of these consumer attributes into a single figure 
ﾏW;ゲ┌ヴｷﾐｪ デｴWｷヴ IヴWSｷデ┘ﾗヴデｴｷﾐWゲゲが ﾆﾐﾗ┘ﾐ ;ゲ ; けIヴWSｷデ ゲIﾗヴWげく TｴW デｴｷヴS ;ゲヮWIデ ｷゲ デｴW subsequent 
circulation by CRBs of these standardised, agglomerated and individualised profiles of 
consumer behaviour  (credit reports), to lenders, service providers, customers etc.764 The 
rationale for CIS is that it reduces the information asymmetry prevalent between lenders and 
borrowers, which may lead to adverse selection, credit rationing and moral hazard.765 
Therefore, CIS enables lenders to reduce non-performing loan portfolios (NPLs) and engage in 
ﾗヮデｷﾏ;ﾉ ﾉWﾐSｷﾐｪ デﾗ けIヴWSｷデ┘ﾗヴデｴ┞げ Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴゲく 
Credit Reports 
Once CRBs receive the raw data on standardised templates, they distil this information into a 
ゲｷﾐｪﾉW IヴWSｷデ ヴWヮﾗヴデ デｴ;デ I;ヮデ┌ヴWゲ デｴW Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴげゲ IヴWSｷデ ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐく Tｴｷゲ ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デion is used 
ヮヴｷﾏ;ヴｷﾉ┞ デﾗぎ I;ﾉI┌ﾉ;デW デｴW I┌ゲデﾗﾏWヴゲげ I;ヮ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ デﾗ ヮ;┞ ; ﾉﾗ;ﾐ H┞ Iﾗﾏヮ;ヴｷﾐｪ デｴW I┌ゲデﾗﾏWヴゲげ 
I┌ヴヴWﾐデ ﾉﾗ;ﾐゲ ;ﾐS ヴWI┌ヴヴｷﾐｪ ┌デｷﾉｷデ┞ ヮ;┞ﾏWﾐデゲ ┗ゲく ｷﾐIﾗﾏWき ;ﾐS ;ゲゲWゲゲ ; IﾉｷWﾐデゲげ IヴWSｷデ HWｴ;┗ｷﾗ┌ヴ 
H┞ ヴW┗ｷW┘ｷﾐｪ デｴW I┌ゲデﾗﾏWヴゲげ ヴWヮ;┞ﾏWﾐデ ｴｷゲデﾗヴ┞が ｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ timely payments, pre-payments and 
over-payments.766 The credit report may also contain a credit score, a single digit that captures 
the credit worthiness and character of a credit consumer. 
 The Development of Credit Scores 
The credit score - the measure of ;ﾐ ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉげゲ IヴWSｷデ-worthiness - is distilled using credit 
scorecards, which have evolved into automated statistical tools, algorithms or models used to 
predict the behaviour of new credit applications, based on the performance of previous credit 
                                                          
764 WﾗヴﾉS B;ﾐﾆが けGWﾐWヴ;ﾉ PヴｷﾐIｷヮﾉWゲ aﾗヴ CヴWSｷデ ‘Wヮﾗヴデｷﾐｪげ ふTｴW WﾗヴﾉS B;ﾐﾆ ヲヰヱヱぶ ΑヰヱΓン Αく 
765 ibid 1. 
766 GWヴ;ﾉSｷﾐW OげKWWaaWが M;ヴｷW V;ﾉSW┣ ;ﾐS K;ヴｷH┌ N┞;ｪｪ;ｴが けCヴWSit Information Sharing in Kenya: A Guide for 




applicants. In addition, it predict the performance of existing loan accounts, using past 
experience of accounts with similar characteristics.767 To this extent, credit scoring entails a 
さヮヴﾗH;HｷﾉｷゲデｷI IﾗﾐIWヮデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ヴｷゲﾆ SWaｷﾐｷﾐｪ ┘ｴ;デ ｷゲ ﾏW;ﾐデ H┞ デｴW IヴWSｷデ ┘ﾗヴデｴiness of an individual 
Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴざく768 The first step in the construction of a credit score is the identification of specific 
attributes or risk factors, usually used by credit appraisal officers at face-to-face credit 
application stages, including character, capital, condition, collateral and capacity.769 This entails 
applying subjective judgment and interpretation of data.770 
The second step involves the collection of standardised/templated samples of historical (up to 
7 years back) consumer credit profiles from credit providers, including: identification, 
employment, account, guarantor, bounced cheque, and credit application data, and also 
collateral registry and fraudulent activities data.771 Notably, the data templates are designed 
to collect information relating to or concerned with the calculable effects of default, rather 
than the causes of the default, thus failing to differentiate between defaults caused by illness 
or loss of employment, and default resulting from moral hazard.772 
The third step entails using statistical computing techniques (e.g. algorithms) to analyse the 
historical data, and isolate the consumer characteristics which measure the probability that a 
credit consumer will default on his or her loan obligations.773 These include residential status, 
marital status, occupation, years on a job, number of previous loans, and previous 
                                                          
767 Micro-Finance Risk Management LLC (n 729) 3. 
768 DﾗﾐﾐIｴ; M;ヴヴﾗﾐが けさLWﾐSｷﾐｪ H┞ N┌ﾏHWヴゲざぎ CヴWSｷデ “Iﾗヴｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS デｴW Cﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ‘ｷゲﾆ ┘ｷデｴｷﾐ AﾏWヴｷI;ﾐ 
Cﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴ CヴWSｷデげ ふヲヰヰΑぶ ンヶ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞ ;ﾐS ゲﾗIｷWデ┞ ヱヰンが ヱヰンく 
769 Micro-Finance Risk Management LLC (n 729) 4. 
770 Tｴﾗﾏ;ゲ W;ｷﾐ┘ヴｷｪｴデが けEﾉｷデW Kﾐﾗ┘ﾉWSｪWゲぎ Fヴ;ﾏｷﾐｪ ‘ｷゲﾆ ;ﾐS デｴW GWﾗｪヴ;ヮｴｷWゲ ﾗa CヴWSｷデげ ふヲヰヱヱぶ ヴン 
Environment and Planning A 650, 657. The author argues thaデ けW;Iｴ ぷゲIﾗヴW I;ヴS SWゲｷｪﾐWヴへ I;ﾐ ┗ｷW┘ デｴW 
meaning of the data in different ways, and the interpretation is open to negotiation: ignoring some types of 
S;デ; ;ﾐS ┗;ヴｷ;HﾉWゲ ﾗ┗Wヴ ﾗデｴWヴゲが ┗ｷW┘ｷﾐｪ I┌ゲデﾗﾏWヴゲ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ I;ﾉI┌ﾉ;デｷ┗W aヴ;ﾏWゲげく 
771 CWﾐデヴ;ﾉ B;ﾐﾆ ﾗa KWﾐ┞; ;ﾐS KWﾐ┞; B;ﾐﾆWヴゲ AゲゲﾗIｷ;デｷﾗﾐが けCヴWSｷデ ‘WaWヴWﾐIW B┌ヴW;┌ D;デ; “ヮWIｷaｷI;デｷﾗﾐ 
DﾗI┌ﾏWﾐデげ аｴデデヮゲぎっっ┘┘┘くIWﾐtralbank.go.ke/wp-content/.../KBA-Data-Specification-Document.pdf> 
;IIWゲゲWS Γ J┌ﾉ┞ ヲヰヱΑき CWﾐデヴ;ﾉ B;ﾐﾆ ﾗa KWﾐ┞; ;ﾐS KWﾐ┞; B;ﾐﾆWヴゲ AゲゲﾗIｷ;デｷﾗﾐが けCヴWSｷデ ‘WaWヴWﾐIW B┌ヴW;┌ D;デ; 
“デ;ﾐS;ヴSゲ M;ﾐ┌;ﾉげ аｴデデヮゲぎっっ┘┘┘くIWﾐデヴ;ﾉH;ﾐﾆくｪﾗくﾆWっ┘ヮ-content/.../08/KBA-Data-Standards-Manual.pdf> 
accessed 9 July 2017. These two guidelines have been developed by the Central Bank of Kenya and the Kenya 
Bankers Association in accordance with Section 18 of the Credit Bureau Regulations, 2013, which outlines the 
nature of information to be shared. 
772 “デW┗W G;デWﾏH┌ K;ｷヴ┌ ;ﾐS AﾐﾐW Aﾏ;Sｷが けKWﾐ┞; CヴWSｷデ Iﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ “ｴ;ヴｷﾐｪ Iﾐｷデｷ;デｷ┗Wぎ A PヴﾗヮﾗゲWS 
MWIｴ;ﾐｷゲﾏ aﾗヴ AﾉデWヴﾐ;デｷ┗W Dｷゲヮ┌デW ‘Wゲﾗﾉ┌デｷﾗﾐげ ふFｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ “WIデﾗヴ Deepening (FSD) Kenya 2014) Commissioned 
Report 9. The authors noted that the Kenyan CIS infrastructure and regulations do not provide a classification 
of the kinds of default, and therefore do not respond to the circumstances leading to the default. 
Consequently, the strict application of the law raises the perception of unfairness. 
773 Metropol, for example, used discriminant analysis in its first documented construction of a credit score in 




delinquencies.774 As noted by Marron, credit providers use these statistical techniques to 
ヴWS┌IW デｴW IﾗﾏHｷﾐWS HﾗS┞ ﾗa Hﾗヴヴﾗ┘Wヴゲ ｷﾐデﾗ ; さIﾗｴWヴWﾐデ Wﾐデｷデ┞ SWﾏﾗﾐゲデヴ;デｷﾐｪ ;デデヴｷH┌デes as 
though they were intrinsic to it, independent from the actions of the individual consumers 
Iﾗﾏヮﾗゲｷﾐｪ ｷデざく775  
The fourth step (the crux of the credit scoring exercise) involves weighting the identified default 
prediction attributes, by scores, to form ; けIヴWSｷデ ゲIﾗヴWげく HWﾐIW ; ｴｷｪｴWヴ デﾗデ;ﾉ ﾗa ゲIﾗヴWS 
attributes signifies a good, creditworthy borrower, while a lower total of scored attributes 
signifies a bad, un-creditworthy borrower. As noted by Leyshon and Thrift, this process is the 
heart of the construction of financial inclusion and exclusion, good and bad borrowers, 
trustworthy and untrustworthy consumers.776 For example, during phase 1 of the Kenyan CIS 
project CRBs and banks applied binary classifications of good and bad credit applicants, thereby 
excluding millions of consumers from the credit market.777  Graduated credit scores were 
adopted after advocacy by consumer groups and Parliament.   
The fifth step involves the validation of the scoring model using a larger sample of historical 
credit consumer information, to ensure that score card continues to discriminate accurately 
between creditworthy and uncreditworthy consumers. This leads to the last step where, based 
on the result of the validation exercises, the scoring model may be recalibrated by including or 
removing some attributes, or adjusting and reassigning particular scores to them.  The credit 
scoring mechanism is then tested against past data to see if the scoring mechanism could have 
accurately predicted the performance of previous loan applications. At a minimum, 7 years of 
historical data is needed to be able to create a reliable credit scoring mechanism.778 
KWﾐ┞;げゲ ┌ﾐｷケ┌W aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴWが ｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ デｴW ヮヴW┗;ﾉWﾐIW ﾗa “IM-based mobile banking and 
digital lending, has inspired mobile-based credit scoring innovations, including mobile -based 
;ヮヮﾉｷI;デｷﾗﾐゲが ┘ｴｷIｴ ┌ゲW I┌ゲデﾗﾏWヴゲげ ヮｴﾗﾐW S;デ;が ｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ I;ﾉﾉ ;ﾐS “M“ ヴWIﾗヴSゲが ﾏﾗHｷﾉW ﾏﾗﾐW┞ 
                                                          
774 CヴWSｷデ Iﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ “ｴ;ヴｷﾐｪ AゲゲﾗIｷ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa KWﾐ┞;が けCヴWSｷデ “Iﾗヴｷﾐｪげ ぷヲヰヱヶへ CI“ KWﾐ┞; DｷｪWゲデく 
775 Marron (n 768) 106に107. 
776 AﾐSヴW┘ LW┞ゲｴﾗﾐ ;ﾐS NｷｪWﾉ Tｴヴｷaデが けLｷゲデゲ CﾗﾏW Aﾉｷ┗Wぎ EﾉWIデヴﾗﾐｷI “┞ゲデWﾏゲ ﾗa Kﾐﾗ┘ﾉWSｪW ;ﾐS デｴW ‘ｷゲW ﾗa 
Credit-“Iﾗヴｷﾐｪ ｷﾐ ‘Wデ;ｷﾉ B;ﾐﾆｷﾐｪげ ふヱΓΓΓぶ ヲΒ EIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞ ;ﾐS “ﾗIｷWデ┞ ヴンヴが ヴヴΒく TｴW ;┌デｴﾗヴゲ ﾗHゲWヴ┗W デｴ;デ けIヴWSｷデ 
scoring systems, in becoming the obligatory point of entry to the retail system, have set new conventions for 
SWIｷSｷﾐｪ ┘ｴﾗ ｷゲ さｪﾗﾗSざ ;ﾐS ┘ｴﾗ ｷゲ さH;Sざ Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴが ヮヴﾗS┌Iｷﾐｪ ﾐW┘ ヮ;デデWヴﾐゲ ﾗa ｷﾐIﾉ┌ゲｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS W┝Iﾉ┌ゲｷﾗﾐげく 
777 GWﾗヴｪW Nｪｷｪｷが けCBA Bﾉ;Iﾆﾉｷゲデゲ ヱヴヰがヰヰヰ “;a;ヴｷIﾗﾏ Lﾗ;ﾐゲ DWa;┌ﾉデWヴゲげ Business Daily (Nairobi, 26 January 2014) 
<http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/markets/CBA-blacklists-140-000-Safaricom-loans-defaulters/539552-
2161116-rj8i3kz/index.html> accessed 5 July 2017. 




transaction history and social media data, to determine a credit score and loan amount.779 As 
is discussed in further detail in section 3, these innovations are not without criticism, especially 
with regard to high interest rates attached to the loans, exploitation of credit behaviour 
デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ ┌ﾐゲﾗﾉｷIｷデWS けデWﾏヮデ;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS ヮ┌ゲｴげ ﾉﾗ;ﾐゲが ;ﾐS デｴW ﾗヮ;ケ┌W IﾗﾏﾏﾗSｷaｷI;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa IヴWdit 
consumer data.780  
Once the score card has been designed, individuals are ascribed credit scores by CRBs based 
on the credit information distilled from the data templates shared by credit providers, and 
condensed into their credit reports. This entails m;デIｴｷﾐｪ ;ﾐ ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉげゲ ;デデヴｷH┌デWゲ デﾗ デｴW 
historical population attributes for probability of credit default. As Metropol Corporation Kenya 
ゲデ;デWが さthe more traits you share with people who have proven to be good credit risks, the 
ｴｷｪｴWヴ ┞ﾗ┌ヴ ゲIﾗヴWざく781 Through this statistical method, default is regulated within populations 
of borrowers by exposing consumers to new kinds of visibility, and making them amenable, as 
risks, to new kinds of regulation.782  
The credit report, together with the credit score, then becomes available, at a fee, for 
circulation to subscribers, including the credit providers who circulated the initial individual 
credit information, and also the credit consumers, the subjects of the credit reports and scores. 
The credit providers use the credit reports and credit scores to evaluate the creditworthiness 
of their credit consumers, while the latter use the credit reports to discover and contemplate 
their financial, ethical, and moral standing in the eyes of credit providers, utility providers, 
potential employers, landlords, and a growing list of third-party consumers of credit reports. A 
favourable standing compels the consumer to maintain the attributes hailed by credit providers 
and CRBs, while a negative standing compels the consumer to take action to address their 




                                                          
779 MｷIｴWﾉﾉW K;aaWﾐHWヴｪWヴ ;ﾐS P;デヴｷIﾆ CｴWｪWが けDｷｪｷデ;ﾉ CヴWSｷデ ｷﾐ KWﾐ┞;ぎ TｷﾏW aﾗヴ CWﾉWHヴ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗヴ CﾗﾐIWヴﾐいげ 
<http://www.cgap.org/blog/digital-credit-kenya-time-celebration-or-concern> accessed 3 July 2017; See 
;ﾉゲﾗが T;ﾏ;ヴ; Cﾗﾗﾆ ;ﾐS Cﾉ;┌Sｷ; MIK;┞が けHﾗ┘ M-“ｴ┘;ヴｷ Wﾗヴﾆゲぎ TｴW “デﾗヴ┞ “ﾗ F;ヴげ ふCﾗﾐゲ┌ﾉデ;デｷ┗W Gヴﾗ┌ヮ デﾗ Aゲゲｷゲデ 
the Poor (CGAP) and Financial Sector Deepening (FSD) Kenya 2015) 10. 
780 Kaffenberger and Chege (n 779). 
781 MWデヴﾗヮﾗﾉ Cﾗヴヮﾗヴ;デｷﾗﾐが け“IﾗヴWゲげ аｴデデヮゲぎっっ┘┘┘くﾏWデヴﾗヮﾗﾉくIﾗくﾆWっヮWヴゲﾗﾐ;ﾉっゲIﾗヴWゲっб ;IIWゲゲWS ヱヱ J┌ﾉ┞ ヲヰヱΑく 




2.2. Credit Information Sharing as a Policy and Regulatory Response to High Interest Rates 
Credit Information Sharing in Kenya was first mooted in 1999 as a response to the problem of 
Non-Performing Loans (NPLs), leading to the legislation of licensing provisions for CRBs.783 In 
2004, the Government touted CIS as a policy measure in its proposals for the reduction of NPLs 
and high lending rates, a deregulation-oriented policy statement that included: the removal of 
costly banking regulations; removing hindrances to enforcement of collateral; encouraging 
bank transparency on loan charges; and information sharing between banks and regulators.784  
The statutory establishment of CIS was rationalized on economic arguments that high 
indebtedness and high interest rates were caused by the high risk premiums due to information 
asymmetry.785 TｴW ヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉW Wﾏ;ﾐ;デWゲ aヴﾗﾏ AﾆWヴﾉﾗaげゲ デｴWﾗヴ┞ ﾗa ;ゲ┞ﾏﾏWデヴｷI ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐが ┘ｴｷIｴ 
posits that information asymmetry incentivises the seller to sell goods of less than average 
market quality, leading to adverse selection.786  
Iﾐ ヲヰヰΓが CBK ｪﾗ┗Wヴﾐﾗヴ Nﾃ┌ｪ┌ﾐ; NS┌ﾐｪげ┌が ﾗ┌デﾉｷﾐWS デｴW aﾗ┌ヴ ┘;┞ゲ CI“ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS ヴWゲﾗﾉ┗W デｴW ヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏ 
ﾗa ｴｷｪｴ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デWゲ ｷﾐ KWﾐ┞;ぎ SW┗Wﾉﾗヮｷﾐｪ けｷﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ I;ヮｷデ;ﾉげが デﾗ ヴWS┌IW information 
asymmetry and search costs, developing new collateral technology, to replace predominantly 
physical collateral; resolving problems of moral hazard and adverse selection on the part of 
Hﾗヴヴﾗ┘Wヴゲ ;ﾐS H;ﾐﾆゲが ヴWゲヮWIデｷ┗Wﾉ┞き ;ﾐS a;Iｷﾉｷデ;デｷﾐｪ けヴｷゲﾆ-baゲWS ヮヴｷIｷﾐｪげ ﾗa IヴWSｷデが デｴWヴWH┞ ﾉW;Sｷﾐｪ 
デﾗ ;ﾐ けｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉｷゲWSげ ヴｷゲﾆ ヮヴWﾏｷ┌ﾏ ｷﾐ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デWゲが デｴWヴWH┞ ;┗;ｷﾉｷﾐｪ ﾉﾗ┘Wヴ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デWゲ デﾗ 
creditworthy customers.787   
Banks, CRBs, and other stakeholders have also underscored the specific benefits of credit 
scoring as risk management systems: they are objective, standardised consistent and 
                                                          
783 CWﾐデヴ;ﾉ B;ﾐﾆ ﾗa KWﾐ┞;が けB;ﾐﾆ “┌ヮWヴ┗ｷゲｷﾗﾐ Aﾐﾐ┌;ﾉ ‘Wヮﾗヴデ ヱΓΓΓげ ふCWﾐデヴ;ﾉ B;ﾐﾆ ﾗa KWﾐ┞; ヲヰヰヰぶ ヱンに14 
<www.centralbank.go.ke>. The CBK noted that the causes of the high lending rates in Kenya were: high 
domestic debt, effect of the cash ratio, inefficiencies in the banking sector, high levels of non-performing 
loans, perceived risk by the investors, and lack of competition in the banking sector. See also section 31(3) 
and (4) of the Banking Act, Cap. 488, Laws of Kenya. 
784 H;ﾐゲ;ヴS ESｷデﾗヴが けFｷﾐ;ﾐIW MｷﾐｷゲデWヴげゲ ヲヰヰヴ B┌SｪWデ “ヮWWIｴげ ふﾐ ヶΒΓぶ ヱΒヱヴく 
785 Deloitte Consulting Limited (n 600) 29. In this KBA-commissioned report, Deloitte identifies information 
;ゲ┞ﾏﾏWデヴｷWゲ ;ゲ ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデｷﾐｪ aﾗヴ ｴｷｪｴ IヴWSｷデ ヴｷゲﾆ ヮヴWﾏｷ┌ﾏゲ ｷﾐ KWﾐ┞;く TｴW ヴWヮﾗヴデ ﾐﾗデWゲ ;ゲ aﾗﾉﾉﾗ┘ゲぎ けTｴW a;Iデ デｴ;デ 
banks do not have as much information about borrowers as the borrowers have about themselves means 
that banks risk giving loans to some customers at rates which do not cover their risk. Increased credit 
ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ ヴWS┌IWゲ デｴｷゲ ヴｷゲﾆ H┞ ;ﾉﾉﾗ┘ｷﾐｪ H;ﾐﾆゲ デﾗ HWデデWヴ Sｷゲデｷﾐｪ┌ｷゲｴ HWデ┘WWﾐ ｴｷｪｴ ;ﾐS ﾉﾗ┘ ヴｷゲﾆ Hﾗヴヴﾗ┘Wヴゲげく  
786 George A AﾆWヴﾉﾗaが けTｴW M;ヴﾆWデ aﾗヴ さLWﾏﾗﾐゲざぎ Q┌;ﾉｷデ┞ UﾐIWヴデ;ｷﾐデ┞ ;ﾐS デｴW M;ヴﾆWデ MWIｴ;ﾐｷゲﾏげ ふヱΓΑヰぶ Βヴ 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 488. 
787 Njug┌ﾐ; NS┌ﾐｪげ┌が けCヴWSｷデ Iﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ “ｴ;ヴｷﾐｪ デﾗ Eﾐｴ;ﾐIW Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ “WIデﾗヴ DW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデげ ふL;┌ﾐIｴ ﾗa デｴW 
Banking Credit Information Sharing Implementation Project, Nairobi, 27 August 2009) 




transparent measurements of risk; they enhance automation of decision-making; they enable 
quantification of risk (default probability), which permits portfolio management and risk-based 
pricing.788 CIS enables faster and efficient decision-making, financial stability, reduced cost of 
credit, reduced credit risk, increased credit accessibility, and financial discipline.789 CIS has also 
been legitimated as necessary infrastructure for financial inclusion, poverty reduction, 
economic opportunity, financial stability and economic development.790   
Based on these policy rationales, the CBK and the Ministry of Finance spearheaded a 
stakeholder rollout of CIS. In July 2008, the Minister of Finance gazetted regulations governing 
the licensing, operation, and supervision of banking sector CRBs. Consequently, in 2009, the 
CBK, Kenya Bankers Association (KBA), banks, and civil society and donor institutions, including 
Financial Sector Deepening (FSD) Kenya, set up the Kenya Credit Information Sharing Initiative 
ふKCI“Iぶ ;ゲ ; ヮヴﾗﾃWIデ ﾗaaｷIW デﾗ さIｴ;ﾏヮｷﾗﾐ デｴW Wゲデ;HﾉｷゲｴﾏWﾐデ ﾗa ; IヴWSｷデ ヴWヮﾗヴデｷﾐｪ ﾏWIｴ;ﾐｷゲﾏ ｷﾐ 
KWﾐ┞;げゲ H;ﾐﾆｷﾐｪ ゲWIデﾗヴが ;ﾐS IﾗﾗヴSｷﾐ;デW デｴW ゲｴ;ヴｷﾐｪ ﾗa ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾏﾗﾐｪ H;ﾐﾆゲ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ ;ﾉﾉ 
licenゲWS C‘Bゲざ791 Other donor groups such as USAID also provided technical assistance and 
funding to the project. Since 2010, three transnational CRBs に TransUnion (formerly CRB 
Africa), Metropol CRB, and CreditInfo CRB に have entered the Kenyan market and have been 
licensed to operate. After initial pilot projects conducted under the auspices of KCISI, negative 
customer credit information sharing was commenced among banks.  
In 2014, with the amendment of Section 31 of the Banking Act and the gazettement of new 
Credit Reference Bureau regulations, the scope of institutions legally mandated to share with 
CRBs customer information concerning non-performing loans or other negative information 
was widened to include licensed Micro-Finance Institutions (MFIs), SACCO societies, 
Cooperative Societies, and public utility companies. In addition, under Section 18(2) of the 2014 
regulations, banks were legally mandated and compelled to share positive customer credit 
information alongside negative information, while under section 18(3), the other non-banks 
institutions were legally authorised to exchange positive information with CRBs, with prior 
written consent of customers concerned.         
                                                          
788 Micro-Finance Risk Management LLC (n 729) 3. 
789 TN“ ‘M“ E;ゲデ AaヴｷI;が けA B;ゲWﾉｷﾐW “┌ヴ┗W┞ TWIｴﾐｷI;ﾉ ‘Wヮﾗヴデ ﾗﾐ LﾗI;ﾉ P┌HﾉｷI Oヮｷﾐｷﾗﾐ ﾗﾐ デｴW CヴWSｷデ Iﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ 
“ｴ;ヴｷﾐｪ MWIｴ;ﾐｷゲﾏげ ふFｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ “WIデﾗヴ DWWヮWﾐｷﾐｪ ふF“Dぶ KWﾐ┞; ヲヰヱヴぶ ‘Wヮﾗヴデ CﾗﾏﾏｷゲゲｷﾗﾐWS H┞ F“D KWﾐ┞; ヱΑく 
790 Aｪ;デ; “┣┞Sﾉﾗ┘ゲﾆ;が けCヴWSｷデ ‘WaWヴWﾐIW B┌ヴW;┌ Pｴ;ゲW II Fｷﾐ;ﾉ E┗;ﾉ┌;デｷﾗﾐ ‘Wヮﾗヴデげ ふFｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ “WIデﾗヴ DWWヮWﾐｷﾐｪ 
(FSD) Kenya 2015) Commissioned Report 3. 
791 G;HヴｷWﾉ D;┗Wﾉが Tゲｴ;ﾐｪ┘;ﾐW “Wヴ;ﾆ┘;ﾐW ;ﾐS M;ヴﾆ KｷﾏﾗﾐSﾗが けKWﾐ┞; CヴWSｷデ Iﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ “ｴ;ヴｷﾐｪ Iﾐitiative: A 




2.3. The Challenges of Credit Scoring and Information Sharing as Credit Risk Management 
Tools 
The practices of statistical calculation of probability of default risk of individual credit 
consumers through population analysis is subject to certain challenges or difficulties that have 
far-reaching implications, especially in the context of reductiﾗﾐ ﾗa ;ﾐ ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉげゲ Iｴ;ヴ;IデWヴ デﾗ 
; ゲｷﾐｪﾉW aｷｪ┌ヴWが ;ﾐS デｴW ┌ゲW ﾗa デｴｷゲ aｷｪ┌ヴW デﾗ ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デW デｴW ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉげゲ ﾉｷaW Iｴ;ﾐｪWゲく  
First is the indeterminacy and stochastic nature of risk, meaning that it is impossible to know 
the future actions of any one individual, even with statistical models..792 Second, the inaccurate 
assumptions underpinning the statistical models, e.g. equal co-variance in discriminant 
analysis, and inaccuracies and inadequate sample sizes e.g. in logistic regression, may result in 
statistical inaccuracies.793 For example, discriminant analysis has the potential to further 
entrench certain discriminatory biases underpinning the scoring models, and therefore 
technologically systematise and generate patterns of exclusion within a population.794  
Third, using agglomerated, historical consumer credit information to measure future individual 
default risk is vulnerable to data risk e.g. sample bias, as historical data consists of only credit 
consumers who were actually accepted as credit-worthy, and is therefore not representative 
of the whole range of new or future applicants that a lender will encounter. Fourth, the use of 
historical data in this manner entails a temporal risk, whereby the model data is fixed in time, 
while borrower populations in the real world change.795  
Fifth, credit scoring models are also ill-equipped to discriminate between various situations and 
contexts that may elicit similar default probability indicators, but which are causally distinct, 
e.g. Kenyan scoring models failing to differentiate between a credit default resulting from 
illness or loss of employment, and default resulting from moral hazard.796 Consequently, the 
individuals in both instances would be assigned the same credit scores as to their 
                                                          
792 Dawn Burton, けCヴWSｷデ “Iﾗヴｷﾐｪが ‘ｷゲﾆが ;ﾐS Cﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴ LWﾐSｷﾐｪゲI;ヮWゲ ｷﾐ EﾏWヴｪｷﾐｪ M;ヴﾆWデゲげ ふヲヰヱヲぶ ヴヴ 
Environment and Planning A 111, 115. The author refers to the 2008 credit crisis as an example of the failure 
of consumer behavior predictive models. See also, Marron (n 768) 114. The author argues that "the 
effectiveness of a credit scoring model can thus be judged only macroscopically on how well it distinguishes, 
at the level of the population of consumers and across numerous cases, the distinctive sub-groupings of 
けｪﾗﾗSげ ;ﾐS けH;Sげ Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴゲく 
793 Marron (n 768) 114. 
794 Wainwright (n 770) 659. 
795 Marron (n 768) 114に115; Burton (n 792) 116. 
796 Kairu and Amadi (n 772) 9. The authors noted that the Kenyan CIS infrastructure and regulations do not 
provide a classification of the kinds of default, and therefore do not respond to the circumstances leading to 




trustworthiness. Burton and others have also questioned the ability of credit scoring to 
Iﾗﾐゲデヴ┌Iデ ヴｷゲﾆ ﾏﾗSWﾉゲ デｴ;デ さWﾐS┌ヴW ﾉｷﾐW;ヴﾉ┞ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ デｷﾏW ｷﾐ ﾐWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷWゲざ ;ﾐS ｴ;┗W 
noted the destabilization of linear life experiences (which are central to the logic of default 
prediction models) by, for example, temporary labour markets, or the so-I;ﾉﾉWS けｪｷｪ 
WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷWゲげく797 
In addition, where a credit scoring model has a homogenous conception of population, its 
application by a large creditor across a large territory fails to take into account economic 
characteristics peculiar to specific regions of the territory, and therefore, the regional-sub-
population differences. The scoring model therefore ends up coming up with relatively 
inaccurate credit risk scores.798  
The risks of homogenous conception of population are especially underscored in instances of 
the transplantation by transnational financial institutions of credit risk management tools such 
as scoring technologies from developed economies to developing economies.799 For example, 
when Citigroup, a transnational bank with a presence in Kenya, applied its global scoring model 
(that applied 60% of the weight to financial ratios) to the Kenyan Small and Medium Enterprise 
(SME) sector without taking into account the local situation, 90% of the portfolio resulted in a 
negative score. Consequently, Citigroup decided not to enter the Kenyan SME sector, and 
closed down its SME banking division, despite the sector being well-performing.800 This 
demonstrates the power of particular subjective discourses of risk that are embedded in 
technological and statistical credit scoring models and particular institutions, and which control 
the paradigms through which institutions view certain economic systems.  
Emerging Market Infrastructural Challenges 
The use of credit scoring models that give significant weight to specific risk indicators such as 
bankability, residence, occupation, income, and addresses, also faces specific challenges in 
emerging markets and developing economies such as Kenya. First, credit scoring on the basis 
ﾗa IヴWSｷデ Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴゲげ H;ﾐﾆ ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデ ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ ゲ┌aaWヴゲ デｴW Iｴ;ﾉﾉWﾐｪW ﾗa ; ﾉ;ヴｪW ┌ﾐH;ﾐﾆWS ふﾏﾗヴW 
                                                          
797 D;┘ﾐ B┌ヴデﾗﾐ ;ﾐS ﾗデｴWヴゲが けM;ﾆｷﾐｪ ; M;ヴﾆWデぎ TｴW UK ‘Wデ;ｷﾉ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ “Wヴ┗ｷIWゲ IﾐS┌ゲデヴ┞ ;ﾐS デｴW ‘ｷゲW ﾗa デｴW 
Complex Sub-PヴｷﾏW CヴWSｷデ M;ヴﾆWデげ ふヲヰヰヴぶ Β CﾗﾏヮWデｷデｷﾗﾐ わ Change 3; Wainwright (n 770) 659. 
798 Marron (n 768) 114. 
799 Burton (n 792). The author argues that risks should be understood through a richer reading of social and 
cultural analysis and interpretation. He focuses on emerging markets as an example of understanding the 
social and cultural constructed nature of risks and credit scoring, by assessing technological expertise, legal 
systems, culture, norms, beliefs and social relations of financial institutions in specific places. 




than 58% as at 2016), and financially-excluded Kenyan population (about 24.6% as at 2016), 
and the practice of a cash-based economy, and SIM-based mobile money banking and 
remittance, even among the banked population.801 Credit providers in Kenya have of course 
sought to meet this challenge through the rollout of mobile phone-based digital lending, and 
the application of mobile phone use data in credit scoring.802 However, this innovative method 
of credit risk management faces the challenges of peculiar habits of phone-sharing (despite the 
legally-mandated registration of SIM cards) in Kenya, including in the transfer of funds. 
Consequently, credit scoring individuals using mobile phone data gives an inaccurate picture. 
Second, credit scoring on the developed economy model which places significant weight on 
employment in the formal economy where income can be accurately traced and verified, also 
faces challenges when applied to an emerging market economy like Kenya where, as at 2016, 
only 12% of the population was on salaried employment, and the majority of the population 
derive their livelihood from the informal sector.803 In addition, the scoring model may not 
capture the total financial or earning capacity of even the salaried population who, on average 
have about two sources of income (the additional sources derived from the informal sector).804  
The third challenge in applying credit scoring models in Kenya has been due to the metric of 
traceability, which requires the collection of verifiable personal details and address, largely 
from official identification documents such as a government issued identification card (ID), and 
utility bills such as water and electricity bills. Access to these documentation by potential 
borrowers is still a challenge, as only 56% of the population has access to electricity 
connectivity805, while less than 27% has access to metred water connections within their 
homes.806 According to Metropol Kenya, these デヴ;IW;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ a;Iデﾗヴゲ ;ヴW さIﾗﾐゲｷSWヴWS デﾗ Wﾐゲ┌ヴW 
                                                          
801 Central Bank of Kenya, Kenya National Bureau of Statistics and Financial Sector Deepening (FSD) Kenya (n 
718) 6. As at 2016, the financially included segment of the Kenyan population was 73.3%, having increased 
by 50% over the last 10 years, largely due to the introduction of mobile phone-based banking and its adoption 
by prudentially-regulated banks. However, the percentage of the population with bank accounts remains 
below 42.3%. 
802 See generally, Kaffenberger and Chege (n 779); On credit scoring of mobile-phone-based digital borrowing, 
see Cook and McKay (n 779). 
803 Central Bank of Kenya, Kenya National Bureau of Statistics and Financial Sector Deepening (FSD) Kenya (n 
718) 3. 
804 ibid. 
805 BWﾐ Cｴ┌ﾏﾗが けKWﾐ┞;げゲ EﾉWIデヴｷIｷデ┞ AIIWゲゲ ‘;デW Nﾗ┘ ;デ ; HｷゲデﾗヴｷI ヶヰ ヮWヴ CWﾐデげ Daily Nation (Nairobi, 23 July 
2016) <http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/kenya-electricity-access-rate-now-at-a-historic-sixty-per-
cent-/440808-3307998-p0whfa/index.html> accessed 13 July 2017. 
806 World Health Oヴｪ;ﾐｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS UﾐｷデWS N;デｷﾗﾐゲ CｴｷﾉSヴWﾐげゲ F┌ﾐSが けPヴﾗｪヴWゲゲ ﾗﾐ Dヴｷﾐﾆｷﾐｪ W;デWヴが “;ﾐｷデ;デｷﾗﾐ 




ｷﾏヮヴﾗ┗WS Iｴ;ﾐIWゲ ﾗa ヴWIﾗ┗Wヴ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ ｷﾐ デｴW W┗Wﾐデ ﾗa SWa;┌ﾉデざく807 Consequently, a systemic lack of 
access to public utility services such as water and electricity connections, especially to 
marginalized populations, further pushes them to the periphery of credit access, due to 
corresponding lower scores of creditworthiness.    
The limitations of credit scoring systems discussed above stand in stark contrast to the 
narrative of credit scoring and reporting as an accurate, scientific, objective, transparent, 
uniform and consistent statistical exercise of measuring the probability of individuals defaulting 
on their credit obligations. This view is further entrenched in its users by the automation, and 
embedding of credit scoring techniques in complex, algorithmic, computing models. However, 
the basis of assigning credit scores to individuals is less accurate, or even knowable, to most of 
the users of credit scores and reports.     
3. The Reproduction of Inequitable Lending Markets Within CIS 
3.1. CIS Infrastructure as Socio-Technical Agencements 
The notion of Socio-Technical Assemblages or Agencements (STAs) emanates from Science and 
Technological Studies (STS), and more specifically Actor-Network Theory, and refers to the 
hybrid collectives (composed of humans, ideas, discourses, materials, technologies, texts, 
routines and practices) in which action (including its reflexive dimension which produces 
meaning) takes place.808 CIS infrastructure in Kenya is conceptualised as an STA, to the extent 
that it is a hybrid infrastructure composed of neoliberal ideas and discourses, neoclassical 
economic theories, formal-liberal legal norms, technological rationalities and related 
mathematical, statistical, and computing technologies and practices. In addition, this hybrid 
collective enrols lenders, borrowers, Credit Reference Bureaus, local and transnational banking 
regulators and policy makers, and other financial markets stakeholders, in its infrastructure. 
Analysing CIS infrastructure as STAs enables an appreciation of the plurality of ideas, ideologies, 
discourses, practices and devices that aid in economic valuation and calculation, and make 
possible the constitution of a particular understanding of credit risk, and how to make it 
predictable and calculable.809 It also enables an understanding of the construction of the 
market for credit information, and the credit market, based on the tools of economic 
                                                          
807 Metropol Corporation (n 781). 
808 Ç;ﾉﾀズﾆ;ﾐ ;ﾐS C;ﾉﾉﾗﾐ ふﾐ ンンヰぶ Γく 




calculation and valuation, such as credit scores. By isolating and analysing the workings of 
various valuation and calculation tools, such as economic and legal theories, it is possible to 
further understand the construction and sustenance of relations of domination within the 
credit market, and how inequitable credit markets are reproduced within CIS.  
Where certain analyses of the credit market may simply see competition or confrontation 
between autonomous elements of the CIS infrastructure, the concept of an STA discovers a 
different reality. The affirmation of the autonomy and rationality of various economic and legal 
ideas, techniques and technologies within CIS and the credit markets conceals and legitimates 
the power asymmetries between lenders and borrowers, and high interest rates.810 The CIS 
infrastructure formats the minds and bodies of individual stakeholders, and the bureaucracies 
and systems of institutions, reducing them to disciplined actors that fit smoothly into the risk 
management logic of neoliberal capital.811  
To become durable, establish hegemony, reproduce, and even change, the inherently 
inequitable neoliberal credit markets are anchored in materiality such as CIS infrastructure, 
which structure and manufacture irreversibility to ensure their perpetuation.812 In the present 
discussion, CIS technologies and praIデｷIWゲ ｷﾐ KWﾐ┞;げゲ H;ﾐﾆｷﾐｪ ゲWIデﾗヴ ﾗヮWヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷゲW デｴW 
neoliberal free market ideologies embedded in neoclassical economic ideas, formal-liberal 
legal norms, and technological rationality, and have in fact contributed to the deepening of 
power asymmetries between lenders and borrowers, and the reproduction of high interest 
rates, high indebtedness and financial exclusion, as discussed below. 
3.2. Neoclassical Economic Ideology in CIS Technologies and Practices 
Neoclassical economic ideas reproduce power asymmetries and inequality in the Kenyan 
lending market by appropriating and operationalising assumptions about the homo 
economicus に the rational, utility-maximising individual に in the discourse and practices of 
creditworthiness in CIS. 
 In capitalist credit markets, Marron contends, the future is permeated with uncertainty due to 
the complexity of social life, the dis-embeddedness of transactions from social relations, and a 
                                                          
810 ibid 13. 
811 MｷIｴWﾉ C;ﾉﾉﾗﾐが けAﾐ Eゲゲ;┞ ﾗﾐ デｴW Gヴﾗ┘ｷﾐｪ CﾗﾐデヴｷH┌デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa EIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI M;ヴﾆWデゲ デﾗ デｴW PヴﾗﾉｷaWヴ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW 
“ﾗIｷ;ﾉげ ふヲヰヰΑぶ ヲヴ TｴWﾗヴ┞が C┌ﾉデ┌ヴW わ Society 139, 145. 




heightened dependence upon the self-governing potential of individuals.813 Consequently, 
capitalist credit markets are built upon instrumental rationality and the capacity for foresight, 
in which risk is a probabilistic analysis of the recursiveness of events, and hence calculation of 
future default. 
TｴW けｪﾗﾗSげ IヴWSｷデ Ionsumer is thus defined as a rational and socially-responsible, prudent, 
forward-thinking, and responsible subject.814 This is demonstrated, for example, in the KCISI 
ﾏWゲゲ;ｪｷﾐｪ I;ﾏヮ;ｷｪﾐ デｴ;デ WﾐIﾗ┌ヴ;ｪWゲ IヴWSｷデ Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴゲ デﾗ さﾗHデ;ｷﾐ デｴWｷヴ IヴWSｷデ ヴWヮﾗヴデゲ ﾗﾐ ; 
regular basis so that they can see for themselves how responsible and compliant behaviour in 
ｴ;ﾐSﾉｷﾐｪ デｴWｷヴ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ;aa;ｷヴゲ I;ﾐ Wﾐｴ;ﾐIW デｴWｷヴ IヴWSｷデ ゲIﾗヴWゲ ;ﾐS a;Iｷﾉｷデ;デW ;IIWゲゲ デﾗ IヴWSｷデざく815 
This responsibilizing discourse is further defined in the various credit scoring algorithms and 
IヴWSｷデ ヴWヮﾗヴデゲが ┘ｴｷIｴ SWaｷﾐW ﾐﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗W W┝ヮWIデ;デｷﾗﾐゲ デｴ;デ ゲWデ ;ヮ;ヴデ デｴW けﾐﾗヴﾏ;ﾉげ Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴ aヴﾗﾏ 
デｴW けSW┗ｷ;ﾐデげが ┌ﾐデヴ┌ゲデ┘ﾗヴデｴ┞ Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴく TｴW けﾐﾗヴﾏ;ﾉげ Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴが ヮヴWaWヴヴWS H┞ デｴW IヴWSｷデ 
providers, is defined by CISA Kenya as a married, home-owner, having worked in the same job 
for 10 or more years in a full-time salaried employment at a manager or executive level, and 
having taken 5 or more previous loans, with no previous delinquencies. On the other hand, the 
けSW┗ｷ;ﾐデげ IヴWSｷデ Iﾗﾐゲ┌mer is a tenant who is single, and has been on a job for less than a year, 
or is unemployed, and has no previous loan, or is an average delinquent.816  
This responsibilizing discourse within the credit scores and reports acts upon the credit 
consumers, defining them as subjects within loan agreements, as docile bodies who meet their 
repayments.817 The threats of blacklisting by banks, the circulation of negative credit scores 
and reports, and their exclusion from the credit market (for up to 5 years, in Kenya), are 
evolving into control mechanisms that compel compliance to behaviour deemed rational and 
responsible by the credit providers. This includes individual consumers carefully cultivating 
their credit histories to conform to the classification of prudent, responsible, trustworthy 
customers, rather than deviant customers. As disciplining and moralising technology, CIS 
compels credit consumers to not only keep up to date with their credit repayment obligations, 
but also to regularly consume even more credit. 
                                                          
813 Marron (n 768) 104. 
814 Burton (n 792) 113. 
815 M;ヴデｷﾐ “ﾉﾗ┌ｪｴ ;ﾐS “┌ﾆｴ┘ｷﾐSWヴ Aヴﾗヴ;が けCヴWSｷデ ‘WaWヴWﾐIW PヴﾗﾃWIデ Pｴ;ゲW II MｷS TWヴﾏ ‘W┗ｷW┘げ ふFｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ 
Sector Deepening (FSD) Kenya 2013) Commissioned Report 19. 
816 Credit Information Sharing Association of Kenya (n 774). 
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The algorithmically constructed creditworthy consumer mirrors the neoliberal entrepreneurial 
subject in neoclassical economics に the homo economicus に who is, by definition, able to 
provide for their own security and freedom in the face of an uncertain future through a whole 
host of rational and calculative practices and techniques designed to enable the seizing of 
opportunities.818 TｴW ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉげゲ IヴWSｷデ ゲIﾗヴWが デｴWﾐが WﾏHﾗSｷWゲ ; ﾏW;ゲ┌ヴWﾏWﾐデ ﾗa デｴW 
entrepreneurial abilities of the credit user.819 This responsibilizing discourse has consequently 
constructed the issue of high interest rates and lack of access to credit as a private problem of 
the credit consumer, which is to be resolved not by public regulatory action but rather the 
Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴげゲ Iﾗﾏヮﾉｷ;ﾐIW デﾗ デｴW ﾐﾗrmative and calculative imperatives within credit scores and 
reports. This is W┝WﾏヮﾉｷaｷWS H┞ CBK ｪﾗ┗Wヴﾐﾗヴ Nﾃ┌ｪ┌ﾐ; NS┌ﾐｪげ┌げゲ ヴWﾏ;ヴﾆ デｴ;デ ﾉﾗ┘ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デWゲ 
さI;ﾐ only be achieved when financiers have better information with which to evaluate credit 
ヴｷゲﾆざく820 CﾗﾐゲWケ┌Wﾐデﾉ┞が デｴW SｷゲIﾗ┌ヴゲW ;ﾐS ヮヴ;IデｷIW ﾗa さヴｷゲﾆ-H;ゲWS ヮヴｷIｷﾐｪざ ﾗa ﾉﾗ;ﾐゲ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ デｴW 
use of credit scores and reports, seeks to transfer the debate on high interests rates and high 
consumer indebtedness from the public, political, regulatory arena, to the private, ostensibly 
apolitical, contractual arena.   
The responsibilizing, neoliberal discourse of the socially-ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲｷHﾉW けIヴWSｷデ ゲ┌HﾃWIデげ 
ideologically conceals at least two facts of the nature of the Kenyan credit market. First, the 
credit market is characterised by an asymmetrical power relation favouring the lender, 
whereby a one-sided borrower responsibility is viewed as the norm に a tenet which, Knights 
and Vurdubakis argue, is central to the profits and powers of lenders.821 This power asymmetry 
has been central to the exploitation of Kenyan borrowers by banks, through unconscionable 
lending terms. The CIS infrastructure, while touted as the policy solution to high interest rates 
and high indebtedness, actually deepens this power asymmetry through the disciplining power 
of credit scores and reports.  
Second, as argued by Langley, the performance of the subject position of the responsible and 
entrepreneurial borrower is necessarily partial and incomplete, and especially difficult for 
those with low incomes.822 TｴW Iﾗﾐゲデヴ┌Iデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW けﾐﾗヴﾏ;ﾉげ Hﾗヴヴﾗ┘Wヴ ;ゲ SｷゲIﾗﾐﾐWIデWS aヴﾗﾏ 
                                                          
818 ibid 460. 
819 ibid 459. 
820 “;ヴ;ｴ K;ﾐ;ｷ┞; ;ﾐS Aﾏﾗゲ Oﾏﾗﾉﾉﾗが けヲﾐS ‘Wｪｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ CヴWSｷデ Iﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ “ｴ;ヴｷﾐｪ CﾗﾐaWヴWﾐIWぎ UﾐﾉﾗIﾆｷﾐｪ AIIWゲゲ 
デﾗ AaaﾗヴS;HﾉW CヴWSｷデげ ふAゲゲﾗIｷ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗf Kenya Credit Providers 2013) Conference Report 8. 
821 D;┗ｷS Kﾐｷｪｴデゲ ;ﾐS TｴWﾗ V┌ヴS┌H;ﾆｷゲが けC;ﾉI┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa ‘ｷゲﾆぎ Tﾗ┘;ヴSゲ ;ﾐ UﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐSｷﾐｪ ﾗa Iﾐゲ┌rance as a 
Mﾗヴ;ﾉ ;ﾐS PﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ TWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪ┞げ ふヱΓΓンぶ ヱΒ AIIﾗ┌ﾐデｷﾐｪが Oヴｪ;ﾐｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐゲ ;ﾐS “ﾗIｷWデ┞ ΑヲΓく 




the realities of the uncertainties, difficulties and systemic subjectivities inherent in liberal 
market economies, including high unemployment rates, low wages, and casual labour 
contracts, especially in the gig-economy, makes it difficult to comply with the disciplinary 
imperatives of responsible borrowers as constructed in the credit scoring and reporting 
ゲ┞ゲデWﾏゲく TｴW ;┗Wヴ;ｪW KWﾐ┞;ﾐ IヴWSｷデ Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴ ｷゲ デｴWﾐ ゲデ┌Iﾆ ｷﾐ デｴW け┌ﾐIヴWSｷデ┘ﾗヴデｴ┞げ 
Iﾉ;ゲゲｷaｷI;デｷﾗﾐが ;ﾐS デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ デｴW デWIｴﾐｷケ┌W ﾗa けヴｷゲﾆ-H;ゲWS ヮヴｷIｷﾐｪげが ｷゲ ゲ┌HﾃWIデWS デﾗ ｴｷｪｴ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ 
rates and potentially high indebtedness. The neoclassical economic assumption of the 
existence of the homo economicus に the rational, utility-maximising individual borrower 
exhibiting prudence, forethought, and personal responsibility - reproduces inequality in access 
to affordable credit.  
3.3. The Ideology of Legal Formalism in CIS Technologies and Practices 
Four related formal-liberal legal ideologies are also at work within credit scoring and reporting 
technologies, and contribute to the reproduction of power asymmetries and inequality in the 
Kenyan lending market, and consequently, high interest rates and indebtedness: the legally 
abstracted legal subject with rights and duties; individual liberty and freedoms; equal 
Iﾗﾐデヴ;Iデ┌;ﾉ H;ヴｪ;ｷﾐｷﾐｪ ヮﾗ┘Wヴ ｷﾐ デｴW ヮヴｷ┗;デW ゲヮｴWヴWき ;ﾐS デｴW ﾏﾗヴ;ﾉｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS けWデｴｷaｷI;デｷﾗﾐげ ﾗa 
the debtor. 
3.3.1. The Abstract Legal Subject 
Legal formalism ideologically abstracts distinct individuals within communities into 
autonomous legal subjects with equal rights and duties, thereby universalising and contributing 
to the constitution of the homo economicus. This legal abstraction is also achieved through the 
statistical methodology of credit scoring, which entails treating individuals not as subjects, the 
bearers of particular aptitudes or moral qualities, but rather as objects, agglomerations of 
particular, quantifiable attributes. For example, the credit reports, and scoring of risk attributes 
do not differentiate between defaults caused by illness, loss of employment, or even 
bereavement, and defaults caused by moral hazard.823 By making visible the risk attributes of 
individual credit consumers at the level of populations rather than the individual, credit scoring 
masks or ignores the individual identities and categories which have been the victims of 
                                                          




marginalisation, high interest rates and high indebtedness in the Kenyan lending market.824 
Consequently, by this abstraction and risk-pricing of loans, credit scoring and reporting may 
actually perpetuate these disadvantages in the credit market, within these specific groups.      
3.3.2. Individual Liberty 
The second related legal ideology that runs through CIS technologies and practices is individual 
liberty or freedom, interwoven in the discourse of equality of opportunity in the neoliberal 
WIﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞が ;ﾐS I;ヮデ┌ヴWS ｷﾐ デｴW ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲｷHｷﾉｷ┣ｷﾐｪ ﾉ;ﾐｪ┌;ｪW ﾗa I┌ﾉデｷ┗;デｷﾐｪ ﾗﾐWげゲ IヴWSｷデ ゲIﾗヴW ｷﾐ 
pursuit of financial and other types of freedom. This is evident, for example, in the web 
campaigns of Tala, a Kenyan credit scoring tech-┗WﾐSﾗヴぎ さ┘W ;ヴW ぐ ヮ;ゲゲｷﾗﾐ;デW ;Hﾗ┌デ W┝デWﾐSｷﾐｪ 
aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ aヴWWSﾗﾏ デﾗ デｴW Hｷﾉﾉｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa ┌ﾐSWヴゲWヴ┗WS ヮWﾗヮﾉW ;ヴﾗ┌ﾐS デｴW ┘ﾗヴﾉSざく825 In 2016, Tala 
KWﾐ┞; ヴ;ﾐ ; I;ﾏヮ;ｷｪﾐ ﾗﾐ デｴW ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ｴﾗﾉｷS;┞ IﾗﾏﾏWﾏﾗヴ;デｷﾐｪ KWﾐ┞;げゲ Independence with the 
ゲﾉﾗｪ;ﾐ ざFinancial freedom: 4 lessons from Tala customers - Celebrating financial freedom for 
KWﾐ┞;げゲ M;S;ヴ;ﾆ; D;┞ざく826 Another East African digital lender and credit reporting outfit に L-
Pesa Microfinance に ;ﾉゲﾗ ヮヴﾗﾏｷゲWゲ さFinancial Freedom with L-Pesa Digital Credit Score 
Certificateざく827 
However, the contradiction inherent in the operationalisation of this discourse of freedom 
within CIS technologies is that individual freedom and security no longer refer to thrift, 
prudence, and the absence of debt, but rather the responsible and entrepreneurial meeting, 
management and manipulation of continuous, outstanding obligations.828 The concept of 
aヴWWSﾗﾏ ｴ;ゲ HWWﾐ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉｷ┣WS デﾗ ﾏW;ﾐ けSｷゲIｷヮﾉｷﾐWS ｷﾐSWHデWSﾐWゲゲげ ヴ;デｴWヴ デｴ;ﾐ デｴヴｷaデ┞ ;HゲWﾐIW 
of debt. As Rose Kinuthia, the Acting CEO of TransUnion Kenya ゲデ;デWSが さTｴW ﾏﾗヴW ┞ﾗ┌ Hﾗヴヴﾗ┘ 
and pay, the more you are viewed as a low-ヴｷゲﾆ I┌ゲデﾗﾏWヴざく829 Indeed, the credit scoring 
algorithms of CRBs such as Metropol also reward perpetual indebtedness and the timely 
meeting of obligations with high credit scores, and penalises individuals who have never taken 
                                                          
824 Central Bank of Kenya, Kenya National Bureau of Statistics and Financial Sector Deepening (FSD) Kenya (n 
718) 5に8. The categories with constrained access to credit in Kenya include women, rural populations, those 
without formal employment, the less educated, and those in the Western and Coastal regions of the country. 
825 T;ﾉ;が けAHﾗ┌デげ ふTALA) <http://tala.co/about/> accessed 14 July 2017. 
826 T;ﾉ; KWﾐ┞;が けFｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ FヴWWSﾗﾏぎ ヴ LWゲゲﾗﾐゲ aヴﾗﾏ T;ﾉ; C┌ゲデﾗﾏWヴゲげ аｴデデヮゲぎっっﾏWSｷ┌ﾏくIﾗﾏっデ;ﾉ;っaｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ-
freedom-4-lessons-from-tala-customers-24924b97fcd3> accessed 16 July 2017. 
827 けFｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ FヴWWSﾗﾏ ┘ｷデｴ L-Pesa Digital Credit Score Certificate に L-PWゲ; FｷﾐデWIｴ Bﾉﾗｪげ аｴデデヮぎっっHﾉﾗｪくﾉ-
pesa.com/index.php/2016/10/05/financial-freedom-with-l-pesa-digital-credit-score-certificate/> accessed 
16 July 2017. 
828 Langley (n 822) 133. 
829 T;ﾉ; KWﾐ┞;が けHﾗ┘ Pﾗゲｷデｷ┗W CヴWSｷデ ‘Wヮﾗヴデｷﾐｪ C;ﾐ HWﾉヮ Yﾗ┌ Gヴﾗ┘げ аｴデデヮゲぎっっﾏWSｷ┌ﾏくIﾗﾏっをデ;ﾉ;ぱKEっｴﾗ┘-




out a loan, or those who close a long-running credit account in a bid to reduce their 
indebtedness, with lower credit scores.830 This peculiar logic of credit scoring systems therefore 
disciplines and compels individuals to take up and maintain timely payments of credit they do 
not need, merely to maintain favourable creditworthy scores.831  
This peculiar logic of credit scoring systems was questioned in Barbra Georgina Khaemba v 
Cabinet Secretary, National Treasury & another [2016] eKLR, where the Petitioner requested 
デｴW Hｷｪｴ Cﾗ┌ヴデ デﾗ SWIﾉ;ヴW デｴ;デ さｷﾐ デｴW ゲWﾐゲW デｴ;デ ; ﾐW┘ Hﾗヴヴﾗ┘Wヴ ｴ;ゲ ﾐﾗ ﾆﾐﾗ┘ﾐ ｴｷゲデﾗヴ┞が ゲ┌Iｴ ; 
person is discriminated against by having been given higher interest rates by mere reason of 
┌ﾐﾆﾐﾗ┘ﾐ ｴｷゲデﾗヴ┞くざ832 This, she argued, amounted to discrimination on the ground of not having 
borrowed before. The High Court rejected this argument, finding no grounds for discrimination, 
on 2 main premises. First, credit agreements are voluntary, not legally mandated, and are 
already regulated by the CBK, and the courts will only interfere in instances of human rights 
violations. Second, the court argued, whereas every individual may be in need of a loan, not 
everyone may meet the loan application criteria. Therefore, when an ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉげゲ IヴWSｷデ ｴｷゲデﾗヴ┞ 
does not favour them in getting a loan, it cannot be said that he or she is being discriminated.833  
The classification of lending contracts as voluntary or private relationships in the context of 
KWﾐ┞;げゲ ﾉWﾐSｷﾐｪ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデが Iｴ;ヴ;IデWrised by high interest rates, high indebtedness, and the 
introduction of statutory CIS, is problematised by two observations. First is the increasingly 
colonising power of CIS, in its logic of creditworthiness being transplanted to other non-credit 
relationships such as employment and tenancies, as a result of the statutory expansion of 
subscribers and users to credit reports.834 In fact, the continued future feasibility of CRBs in 
Kenya has been anchored on the statutory deepening of this market, through the widening of 
                                                          
830 Metropol Corporation (n 781). 
831 Liz Pulliam Weston, Your Credit Score: How to Improve the 3-Digit Number That Shapes Your Financial 
Future (FT Press 2011) 58. The author debunks the naturally logical myth that closing credit accounts will help 
;ﾐ ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉげゲ IヴWSｷデ ゲIﾗヴWく “ｴW ﾐﾗデWゲ デｴ;デ Iﾉﾗゲｷﾐｪ IヴWSｷデ ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデゲ ｴ┌ヴデゲ デｴW Hﾗヴヴﾗ┘Wヴ H┞ aｷヴゲデが ﾏ;ﾆｷﾐｪ ﾗﾐWげゲ 
credit history look younger than it is, and second, reduces the total credit available to the individual account 
holder. Consequently, closing revolving credit acIﾗ┌ﾐデゲ ｴ┌ヴデゲ ヴ;デｴWヴ デｴ;ﾐ ｴWﾉヮゲ ﾗﾐWげゲ IヴWSｷデ ゲIﾗヴWく 
832 Barbra Georgina Khaemba v Cabinet Secretary, National Treasury & the Attorney General [2016] eKLR 
(High Court of Kenya at Nairobi (Milimani Law Courts)) 23, Para. 41. 
833 ibid 26, Para 47-49. 
834 Section 30 of the CRB Regulations (2014) allows third parties to obtain directly from a CRB, a credit report 
of a customer, with their consent, for purposes of: assessment of credit facility; employment, underwriting 
ｷﾐゲ┌ヴ;ﾐIWき SWデWヴﾏｷﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW I┌ゲデﾗﾏWヴげゲ WﾉｷｪｷHｷﾉｷデ┞ aﾗヴ ; ﾉｷIWﾐゲW ﾗヴ HWﾐWaｷデ ｪヴ;ﾐデWS H┞ デｴW ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデき 
assessment of credit or repayment risks associated with an existing credit obligation; or legitimate need for 
information in connection with business transactions initiated by the customer or other lawful transaction or 





the uses of credit reports, so as to improve the demand side of bureau services.835 The power 
of CIS to impact on the life chances of credit consumers is amplified.  
Second, the disciplining logic of CIS, which compels perpetual indebtedness so as to qualify for 
other credit and non-credit life chances, potentially removes modern credit contracts from the 
ambit of voluntary and private relationships. 
3.3.3. Equal Bargaining Power 
The ideology of equal bargaining power in the private sphere is exemplifieS ｷﾐ KWﾐ┞;ﾐ Iﾗ┌ヴデゲげ 
legal assumption of parity in bargaining power (in interest rate related credit disputes), and 
their reluctance to interfere in or rewrite the contractual rate of interest.836 This is despite the 
Iﾗ┌ヴデゲげ obiter dicta observations on the deeply asymmetrical power relationships.837 The courts 
have, however, developed common law grounds for intervention, including harsh, illegal, 
fraudulent, and unconscionable contracts as grounds for rewriting interest rate clauses.838 The 
logic of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis underpinning CIS embraces this equal bargain 
ideology. It implies that the bridging of information asymmetries between the lender and 
borrower (in favour of the latter) optimises the contractual negotiations and leads to an 
optimal, risk-based pricing of loans, as reflected in the contractual interest rate. This 
assumption is captured in Fｷﾐ;ﾐIW MｷﾐｷゲデWヴ HWﾐヴ┞ ‘ﾗデｷIｴげゲが comments, touting CIS as 
empowering credit consumers to negotiate for better interest rates using their credit 
reports.839  
This rationalization conceals the impact of CIS in deepening the inherent power asymmetries 
between lender and borrower, in favour of the former. As noted by the Kenya Credit Providers 
Association (KCPA), power asymmetries in lending relationships may be accentuated by CIS, 
through predatory lending, unsolicited marketing using borrower credit data, using threats of 
                                                          
835 Kanaiya and Omollo (n 820) 9, 25. 
836 See National Bank of Kenya Ltd v Pipeplastic Samkolit (K) Ltd & another [2001] eKLR (The Court of Appeal 
at Nairobi). 
837 See the colourful comments of Ogola J., in Captain JN Wafubwa v Housing Finance Company of Kenya 
[2012] eKLR (The High Court of Kenya at Nairobi (Milimani Commercial Courts)). TｴW Cﾗ┌ヴデ ゲデ;デWS デｴ;デ けB;ﾐﾆゲ 
in Kenya reign large. I am reminded of a predator who after killing the prey is not satisfied to leave the carcass 
to the vultures, but becomes both the predator and the vulture, killing the prey and gleaning the meat from 
the carcass to ensure the prey is really dead. I am also reminded of a robber killing his victim and not only 
attending his funeral, but insisting on carrying the casket to the grave to confirm that his victim is dead and 
H┌ヴｷWSくげ 
838 See Margaret Njeri Muiruri v Bank of Baroda (Kenya) Limited (n 720). 
839 CヴWSｷデ Iﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ “ｴ;ヴｷﾐｪ AゲゲﾗIｷ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa KWﾐ┞;が けCI“ aﾗヴ Iﾐﾐﾗ┗;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ IﾐIﾉ┌ゲｷﾗﾐぎ さMｷﾆﾗヮﾗ 




CRB blacklisting for debt collection, and denial of employment and other economic 
opportunities, practices which have elicited CBK intervention.840 The Kenyan banks have been 
;II┌ゲWS ﾗa ;H┌ゲｷﾐｪ CI“ ｷﾐ さデｴW SWゲｷヴW デﾗ ヴWIﾗ┗Wヴ W┗Wヴ┞デｴｷﾐｪ ﾉﾗゲデざが H┞ Hﾉ;Iﾆﾉｷゲデｷﾐｪ Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴゲ aﾗヴ 
non-default issues such as ledger fees on dormant accounts and account closing charges, legally 
unenforceable loan agreements, and micro-loan amounts of as little as Kshs. 100 (£0.70).841  
In addition, despite the various consumer protection provisions included in the CRB regulations 
and the Consumer Protection Act, the bureaus remain accountable to relatively uninformed 
and uninfluential borrowers on the one hand, and powerful stakeholders on the other hand, 
including banks, technology vendors and regulatory authorities, who can impose their will on 
the bureaus.842 Despite progressive judicial reforms to improve access to justice for Kenyans, 
court processes remain inordinately long, tedious, and expensive for consumers to challenge 
unconscionable interest rate provisions of loan contracts, and inaccurate credit reports.843 
Consequently, the ideology of equal bargaining power as expressed through the CIS mechanism 
preserves the asymmetrical and exploitative power relations between credit providers and 
consumers in Kenya.    
3.3.4. Moralisation of the Borrower 
Ideological-ﾉWｪ;ﾉ ﾏﾗヴ;ﾉｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW Hﾗヴヴﾗ┘Wヴげゲ SWHデ ﾗHﾉｷｪ;デｷﾗﾐs makes uneven the power 
relations between borrower and lender, and accounts for the profits and powers of lenders in 
capitalist societies.844 Tｴｷゲ ﾏﾗヴ;ﾉ ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW SWa;┌ﾉデｷﾐｪ SWHデﾗヴ ;ゲ けSW┗ｷ;ﾐデげ ｷゲ ヴWaﾉWIデWS ｷﾐ 
KWﾐ┞;げゲ ;Sﾗヮデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa Eﾐｪﾉｷゲｴ H;ﾐﾆヴ┌ヮデI┞ laws and traditions, in which law is a central mechanism 
for the moralisation of debtors, and the shunning of bankrupts through exclusion from credit 
and non-credit social opportunities,845 and also the committal of judgment debtors to civil 
                                                          
840 Davel, Serakwane and Kimondo (n 791) vi. Fﾗヴ デｴW CBKげゲ ｷﾐデWヴ┗Wﾐデｷﾗﾐが ゲWW CWﾐデヴ;ﾉ B;ﾐﾆ ﾗa KWﾐ┞;が 
け“┌Hﾏｷゲゲｷﾗﾐ ﾗa CヴWSｷデ Iﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ デﾗ LｷIWﾐゲWS CヴWSｷデ ‘WaWヴWﾐIW B┌ヴW;┌ゲげ 
<https://www.centralbank.go.ke/uploads/banking_circulars/1456582762_Banking%20Circular%20No%204
%20of%202016%20-%20The%20Banking%20Amendment%20Act%202016.pdf> accessed 16 July 2017; 
‘;ゲｴｷS AｴﾏWS ;ﾐS “ｷﾏﾗﾐ K;ヴ┌ﾐSｷデ┌が けKWﾐ┞; CヴWSｷデ Pヴﾗ┗ｷSWヴゲ AゲゲﾗIｷ;デｷﾗﾐぎ ‘ﾗ;Sﾏ;ヮ ヲヰヱヰ-ヲヰヱヵげ ふFｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ 
Sector Deepening (FSD) Kenya 2010) 5. 
841 “WW Nｪｷｪｷが けP;ｷﾐ ﾗa KWﾐ┞;ﾐゲ Bﾉ;IﾆﾉｷゲデWS aﾗヴ Aﾏﾗ┌ﾐデゲ ;ゲ “ﾏ;ﾉﾉ ;ゲ “ｴヱヰヰ ｷﾐ MﾗHｷﾉW Lﾗ;ﾐゲが B;ﾐﾆ FWWゲげ ふﾐ ヶヱヶぶく 
842 Kanaiya and Omollo (n 820) 24. 
843 Kairu and Amadi (n 772) 1. 
844 See generally, R Gelpi and F Julien-Labruyère, The History of Consumer Credit: Doctrines and Practices 
(Springer 2000). 
845 Division 15 of the Insolvency Act (No. 8 of 2015), Laws of Kenya, for example, provides for certain 
restrictions on the bankrupt, including engaging in certain businesses. Other election law provisions, including 




jail.846 This discourse of legal moralisation has been entrenched in the logic of CIS, which touts 
デｴW IヴWSｷデ ゲIﾗヴW ;ﾐS デｴW IヴWSｷデ ヴWヮﾗヴデ ;ゲ ﾏW;ゲ┌ヴWゲ ﾗa ;ﾐ ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉげゲ IヴWSｷデ┘ﾗヴデｴｷﾐWゲゲが 
trustworthiness, morality and ethics.  
For example, Section 2 of the CRB regulations (2013) defines a credit report as a measure of a 
ヮWヴゲﾗﾐげゲ さIヴWSｷデ┘ﾗヴデｴｷﾐWゲゲが IヴWSｷデ ゲデ;ﾐSｷﾐｪが IヴWSｷデ I;ヮ;Iｷデ┞が Iｴ;ヴ;IデWヴが ﾗヴ ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉ ヴWヮ┌デ;デｷﾗﾐざが 
to be used to gauge eligibility for credit and non-credit opportunities.847 This is despite the 
disclaimers included by CRBs in their credit reports, to the extent that the credit information 
does not reflect on the solvency, financial standing, or the stability, honesty or motives of any 
party or general creditworthiness848 This moralisation of the debtor is mainstreamed in the 
SｷゲIﾗ┌ヴゲW ﾗﾐ CI“ ｷﾐaヴ;ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴW ;ﾐS ヮヴ;IデｷIWゲが ;ゲ W┝WﾏヮﾉｷaｷWS H┞ デｴW IﾗﾏﾏWﾐデゲ ﾗa Eケ┌ｷデ┞ B;ﾐﾆげゲ 
CｴｷWa OヮWヴ;デｷﾐｪ OaaｷIWヴが Dヴ KｷヮﾐｪげWデｷIｴが デｴ;デぎ  
さAKCP ┘ｷﾉﾉ ;ﾉゲﾗ ヮヴﾗﾏﾗデW ｪﾗﾗS Iｷデｷ┣Wﾐゲｴｷヮ ;ゲ ｷデ ゲ┌ヮヮﾗヴデゲ the implementation of Chapter 
6 of the Constitution of Kenya which necessitates ethical behaviour by all those seeking 
appointment to or holding public office. A clean report from the CRB will thus become 
one way the public can assess the ethical standing ﾗa デｴW ;aaWIデWS ヮWヴゲﾗﾐゲざく849  
This discourse disciplines the borrower by indicating that affordable loans through reasonable 
ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デWゲ ;ヴW ヮヴWSｷI;デWS ﾗﾐ デｴW Hﾗヴヴﾗ┘Wヴげゲ ﾏﾗヴ;ﾉｷデ┞が ┘ｴｷIｴ ｷゲ I;ヮデ┌ヴWS ｷﾐ デｴWｷヴ IヴWSｷデ ゲIﾗヴW 
and credit report. As the proposed ﾏﾗデデﾗ ﾗa AKCP ゲデ;デWSぎ さKWWヮ ┞ﾗ┌ヴ IヴWSｷデ ゲIﾗヴW ｴW;ﾉデｴ┞ ;ﾐS 
Wﾐﾃﾗ┞ ﾉﾗ┘Wヴ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デWゲざく850 The use of CRB reports as a measure of individual character in 
granting access to non-credit related opportunities such as public service jobs has been 
litigated in the case of Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & Others v Judicial Service 
Commission & the Attorney General, where the Applicants asked the court to declare that the 
                                                          
846 See sections 39 and 40 of the Civil Procedure Act, Cap. 21, Laws of Kenya, which provide for the arrest and 
detention of judgment-debtors, on a decree-ｴﾗﾉSWヴげゲ ;ヮヮﾉｷI;デｷﾗﾐく TｴW Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデ┞ ﾗa デｴWゲW ヮヴﾗ┗ｷゲｷﾗﾐゲ 
was litigated in the case of Beatrice Wanjiku & Another v Attorney General & Another [2012] eKLR (High Court 
of Kenya at Nairobi (Milimani Law Courts))., where the High Court declared that they were not incompatible 
with the International Law provisions of the Article 11 of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil 
;ﾐS PﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ ‘ｷｪｴデゲ ふICCP‘ぶ ┘ｴｷIｴ ヮヴﾗ┗ｷSWゲ デｴ;デ さno one shall be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability 
デﾗ a┌ﾉaｷﾉ ; Iﾗﾐデヴ;Iデ┌;ﾉ ﾗHﾉｷｪ;デｷﾗﾐざく TｴW Iﾗ┌ヴデ ｴWﾉS デｴ;デ ｷﾏヮヴｷゲﾗﾐﾏWﾐデ ﾗa Iﾗﾐデヴ;Iデ┌;ﾉ SWHデﾗヴゲ ｷゲ Iﾗﾏヮ;デｷHﾉW ┘ｷデｴ 
the Article 11 of the ICCPR as long as the statutory and procedural aspects of Sections 38 and 40 are complied 
with. 
847 Section 8 of the Credit Reference Bureau Regulations (2013) 
848 OげKWWaaWが V;ﾉSW┣ ;ﾐS N┞;ｪｪ;ｴ ふﾐ Αヶヶぶ ヶヶく 





use of credit reports for vetting applicants for judicial positions was illegal, as they were 
extraneous requirements not found under the constitutional and statutory framework.  
Odunga J., rejecting the Application, held that the requirement of furnishing CRB reports is 
ﾏW;ﾐデ デﾗ SWデWヴﾏｷﾐW デｴW ;ヮヮﾉｷI;ﾐデげゲ ｷﾐデWｪヴｷデ┞が ｴﾗﾐWゲデ┞ ;ﾐS ｴｷｪｴ ﾏﾗヴ;ﾉ Iharacter in professional 
and personal life, respect for professional duties, and the ability to understand the need to 
maintain propriety and the appearance of propriety.851 This appreciation of the credit report 
as a measure of morality was reaffirmed by another High Court in the case of G.B.M. Kariuki v 
Director of Criminal Investigations & 3 others, where Aburuli J. stated that credit reports, 
;ﾏﾗﾐｪ ﾗデｴWヴ IﾉW;ヴ;ﾐIWゲが ┘WヴW さｴ;ﾐSﾏ;ｷSWﾐゲ ｷﾐ SWデWヴﾏｷﾐｷﾐｪ デｴW ;ヮヮﾉｷI;ﾐデげゲ ｷﾐデWｪヴｷデ┞ざ852       
Looked at in the totality of the workings of economic and legal rationalities, there stands out 
;ﾐ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ Iﾗﾐデヴ;SｷIデｷﾗﾐ ｷﾐ デｴｷゲ ﾏﾗヴ;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa SWHデﾗヴゲげ Iﾗﾐデヴ;Iデ┌;ﾉ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲｷHｷﾉｷデｷWゲく FヴWW-
market credit agreements, rationalized by economic theory and contract law as necessarily free 
from social and ethical considerations, are partially moralised as one-sided ethical agreements, 
where the moral or ethical responsibilities and sanctions attach only to borrowers and not 
lenders. Yet as demonstrated in Captain J.N. Wafubwa v Housing Finance Company of Kenya, 
courts, while noting the unethical contractual behaviour of banks in obiter remarks, are 
precluded from enforcing ethics and morality in their judgments.853  
While, on the one hand, neoclassical economic theory and legal theory reify free market 
contractual agreements as essentially economic, and necessarily asocial and apolitical, on the 
ﾗデｴWヴ ｴ;ﾐSが デｴW┞ ゲｷﾏ┌ﾉデ;ﾐWﾗ┌ゲﾉ┞ WﾐaﾗヴIW デｴW Hﾗヴヴﾗ┘Wヴげゲ ﾏﾗヴ;ﾉ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲｷHｷﾉｷデｷWゲ ┌ゲｷﾐｪ ﾉWｪ;ﾉﾉ┞-
backed sanctions. This is exemplified, as discussed earlier, by the amplification of the 
IﾗﾐゲWケ┌WﾐIWゲ ﾗa ; SWHデﾗヴげゲ IヴWSｷデ SWa;┌ﾉデ ｷﾐ ﾗﾐW Hｷﾉ;デWヴ;ﾉ IヴWSｷデ ;ｪヴWWﾏWﾐデが デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ デｴW 
ヴWヮﾗヴデｷﾐｪ ﾗa デｴW SWa;┌ﾉデ デﾗ ; C‘Bが デｴW Sﾗ┘ﾐ┘;ヴS ;Sﾃ┌ゲデﾏWﾐデ ﾗa デｴW ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉげゲ IヴWSｷデ ゲIﾗヴWが 
and their penalisation by all other subscribers to CRB reports, through increased interest rates, 
reduced access to credit, reduced chances of employment, and other unrelated transactions. 
This CIS mechanism thereby makes a travesty of privity of contract, a supposedly sacrosanct 
legal principle underpinning neoliberal markets.  
                                                          
851 Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & Others v Judicial Service Commission & the Attorney General  
[2016] eKLR (High Court of Kenya at Nairobi (Milimani Commercial Courts)) 222, Para 334. 
852 GBM Kariuki v Director of Criminal Investigations & 3 others [2016] eKLR (High Court of Kenya at Nairobi 
(Milimani Law Courts)) 12, Para 15. 




3.3.5. The Minimalist State 
Lastly, the ideology of the minimalist State, underpinning the formalist doctrine of the Rule of 
Law, runs through the deployment of CIS in Kenya, albeit with contradictions. The neoliberal 
argument that markets have superior information compared to the State, and therefore the 
ﾉ;デデWヴげゲ ｷﾐ┗ﾗﾉ┗WﾏWﾐデ ｷﾐ デｴW ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa IヴWSｷデ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲ ヴWゲ┌ﾉデゲ ｷﾐ ゲ┌H-optimal regulatory 
schemes, inefficient markets, and constricted access to credit, underpinned the banking 
ゲWIデﾗヴげゲ ﾗヮヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐ デﾗ ﾉWｪｷゲﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デW I;ヮゲく854 CIS steps in as a market mechanism 
that discursively privatises the problem of high interest rates, and responsibilizes borrowers to 
put in individual effort to gain favourable credit scores for lower costs of credit.  
The contradiction inherent in this ideological economic and legal argument is the significant 
role that the Kenyan State, through Parliament, the CBK and the National Treasury, have played 
in ensuring information symmetry by establishing CIS on a statutory basis. As admitted by 
Eケ┌ｷデ┞ B;ﾐﾆげゲ Dヴ KｷヮﾐｪげWデｷIｴが デｴW ヴﾗﾉﾉﾗ┌デ ﾗa CI“ ｴ;ゲ ﾐWIWゲゲ;ヴｷﾉ┞ HWWﾐ ;ヮヮヴﾗ;IｴWS ;ゲ ; ヮ┌HﾉｷI 
rather than a private issue, through the intimate involvement of the State at all levels.855 
First, Parliament has necessarily interfered with the constitutional rights of credit customers to 
privacy of their information, by enacting section 31 of the Banking Act, which allows banks to 
legally share customer credit information among themselves, through CRBs, rather than relying 
on individual consent clauses.856 Tｴｷゲ ｴ;ゲ ｷﾐaヴｷﾐｪWS ﾗﾐ Hﾗヴヴﾗ┘Wヴゲげ ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉ ﾉｷHWヴデｷWゲ ┘ｴｷIｴが 
under the classical Rule of Law doctrine, reside in the private sphere, and predate the State, 
and should only be interfered with on the basis of protecting wider public interest.857  
Second, Parliament, through the Treasury Cabinet Secretary, has divested individual borrowers 
of their proprietary rights to their private credit information, by legalizing the commodification 
                                                          
854 See Memorandum of Understanding from Kenya Bankers Association (n 587). 
855 Kanaiya and Omollo (n 820) 12く Dヴ KｷヮﾐｪげWデｷIｴ ヮヴ;ｷゲWS デｴW CI“ ｷﾐｷデｷ;デｷ┗W ;ゲ け; ヮ┌HﾉｷI ゲﾗﾉ┌デｷﾗﾐ デﾗ ; ヮ┌HﾉｷI 
problem, and as a positive move away from the tendency by Kenyans to develop private solutions to public 
ヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏゲくげ 
856 The Banking Act, Cap. 488, Laws of Kenya. 
857 TｴW Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデ┞ ﾗa デｴW ゲｴ;ヴｷﾐｪ ﾗa IヴWSｷデ I┌ゲデﾗﾏWヴゲげ ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ ┘;ゲ aｷヴゲデ ﾉｷデｷｪ;デWS ｷﾐ Barbra Khaemba 
v Cabinet Secretary, National Treasury & Anor (n 832) 23, Para 41. On whether the limitations to credit 
Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴゲげ ヮヴｷ┗;I┞ ┌ﾐSWヴ デｴW CヴWSｷデ ‘WaWヴWﾐIW B┌ヴW;┌ ‘Wｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲ ふヲヰヰΒぶ ｷﾐaヴｷﾐｪWS デｴW ヴｷｪｴデ デﾗ ヮヴｷ┗;I┞が 
LWﾐ;ﾗﾉ; Jく ｴWﾉS ;ゲ aﾗﾉﾉﾗ┘ゲぎ さI ;ﾏ ｷﾐ デｴｷゲ ヴWｪ;ヴS ゲ;デｷゲaｷWS デｴ;デ デｴW ゲ;ｷS ‘Wｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲ Sﾗ ﾐﾗデ ｷﾐaヴｷﾐｪW ﾗﾐ デｴW ヴｷｪｴt 
to privacy as the said limitation, in my opinion, is to facilitate and promote an efficient loan system with 




of their data by CRBs and banks, and vesting the proprietary rights over the data and any 
derivative works from the data, in the CBK.858  
Third, the State has, by characterising CRBs as agents of the CBK, shielded them from liability 
resulting from damages caused by the inaccurate characterization of credit consumers in their 
credit scores and reports. While, in the case of Barbra Georgina Khaemba, the case of 
discrimination was directed against the defendant bank, a similar case would not be 
entertained against CRBs either, as Section 19 of the CRB Regulations (2013) protects them 
aヴﾗﾏ ﾉｷ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ aﾗヴ デｴWｷヴ ｷﾐ;II┌ヴ;デW ゲデ;デｷゲデｷI;ﾉ ヮヴWSｷIデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉゲげ SWa;┌ﾉデ ヴｷゲﾆく Tｴｷゲ ｷゲ SWゲヮｷデW 
their significant impact on life chances, and despite the weaknesses and inaccuracies of credit 
scoring and reporting practices discussed in section 2 above.  
Fourth, the State has sought to make the CRB or credit information sector profitable through 
the statutory expansion of the uses of credit reports to include non-credit relationships such as 
employment and other unrelated contractual and non-contractual relations.859  
During the inception, rollout and operationalization phase of the Kenyan CIS, the CBK and 
National Treasury played a significant, indispensable role beyond their statutory functions, by 
providing funding, infrastructure, legitimacy, research, and administrative and bureaucratic 
facilitation to the KCISI and AKCP, to the extent that FSD Kenya, a key donor and technical 
partner in the project, echoed concerns that the banking industry was relying excessively on 
the CBK leadership.860 
The contradiction inherent in the operationalisation of the related economic and legal 
ideologies of financial market deregulation and minimalist State regulation of interest rates and 
high indebtedness is relevant for two reasons. First, it underscores the discursively concealed, 
ゲｷｪﾐｷaｷI;ﾐデ ヴﾗﾉW ﾗa デｴW “デ;デW ｷﾐ Iﾗﾐゲデヴ┌Iデｷﾐｪ ; けaヴWWげが WaaｷIｷWﾐデが ﾉWﾐSｷﾐｪ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデ ┘ｷデｴ ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ 
symmetry. The optimization of market pricing of loans within private credit contracts has 
necessitated their discursive classification as a public issue, pre-empting the significant 
involvement of the State, and the infringement of the rights to privacy and property of credit 
I┌ゲデﾗﾏWヴゲが ｷﾐ デｴW けヮヴｷ┗;デW ゲヮｴWヴWげく “WIﾗﾐSが デｴW Iﾗﾐデヴ;SｷIデｷﾗﾐ SWﾏﾗﾐゲデヴ;デWゲ デｴW ｷﾐSWデWヴﾏｷﾐ;I┞ 
of the legal ideology of the minimalist State, and potentialities for the progressive involvement 
                                                          
858 See Section 47 of the Credit Bureau Regulations (2013).  
859 Section 30 of the CRB Regulations (2013) provides for the access to CRB credit reports by third parties, 
with the consent of customers. 




ﾗa デｴW “デ;デW ｷﾐ Iﾗﾐゲデヴ┌Iデｷﾐｪ けa;ｷヴげ ;ﾐS ;aaﾗヴS;HﾉW ﾉWﾐSｷﾐｪ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲが ｷﾐ a;┗ﾗ┌ヴ ﾗa デｴW Hﾗヴヴﾗ┘Wヴ デｴ;デ 
has seemingly been marginalised in the operationalisation of the CIS.  
3.4. The Ideology of Technological Rationality in CIS Technologies and Practices  
The CIS infrastructure in Kenya embodies two aspects of the ideology of technological 
rationality, which has undergirded CIS as a policy choice for dealing with the problem of high 
interest rates within an unregulated interest rate market: technological determinism or 
autonomy; and efficiency-rationality of automated and statistical credit scoring and reporting 
techniques. Technological rationality has also co-constituted and contributed to the ideological 
power of economic and legal ideas discussed above, in deepening power asymmetries within 
lending contracts, and reproducing high interest rates and high indebtedness.  
As discussed more substantively in chapter 2, technological determinism posits that technical 
development is independent of external factors, that is, technologies have an autonomous 
functional logic that can be explained without reference to society.861 Consequently, social 
institutions and their related arrangements and progress must adapt to the imperatives of 
technology, entailing, for example, trade-offs between technological efficiency and social 
values.862  
This ideology of technological determinism has permeated the discursive introduction of credit 
scoring and reporting technologies and practices in Kenya. Due to their foundation in 
mathematical/statistical methods and computing algorithms, CIS has appropriated the 
けゲIｷWﾐデｷaｷIげ ;デデヴｷH┌デWゲ ﾗa ﾐWﾗIﾉ;ゲゲｷI;ﾉ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIゲ ;ﾐS ﾐ;デ┌ヴ;ﾉ ゲIｷWﾐIWが SWWﾏWS ;ゲ ﾗHﾃWIデｷ┗Wが 
neutral, uniform and consistent, apolitical and asocial.863 Consequently, CIS has been black-
boxed, rendered opaque, rational, authoritative and thereby incontestable by the apparent 
scientific and simple logic of the generated single figure that describes individual credit 
worthiness.864 The ideology of technological autonomy has deflected the attention of credit 
consumers and even regulators and policy makers, from the origination of the design of CIS 
                                                          
861 FWWﾐHWヴｪが け“┌H┗Wヴゲｷ┗W ‘;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐげ ふﾐ ヴヰぶ ンヰヴき ‘ﾗヮﾗｴﾉ ふﾐ ンΒΓぶ Βヶく 
862 FWWﾐHWヴｪが け“┌H┗Wヴゲｷ┗W ‘;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐげ ふﾐ ヴヰぶ ンヰヴく 
863 Burton (n 792) 114. 
864 IP“O“ P┌HﾉｷI Aaa;ｷヴゲが け“デ;ﾆWｴﾗﾉSWヴ A┘;ヴWﾐWゲゲ ﾗa デｴW CI“ MWIｴ;ﾐｷゲﾏ ｷﾐ KWﾐ┞;げ ふFｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ “WIデﾗヴ DWWヮWﾐｷﾐｪ 
(FSD) Kenya 2015) Report Commissioned by FSD Kenya 4. The black-boxing of CIS was one of the concerns 
captured from the public survey: there was insufficient information about how credit scoring and information 
sharing worked, pointing to the need for additional enhanced and directed communication. See also Marron 




technology in the social interests of CRBs, banks and other stakeholders, rather than the 
autonomous logic of technology.  
An example of the entrenchment of this ideology of CI“ ;┌デﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞ ┘;ゲ SWﾏﾗﾐゲデヴ;デWS  ｷﾐ H;ﾐﾆゲげ 
;ﾐS C‘Bゲげ ヴWﾉｷ;ﾐIW ﾗﾐ デWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ SWデWヴﾏｷﾐｷゲﾏ デﾗ ;ヴｪ┌W ;ｪ;ｷﾐゲデ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デW I;ヮゲが ゲｷﾐIW デｴW┞ 
would restrict and standardize the profit margins levied on specific borrowers, irrespective of 
their risk profiles, resulting in banks restricting their lending to low risk or collateralised 
borrowers.865 This argument derived from the binary logic of the credit scoring technologies 
that had been deployed by Kenyan banks since 2010, and which critically classed borrowers 
into two profiles: good and bad lenders, rather than a continuum of high risk and low risk 
borrowers.866 This binary logic of the credit scores was therefore distilled into a technological 
rationality that constructed a particular market of good and bad borrowers, and consequently 
laid out the restricted possibilities that were available to financial markets regulators and policy 
makers, in addressing the problem of high interest rates. Hence regulatory options were being 
restricted to what fits with the technical design of the credit scoring models. 
There were also other critical design choices in the early phases of the CIS rollout, which 
inordinately deepened the power asymmetries in lending agreements, and maintained high 
rates. They included the data sharing template that accommodated only negative credit 
consumer information, and the automatic blacklisting of individuals for default and non-default 
related disputes - CIS designs which were deemed mere inefficiencies within an otherwise 
objective and neutral infrastructure. The concealing move of technological determinism or 
autonomy, in this instance, is that the infrastructure designs reflect the interests of capital, that 
is, credit providers. It also reflects the asymmetrical nature of lending agreements in liberalised 
financial markets, as a technological rather than a social preference.  
The technological bias towards creditors stems from the non-representation of borrowers in 
the CIS initiative. While it may be argued that the regulators were present to safeguard 
consumer interest, that is not evident in the process and design of CIS, which has side-lined the 
democratic participation of credit consumers, despite the project being touted by both industry 
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<http://www.nation.co.ke/business/Banks-call-on-Uhuru-to-dismiss-proposed-law-on-interest-rates/996-
3319776-mit13pz/index.html> accessed 26 September 2016. 




players and the courts as a public interest infrastructure.867 Credit customers have been 
relegated to docile bodies that simply comply with the disciplinary imperatives of capital, 
disguised as technological imperatives, while having no decisive input to the core discursive 
logic of credit risk management.868 However, the relevant legal provisions on consumer 
protection, including rights to correct personal information, data security, privacy standards, 
and the periods of blacklisting, do not confront the abstracting, population-level 
methodologies of credit scoring, which are rife with inaccuracies that are further amplified by 
the colonising trend of CIS.     
The second technological ideology that has driven CIS rollout not only in Kenya but also in other 
jurisdictions, is the idea of the scientific, statistical, automated credit scoring models as 
rational, as compared to the previous credit appraisal and risk management techniques used 
by lenders to manage credit relationships. The Weberian conception of technological 
rationalization, discussed in Chapter 2, has entailed emphasis of five features in the context of 
CIS: calculability, that is, quantification of borrower behavioural uncertainty into probability of 
credit risk; efficiency of the means of risk management as an end in itself; predictability of 
borrower and creditor behaviour and relationship; substitution of non-human (CIS) for human 
(embodied loan appraisal) technology, to optimize control over individuals borrowers; and the 
irrationality of rationality, that is, where highly-rational systems dehumanise social 
relationships and cause individuals to lose meaning in their lives.869  
This rationalization of the lender-borrower relationship in Kenya is observed in the context of 
the transformation of the interactions between lender and borrower, and also the institutional 
ヴWゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴｷﾐｪ ﾗa ﾉWﾐSWヴゲげ H┌ヴW;┌Iヴ;IｷWゲが ゲ┞ゲデWﾏゲ ;ﾐS ヮヴﾗIWゲゲWゲが デo the logics of the CIS 
infrastructure. First, as discussed in section 2, the embodied visibility of the individual borrower 
┘ｴﾗ ┗ｷゲｷデゲ デｴW IヴWSｷデ ﾗaaｷIWヴげゲ SWゲﾆ aﾗヴ ; a;IW-to-face interview, and the credit officer, who visits 
デｴW Hﾗヴヴﾗ┘Wヴげゲ ｴﾗﾏW ﾗヴ H┌ゲｷﾐWss premises to inspect his dwellings or business premises, have 
                                                          
867 See Jamlick Gichuhi Mwangi v Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd & another [2016] eKLR (High Court of Kenya at 
Nairobi (Milimani Law Courts)); The case quotes the English case of Carol Ann Gatt v Barclays Bank plc & Mark 
Williams ふヲヰヱンぶ ΓΑ ふJ;ﾐぶ E‘ D ふEWHC ヰヰヰヲ ふQBぶぶ ┘ｴWヴW デｴW Iﾗ┌ヴデ ｴWﾉS ;ゲ aﾗﾉﾉﾗ┘ゲぎ さIﾐ デｴW ﾏﾗSWヴﾐ ┘ﾗヴﾉSが ｷデ ｷゲ 
plainly in the public interest that such authoritative credit information can be obtained and relied on by banks 
and other financial institutions, provided it is done in a lawful and duly-regulated manner which respects the 
rights of the general public and the individuals affected". 
868 See Slough and Arora (n 815) 26 In this CIS evaluation report, credit consumers are allocated the role of 
being entitled to see and object to the contents of their credit reports, while other stakeholders have more 
substantive, constructive roles. 




been replaced by a statistical representation of the individual as a population trend, and a 
ﾐ┌ﾏWヴｷI;ﾉ aｷｪ┌ヴWが ; IヴWSｷデ ゲIﾗヴW デｴ;デ I;ヮデ┌ヴWゲ デｴW ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉげゲ デヴ┌ゲデ┘ﾗヴデｴｷﾐWゲゲが ﾏﾗヴ;ﾉｷデ┞が WデｴｷIゲが 
or creditworthiness, and ultimately, life chances.870 This automated, mathematical system 
rationalises uncertainties into calculable, predictable, and efficiently manageable risk of 
default.  
“WIﾗﾐSが ﾉWﾐSWヴゲげ ｷﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ｷﾐaヴ;ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴWゲが H┌ヴW;┌Iヴ;IｷWゲ ;ﾐS processes have been 
rationalized where Kenyan credit providers have been compelled to reformat their credit 
information management systems (including which information they seek from borrowers, 
how they discursively interpret this information, how they document and transmit this 
information to CRBs) to conform to the imperatives of the CIS infrastructure, including the 
statutory Data Sharing Template. Most banks were forced to overhaul their IT systems to be 
compatible with the discursive scripting of the CI“ ｷﾐaヴ;ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴWげゲ ┌ﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐSｷﾐｪ ﾗa IヴWSｷデ ヴｷゲﾆ 
and its indicators, since, at the inception of information sharing, CRBs were rejecting a high 
percentage of borrower files due to incompatibility with their information management 
systems.871 A notable aspect of the discourse of risk as captured in the CIS system is that it 
emanates from various local and transnational sites of ideational formation and diffusion, 
including the BCBS, which, for example, defines the meaning of foundational risk management 
concepデゲ ゲ┌Iｴ ;ゲ けSWa;┌ﾉデげく872    
The technological rationalization of CIS as efficient, objective, scientific, and superior to other 
risk management and regulatory solutions, has legitimised credit scoring and reporting as the 
optimal policy for addressing the problem of high interest rates in a deregulated lending 
market, and of interest rates fixed as a result of risk-based pricing of loans, as fair and equitable. 
This ideology of technological rationality, however, conceals the many problems associated 
with the practice of credit scoring, discussed in section 2.3 above. These include indeterminism 
and irreducible stochasticity, methodological risk, data risk, temporal risk, decontextualization, 
;ﾐS デｴW ﾏ;ﾐ┞ ｷﾐaヴ;ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴ;ﾉ Iｴ;ﾉﾉWﾐｪWゲ ｷﾐ けTｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉSげ Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴｷWゲが which impact on the 
accuracy of the credit scoring practices. For example, the subjectivity and designer bias 
embedded in credit scoring algorithms have been exposed where individuals have requested 
                                                          
870 Burton (n 792) 114 The author argues that the financial savings of lenders from abolishing embodied credit 
appraisal processes have come at considerable social cost, and have contributed to the dehumanisation of 
society. 
871 Szydlowska (n 790) 15. 
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credit reports from different CRBs and digital lending scoring systems, and have received starkly 
different reports.873   
3.5. The Reproduction of High Interest Rates, High Indebtedness and Power Asymmetries by 
CIS 
Credit scoring and reporting technologies and practices have been touted by Kenyan banking 
regulators and policy makers, the banking sector, and the credit reporting industry as an 
appropriate policy response to the problem of high interest rates, high indebtedness, within a 
deregulated financial market. This section has examined the neoclassical economic theories, 
formal legal doctrines, and technological ideologies underpinning the CIS infrastructure, and 
their agential power in cognitively, normatively, and materially constituting the lending market. 
On this basis, it is argued that credit scoring and reporting technologies and practices may 
actually reproduce high interest rates and high indebtedness and deepen the power 
;ゲ┞ﾏﾏWデヴｷWゲ HWデ┘WWﾐ ﾉWﾐSWヴゲ ;ﾐS Hﾗヴヴﾗ┘Wヴゲ ｷﾐ KWﾐ┞;げゲ ﾉWﾐSｷﾐｪ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデが ｷﾐ aﾗ┌ヴ ┘;┞ゲく 
First, the statistical methodologies of credit scoring do not treat individual credit consumers as 
qualitatively different subjects with qualitatively different aptitudes, moral and ethical qualities 
and risk attributes, but rather as objects abstracted from populations of borrowers, as 
agglomerations of particular quantifiable risk attributes.874 This methodology conceals the 
categories of financial and economic marginalisation that may in fact require affirmative action 
or special consideration. These include, for example, women, rural populations, the less 
educated, the poor, the unemployed, and individuals from certain regions, including Western 
Kenya and the Coastal region, who have lower access to credit.875 The statistical abstraction of 
these inequalities in the credit scoring methodologies sustains or reproduces them, to the 
extent that these categories of borrowers are assigned lower credit scores and subjected to 
higher interest rates.     
                                                          
873 “WWが aﾗヴ W┝;ﾏヮﾉWが MH┌ｪ┌; Nﾃｷｴｷ;が けH┌ﾏ;ﾐ Bｷ;ゲWゲ M;┞ H┌ヴデ PヴﾗｪヴWゲゲ ﾗa Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ TWIｴげ Business Daily 
(Nairobi, 15 June 2016) <http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/corporate/Human-biases-may-hurt-progress-
of-financial-tech/539550-3250980-qa750mz/index.html> accessed 9 July 2017; See also Varick Schwartz, 
けCヴWSｷデ “Iﾗヴｷﾐｪ ｷﾐ KWﾐ┞;ぎ OHゲWヴ┗;デｷﾗﾐゲ ;ﾐS Cﾗﾏヮ;ヴｷゲﾗﾐゲ aヴﾗﾏ デｴW FｷWﾉS づ Kｷ┗;げ 
<https://fellowsblog.kiva.org/fellowsblog/2012/08/30/credit-scoring-in-kenya-observations-and-
comparisons-from-the-field> accessed 17 July 2017. 
874 Marron (n 768) 111に112. 





“WIﾗﾐSが IヴWSｷデ ゲIﾗヴｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS ヴWヮﾗヴデｷﾐｪ ﾏWデｴﾗSﾗﾉﾗｪｷWゲ Iﾗﾐゲデヴ┌Iデ デｴW けｪﾗﾗSげ IヴWSｷデ Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴ ;ゲ ; 
socially-responsible subject, having attributes such as prudence, forethought, and personal 
responsibility.876 In addition, these technologies moralize the debt obligations, casting the 
borrower who does not live up to the attributes of a good credit consumer as immoral, 
untrustworthy, uncreditworthy, and therefore to be excluded from credit and other life 
chances.877 By making borrowers see themselves and others through the logic of the market, 
this disciplining discourse individualises the responsibility for access to affordable credit and 
the opportunity to consume. It also suggests that inequality in financial opportunity and life 
chances is the result of individual will and morality rather than structural conditions of capitalist 
society.878  
Consequently, abstracted and subsequently individualised credit scores disguise the structural 
conditions or causalities of individual behaviour, and suggest that all economic behaviour is a 
result of personal choice, and an indicator of moral worth.879 Fﾗヴ W┝;ﾏヮﾉWが デｴW ヴW;ﾉｷデ┞ ﾗa KWﾐ┞;げゲ 
economy, ｷﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ デｴW ﾏ;ﾃﾗヴｷデ┞ ﾗa IヴWSｷデ Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴゲ ﾉｷ┗W けヮヴWI;ヴｷﾗ┌ゲげ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ﾉｷ┗Wゲ 
characterised by an informal economy, unemployment, poor access to banking services and 
ヮ┌HﾉｷI ┌デｷﾉｷデ┞ ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデゲが WデIが ;ヴW IﾗﾐIW;ﾉWS ｷﾐ デｴW Iｴ;ヴ;IデWヴｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW けｪﾗﾗSげ Hﾗヴヴﾗ┘Wヴく 
Consequently, credit scoring models lock borrowers in systemically generated risk 
classifications which they cannot easily act upon, thereby denying them even the mobility 
promised for those who can take steps to improve their credit scores. 
Third, credit scoring and reporting practices entail the statistical splitting, sorting, and 
SｷaaWヴWﾐデｷ;デWS Iﾉ;ゲゲｷaｷI;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉ Hﾗヴヴﾗ┘Wヴゲ ;IIﾗヴSｷﾐｪ デﾗ ヮﾗヮ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲが ﾗヴ けIﾉ;ゲゲｷaｷI;デｷﾗﾐ 
ゲｷデ┌;デｷﾗﾐゲげ デｴ;デ a┌ﾐS;ﾏWﾐデ;ﾉﾉ┞ ゲｴ;ヮW デｴWｷヴ ﾉｷaW Iｴ;ﾐIWゲく880 This is especially as a result of credit 
ゲIﾗヴｷﾐｪげゲ ｷﾐIヴW;ゲｷﾐｪ Iﾗﾉﾗﾐｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa IヴWSｷデが aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉが Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデが ;ﾐS ﾏ;ﾐ┞ ﾗデｴWヴ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI 
and non-WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ;ゲヮWIデゲ ﾗa ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉゲげ ﾉｷ┗Wゲが ｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ ;IIWゲゲ デﾗ ヮ┌HﾉｷI ゲWヴ┗ｷIWゲく WｴｷﾉW IヴWSｷデ 
scoring and reporting offer the promise of increasing financial access to the marginalized 
through risk-based pricing of loans, they also create new economic classes, or amplify gaps in 
economic opportunity, by attaching different interest rates and loan structures to different 
                                                          
876 Burton (n 792) 113. 
877 Langley (n 817) 453. 
878 J┌ﾉｷ;ﾐ J┑ヴｪWﾐﾏW┞Wヴ ;ﾐS K;ヴﾗﾉｷﾐW KヴWﾐﾐが けCﾉ;ゲゲｷaｷI;デｷﾗﾐ “ｷデ┌;デｷﾗﾐゲぎ A NW┘ FｷWﾉS ﾗa ‘WゲW;ヴIｴ aﾗヴ V;ﾉ┌;デｷﾗﾐ 
“デ┌SｷWゲいげ ふヲヰヱヶぶ ヴ V;ﾉ┌;デｷﾗﾐ “デ┌SｷWゲ ヱΑΑが ヱΑΓく 
879 ibid 180. 
880 M;ヴｷﾗﾐ Fﾗ┌ヴI;SW ;ﾐS KｷWヴ;ﾐ HW;ﾉ┞が けCﾉ;ゲゲｷaｷI;デｷﾗﾐ “ｷデ┌;デｷﾗﾐゲぎ LｷaW-Cｴ;ﾐIWゲ ｷﾐ デｴW NWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉ Eヴ;げ ふヲヰヱΑぶ ヴヲ 




credit scores. This results in a growing pattern or gap between the economically advantaged 
and disadvantaged.881 For example, excessively high interest rates to certain populations of 
borrowers can continue to be justified or legitimated on the basis of risk-based pricing.      
Fourth, credit scoring and reporting technologies are performative, to the extent that, in 
statistically determining the creditworthiness of an individual, they become self-fulfilling 
prophecies, creating the financial condition that the claim to merely indicate. For example, 
where a scoring model designates an individual as uncreditworthy, irrespective of the accuracy 
of the score, the model raises the cost of future credit financing for the individual, or may even 
exclude them from the credit market, therWH┞ ｷﾐIヴW;ゲｷﾐｪ デｴW ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉげゲ ﾉｷﾆWﾉｷｴﾗﾗS ﾗa aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ 
difficulty, and further deteriorating their credit score.882 Similarly, the designation of an 
individual as creditworthy (irrespective of its accuracy), and the assignment of a high credit 
score, decreases their future cost of credit, resulting in more favourable financial conditions 
that make their performance of future debt obligations easier, and improves their credit score 
further. This positive, self-referential feedback loop can performatively create vicious or 
virtuous cycles which may trap some borrowers in perpetual poverty, or lock in the privileges 
of some borrowers, while accentuating their respective disadvantages and advantages.883  
Due to the positive, self-referential feedback loop that is created, the degree of performativity 
of the credit scoring model actually increases, as further deterioration of an uncreditworthy 
ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉげゲ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ IﾗﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐゲが ﾗヴ デｴW aﾉﾗ┌ヴｷゲｴｷﾐｪ ﾗa ; IヴWSｷデ┘ﾗヴデｴ┞ ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉげゲ IヴWSｷデ ゲデ;デ┌ゲが 
make the scoring models even more accurate. The application of the credit scores and reports 
to non-IヴWSｷデ ;ゲヮWIデゲ ﾗa ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉゲげ ﾉｷ┗Wゲが ゲ┌Iｴ ;ゲ ｷﾐゲ┌ヴ;ﾐIW ヮヴWﾏｷ┌ﾏゲが Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ 
opportunities, welfare benefits, and other life chances, further amplifies the performative 
power of these risk classification technologies and their inaccuracies, entrapping credit 
consumers in prophesied cycles of either poverty or privilege, high interest rates and high 
indebtedness, or affordable credit.884 As Citron and Pasquale argue, when scoring systems have 
the potential to take a life of their own, contributing to or creating the situation they claim 
merely to predict, it becomes a normative matter, requiring moral justification and rationale.885       
                                                          
881 ibid. 
882 D;ﾐｷWﾉﾉW KW;デゲ Cｷデヴﾗﾐ ;ﾐS Fヴ;ﾐﾆ A P;ゲケ┌;ﾉWが けTｴW “IﾗヴWS “ﾗIｷWデ┞ぎ D┌W PヴﾗIWゲゲ aﾗヴ A┌デﾗﾏ;デWS PヴWSｷIデｷﾗﾐゲげ 
(2014) 89 Washington Law Review 1, 18. 
883 Akos Rona-T;ゲが けTｴW Oaa-Label Use of Consumer CヴWSｷデ ‘;デｷﾐｪゲげ ふヲヰヱΑぶ ヴヲ HｷゲデﾗヴｷI;ﾉ “ﾗIｷ;ﾉ ‘WゲW;ヴIｴ っ 
Historische Sozialforschung 52, 52. 
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4. Performing Equitable Credit Markets within CIS Technology 
Since inception, the technologies and practices of credit scoring and reporting have necessarily 
HWWﾐ ゲデWWヮWS ｷﾐ ; ヮWヴﾏ;ﾐWﾐデ ヮヴﾗIWゲゲ ﾗa さa;ｷﾉ┌ヴWが IﾗﾐデWゲデ;デｷﾗﾐが ;ﾐS ヴWｪWﾐWヴ;デｷﾗﾐざが ﾗ┘ｷﾐｪ デﾗ 
the flaws and challenges inherent in their ontologies, epistemologies, and methodologies of 
risk.886 Competing innovations continue to make use of increased computing power and big 
data to fine-tune the accuracy of credit scores. The Kenyan credit information market has, 
undoubtedly, been the arena of many innovations aimed at recalibrating the conventional risk 
attributes in credit scoring models, to correspond to the country context. These include the 
introduction of digital lending and credit scoring on the basis of mobile phone data.887 
However, despite these efforts, the competing innovations do not challenge the fundamental 
flaws in the discourse of risk management by credit scoring. First, the innovations remain 
ゲデWWヮWS ｷﾐ ゲデ;デｷゲデｷI;ﾉ ﾏWデｴﾗSゲ デｴ;デ ゲWWﾆ デﾗ I;ﾉI┌ﾉ;デW ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉゲげ ヮヴﾗH;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ ﾗa IヴWSｷデ SWa;┌ﾉデ 
based on population trends.888 Second, credit scoring and reporting remains concerned with 
the calculable effects of default, rather than the causal effects.889 Third, credit information 
sharing remains a disciplinary mechanism that places in the hands of lenders immense control 
over borrowers, creating an inordinately asymmetrical power relationship with borrowers, yet 
credit scoring models remain opaque, unaccountable and incontestable.890  
This situation calls for a radical rethink of the ideologies underpinning credit information 
sharing in Kenya and elsewhere. A starting point could be the analysis and exploitation, for 
progressive politics of equitable markets, of the contradictions and indeterminacies inherent 
in the economic, legal and technological ideologies underpinning CIS in Kenya. Within the 
ideology of legal formalism, for example, there are contradictions relating to the legitimated 
legislative interference with the credit consumWヴゲげ ヮヴﾗヮヴｷWデ;ヴ┞ ヴｷｪｴデゲ デﾗ デｴWｷヴ S;デ;が ヮヴｷ┗;I┞ 
ヴｷｪｴデゲが ;ﾐS デｴW ヴｷｪｴデ デﾗ ﾉWｪ;ﾉ ヴWIﾗ┌ヴゲWが ｷﾐ ; HｷS デﾗ Iﾗﾐゲデヴ┌Iデ けaヴWWげ ;ﾐS ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ-efficient 
lending markets. This may provide an avenue for the legal deconstruction of proprietary rights, 
trade secrets and other intellectual property rights of CRBs and other credit scoring firms to 
their credit scoring models, which contribute to the opacity and unaccountability of scoring 
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888 Marron (n 768) 114. 
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ﾏﾗSWﾉゲ ┘ｷデｴ ゲ┌Iｴ ゲｷｪﾐｷaｷI;ﾐデ ｷﾏヮ;Iデ デﾗ ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉゲげ ﾉｷaW Iｴ;ﾐIWゲく891 One avenue may be the 
open-sourcing of the algorithms underpinning credit scoring and reporting models that benefit 
from State market-making, and allow the participation of scoring subjects in auditing and 
contributing to the design of the CIS infrastructure.892 
Within both legal formalism and neoclassical economic ideology, there are contradictions 
relating to the legal and economic moralisation of debtor behaviour, in the bid to individualize 
responsibility for access to affordable financing.893 Individualisation of this responsibility is 
meant to preserve the efficient price-ﾏWIｴ;ﾐｷゲﾏ ﾗa デｴW けヮヴｷ┗;デW ゲヮｴWヴWげ ﾗa SWヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デWS 
financial markets from the distorting influences of politics, ethical concerns and interest rate 
ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐく TｴW Hﾗヴヴﾗ┘Wヴげゲ HWｴ;┗ｷﾗ┌ヴ ｷゲ ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉｷ┣WS ;ﾐS ﾏﾗヴ;ﾉｷゲWSが ┘ｴｷﾉW デｴW ﾉWﾐSWヴげゲ HWｴ;┗ｷﾗ┌ヴ 
is simultaneously reified from social and political considerations. This contradiction may 
provide an avenue for the legal construction of a market for ethical lender behaviour, with 
equally dire consequences for unethical lending.  
For example, Kenyan banks benefit immensely from many ideologically concealed aspects of 
デｴW “デ;デWげゲ Iﾗﾐゲデヴ┌Iデｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS ゲ┌ゲデWﾐ;ﾐIW ﾗa ; ゲデ;HﾉW ﾏﾗﾐWデ;ヴ┞ ゲ┞ゲデWﾏく TｴWゲW ｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ ; ﾉｷIWﾐゲW 
デﾗ けIヴW;デW ﾏﾗﾐW┞げ ｷﾐ デｴW aﾗヴﾏ ﾗa aヴ;Iデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ヴWゲWヴ┗W H;ﾐﾆｷﾐｪ, privileged participation and 
profiting from the Treasury Bills market, borrowing from the CBK, and membership in a State-
maintained national payments infrastructure.894 Access to these public benefits should be tied 
to certain criteria for ethical lending, especially to the systemically marginalized borrowers. 
Another scheme for constructing a market for ethical lending is the stabilisation and 
establishment, rather than privatization, of State-owned development banks that lend at fairly 
                                                          
891 Brenda Reddix-“ﾏ;ﾉﾉゲが けCヴWSｷデ “Iﾗヴｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS Tヴ;SW “WIヴWI┞ぎ Aﾐ AﾉｪﾗヴｷデｴﾏｷI Q┌;ｪﾏｷヴW ﾗヴ Hﾗ┘ デｴW L;Iﾆ ﾗa 
Tヴ;ﾐゲヮ;ヴWﾐI┞ ｷﾐ CﾗﾏヮﾉW┝ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ MﾗSWﾉゲ “I┌デデﾉWS デｴW Fｷﾐ;ﾐIW M;ヴﾆWデげ ふヲヰヱヱぶ ヱヲ UC D;┗ｷゲ B┌ゲｷﾐWゲゲ L;┘ 
Journal 87, 89. The author argues that "the use of risk models IヴW;デWゲ ヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏゲ ┘ｴWﾐ デｴW ﾏﾗSWﾉゲげ 
mathematical algorithms are combined with rigid proprietary protections, governmental ineptitude, and a 
lack of marketplace transparency". This combination creates conditions for market crises such as the 2008 
IヴWSｷデ Iヴ┌ﾐIｴくげ 
892 For a discussion on open-ゲﾗ┌ヴIW ヴｷゲﾆ ﾏﾗSWﾉゲが ゲWW Eヴｷﾆ F GWヴSｷﾐｪが けCﾗSWが Cヴ;ゲｴが ;ﾐS OヮWﾐ “ﾗ┌ヴIWぎ TｴW 
O┌デゲﾗ┌ヴIｷﾐｪ ﾗa Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ‘Wｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ デﾗ ‘ｷゲﾆ MﾗSWﾉゲ ;ﾐS デｴW GﾉﾗH;ﾉ Fｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ Cヴｷゲｷゲげ ふヲヰヰΓぶ Βヴ W;ゲｴｷﾐｪデﾗﾐ L;┘ 
Review 127, 189. The author proposes the promotion of open-source risk models by regulators, and also 
discusses the potential draw-backs of such an approach including model homogeneity and concentration of 
methodological risk. 
893 Marron (n 768) 111に112; Jürgenmeyer and Krenn (n 878) 179に180. 
894 Chami, Sharma and Fullenkamp (n 688) 14. The IMF notes, for example, that the national payments system 
is a public good. In addition, it admits that the various guarantees that taxpayers give to enable the efficient 




competitive yet fair and affordable rates to the categories of borrower populations 
marginalized by high interest rates and poor credit scores. 
Within the ideology of technological rationality, there are contradictions relating to the opacity 
and black-boxing of credit scoring and reporting models through automation, design, and also 
claims to trade secrets and other intellectual property claims, alongside the discursive branding 
of CIS as a transparent, efficient, neutral objective technology that resolves the problem of 
information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers.895 This contradiction, and the claims 
of technical efficiency as the overarching design factor in achieving market information 
symmetry, may provide an avenue for the technological construction of a radically transparent 
lending market, where lender credit information is as transparent as borrower credit 
information.  
AデデWﾏヮデゲ ;デ デｴｷゲ ゲIWﾐ;ヴｷﾗ ┘WヴW ﾏ;SW ┘ｷデｴ デｴW ゲｴ;ヴｷﾐｪ ﾗa Hﾗヴヴﾗ┘Wヴゲげ ヮﾗゲｷデｷ┗W IヴWSｷデ ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ 
(since 2014), a prospect that Kenyan banks vehemently opposed, on the grounds that 
IﾗﾏヮWデｷﾐｪ H;ﾐﾆゲ ┘ｷﾉﾉ ヮﾗ;Iｴ W;Iｴ ﾗデｴWヴげゲ IﾉｷWﾐデゲく896 A deliberate consumer-biased design for 
sharing both borrower credit information and lender information may hold the promise for 
confronting the power asymmetries favouring lenders in the present CIS infrastructure in 
Kenya. For example, the currently existing publication by the CBK of average lending rates in a 
bid to promote transparent pricing credit by commercial banks, can be extended to other 
critical lending charges and terms.    
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the third aspect of the fourth research sub-question: how has the 
ideological and performative power of technological ideas, artefacts and related practices, 
ヴWヮヴﾗS┌IWS ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ ﾐWﾗﾉｷHWヴ;ﾉｷゲﾏ ｷﾐ KWﾐ┞;げゲ ｷnterest rate markets? It has examined the 
technification of the interest rates market, that is, the enrolment, adoption or imposition of 
technical methods (specifically the Credit Information Sharing infrastructure) into the 
overarching process of economisation and juridification of the lending market. In this effort, 
the discussion has examined the ideological and performative power of the CIS infrastructure 
                                                          
895 See generally, Citron and Pasquale (n 882). 




and its role in the reproduction of regulatory neoliberalism, and deepening of lender-creditor 
poweヴ ;ゲ┞ﾏﾏWデヴｷWゲが ｷﾐ KWﾐ┞;げゲ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デW ﾏ;ヴﾆWデく 
Section 2 has examined the mathematical, statistical and computational methods that are used 
to build the credit-worthiness of an individual borrower, by reducing for credit providers the 
combined body of borヴﾗ┘Wヴゲ ｷﾐデﾗ ; さIﾗｴWヴWﾐデ Wﾐデｷデ┞ SWﾏﾗﾐゲデヴ;デｷﾐｪ ;デデヴｷH┌デWゲ ;ゲ デｴﾗ┌ｪｴ デｴW┞ 
┘WヴW ｷﾐデヴｷﾐゲｷI デﾗ ｷデが ｷﾐSWヮWﾐSWﾐデ aヴﾗﾏ デｴW ;Iデｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa デｴW ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉ Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴゲ Iﾗﾏヮﾗゲｷﾐｪ ｷデざく897 
In addition, it has examined CIS adoption by Kenyan financial markets participants, policy 
makers and regulators, as a policy and regulatory solution to the problem of high interest rates, 
while maintaining the deregulation of financial markets.  
Some of the challenges emanating from the establishment of CIS include: the indeterminacy 
and stochastic nature of risk; the inaccurate assumptions underpinning statistical models, e.g. 
equal co-variance in discriminant analysis, and inadequate sample sizes; the bias in historical 
consumer credit data; temporal risk; and the failure to differentiate reasons for default. Others 
include emerging market challenges such as huge segments of financially excluded and 
unbanked individuals, a small formal economy, and inadequate traceability infrastructure such 
as metered public utility systems. The argument presented is that by adopting CIS, regulators 
and bankers have sought to cast the problem of high interest rates and high indebtedness as a 
private rather than a public issue attracting regulatory action.  
 Section 3 has conceptualized the CIS infrastructure as a socio-technical assemblage (STA), and 
isolated the ideological origins of the discursive conception of credit risk, in three sources: 
neoclassical economics, legal formalism, and technological rationality. For example, the 
algorithmic construction of the creditworthy consumer mirrors the neoliberal entrepreneurial 
subject in neoclassical economics に the homo economicus に who is, by definition, able to 
provide for their own security and freedom in the face of an uncertain future through a whole 
host of rational and calculative practices and techniques designed to enable the seizing of 
opportunities. 
In addition, four related formal-liberal legal ideologies are also embedded within CIS 
technologies: the legally abstracted legal subject with rights and duties; individual liberty and 
freedoms; equal contractual bargaining power in the private sphere; and the moralisation and 
けWデｴｷaｷI;デｷﾗﾐげ ﾗa デｴW SWHデﾗヴく L;ゲデﾉ┞が CI“ WﾏHﾗSｷWゲ デ┘ﾗ ;ゲヮWIデゲ ﾗa デｴW ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ﾗa デWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ 
                                                          




rationality: technological determinism or autonomy; and efficiency-rationality of automated 
and statistical credit scoring and reporting techniques. Technological rationality has also co-
constituted and contributed to the ideological power of economic and legal ideas discussed 
above, in deepening power asymmetries within lending contracts, and reproducing high 
interest rates and high indebtedness.  
The discussion has developed the argument that these three ideologies have legitimated and 
performed liberalized interest rate markets, and regulatory neoliberalism. By analysing the 
ideological and performative impacts of these three ideational disciplines as calculative and 
valuation tools in credit risk management, the discussion has shown the tendency of CIS to 
sustain the power asymmetries between Kenyan lenders and borrowers, and also to sustain 
high interest rates, indebtedness, and ultimately, inequitable access to affordable credit.  
More fundamentally, the discussion demonstrates how the embedding of neoliberal hegemony 
in technological devices, and the deployment of these technological devices (such as CIS 
technologies) as not only market devices but also policy and regulatory tools, reproduces and 
sustains the inequitable liberalised credit markets, and, through its self-referencing logic, limits 
the crafting of other regulatory experiments to construct equitable and affordable credit 
markets. The discussion also demonstrates the potential for the spread of transnational 
neoliberal regulatory hegemony through technological transfer or diffusion from the global 





Conclusion: Implications of the Ideological and Performative Power of the Ideational 
Infrastructure of Financial Markets on Third World Contestation 
1. Research Questions and Theoretical Approach 
This thesis has examined the ideological and performative role of ideas and their related 
technologies and practices in the reproduction of transnational regulatory neoliberalism in the 
globalized financial markets and related transnational and national regulatory institutions, and 
specifically in Third World countries. The study was premised on the observation that Third 
World contestation of transnational financial regulatory neoliberalism has registered both 
progress and challenges, but regulatory neoliberalism and the globalization of financial markets 
grows more resilient, despite periodic setbacks. 
The main research question explored was as follows:  
How has the ideational infrastructure of global financial markets impacted on the 
regulatory reforms within the transnational and Third World financial regulatory 
orders? 
This research question has been explored through a series of related sub-questions addressed 
in the six chapters: 
1. Wｴ┞ ｴ;ゲ デｴW TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉSげゲ ｴｷゲデﾗヴｷI;ﾉ IﾗﾐデWゲデ;デｷﾗﾐ a;ｷﾉWS デﾗ ヴ;SｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ デヴ;ﾐsform the 
transnational financial regulatory order? 
2. To what extent can interdisciplinary ideology critique and performativity theory form 
theoretical assemblages within TWAIL praxis of resetting the international financial 
regulatory order to speak for Third World concerns? 
3. How has the ideological and performative power of economic, legal and technological 
ideas and related practices reproduced regulatory neoliberalism within the IMF and 
World Bank? 
4. How has the ideological and performative power of economic, legal and technological 





While noting the significance of other factors in the reproduction of transnational regulatory 
neoliberalism, the thesis identified and focused on the ideological and performative power of 
neoclassical economic theories, doctrines of legal formalism, technological ideas, artefacts, and 
their related practices, which form the ideational infrastructure of contemporary financial 
markets. The discussion examined how these ideas and related practices construct meaning, 
relationships and institutions, allocate identities, interests and capacities, define problems and 
their solutions, and enable and constrain action. These actions are realised through various 
ideological strategies, including universalization, reification, naturalization, rationalization, and 
narrativization. In addition, the regulatory role of ideas is enabled not only by their impact on 
human cognition, but also their performative effect, that is, where the ideas enact their 
respective claims into reality.  
The main argument explored in this study is that the ideational infrastructure of the financial 
markets legitimates, constitutes and performs neoliberal financial markets and regulatory 
neoliberalism, within the transnational and national financial regulatory institutions. This 
ideational infrastructure ideologically legitimates and performs regulatory neoliberalism as the 
only rational regulatory paradigm, while concealing its reproduction of inequality and power 
asymmetries. It also restricts the regulatory possibilities available to Third World policy makers 
and regulators for addressing the externalities of neoliberal financial markets, including, as 
explored in the Kenya case studies, high interest rates and high indebtedness. 
The breadth of the research questions necessitated an eclectic theoretical approach that drew 
from Critical Theory (including Critical Legal Studies, Critical Realism, and Critical Theory of 
Technology), Actor-Network Theory (ANT), and Economic Performativity Theory. This eclectic 
approach demonstrated the insights that traditional theoretical frameworks deployed in 
analysis and critique of transnational financial regulatory institutions from a Third World 
perspective, including Marxist Approaches to International Law (MAIL) and Third World 
Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), can levy from ANT and Performativity Theory. These 
insights include the agential, performative and regulatory role of ideas, discourses, texts, 
metrics, artefacts, and computing technologies within financial markets, and their role in 
making durable the power structures produced by legal and economic ideologies. 
The role of the ideational infrastructure of financial market in reproducing regulatory 
neoliberalism was explored not only across three disciplines に law, economics and technology 




KWﾐ┞;げゲ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ﾏ;kers, regulators and legislators. This analysis stressed the 
co-constitutive nature of economic, legal and technological ideas and practices, and the need 
for an integrated analytical approach in exploring the resilience of regulatory neoliberalism. 
2. Chapter Conclusions 
Cｴ;ヮデWヴ ヱ W┝;ﾏｷﾐWS デｴW TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉSげゲ ｴｷゲデﾗヴｷI;ﾉ IﾗﾐデWゲデ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デヴ;ﾐゲﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴ┞ 
hegemony, noting how transnational financial institutions, in turn, opposed, recapitulated to, 
or co-opted Third World demands in a manner that increased デｴW ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴゲげ ;┌デｴﾗヴｷデ┞ ;ﾐS 
jurisdiction, and in fact reproduced neoliberalism in the resisting countries. In addition, it also 
demonstrated how TWAIL had to change its theories, methodologies and practices, in response 
to the mutation and reinvention of hegemonic power, from military and economic power, to 
discourse and expertise, diffused private corporate law-making power, and material 
reorganization of the global financial markets.  
The discussion examined the re-emergence and resilience of transnational regulatory 
neoliberalism after successive revolutionary moments, including the 2008 financial crisis, 
noting that its reproduction was secured by, among other structural reasons, the durability of 
the neoliberal ideational infrastructure of the globalised financial markets. The ideological and 
performative power of this ideational infrastructure, which has extended into Third World 
WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷWゲが SWaｷﾐｷﾐｪ “デ;デWが H┌ヴW;┌Iヴ;デゲげが WﾉｷデWが ;ﾐS Iｷデｷ┣Wﾐゲげ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデゲ ;ﾐS ┘ﾗヴﾉS┗ｷW┘ゲが ｴ;ゲ 
SWaﾉ;デWS デｴWゲW Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴｷWゲげ ﾐ;デｷonal regulatory reforms, and their contestation of the 
transnational financial regulatory order.    
Against the backdrop of these findings, Chapter 2 proposed an eclectic theoretical framework 
that captures the ideological and performative nature and role of the multifaceted ideational 
infrastructure of financial markets in reproducing transnational and national regulatory 
neoliberalism. The facets examined included neoclassical economic theories, doctrines of legal 
formalism, technological ideas, and their related practices. To explore the co-constitutive 
ideological aspects of economics, law and technology, the discussion applied Critical Legal 
Theory, Critical Realism, and Critical Theory of Technology. These frameworks share certain 
arguments, including that the respective claims of law, economics and technology to neutrality, 
objectivity, rationality and autonomy, are mere ideological claims that conceal historical and 




claims restrict the imagination and operationalization of more equitable social and economic 
arrangements. 
However, noting that the power of ideas is not restricted to their ideological impact on 
cognition, the chapter also applied performativity theory, to demonstrate how economic, legal 
and technological ideas, practices and artefacts also contribute to realising the world they 
describe. This insight, emanating from the Actor-Network Theory school, augments Critical 
TｴWﾗヴ┞げゲ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞-critique, and challenges TWAIL practitioners to examine not only the power 
of expertise in shaping global economic, political and social life, but also how this ideational 
power is embedded in technologies that are diffused into quotidian life of Third World citizens. 
Another insight that Performativity Theory brings to TWAIL is the potential for harnessing the 
ideological and performative, yet indeterminate and contradictory nature of ideas 
underpinning hegemonic regulatory neoliberalism, in counter-hegemonic praxis. 
Chapter 3 applied the insights on the ideological and performative power of the ideational 
infrastructure of financial markets, in examining the role and functioning of BWIs, and their 
relationship to Third World countries. The discussion outlined the different types of power 
exercised in different stages of the life of the BWIs, including their establishment, 
operationalization, and expansion into the Third World. The discussion, while appreciating the 
significance of the structural power and influence of the US in structuring the BWIs and 
influencing its historical and current regulatory role, noted that the structuralist explanation of 
Western hegemony over-estimates structural power and under-estimates the power of the 
ideational infrastructure of financial markets.  
The discussion demonstrated how, over time, the expert neoclassical economic and rule of law 
theories on economic growth, development, and financial market deepening, have decoupled 
aヴﾗﾏ デｴWｷヴ ﾗヴｷｪｷﾐ;デﾗヴゲげ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデゲが ;ﾐS W┝WヴIｷゲWS ;ﾐ ｷﾐSWヮWﾐSWﾐデ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ ;ﾐS ヮWヴaﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗W 
power upon IMF and World Bank bureaucrats, and in their relations with Third World countries. 
In addition, the discussion also demonstrated how these neoliberal economic and legal 
rationalities have been embedded and made durable in various technologies circulated by 
BWIs, including algorithmic-driven macro-econometric models and the Debt Management and 
Financial Analysis System (DMFAS). The chapter concluded that BWIs should be conceptualized 
as neither benevolent development institutions nor inescapably exploitative mechanisms for 
global capitalism, but rather sites for active and continuous ideological and performative 




Chapter 4 shifted the site for the origination and application of expert ideas to the Third World, 
where it examined the manifestation of the ideological and performative power of neoclassical 
economic ideas in the deregulation and re-ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デWゲ ｷﾐ KWﾐ┞;げゲ Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾏWヴ 
lending market. The discussion demonstrated the role of neoclassical economic theories, 
including the McKinnon-Shaw Hypothesis and the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH), in 
ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ Iﾗﾏﾏｷデデｷﾐｪ KWﾐ┞;げゲ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ﾏ;ﾆWヴゲ ;ﾐS ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴゲ デﾗ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ヴ;デW 
liberalization, despite evidence of policy failure, and the rise of market lending rates. In 
addition, the discussion also demonstrated the performative power of macro-econometric 
models deployed by the CBK (with the guidance of the BWIs) in fixing the policy paradigms of 
all market actors, thereby establishing macroeconomic governability on the basis of 
deregulatory economic theories and policies.  
By reviewing the rhetoric of Parliamentarians, regulators and policy makers, economic experts 
and other stakeholders during the 20-year interest rate de-regulatory debate, the discussion 
;ﾉゲﾗ W┝;ﾏｷﾐWS ｴﾗ┘ ﾐWﾗIﾉ;ゲゲｷI;ﾉ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷIゲげ Iﾉ;ｷﾏ デﾗ ゲIｷWﾐデｷaｷIｷデ┞が ﾐeutrality, rationality and 
;┌デﾗﾐﾗﾏ┞が ┘;ゲ ┌ゲWS デﾗ SWヮﾗﾉｷデｷIｷ┣W デｴW ｷゲゲ┌W ﾗa H;ﾐﾆゲげ W┝ヮﾉﾗｷデ;デｷ┗W ﾉWﾐSｷﾐｪ ヴ;デWゲく WｴｷﾉW ﾐﾗデｷﾐｪ 
the potential for politicization and deconstruction of financial market liberalization theories, as 
was achieved by Kenyan Parliamentarians, the chapter concludes that these efforts are only 
sustainable if made durable. This durability necessitates establishing an economic paradigm 
that combines collective action with individual calculation and optimization; and building a 
sustainable reservoir of local development capital and weening the economy of dependence 
on transnational capital.         
Chapter 5 examined the second pillar of the ideational infrastructure for establishing and 
operationalizing liberalized financial markets in Kenya に the Rule of Law. It traced the post-
colonial legal transplantation of rule of law discourses from the UK and the US into Kenya, and 
their re-embedding under various BWI-sponsored law reform projects aimed at deepening the 
financial markets. The discussion examined how the ideological aspects of the rule of law, co-
constituted by the New Institutional Economics, were used by Kenyan regulators and banking 
sector to conceal the inherently inequitable, exploitative and asymmetrical nature of lending 
agreements in Kenya, and to deflect the blame for unconscionably high interest rates to the 
government.  
The chapter further examined the ideological and constitutive nature of four doctrines of the 




formal equality under the law. The deconstruction of the legal ideologies simultaneously 
demonstrated the constitutive power of law, which was conceptualised as legal performativity. 
The discussion demonstrated the role of rule of law doctrines in restricting how the problem 
of high interest rates is conceived by policy makers and regulators, and what regulatory options 
are available to them, while reproducing the inequalities and power asymmetries inherent in 
the liberalized lending market. The discussion concluded that the task of politicization and 
deconstruction of the ideology of the rule of law can be strategically used in the reconstruction 
of a just and equitable economy. 
Chapter 6 examined the third pillar of the ideational infrastructure of neoliberal financial 
markets in Kenya に financial technologies. It examines Credit Information Sharing (CIS) 
infrastructure as both a regulatory and private sector response to the problem of high interest 
rates in Kenya. The discussion conceptualized CIS infrastructure as a socio-technical 
assemblage (STA) of co-constitutive neoclassical economic theories of efficient markets, 
neoliberal rule of law theories of individual rights, duties and responsibilities, ideologies of 
technological autonomy and determinism, and also social market actors, including regulators, 
lenders, and consumers. The chapter demonstrated how this ideational infrastructure 
embodies both ideological and performative power, which acts upon regulators, lenders and 
borrowers, and conceives the issue of high interest rates as a private challenge to be met by 
responsible lending, rather than a public issue wrought by the nature of globalized 
financialization.  
It also demonstrated the performative power of CIS infrastructure, to the extent that credit 
scoring tends to lock in and enhance the privileges of credit consumers with positive credit 
scores, while worsening the position of those with negative scores. This performativity of credit 
scores lies in their concealing of identities of financial exclusion and structural causes of credit 
default, shaping life chances by fixing privileges and conditions of deprivation, and acting as 
self-fulfilling prophecies. The chapter argued that the discourse of risk as embedded in the 
scripting, design and algorithmic logic of CIS infrastructure reproduces regulatory neoliberalism 
;ﾐS デｴW ｷﾐWケ┌;ﾉｷデｷWゲ ;ﾐS ヮﾗ┘Wヴ ;ゲ┞ﾏﾏWデヴｷWゲ ｷﾐｴWヴWﾐデ ｷﾐ KWﾐ┞;げゲ ﾉWﾐSｷﾐｪ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデく TｴW SｷゲI┌ゲゲｷﾗﾐ 
concluded by calling for similar performative projects for the benefit of consumers, including 
ﾉWﾐSWヴゲげ ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ-sharing among consumers, the open-sourcing, nationalization, or public 





3. Key Findings 
The key finding of this thesis is the significance of the ideological and performative power of 
neoliberal economic, legal and technological ideas and practices underpinning the cognitive 
infrastructure of the financial markets, in the reproduction of regulatory neoliberalism in 
transnational and Third World financial regulatory institutions. This is articulated in four related 
insights.  
Transformation of Neoliberal Hegemony in Financial Markets 
First, since the initial contestation of the imperial and colonial project, the hegemonic liberal 
logic underpinning the relationship between the Third World, the developed economies, and 
International Law continues to react dynamically to resistance and contestation. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, it has metamorphosed and reinvented itself from brute force and coercive 
;┌デｴﾗヴｷデ┞が デﾗ SｷゲI┌ヴゲｷ┗W ;ﾐS ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ ヮﾗ┘Wヴく Tｴｷゲ ｴ;ゲ HWWﾐ SWﾏﾗﾐゲデヴ;デWS ｷﾐ デｴW BWIゲげ 
appropriation of the discourses of economic development, human rights, poverty, governance, 
and the rule of law. Neoliberal hegemony and its logic have diffused to unaccountable non-
State institutions such as transnational corporations (TNCs), academia and media, while 
assimilating Third World hegemonic elites, and incorporating new centres of accumulation, 
including technological systems and practices.898  
In addition, regulatory neoliberalism has also transformed from legal to material hegemony, 
where power has been redistributed through the material reorganization of the economy, as 
SWﾏﾗﾐゲデヴ;デWS H┞ デｴW aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ﾏ;ヴﾆWデゲげ IヴW;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ゲ┞ﾐデｴWデｷI aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ;ゲゲWデゲ デｴ;デ ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデゲ 
have been compelled to recognize, due to systemic risk concerns.899 As demonstrated in 
Chapters 4 and 6, power has also been redistributed through the diffusion of financial 
technologies and practices such as macro-econometric models and credit information sharing 
technologies, in which neoliberalism has been embedded.   
Agential Power of the Ideational Infrastructure of Financial Markets 
The second insight is the significant power of the ideational infrastructure underpinning the 
financial markets, which has been under-emphasized in contrast to the structural aspects of 
global hegemony, including the economic, military, and market power of the US and its 
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developed economy allies such as Britain, France, and Germany.900 As explored especially in 
Chapter 3, ideas and related practices underpinning financial market liberalization, including 
the Mckinnon-Shaw Hypothesis, and the New Institutional Economics theories, are over time 
SWIﾗ┌ヮﾉWS aヴﾗﾏ デｴWｷヴ ﾗヴｷｪｷﾐ;デﾗヴゲが ;ﾐS デｴW ﾗヴｷｪｷﾐ;デﾗヴゲげ ﾗHﾃWIデｷ┗Wゲ ;ﾐS ｷﾐデWヴWゲデゲく CﾗﾐゲWケ┌Wﾐデﾉ┞が 
デｴW┞ ;Iケ┌ｷヴW デｴW けヴWﾉ;デｷ┗Wﾉ┞-;┌デﾗﾐﾗﾏﾗ┌ゲげが ﾐW┌デヴ;ﾉ ;ﾐS ;ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ ﾐ;デ┌ヴW ﾗa W┝ヮWヴデｷゲW and 
technique, which is embedded in financial markets infrastructure, and acts upon transnational 
and national bureaucrats, thereby shaping how they conceptualize problems and the available 
solutions. The chapter 4 case study of the economization of the Kenyan interest rates market 
has also demonstr;デWS デｴW WﾏHWSSｷﾐｪ ﾗa BWIゲげ ﾐWﾗIﾉ;ゲゲｷI;ﾉ ﾏ;Iヴﾗ-econometric models into 
KWﾐ┞;ﾐ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;デﾗヴゲげ H┌ヴW;┌Iヴ;IｷWゲが デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ デｴW ﾉﾗ;ﾐ IﾗﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデｷWゲ ;ﾐS デWIｴﾐｷI;ﾉ 
assistance programs. Once embedded, they become relatively autonomous, as a result of 
ideological reification and naturalization. 
Co-constitutive Nature of Legal, Economic and Technological Ideas and Practices 
The third insight is the complex, co-constitutive, but not necessarily causal, relationships 
between legal formalism, neoclassical economic theories, technological ideas, and their related 
practices, which contribute to the resilience and durability of transnational regulatory 
neoliberalism. The chapter 5 case study on juridification of the Kenyan interest rates market 
has demonstrated the co-constitutive relationship between the Rule of Law and New 
Institutional Economics, in articulating the essentialism of the institution of private property in 
economic and financial market development. The chapter 6 case study on Credit Information 
Sharing technologies in Kenya has demonstrated the nature of these technologies as hybrid 
assemblages of co-constitutive legal, economic and technological ideas and practices. The 
inter-disciplinary nature of ideologies underpinning neoliberal regulatory discourse, their 
performation through practice, and further embedding in technologies and other materialities, 
reveals the need for the Third World to expand its focus in contesting legal norms, to include 
equally significant economic and technological ideas, practices, and artefacts.901 This insight is 
デｴWヴWaﾗヴW ｷﾏヮﾗヴデ;ﾐデ aﾗヴ TWAIL ヮヴ;IデｷデｷﾗﾐWヴゲげ a;ゲｴｷﾗﾐｷﾐｪ ﾗa ヴWﾉW┗;ﾐデ デﾗﾗﾉゲ aﾗヴ ヮヴ;┝ｷゲく   
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Emancipatory Potential of the Legitimating and Performative Power of Ideas and Practices 
The fourth insight is the conceptual indeterminacy, inconsistency, and contradiction at the 
heart of the legal, economic and technological ideologies. This finding is relevant to the debate 
among TWAIL practitioners, on whether they should resist and contest the neoliberal 
transnational financial regulatory order from outside, reform it from within, or merely contest 
the hegemonic ordering with the tools availed within the system. It supports immanent 
Iヴｷデｷケ┌Wげゲ I;ﾉﾉ デﾗ W┝ヮﾉﾗｷデ デｴW Iﾗﾐデヴ;SｷIデｷﾗﾐゲ ;ﾐS ｷﾐSWデWヴﾏｷﾐ;IｷWゲ ﾗa ﾉWｪ;ﾉ aﾗヴﾏ;ﾉｷゲﾏが ﾐWﾗIﾉ;ゲゲｷIal 
economics, and technological ideas and related practices, in conceptually reorienting them to 
speak for the concerns of the Third World peoples, as was attempted, for example, through the 
New International Economic Order (NIEO). This includes (as advocated by Eslava and Pahuja) 
Iｴ;ﾉﾉWﾐｪｷﾐｪ IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;┘げゲ E┌ヴﾗIWﾐデヴｷI ┌ﾐｷ┗Wヴゲ;ﾉｷデ┞ デﾗ ;ゲヮｷヴW aﾗヴ ; ﾐW┘ ┌ﾐｷ┗Wヴゲ;ﾉｷデ┞く This 
finding of conceptual indeterminacy is also relevant to the harnessing of the ideological and 
performative power of economic and technological ideas and practices towards designing 
alternative economic and technological organizations. As proposed in Chapter 6, this includes 
a radical democratization of public technological infrastructure, e.g. credit scoring and 
reporting technologies, through open sourcing.  
The thesis concludes that the present Third World efforts aimed at contesting the regulatory 
neoliberalism at the heart of the transnational financial regulatory order should also focus on 
the ideological and performative power of the ideational infrastructure of the global financial 
markets. In doing so, TWAIL practitioners should of necessity adopt an interdisciplinary 
approach in their reflection, conceptualization, articulation, dissemination and legal 
operationalization of an alternative international financial law praxis. 
4. Limitations of the Study Findings 
The thesis has attempted to articulate the power of neoliberal ideas underpinning the financial 
markets in reproducing transnational regulatory neoliberalism and defeating national financial 
reform projects in Third World countries. However, while the discussion has elicited useful 
insights, certain limitations should be taken note of. 
First, the study, by concentrating on the role of the neoliberal ideational infrastructure and 
related practices, has not explored equally significant and material Third World related factors 
that have also impeded their contestation of transnational financial regulatory order. These 




systemic State corruption, and unique historical, political and cultural contexts that undermine 
the undertaking of a Third World hegemonic project in transnational governance. This is 
evident, for example, in the geo-political challenges confronting the BRICS, as China strategizes 
to be the next economic super-power, while Russia, India, Brazil and South Africa seek a multi-
polar dispersal of power. Third World contestation of transnational regulatory neoliberalism, 
with the benefit of insights on the ideological and performative power of ideas and practices, 
will still be undermined by these other factors.   
Second, the methodology adopted for this study, due to resource and time constraints, has 
relied extensively on document analysis of primary and secondary sources. Due to the nature 
of the subject area に ideas and their cognition by market actors に face-to-face interviews would 
have elicited undoubtedly deeper insights into how Third World regulators and policy makers 
receive and conceive of various ideas, and rationalize their choice of certain neoliberal financial 
regulatory policies.  
Third, as stated in the introductory chapter, the choice of Kenya as a case study was informed 
by its embodying of many characteristics of post-colonial, emerging Third World economies 
under the programmatic management of BWIs, and also as an active member of the Third 
World bloc under the WTO that has contested its globalizing policies. Nevertheless, Kenya has 
distinct economic, political, cultural and historical characteristics that determine how its policy 
makers, regulators and market actors interact with the ideational infrastructure of financial 
markets. 
5. Recommendations for Further Research 
Based on the limitations of the thesis, outlined above, there is need for further research to 
deepen the inquiry on the role of ideas and related technologies and practices in reproducing 
regulatory neoliberalism and globalised financial markets in Third World countries. 
First, there is need for further conceptual articulation by TWAIL scholars of an interdisciplinary 
approach to the study of transnational financial ordering. There remains a lively debate 
between extreme ends of structuralist economic sociologists and Actor-Network theorists, on 
questions of agency. As TWAIL insists on being an assemblage of common sensibilities 
ヴWｪ;ヴSｷﾐｪ デｴW TｴｷヴS WﾗヴﾉSげゲ ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲｴｷヮ ┘ｷデｴ ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ﾉ;┘が ヴ;デｴWヴ デｴ;ﾐ ; ┌ﾐｷaｷWS 
theoretical and methodological framework, it remains open for experimentation with non-




Second, even without a common theoretical approach on the role of ideas and related 
technologies and practices in global ordering, TWAIL should intensify its focus into traditionally 
marginalized ;ヴW;ゲく D;┗ｷS KWﾐﾐWS┞が aﾗヴ W┝;ﾏヮﾉWが ;ヴｪ┌Wゲ aﾗヴ TWAILげゲ renewed focus on political 
economy questions, especially after the financial crisis. The ideological and performative role 
of mainstream economic theory should therefore get more focus in the study of International 
Law. In addition, while acknowledging the significant scholarly work that has already been 
accomplished in the field, TWAIL scholars should stand on the shoulders of these legacies, and 
intensifying their focus on the material embedding of International Law norms, especially in 
technologies. 
Third, as TWAIL II has previously demonstrated in distancing itself from Third World Statesげ 
parochial interests in contesting global hegemony, it should augment its critique of 
ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ﾉ;┘げゲ W┝ヮﾉﾗｷデ;デｷ┗W ﾐ;デ┌ヴW ┘ｷデｴ ;ﾐ Wケ┌;ﾉﾉ┞ (immanent) critical praxis of 
the Third World. This is because successful TWAIL praxis in establishing equitable economies 
and regulatory orders based on justice and equality at the international level should start from 
the Third World countries. Indeed, one of the insights from the critical political economy-Actor 
Network Theory assemblage is that the local has the potential for extending itself into a global, 
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